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MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND REGIONAL MONOPOLY: 
RAILWAYS AND THE PORT OF HULL, 1840-1922. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a case study of the Humber port of Kingston upon Hull over a period of 
some eighty years from 1840. It examines the growth of what was perceived by the 
civic and commercial bodies as a railký, ýay and dock monopoly, a monopoly 
considered prejudicial to the trade of Hull and advantageous to rival ports. The thesis 
focuses on the strategies employed by the civic and commercial bodies of the port to 
counteract and defeat the perceived monopoly. It then goes on to explore the 
evolution of relationships between the parties involved after competition had been 
established. 
The methodology is to analyse the motivations and tactics of all parties and 
demonstrate that although the overall strategies adopted were a failure in the eyes of 
the civic body they were ultimately of great benefit to the port. 
The existing historiography takes little account of the singular and robust civic 
involvement in railways and docks at Hull. Therefore no examination has been made 
of the consequences of the intervention of Hull Corporation and traders in railway 
and dock development at the port. which this thesis sets out to examine. 
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CHAPTER1. 
TRANSPORT, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT & MUNICIPAL 
POLITICS. 
1. Introduction. 
This thesis is a case study of the Humber port of Kingston upon Hull, at the time the 
third largest in England, over a period of some eighty years from 1840. It is 
concerned with the railways serving the port and the interactions between them and 
the bodies representing its civic and commercial interests. More particularly, it 
examines the growth of what was perceived by the civic and commercial bodies as a 
railway monopoly, inimical to the trade of Hull and to the advantage of rival ports, 
exercised by the North Eastern Railway Company (NER). The thesis focuses on the 
strategies employed by the Corporation and traders of Hull to counteract and defeat 
the perceived monopoly, largely by the promotion of an independent railway and 
dock. The key component of this strategy was what became the Hull Barnsley and 
West Riding Junction Railway and Dock Company (HBR), the study of which is 
central to this thesis. The justification for the study lies in the light it sheds on the 
effect of municipal politics on the close and interdependent relationships between the 
various modes of transport and systems of distribution in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, which are all too often treated in isolation. There is a paucity of 
academic literature concerning municipal policy regarding the railway-port interface. 
A rare exception is the case of Liverpool for which Jarvis has produced an analytical 
history that includes a chapter on the relationship between the port authority, The 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board. and the railway companies serving the port. He 
concludes that the dock authority accepted the usefulness of railways but feared and 
hated the railway companies. ' 
A. Jarvis, Lh, crpool Central Docks, 1799-1905-An Illustrated Hisiotý,, (Stroud, 1991), pp. 91-116. 
9 
Some caution must be exercised in drawing more general conclusions from 
this thesis. as the extent of the civic involvement in the de\ýelopment of the transport 
infrastructure of Hul I during the nineteenth century was a singular one, \N ith the r6le 
of Hull Corporation being pivotal. From the inception of the railway from Leeds to 
Selby, in 1836, Hull Corporation showed an inclination to give practical, political 
and, in a few cases, financial support to independent railway schemes, but its greater 
involvement did not come about until the proposal for the HBR in 1879. In order to 
counter the NER's perceived monopoly it obtained parliamentary powers to prevent 
the sale or leasing of the HBR, an independent company which it was instrumental in 
promoting. The singular circumstances of the railway and dock monopoly at Hull 
may be established when comparison is made with the ports of Liverpool and 
Southampton; the essential difference being the degree of involvement by the civic 
authorities. In Liverpool the London & North Western Railway (LNWR) enjoyed a 
strong competitive position similar to that of the NER at Hull, but this was more a 
case of railway monopoly being sustained by the absorption of competing 
companies, whereas at Hull the NER's strategy was to prevent access by other 
railway companies except by means of running powers granted by it. ' 
For fifteen years from the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway 
in 1830 that company, later absorbed into the LNWR, controlled all routes into 
Liverpool and strenuously opposed attempts by other companies to gain acceSS. 
3 The 
Manchester and Leeds Railway (MLR) [the Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway (LYR) 
from 1847] eventually gained access in 1845, followed in 1874 by the Cheshire 
2 J. R. Kellett, The Impact of RailwaYs on Victorian Cities, (London, 1969), p. 188. 
A. Vaughan, Railu, ay Politics and Money, (London, 1997), p. 134. Vaughan asserts that 'the NER 
was ... co-operative with other railways which wished to use 
its tracks. ' This is true but ignores the 
fact that, because of various agreements, running powers, particularly in the Hull area, were little 
used. 
3 J. Marshall, The Lancashire and Yorkshire Raihi, q, v, Fol. 1, (Newton Abbot, 1969), p. 128. 
J. Simmons & G. Biddle, (eds. ), The 0, ýford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997). 
p. 285. The LNWR acquired Garston Dock to the east of Liverpool in 1864 as a rival to the Mersey 
docks to ship timber and Lancashire coal to Ireland. 
10 
Lines Committee made up of the Great Northern Railway (GNR), 'vlanchester. 
Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway (MSLR) and Midland Railway (MR). ' 
Liverpool docks were initially constructed in 1715 as a civic enterprise. but 
because of dissatisfaction with the port's administration Corporation control was 
removed, and from 1857 the docks were administered by the Merseý Docks and 
Harbour Board, described by some historians as the strongest, and possibly most 
dynamic port administration in England. ' Prior to the formation of the Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Board the entire business of the port was the responsibility of the 
Trustees of the Liverpool Docks who were, in fact, the Borough Council using a 
different minute book. ' The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board consisted of 28 
7 members, of whom 24 were elected by the ratepayers. The generally held view of 
the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board as energetic and forward-looking has been 
disputed, although it has been conceded that the Port of London Authority, formed in 
1908, flattered Liverpool's administration by imitating it. ' 
At Southampton the docks were in the hands of a private company until 1892 
and the London and South Western Railway Company enjoyed a monopoly of access 
to the port for many years, defeating all attempts by other railway companies to gain 
entry. ' The Dock Company had neither the will nor the capital necessary to make 
essential improvements to the facilities and the railway company refused to become 
involved. However, the situation changed completely with the appointment of 
J. Simmons, The Railway in Town and Country 1830-1913, (Newton Abbot, 1986), pp. 208-209. 
Marshall, The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railwav, [, 'ol. 1, p. 129. 
5 S. Mountfield, Western Gateway -A History of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, (Liverpool, 
1965), pp. 1- 15. 
6 A. Jarvis. Personal communication. 
7 H. J. Dyos &. D. H Aldcroft, British Transport, (Leicester, 1971), p. 272. 
8 A. Jarvis, 'The Members of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board and Their Way of Doing 
Business', International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. 6, (June 1994), p 123. 
G. J. Milne, 'Port Politics: Interest, Faction and Port Management in Mid-Victorian Liverpool', in 
Harbours and Havens: EssaYs in Honour of Gordon Jackson, (St. Johns, Newfoundland, 1999). pp. 
35-62 
A. Bryant, Liquid History - Fýfiy Ycars qf The Port qf London Authorit. 1% (London, 1960), pp. 3 )9-64. 
9 H. P. White, 
.4 Regional History (? f the RailwaYs of Great Britain, Io/. 2, Southern England, 
(Newtoii Abbot, 1970), p. 135. 
Charles Scotter as general manager of the railway in 1885. " Scotter displayed a 
dynamism which had previously been lacking. The railway offered the dock 
company substantial loans for improvement and, in 1892, acquired the docks. 
initiating a comprehensive programme of investment which secured the future of the 
port. ' I 
The civic involvement in railways at Hull went further than at Liverpool or 
Southampton. The Corporation not only encouraged an independent railway and 
dock company at the port but also obtained Parliamentary powers to safeguard that 
independence. The existing historiography concerning Hull takes little account of the 
vigorous civic involvement in the railway situation during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. That existent concentrates upon the constructional, operational 
and economic aspects of the railways concerned. No examination has been made of 
the consequences of the intervention of Hull Corporation in railway development at 
the port, which this thesis sets out to examine. 
Probably the best academic overview of the situation at Hull is given by 
Simmons. He traces the growth of resentment against the NER at Hull and argues, as 
does this thesis, that the inadequacies of the port were in no small measure the fault 
of the Dock Company. He also notes the involvement of the Corporation in the 
establishment of the HBR and the more co-operative stance of the railway companies 
from the mid- I 890s, themes which are central to this thesis. But his review is concise 
and precludes the detailed analysis offered here. " 
The standard work on the NER, a major player in nineteenth century Hull, is 
Tomlinson's North Eastern Railway, published in 1914. This monumental tome 
charts the history of the NER in great detail. However, Tomlinson was a paid 
employee of the company who worked with its official blessing, and this may have 
10 J. Simmons, The Victorian Railway, (London, 1991), p. 264 
Simmons, The Railivay in Town and Country 1830-1913, p. 208. 
R. A. Williams, The London and South Western Railway, f'ol. 2, (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp. 134- 
148. 
White, A Regional Historv of the Railwavs of Great Britain, Vol. 2, pp. 136-138. 
C. H. Grinlin-, The Ways qf our RailwaYs, (London, 1911), pp. 285-290. 
Simmons, The Railway in Town and Country, 1830-1914. pp. 204-207. 
J. Simmons, The Railwqv in England and Wales 1830-1913, (Leicester, 1978), pp. 67 & 91. 
12 
affected his objectivity. Writing on the formation of the NER Tomlinson waxed 
euphoric over the new creation: -Stretching a well regulated monopoly through the 
rich mineral and agricultural part of England from which it derives its name, the 
North Eastern Railway. in 1854, presented one of the most remarkable examples of 
amalgamation. ' 13 He goes on to state 'The NER could certainly not be charged with 
indifference to the port [of Hull]. " 14 One of the purposes of this study is to assess the 
degree to which these claims can be substantiated. 
A more dispassionate view than that of Tomlinson is given in Brooke's 
doctoral thesis and subsequent article, which provide an analysis of the various 
agreements negotiated by the NER to safeguard its trading position, and the 
company's relationship with the port of Hull. However. the work ends at the crucial 
date of 1880, when the HBR obtained its Act. 15 The economic history of the NER is 
more generally examined in Irving's The North Eastern Railway Company 1870- 
1914. An Economic History. " This work, however, completely ignores the r6le of the 
Corporation of Hull and its relationship with the NER. 
By comparison the HBR is poorly represented by academic volumes. There 
are, however, works by lay historians that are of value. The Hull & Barnsley Railway 
appears in two volumes, the first being edited by K. Hoole and the second by B. 
Hinchliffe. " They concentrate mainly on the construction and operation of the 
railway although there is a short analysis of the relationship between the HBR and 
Hull Corporation. " They are compilations of work by various authors and 
consequently suffer from a lack of connectivity, engaging with matters of little 
13 W. W. Tomlinson, North Eastern Railwav, (Newton Abbot edition, 1967), p. 526. 
Tomlinson, North Eastern Raihi, qy, p. 6233. 
15 D. Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railway 1854-1880. A study in railway consolidation and 
competition', (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Leeds University, 1971). 
D. Brooke. 'The Struggle between Hull and the North Eastern Railway', Journal of Transport 
Hisloi-v, Vol. I. No. 4, (September 1972), pp. 220-237. 
16 R. J. Irving, The North Eastern Raihi, (, ý, Company 1870-1914 An economic history. (Leicester, 
1976). 
17 K. Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley Railway, Fol. 1, (Newton Abbot, 1972). 
B. Hinchliffe, (ed. ). The Hull & Barnsley Railway, 1ol. 2, (Sheffield, 1980). 
18 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull &- Barnslei- Railway, l'ol. 1, pp. 181-197. 
I-, 
interest to academic historians. They are, however useful for the chronological aspect 
of the thesis. Additionally, there are two small works kNhich consist mainly of 
descriptions of the line, locomotives and rolling stock. " 
Before proceeding to focus more closely on the singular transport situation in 
Hull it is appropriate to review transport systems and regional development in a 
broader context. This will serve to establish the more general relevance of what 
otherwise may appear to be no more than an isolated study of one urban area, its port 
and railways. 
2. Transport systems. 
There is some disagreement among historians concerning the wider significance of 
the period of increasing industrialisation commencing around the mid-eighteenth 
century and often known as the Industrial Revolution. " One school of thought sees it 
as a broad change in Britain's economy and society. The alternative view perceives a 
much narrower phenomenon, the result of technical change in only a few industries, 
particularly cotton and iron. Although the degree is still debated, it is generally 
agreed that the industrial revolution was dependent on innovation and investment in 
the transport infrastructure. " Until the arrival of railways in the 1830s the agencies of 
transport were the road system, inland waterways and coastal shipping. 
Roads had provided arteries of transport for centuries and, by 1820, turnpike 
trusts had achieved an aggregate improvement in the road system of England. 22 
,9G. D. Parkes, The Hull and Barnsley Railway, (Lingfield, 1946). 
M. Barker, 'The Hull and Barnsley Railway' in D. Goodman (ed. ), Aspects of Hull, (Barnsley, 
1999), pp. 99-112. 
20 P. Temin, 'Two views of the Industrial Revolution', The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 57, No. 
1, (March 1997), pp. 63-68. 
21H. J. Dyos & D. H. Aldcroft, British Transport, (Leicester, 1971), p. 18. 
22 R. Szostak, The Role of Transport in the Industrial Revolution, (Montreal, 199 1 )ý pp. 60-62. 
M. J. Freeman, 'Transport' in J. Langton & R. J. Morris, Atlas of Industrialising Britain 1780- 
1914, (London, 1966), p. 80. 
14 
Turnpike roads were established from Hull to York in 1764-5 and to Selby and the 
West Riding of Yorkshire, in 1793.23 
Inland navigation provided an increasingly important alternative to road 
transport. In 1699 the undertakers of the Aire and Calder Navigation (ACN), made 
up mainly of businessmen from Leeds and Wakefield, obtained an Act for the 
improvement of the rivers from the confluence of the Aire and the Ouse to Leeds and 
Wakefield. This initial improvement was completed in 1704. Transport by inland 
waterway had been important to the trade of Hull since its founding, but the 
movement of water-borne goods between the West Riding of Yorkshire and the port 
was greatly facilitated by river improvement. 24 
Coastal shipping was a very important mode during the period covered by 
this thesis. It was seen as an extension of the canal and river systems. " Cain notes 
that in the early 1870s, by which time the railway network was largely complete, it 
was estimated that three-fifths of all railway rates were influenced by sea 
competition. 26 Coastal shipping was a serious competitor to the railways until the 
Great War when, in addition to the depredations of German U-boats, the cost of 
marine transport rose sharply, whereas railway rates were held at lower levels as a 
27 result of government control of the railways. Armstrong argues that, in the United 
Kingdom, coastal shipping was crucial to industrial i sation, being prominent in the 
transport of corn and coal, especially the London coal trade. 28 Coastal shipping has, 
however, remained a Cinderella subject so far as most historians are concerned. 
2" J. E. Crowther, 'Turnpike Trusts' in S. Neave & S. Ellis (eds. ), A Historical Atlas of East 
Yorkshire, (Hull, 1996). p. 94. 
K. J. Allison, The East Riding of Yorkshire Landscape, (Howden, 1998), pp. 205-6. 
2, C. Hadfield, The Canals qf Yorkshire andNorth East England, (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 19. 
25 M. Freeman, 'The Industrial Revolution and the Regional Geography of England', Transactions of 
the Institute qf British Geographers, New series, Vol. 9, No. 4, (1984), p. 508. 
26 P. J. Cain, 'Railways and price discrimination in the case of agriculture', Business History, Vol. 18, 
No. 2, (July 1976), p. 2. (From the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Railway Companies' 
Amalgamations, 1872 XIII Pt. 1 [364] xxix-xx). 
7 The Times, 29'h December 1919. 
28 J. Armstrong & A. Kunz, (eds. ), Coastal Shipping and the European Economy I/ 50-1980, (Mainz, 
2002), pp. 11 -2 3. 
15 
There is here a parallel \vith transport of goods bý road . 
2' Armstrong argues that this 
is partly because the theoretical literature in economics and economic history has 
stressed overseas trade rather than internal trade as an instrument of grow-th. " 
An often-neglected aspect of coastal shipping. k-, -hich is particularly relevant 
to this study, is the contribution it made to port and harbour development. Baoxvell 
and Lyth point out that railways came to the fore at a time ývhen there was a need for 
larger ships with quicker turn round times, leading to deepening of docks and 
harbours and the installation of new infrastructure, particularly for handling coal .3' 
The coming of the railways, in the I 830s, facilitated trade for this traffic at ports such 
as those on the River Tyne and at Middlesbrough and Hartlepool. 32 
As I have implied, the UK transport infrastructure consisted of various modes 
brought together in a relationship of competition and co-operation. Armstrong notes 
that whereas it was once customary for scholars to adopt the Whig view of transport 
history as a process of continuous improvement, seeing each new mode as an 
improvement over those existing, it is now more widely accepted that faced with 
competition from new modes, older ones could survive in suitable niches. " 
Adaptation ensured that no mode was totally ousted. Rather there was collaboration. 
Road hauliers bought into canal companies, as later and for different and less 
constructive reasons did the railways. Railways bought into shipping businesses. The 
road carrier Pickford's and the ACN are examples of collaboration, diversification 
and technological innovation. -" Pickford's became a carrier for the railways and the 
ACN introduced container boats on its navigation . 
3' Each mode capitalised on its 
strengths in providing, as far as possible, the best and most economical service. 
29 T. Barker & D. Gerhold, The Rise and Rise of Road Transport 1700-1990, (London, 1993) p. 11. 
30 J. Armstrong, Coastal and Short Sea Shipping, (Cambridge, 1996), p. xi i. 
P. Bagwell & P. Lyth, Transport in Britain - From Canal Lock to Gridlock, (London, 2002), p. 3L 
32 D. Turnock, .4 t7 Historical Geography of RailwaYs in 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
(Aldershot, 1998), pp. 170-176. 
J. Armstrong, 'Transport History, 1945-95', Journal (? f Transport History, 3rd Series, Vol. 19, No. 
2, (September 1998), p. 114. 
G. Turnbull, 'The Railway Revolution and Carriers' response. ' Journal of Transport Histot-i% 2nd 
Series, Vol. 2, No. 1, (March 1969), p. 48. 
H. Crabtree, M. Clarke, (ed. ). Railway on the Water, (Goole, 1993), pp. 18-37. 
16 
However, *economy' and its concomitant, 'efficiency" could be defined in different 
ways by different interested parties. This thesis in part addresses hmN varioLls social 
groups in [lull understood terms such as these and how this helped to shape the wa, s 
in which different modes of transport related to each other. 
3. Transport and regional economy before the railway age. 
As this thesis is concerned with the regional development of the Yorkshire and 
Humber region, it is appropriate to consider the development of regional economies 
and, more particularly. the significance of their transport infrastructure. The 
development of Yorkshire as an industrial centre in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries was extremely important for the port of Hull, which was the main outlet in 
the east. " 
Although rivers and canals were instrumental in the growth of industry, 
regional canal systems were slow in developing and a national system took even 
longer. On a regional scale the industrial belt from Leeds and Bradford to 
Birmingham and the West Midland manufacturing towns was linked to the port of 
Hull by improved rivers and canals by 1704, and by 1790 the river basins of the 
Humber, Mersey, Severn, Thames and Trent were connected by canal systems; albeit 
in some cases circuitously. 37 
Hudson argues that the canal system furthered the development of regional 
economies until the mid-nineteenth century, and that these cohesive regional 
economies existed throughout much of the period of this study, influencing and being 
influenced by the growth of transport networks. The long-term consequence of the 
canal system was a significant increase in the scale and efficiency, if not the 
technology, of regional economic systems. " Turnbull contends that since water 
36 W. G. East, 'The Port of Hull during the Industrial Revolution', Economica, No. 32, (May 193) 
pp. 207-212. 
37 C. Hadfield, British Canals, (London, 1959), p. 80. 
G. W. Crompton, 'Canals and the Industrial Revolution', Journal of Transport History, 3 rd Series, 
Vol. 14, No. 2, (September 1993), pp. 93-110. 
P. Hudson, 'The Regional Perspective', in P. Hudson, (ed. ), Regions and Industries, (Cambridge. ltý - 
1989) pp. 15-3 8. 
17 
transport was no longer restricted to the coastal and riverine periphery. canals 
materially altered the geography of industrial gro\ý-th. ` Thus Mathias argues that 
transport systems assisted the development of industrial regions, stimulating the 
demand for the bricks, stone. timber and iron required for construction. The 
provision of transport facilities also generated purchasing power thrOLIgh the 
relatively high wages paid to the navvies involved in canal. and later rail\, ý-ay. 
construction. "' 
During the development of specialised regional industrial identities up to 
c. 1850 the Midlands became the province of metalwork and hardware trades. 
Lancashire became the almost exclusive producer of cotton and woollen textiles 
predominated in West Yorkshire, leading to a corresponding decline in the 
importance of East Anglia and the South West in this field. " The abundant water 
power and the lime-free character of the water supply and, at a later stage, the 
proximity of high quality coal deposits, were of salient importance in explaining the 
12 initial location and later persistence of the woollen industry in West Yorkshire. As a 
result of increasing industrialisation the West Yorkshire share of the UK woollen 
production rose from 20% to around 60% during the course of the eighteenth 
century. By 1830 there were 600 mills in West Yorkshire compared with 200 in 1800, 
and by 1851 most of these employed more than 200 persons and some more than 
1,000. " This was a formation of sectors of production on a scale never seen before, 
and was particularly relevant to the port of Hull which formed the outlet, not only for 
much of this woollen production, but also for cotton textiles from Lancashire; for 
despite Hull's aspirations to be a major coal port it is necessary to be realistic about 
its rriýjor exports. Coal, as a percentage of total exports between 1850 and 1900 was 
G. Turnbull, *Canals, Coal and Regional Growth during the Industrial Revolution', The Economic 
Hislor 
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42 F. J. Glover, *The Rise of the Heavy Woollen Trade of the West Riding of Yorkshire in the 
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D. T. Jenkins, The British Wool Textile 117dusti-i-, (London 1982). pp. 80-89. 
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2.7%, whereas during the same period cotton goods formed 17.3% of exports, and 
woollen goods from the West Riding of Yorkshire amounted to 7.5%. " In the same 
period there were imports of woollen rags rising from 13,000 lbs. (5,910kg. ) in 1860 Z:! 
to 45,480 lbs. (20,673 kg. ) in 1901. " 
Jackson suggests that a factor influencing regional development in Britain 
was oceanic commerce, which was reflected in the development of provincial ports 
and an increase in their relative importance. London had always been the major port 
of England, retaining the East India Company monopoly of Indian trade until 1813 
and of Chinese trade until 1833. From the latter date geographical advantage enabled 
Bristol and Liverpool to capture an increasing amount of transatlantic trade, 
Liverpool being the port for the Lancashire cotton industry. In the case of Bristol 
expansion was based very much on the extremely lucrative slave trade. " Hull's 
development, as a port for cotton and woollen goods, was therefore, part of a more 
general trend. 
A further impetus to regional economic growth was capital invested by 
landowners in the improvement of inland transport systems, especially where coal or 
other mineral deposits occurred on their estates. Channon has recently made a strong 
case for saying that such figures were a majority. " Nevertheless there were some 
conservative landowners who opposed transport developments that they perceived to 
be detrimental to their amenity. " Such landowners often held out for large amounts 
of compensation for such loss, thus delaying and increasing the cost of railways. This 
occurred in the case of the first railway to Hull, a reason why a comparatively short 
line over easy country took four years to complete, as will be discussed in chapter 2. 
44 J. M. Bellamy, The Trade and Shipping of Nineteenth Century Hull, (Hull, 1971), p. 64. 
45 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping statistics, 1907. 
46 G. Jackson, 'Sea Trade' in J. Langton & R. J. Morris, 4tlas ofIndustrialising Britain 1780-191-1, 
(London, 1986), p. 96. 
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The development of transport infrastructure facilitated the movement of raw 
materials and products as the economy moved from an agrarian to an industrial basis. 
The improved transport system lent itself to greater efficiency. particularly in the 
movement of bulk inorganic materials. Wrigley notes that whereas production of 
organic materials is areal, the movement of minerals and products is punctiform. The 
transport problems involved in moving a million tons of coal from pit-heads 
scattered over an area of a few square miles are quite different form those involved in 
moving the same weight of grain or timber from an area of several thousand square 
miles. The former implies heavy tonnage along a small route mileage. whereas the 
latter implies the reverse. " The canals facilitated the transport revolution, but it was 
the railways which developed it to its full potential in the nineteenth century. 
However, before discussing in detail, the effects of the railways it is appropriate to 
consider the background to and the r6le of ports and, in particular, that of Hull. 
4. Ports with particular reference to the port of Hull. 
The transport system of the 18 th and I 9th centuries developed in a piecemeal manner 
and the development of ports was almost entirely a result of the interplay between 
commercial and political forces at regional or local level. The port of Hull is an 
example of this manner of development, the question of which agency was to control 
and improve the docks at Hull being central to this thesis. 
Unlike continental ports, which often necessitate long hauls from the 
hinterland, the British Isles are fortunate in that there is no place more than 90 miles 
( 145 km) from any port. " Although the idea of discrete areas, from which the traffic 
is derived according to some demonstrable principle, has an attractive simplicity, 
Sargent argued that this is unlikely to correspond with reality. Indeed, West and 
49 E. A. Wrigley, 'The Supply of Raw Materials in the Industrial Revolution. ' in J. Hoppit & E. A. 
Wrigley. (eds. ), The Industrial Revolution in Britain, 11, (Oxford, 1994), p. 93. 
50 L. C. A. Knowles, The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain during the 
I Nineteenth Centurý,. (London, 1941), p. 258. 
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South Yorkshire and the North Midlands exemplify this. each with traffic flo"s to 
and from ports as far distant as London. Newcastle. Liverpool and Hull. " 
The proximity of ports to industrial facilities was particularl\ advantageous to 
trade in the pre-canal era as, despite improvements made by turnpike trusts. haulage 
was difficult due to the poor condition of the road system. As I have already noted 
the building of canals in the eighteenth century, in conjunction with improvements to 
complementary river systems. facilitated transport of bulk goods to the portS. 52 There 
was thus a close association between canals and ports of which Hull is a good 
illustration. It has been suggested that before the coming of the rail'ývays Hull's 
communications with its hinterland were almost entirely by water transport, although 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis we will see an example of a road carrier switching to rail 
transport. " 
Ports developed slowly until the arrival of railways, whose coming coincided 
with technical advances in the design of ships in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
The average tonnage of merchant vessels increased only from 800 to 1,000 in the 100 
years to 1830, propulsion being by sail. The almost threefold increase in port tonnage 
up to 1830 came from a growth in the numbers of ships rather than their increased 
5'A. J. Sargent, Seaports and Hinterlands (London, 193 8), pp. 4-15. 
B. Slack, 'Terminals and Location', Transport Geography on the Web, (January 2005), 
(, rd [http: //people. hofstra. edu/geotrans/index. htmi] -) 
August 2005). In recent years the validity of the 
hinterland concept has been questioned, especially in the context of contemporary containerisation. 
The mobility provided by the container has greatly facilitated market penetration, so that many 
ports now compete over the same market areas for business. The notion of discrete hinterlands with 
well-defined boundaries is therefore questionable. Nevertheless, the concept is still widely 
employed, and port authorities continue to emphasise their ports' centrality to hinterland areas in 
their promotional literature. 
52 Hadfield, The Canals (? f Yorkshire and North East England, pp. 17-43. 
B. F. Duckham, The )orkshire Ouse, (Newton Abbot, 1967), pp. 59-85. 
53 G. Jackson, 'Port Building on the Humber, c. 1770-1850: A Survey of Local Motivation', Bulletin 
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capacity. " This led to an increase in the water area upon which ships needed to ride 
whilst being loaded and unloaded. a laborious process at the time. " 
When steam-propelled iron ships came into use from the 1830s their size and 
draught increased and, in the case of river ports. it was necessary to make and 
maintain a deep channel for access. " This eventually limited the size of ships at ports 
situated further up-river as the costs of river improvement and conservation became 
prohibitive. Consequently, ports such as Chester. Lincoln. Norwich and York became 
decreasingly important. " Additionally, a greater area was required for warehouses to 
cope witli the storage of goods for transhipment. Before the eighteenth century most 
ports functioned by means of harbours or piers. Many natural harbours had been 
improved but a major step forward in port development was the wet dock, introduced 
at Liverpool in 1715, Bristol in 1765, and Hull in 1778.58 
Jackson argues that while established ports such as Bristol, Hull, Liverpool 
and London expanded their traditional r6le, they did not to any great extent impinge 
on the commercial and industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries-, the great impetus to expansion occurring after 1840 with the arrival of 
railways and increasing numbers of steam vessels. This development was not solely 
confined to existing ports. New ports such as Cardiff, Hartlepool and Seaham were 
developed for the coal trade. As well as railway involvement a major factor was 
demand from steam shipping for bunker coal. The ports which enjoyed the greatest 
success were coal ports, as steamships were reluctant to use those at which coal was 
unavailable. " 
The period after 1840 saw a great increase in port facilities and changes in 
port administration nationally. The development of administration took three main 
paths. Firstly there was a move from private to municipal control of dock facilities, 
such as occurred on the Tyne, and much later in London, secondly, towards the 
5' G. Jackson 'The Ports' in M. J. Freeman & D. H. Aldcroft, (eds. ), Transport in Fictorian Britain, 
(Manchester, 1988). p. 218. 
55 Dyos & Aldcroft, British Transport, p. 54. 
56 F. W. Morgan, Ports and Harbours, (London, 1958). pp 14-16. 
57 A. H. J. Brown, Port Economics, (London, 1953), p. 48. 
58 L. F. Vernon-Harcourt. Harbours and Docks, (London, 1885). pp. 381-39-3). 
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middle of the century, there was a trend to the establishment of trusts in place of ciN ic 
authorities to take control of docks, examples of which occurred at Liverpool and 
Glasgow. thirdly. railway companies sought port facilities and entered into the dock 
business, examples being Hull and Southampton. " 
This not only facilitated railways' involvement in foreign trade. particularly 
in the passenger business, but also placed them in both competition and co-operation 
ýý'ith coastal shipping. leading to an expansion in the facilities of existing ports and 
the development of new ones. allowing railways to provide speedN. and convenient 
access to and from the hinterland. Liverpool, whose trade gre\ý bý, 20% between 
1850 and 1914 and Cardiff, which had the third largest export tonnage by 1914. are 
examples of two such ports. " Railways needed large areas of land at such 
interchanges as a result of the increase of steam navigation and the size of ships. " 
The railway companies were far from being in complete control of the 
development of ports and dock facilities quite apart from the fact that they owned 
only a minority. They, along with other dock authorities, had to contend with the 
power of the shipping lines. Indeed, Bird asserts that the struggle of ports to keep up 
with the increasing size of ships gave rise to a master and servant relationship 
between ship owners and the providers of dock facilities, driven by the shipping 
companies. " The effects of the breakdown of this relationship and its deleterious 
effect on a port will be illustrated in this thesis by the conduct of the Hull Dock 
Company in the nineteenth century, when it ignored the need to accommodate larger 
vessels and suffered from competition in its hinterland which overlapped that of the 
ports of Hartlepool, Grimsby and Liverpool. 
Hull has been a recognised port since the 14 th century. 64 For most of the time, 
61 it was the third port in England after London and Liverpool. In 1369 one of the 
60 G. Jackson, 'The Shipping Industry', in M. J. Freeman & D. H. Aldcroft, (eds. ), Transport in 
17ctorian Britain. p. 268. 
61 1. Friel, I larilime Hislori, o .f 
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most prominent maritime institutions of Hull was founded. This was a fratemm 
called the Guild of the Holy Trinity, ý, vhich was to be influential in the provision of 
dock facilities at Hull. " Hull's only sheltered landing place up to the late eighteenth 
century was the old harbour. a natural haven at the mouth of the River Hull. The port 
was unique in Britain in not having a legal quay where goods could be checked and 
duty assessed by the port's customs officers. This resulted in considerable evasion of 
duty and loss of revenue by the government, together with increasing hindrance to 
trade caused by growing congestion in the harbour area. " As a result of loss of 
revenue the Custom House in Hull was informed, in 1772, that unless the town 
would co-operate with the Board of Customs, by establishing a legal quay, 
accommodation would be found elsewhere on the Humber. " Along with this threat 
the Board of Customs offered a cash subsidy of f15,00O. " This carrot and stick 
approach produced action. The merchants, together with the Trinity House Brethren 
and the Corporation, formed the Hull Dock Company in 1773 for the purpose of 
W. R. Childs, 'Concentration, Dependence and Maritime Activity at the Regional and Community 
Levels: The Case of Hull, Scarborough and their Yorkshire Hinterlands' in D. J. Starkey & M. 
Hahn-Pedersen, (eds. ), Concentration, Dependence and the R61e qf Maritime Activity in North Sea 
Communities, 1299-1999, (Esbjerg, 1999), pp. II- 16. 
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making a new dock off the River Hull. An Act of Parliament in 1774 authorised the 
dock, which was opened on 22)'d September 1778.70 
Under the Act that established it the Dock Company received certain rights. 
The main privilege was to levy tonnage rates, varying according to the voyage. on all 
vessels entering the harbour or docks or loading or unloading cargo in any part of 
Hull, whether using the company's docks or not. Ho%kýevcr, coasters to or from places 
on the Trent or Ouse, which did not use the docks, were exempt from these charges. 
The Dock Company had the right to levy inward wharfage dues on all goods landed 
or discharged on the quays of the company. It also claimed the right to levy outward 
wharfage dues on all goods shipped from its quays .7' These privileges gave the Hull 
Dock Company a virtual monopoly of the dock business. The traders of the port 
contended that there was a corresponding obligation to meet the growing needs of the 
port for increased dock accommodation. This issue was to become a constant source 
of friction between the Dock Company and the commercial interests of the port. 72 
During the period from the opening of the first dock in 1778 until 1828 the Dock 
Company levied both inward and outward wharfage on goods which passed across 
its quays. In 1828 the claim of the company to levy outward wharfage was disputed 
in the Queen's Bench Division, where the judge ruled that the claim was not justified 
by the company's Act. No further outward wharfage was charged until 1844. " 
The entrance to the original dock was inconvenient because of the crowded 
condition of the River Hull, and an additional dock was opened in 1809.71 It 
communicated directly with the Humber and was called Humber Dock. The earlier 
dock, which had previously been known only as 'the dock', now became Old Dock. 
70 City Archives, Hull, A 12, Hull Dock Act, 1774. 
Figure 26. Town Docks, Hull. 
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The wharfage rates established under the first Dock Act were extended to Humber 
Dock. " An increase in trade in the 1820s and 1830s led to controvers\ between the 
Dock Company and the users of the port despite a further dock called Junction Dock. 
leading off Humber Dock and connecting with Old Dock, being added to the system 
in 1829. " The port was con ested and the entrance lock gates were not wide enough 9 4: 1 
for the larger vessels now Nvishing to use the port. 77 Town centre docks, such as those 
at Hull were becoming obsolete. The impending entry of railways into docks by way 
of town streets was unsatisfactory. 7' The Dock Company offered to sell the docks to 
the town and although the Corporation agreed to the conditions, the local press and 
the public were hostile to the proposal . 
79 This was the first attempt to form a Dock 
Trust and it failed as the townspeople of Hull. unlike those of Liverpool. were not 
prepared to shoulder the financial burden of purchasing and then improving the dock 
accommodation. " 
Dissatisfaction among the mercantile community with the facilities offered by 
the Dock Company led to a proposal for an independent dock promoted by local 
businessmen " There was suspicion that it was a ploy to galvanise the Dock 
Company into action, rather than a bona. fide proposal. 82 It succeeded, initially at 
least. Alarmed by this threat to its monopoly the Dock Company proposed the 
building of another dock on the same site as the earlier scheme. The proposals were 
presented to Parliament in 1840 . 
8' Despite the obvious and urgent need for additional 
75 Bellamy, The Trade & Shipping (? f Nineteenth Centuty Hull, p. 10. 
76 City Archives, Hull, TLP 3 1, Board of Trade Report, 15'h February 186 1. 
77 Hull A dvertiser, I 9th March 1836. 
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79 Hull, 4dvertiser, Editorial 31" March 1837 & 24 th November 1837. 
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City Archives, Hull. CQP4, Bill for the construction of a dock east of the Citadel. 
g, City Archives, Hull, DPD/I 2/1/34, Queen's Dock Company Prospectus, 1P November 1838. 
Much of the dock was to be built on land owned by Robert Raikes, a banker of Hull who was one 
of the prornoters of the scheme. Raikes was the owner of the land near Hessle, the negotiations over 
the purchase of which held up the construction of the Hull and Selby railway. (see chapter 2) 
83 Clity Archives, Hull, TLP 2, Bill for providing a dock and other works connected therewith, in 
addition to the docks already established at the port of Kingston upon Hull, and for amending the 
Acts relating to such last-i-nentioned docks. (1840) 
" 
dock accommodation, and e\, idence to the Commons Committee that the imminent 
coming of the railway would increase this, the Hull Dock Compan\ objected to 
amendments made to the Bill by Parliamentary Committees and , ýithdre\ý it in June 
1840 . 
84 The dock system at Hull, at the time of the coming of the railway in 1840, 
comprised three small docks: Humber Dock. Junction Dock and Old Dock together 
with the Old Harbour in the River Hull. The need for additional accommodation was 
obvious to all except the Hull Dock Company. 
The case of the Hull Dock Company illustrates Jackson's assertion of three 
key factors concerning the development of ports in the nineteenth century*, the 
continued rise in aggregate tonnage, the evolution of steamships, and the growth of 
coal exports. " The Hull Dock Company consistently failed to address all these 
issues. a result being that until 1885, with the opening of the Alexandra Dock of the 
HBR, Hull was not only overcrowded and inefficient, but lacked a deep-water dock 
and modem coal-handling appliances. By way of contrast up-river from Hull, in 
1828, the ACN had opened its port of Goole, whose well-designed dock system 
allowed rapid transfer of cargo between barges and ships. " Hull could not match the 
efficient working of Goole, but its one great advantage was that vessels of deep 
draught were unable to navigate as far up-river as Goole. " 
The frustration felt in Hull was intensified by the presence on the other side 
of the Humber, at Grimsby, of a port which enjoyed the whole-hearted support of the 
MSLR, which owned the docks and was ready to make large investments in them. " 
The case of Grimsby illustrates Turnock's argument that a critical factor affecting 
dock development was capital for improvement. Railways, to be considered in the 
next section, became a crucial factor in the provision of capital and the expansion of 
84 Sheahan, Histoi-v qf Kingston upon Hull, p. 292. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 2, East Dock Parliamentary proceedings. Thomas Ward, a ship-owner, 
appearing before the Commons Committee on 15 th June 1840 acknowledged that the railway from zzý 
Selby, to be opened on I st July, would demonstrate an acute need for increased dock facilities at 
Hull. 
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transport facilities at the ports they owned, and the links they provided with the 
expanding hinterlands, in terms of capacity and speed of service. "' 
5. Railways and economic development. 
Until the 1960s historians agreed that railways were crucial to the British economy in 
the nineteenth century. But in 1964 Fogel's analysis of the American railroad system 
suggested that that railroads were less important in American economic growth than 
had been supposed, and in 1970 Hawke came to a similar conclusion in respect of the 
railways of Britain. 9' His findings were that railways saved between 7% and I I% of 
UK national income in 1865, a figure somewhat lower than many had assumed. 9' The 
debate over the empirical adequacy of this work has continued for more than three 
decades. Foreman-Peck investigated this question from an alternative viewpoint by 
posing the question: 'How much lower would the British national income have been 
without improvements in railway productivity? ' His conclusions were that railways, 
in round terms, were as important to the British economy as contemporaries thought, 
thus vindicating their supposed contribution to economic growth, a view which still 
tends to be supported by most historians. 9' 
But a degree of controversy still attaches to the question of how the economic 
benefit was distributed. At one time historians emphasised the integrated effect of 
railways on the national economy. Over twenty years ago Freeman argued that the 
Victorian economy was fragmented and regionalised, and that railways did not 
necessarily increase national economic integration, pointing out that although they 
did introduce long-distance traffic flows, in aggregate the balance was on short-haul 
89 Tumock, An Historical Geography qf Railways in Great Britain and Northern 1reland, p. 169. 
90 W. R. Fogel, Railroads andAmerican Economic- Growth, (Baltimore, 1964). 
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regional traffic, at least until well past the mid-century. " More recently Turnock has 
agreed, suggesting that the railways often bolstered economic interests at regional 
and local levels. He cites the promotion of the HBR as an example of hoN\. as late as 
the 1880s. local interests sought to strengthen their position. " 
Contrary to what may have been expected the immediate impact of railxvays 
was on passenger, rather than freight transport. 9' In the first yCar of operation of the 
Liverpool & Manchester Railway after its opening in 1830 the revenue derived from 
passengers was twice that from the transport of goods. 9' The reasons for the delay in 
the development of goods traffic were the relative cheapness of transport by inland 
waterway and the fact that the transport and distribution infrastructure of many 
companies was adapted to waterways. This was particularly so in the Midlands and 
Yorkshire. where extensive canal networks existed, and there was a reluctance to 
abandon the existing infrastructure. Pickford's, for example, had invested much 
capital in canals. 9' As has already been noted, Hull benefited from waterway 
improvements carried out by the ACN. 
Another factor was that the great majority of the railway companies of the 
1830s were small concerns operating fewer than fifty miles of line. " The use of 
railways for bulk commodity export was most appropriate in North-east England 
where, for topographical reasons, canal connections did not exist but waggonways 
did. This topography gave the river ports of the region an advantage in the 
transhipment of coal traffic, as the steep banks of the River Tyne allowed the easy 
93 M. J. Freeman, 'Introduction'. in M. J. Freeman & D. H. Aldcroft, (eds. ), Transport in Fictorian 
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discharge of coal into river craft using gravity alone". This issue was eN entuallýý 
addressed at ports such as Hull, which did not enjoy such advantage, by the use of 
sophisticated coal handling appliances. "' 
Apart from competition from waterway carriers. freight traffic on the 
railways grew slowly because of problems associated xvith the management of such 
traffic by rail. To gain passengers was easy by comparison. They merely presented 
themselves for transport in accordance with a timetable and if the transport ý\-Cre 
rapid. efficient and affordable they returned for more. Freight transport, ho\\-ever. 
required a network of contacts and knowledge of the traffic needs of the various 
trades in any particular area. This specialised knowledge took time to acquire. 
Railways were up against existing networks established earlier by other carriers and 
were too autonomous to appreciate the necessity of working co-operatively to build 
up such networks for themselves. "' Furthermore. because of the regionally integrated 
transport system that already existed, railways found it necessary to impose self- 
restraint in the structure of their freight rates to encourage the trade of the regions 
they served. "' Hawke supports such views, arguing that that the reduction in freight 
transport charges due to the railways was very small in the 1840s but began to 
increase rapidly thereafter. "' 
However, it was not until 1852 that receipts from goods traffic exceeded 
those from passengers and, at about the same time. the volume of traffic carried by 
rail exceeded that carried by waterways. "' One section of the market where railways 
had a dramatic effect was on the cost of domestic coal. For almost 250 years the coal 
cartel of northern England had held a monopoly of both production and the export 
market in London and at other coastal ports. The opening up of new mining districts 
by the railways and the transport of coal to London by rail was a major factor in the 
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breaking up of the cartel in 1844. "' In 1851 Francis ý, ýrote: 'An inestimable blessillu, 
which the country owes to the rail is the reduction in the price of coal: the cost of 
%vhich is one third less, o-vving to the monopoly of the coal-owners being broken. "" 
Some forty years later the HBR would be formed to break a monopoly in the 
carrying of coal to the port of Hull, an occasion that marked the start of its r6le as a 
major coal port. 
6. The relationship between railways, traders and the state. 
It is appropriate at this point to set the perceived monopoly at Hull in the context of 
the wider debate on railway monopoly and the railway companies' alleged abuse of 
their monopolistic powers. It is therefore necessary to consider the factors leading to 
constraints being placed on railway charges by Parliament. 
The British government took virtually no part in the planning of a national 
railway system unlike other European governments such as France. Gen-nany and 
Belgium, which determined the routes for new railways and, in some cases, paid for 
them. Foreman-Peck asserts that the British free enterprise system led to increased 
capital costs. "' More recently Casson has argued that it led to major inefficiency in 
both the configuration and operation of the railway network. "' British commercial 
interests were strong and were able to treat on equal tenns with the government. "' 
Although there was a growing and widespread perception among traders that 
railways were monopolies in need of regulation the government of 1830-1859 took 
no action. '" In some regions the railways' tactics included buying up canal 
companies. As this thesis suggests, the development of perceived monopolies, such 
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as those at Hull by the privately owned Dock Company and the NER %\ere, in part, a 
consequence of such factors. 
Although the early days of railway promotion were characterised h\ the 
formation of a multiplicity of small companies, from the mid-1840s onwards 
economies of scale dictated that small undertakings amalgamated or were absorbed 
by larger companies. Several of the companies relevant to this studN were formed in 
this period. The LYR was forined in 1847 from the MLR and the 'ýVakefield, 
Pontefract and Goole Railway. The MSLR, (The Great Central Railway [GCR] from 
1897) was also formed in 1847 and arose from the amalgamation of the Sheffield, 
Ashton-under-Lyne and Manchester Railway with three other railways and the 
Grimsby Docks Company. ''' A key participant in this study, the NER. was formed 
from an amalgamation of the York, Newcastle & Berwick, the York & North 
Midland (YNMR). the Leeds Northern and the Malton & Driffield Junction Railways 
in 1854. ' 12 But parliamentary opinion on railway amalgamations was ambivalent. In 
1844 a Select Committee acknowledged the benefits of amalgamation but by 1853 
the reverse was the case although in 1872 the view was once more generally in 
favour of amalgamation. "' In the early 1900s Parliament was once more against 
amalgamations, a situation which will be explored in more detail in chapter 9. 
The railway companies' increasing size and bureaucracy, together with their 
attempts to gain control of competing modes, such as canals, meant that the railways' 
customers increasingly saw them as monopolistic. "' The companies countered this 
by insisting that amalgamation reduced duplication of resources leading to 
improvements in efficiency and, in 1881, managed to convince a Parliamentary 
Select Committee of this. "' Until 1894, when legislation effectively prevented them, 
11, G. Dow, Great Central, I'ol. 2, (London, 1962), p. 22 1. 
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railways were in a position to practise price discrimination. a positive aspect of 
which was that suppliers could reach markets from which they would otherwise be 
excluded. '" 
From the mid-1830s onwards traders gradually became organised at a local 
level into Chambers of Commerce and grew increasingly alarmed at the percei\ ed 
monopolistic behaviour of railway companies. They clashed in Parliament with the 
railway interest. represented by raiNN-ay company chairmen and those with large 
shareholdings, who had a very strong representation. The Hull Chamber of 
Commerce, founded in 1837, was particularly vocal on the subject of rates in general 
and the perceived NER monopoly in particular. 117 As prices fell generally in the 
I 870s railway rates did not, and this cost started to eat into profit margins. Kostal 
argues that until the I 860s the judiciary entertained a deep-seated suspicion of large 
corporations and as a result their decisions served to sustain a chaotic and inefficient 
market served by relatively small railways, which continued to exist because the 
courts insisted on preserving the status quo. Partly as a result of this railways were 
themselves facing higher costs. and in the 1870s, they increased charges for 'terminal 
expenses' causing further discontent. Although maximum charges for conveyance 
were prescribed in the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854 railways could charge 
what they liked for these so-called terminal services. 118 
116 W. W. Sharkey. The Themy qf Natural Monopoly, (Cambridge, 1982), p. 14. Sharkey quotes an 
assertion made by Jules DLIPUit in 1844 that a monopolist who is able to price discriminate is often 
led to choose a pricing structure that maximises social welfare. This was how the NER chose to 
portray itself 
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most complete monopoly in the United Kingdom, from the Tyne to the Humber, with one local 
exception, it has the country to itself, and it has the lowest fares and the highest dividend of any 
lar-e English railwaN, '. 
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Ten-ninal charges ý\ ere rendered for services at either end of the journey. such as loading. 
unloading and use of stations and equipment. Although rail\Naý companies tried to secure 
continued 
Complaints from traders continued and as a result Select Committees were 
appointed in 1881 and 1882 to examine the system of rail, ýý-ay charging. They were. 
unable to come to any decisions regarding uniform charges. "' The traders x\ere. 
however, at a disadvantage compared to the railway companies in that they did not 
present a united front. Whereas railway companies often quarrelled amongst 
themselves they stood together on the question of rates. Traders did not. It was in the 
interests of the large trader to obtain discounts for large quantities but this 
disadvantaged the small trader. Likewise it was to the benefit of the trader who sent 
his goods a long distance to receive a lower differential rate while the local trader. 
paying a higher rate. looked upon this as unfair. 12' An exhaustive enquiry into railway 
charges began in 1884, which led to the Board of Trade being ordered to investigate 
the companies' systems of rates. Companies were required to submit a classification 
of charges for freight traffic. This caused no great difficulty as the Railway Clearing 
House had used such a classification for many years. 12 ' Bills for the regulation of 
railway rates were introduced in each year between 1884 and 1887 but all failed. 122 
Finally the Railway and Canal Traffic Act became law in 1888, specifying new 
maximum rates. 123, 
A problem for the railway companies was that hitherto they had, in many 
cases, charged special reduced rates. Although the companies were prepared to let 
special rates continue they did not have sufficient time to calculate them under the 
parliamentary recognition for ten-ninal charges in return for limits on the amount of these charges, 
such efforts failed because of the widespread perception among traders that the charges were 
unjustified. 
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new regulations so as to come into effect simultaneously with the new maxima. Their 
response, partly based on a determination to maintain income and partly to wreck the 
provisions of the Act. was to raise all rates to the new maxima in 1893. Traders 
found that as a result of agitation for a reduction in railway rates tlleN- were 
compelled to pay more. This caused uproar, especially as the railway companies had 
raised their rates at a time of commercial depression. "' The Conservative MP and 
member of the Hull Chamber of Commerce. Sir Albert Rollit, was instrumental in 
introducing a deputation to the President of the Board of Trade, A. J. Mundella, in 
February 1893, which declared that maximum rates which had been intended as a 
shield for the traders had become a sword in the hands of the railway companies. ' 25 
Parliament responded by passing the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1894, 
giving commissioners the right to peg rates at 1892 levels. Rates could only be 
increased if the railway companies could prove an increase in costs. "' This 
legislation reduced rates, causing the real cost of transport to fall considerably in the 
Edwardian period. M Alborn. argues that although, superficially, the legislation 
seemed to be to the disadvantage of the railways it enabled them to shift the blame 
for higher rates onto political constraints beyond their control. ' 28 Parris has argued 
that the 1894 Act caused charges to be higher that they would otherwise have been, 
as companies were hesitant to reduce rates because they feared that if they found it 
124 P. J. Cain, 'Traders versus Railways. The Genesis of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1894', 
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necessary to raise them again the Commission might not allow them to do So. 129 
However, Cain demonstrates that the Act \\as. indeed. effectiý, e in preventing railway 
companies raising rates. Between 1895 and 1912. out of 136 cases referred to the 
Railway and Canal Commissioners only 10 were judged wholly or partlý in the 
fa\-our of the companies. The remainder were withdrawn, settled before judgement. 
dismissed or giN,, en against the railway companies. "' 
The foregoing has demonstrated that the long dispute over pricing policy 
undermined the railways' efforts to present themselx, es as public utilities acting for 
the benefit of their customers. They were naturally concerned to awid the perception 
that they were abusing their monopoly powers and argued that the aim of the pricing 
policy was to set charges to realise the largest net profit. due regard being had to the 
interests of the public. "' It was the last phrase that was treated with deep cynicism by 
traders and the general public alike. In the case of the NER Irving describes this 
public face as a 'political charade'. "' As I will show in this study, there can be little 
doubt that the traders of the port of Hull would have agreed with this sentiment. 
One result of the 1894 Act was a reduction of the railway companies 
profitability. Although angered by its restrictions, they were rendered powerless for 
many years. But after the national rail strike of 1911 the railway companies conceded 
recognition of trades unions in return for a pledge by the government that they would 
be allowed to raise rates if wages increased. After a bitter battle in Parliament 
between the traders and the railway companies the latter were allowed a general 
increase in rates, implemented by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1913. The 
increase in rates was met with hostility from traders, and the government set up a 
Royal Commission to examine the relationship between the railways and state. It was 
understood that the remit of this commission would include consideration of a 
proposal to nationalise the railways. The commission was suspended and had not 
reported when the Great War broke out in 1914 and the government took control of 
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the railway system leading to rates being maintained at an artificialk, lo, " level for 
the period of hostilities. "' 
7. Railways and the port of Hull. 
The history of railway access to the port of Hull is essentially one of an initial 
approach by an independent undertaking. swiftly follmved by absorption into a 
regional company culminating in the formation of the NER in 1854. The NER 
monopoly lasted until the successful promotion of the HBR in 1880. 
As will be detailed in chapter 2 the first railway to Hull, the Hull and SelbY 
Railway (HSR), was opened in 1840. It approached from the west keeping to the low 
ground alongside the River Humber. securing the only level route as, to the west of 
Hull, the chalk escarpment of the Yorkshire Wolds extends almost to the river. "' 
Until 1880 the NER defeated all attempts to build a railway to Hull from the west. To 
protect its interests in the port it negotiated a series of rate and pooling agreements, 
known as the Humber Agreements, with all other railway companies interested in 
access to Hull, and eventually established control of all rail traffic from Yorkshire, 
Lancashire, and the North Midlands to all ports between the Humber and Tyne. "' 
These arrangements were not unusual in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. Since the opening of the GNR route from London to Edinburgh in 1850, 
which competed with those of the LNWR and MR, railway companies had tempered 
competition among themselves by means of rates and pooling agreements. The 
Octuple Agreement, which regulated the receipts from Anglo-Scottish traffic, and the 
Six Towns Agreement, relating to traffic between London, York, Leeds, Sheffield, 
Doncaster and Lincoln, were signed in 1851, setting a precedent for subsequent 
pooling agreements. "' Rate agreements ensured that the companies concerned 
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charged all customers equafly for supposedly equal sen, ices. The rates \ýCre set at 
regular meetings, known as conferences, between representatiNes of the companies 
concerned. A pooling agreement also set rates and fares but went further in providing 
for the sharing of traffic receipts among companies according to an agreed 
schedule. 
As early as 1845, with the defeat of a scheme for a railway from Hull to 
Barnsley. resentment was kindled among the mercantile and cl\-Ic bodies in Hull at 
the perceived railway monopoly. and thereafter several attempts were made to 
promote independent railways. These all foundered on the rock of the opposition of 
the YNMR and subsequently the NER. Feelings were further inflamed ý, Nhen, in 
1865, the NFR gained control of the northern port of Hartlepool, and agreed to a 
policy of equal rates from the West Riding to Hull and Hartlepool, thus, in the eyes 
of [lull traders, denying it its geographical advantage and, as a corollary, showing 
preference for Hartlepool. "" 
The NER absorbed the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway in 1862, the Stockton 
and Darlington Railway (SDR) in 1863 and the West Hartlepool Railway in 1865; all 
companies which preferred to amalgamate with the NER rather than compete with it 
or assist other companies to compete. The NER was particularly anxious to acquire 
the SDR because of the latter's ownership of the South Durham and Lancashire 
Union Railway (SDLUR), which provided a link between the coal and iron industries 
of Cumberland and Durham. This line had been supported by the LNWR, a potential 
rival to the NER. In an attempt to gain access to the North-east the LNWR had 
purchased a dock at Hartlepool, but Parliament had refused running powers over 
lines linking it with the LNWR. It had, however, given the LNWR running powers 
over the SDLUR and the connecting Eden Valley Railway. "' 
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Thus by 1865 the NER had achieved a regional railý, N-ay monopoly cemented 
partly by external threats to the Durham coalfield from Yorkshire and Cumberland in 
the 1850s, which had stimulated the region's railwa-, companies to form a united 
front against incursions. This was driven by the fact that there was a general 
perception in the North-east, that the NER was , ýell managed with a majoritý of 
directors being local men in tune with the needs of the region. "' The economy of the 
North-east was based on coal and, by 1865. the NER was by far the largest mover of 
coal among all railway companies with a total of nearly 427 million ton-miles carried 
in that year. "' Furthermore the NER patronised the local iron industry for the supply 
of rails, buying only once outside the North-east between 1854 and 1870.142 This was 
not due to altruism but to self-interest. The Pease family, associated with the SDR 
and subsequently the NER, were the owners of more than twenty collieries in County 
Durham and together with Isaac Lowthian Bell, a former director of the West 
Hartlepool Company and subsequently deputy chairman of the NER, were heavily 
involved in the iron industry of the North-east. 141 
Whilst this policy made the NER popular with traders in the North-east it did 
not improve its standing in Hull because of the impact of its equal rates policy. Hull 
suffered from an insular attitude. It considered itself superior to the other ports in the 
region and wished to lay claim to an exclusive hinterland. "' A problem for the NER 
at Hull was that it did not control the docks, which made it unwilling to make large 
investments in them. The docks were in the hands of the Hull Dock Company which, 
as a private undertaking, was more interested in paying large dividends to 
shareholders than improving dock facilities. 
The monopolistic policy of the NER made it unpopular with Hull Corporation 
as well as with the traders. As noted above, and detailed in chapters 2,3 and 5. the 
Corporation had taken a keen interest in railways to the port from the beginning. In 
operated by the SDR and NER. The LNWR running powers were not used as, in 1863, the NER 
agreed to interchange facilities at Carlisle. 
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an attempt to address the shortcomings of the Hull Dock Company it had obtained 
parliamentary powers to purchase the docks and form a non-profit makinu dock trust. 
similar in form to the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, to replace the Dock 
Company. Attempts vxre made to set up the trust inI837.1850.1861 and 1888. but 
the ratepayers of the town were not prepared to provide funds for the purchase and 
improvement of the docks. and the scheme never came to fruition. 
As will be detailed in chapter 4 dissatisfaction with the NER led to , et 
another proposal, in 1879. for a new railway. the HBR. but unlike previous schemes. 
this included a new dock, which would break the constraints which had previously 
curtailed investment in Hull docks. The Bill passed through Parliament in 1880 
despite the best efforts of the NER to defeat it. It provided a deep-water dock and a 
direct rail link to South Yorkshire with its hard steam-coal reserves. The Corporation 
sold land for the dock and railway cheaply to the HBR and contributed f 100,000 
towards its capital. It also obtained a clause in the HBR Act stipulating that the 
railway or dock could be not leased or sold to any other undertaking without the 
consent of the Corporation. In addition it obtained a right for the Town Clerk, or 
other member of the council, to vote at HBR meetings and for the Corporation to 
appoint two directors to the HBR board. "' 
The opening of the HBR and its dock in 1885 created a potentially strong 
competitor to the NER and the Hull Dock Company. This was of little consequence 
to an undertaking of the size of the NER but proved ruinous for the Dock Company 
and subsequently the HBR, the position of the latter being worsened by rate-cutting 
on the part of the NER and a boycott by other railway companies. The HBR was 
unable to pay its debenture interest and creditors, including the contractors who had 
built the railway and dock, and it was taken into receivership. Attempts to sell the 
undertaking to the MR, and subsequently the NER were vetoed by the Corporation 
which. in order to guarantee the independence of the HBR, used the powers 
contained in the 1880 Act. The situation was exacerbated by furious dissension 
among HBR shareholders. those from Hull, particularly the Corporation, being 
prepared to keep the railway independent at all costs; and the London in%, estors and 
145 C It\ Archives, Hu I I, TLP 135. Hui L Barns I e\ and West Riding Junction Rai] waý and Dock Act, 
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speculators. who wished to see a return on their investment. The root problem %ýas 
that the company vý as hopelessly under-capitalised. 
Financial manoeuvring in 1889 allowed the company to increase its 
capitalisation and move into solvency. By the 1890s it %N as on the waý. to becoming a 
successful undertaking, resulting in an improved relationship with the NER. This was 
in sharp contrast to the Hull Dock Company, which had reached a state of penury, 
and in 18933 was absorbed by the NER. 
8. The traders and Corporation of Hull, 1840-1922. 
The relationship between the traders of Hull and the railway company which served 
them needs to be considered in the context of the dissatisfaction of the former at a 
national level, as has been discussed earlier. Furthermore it must be appreciated that 
Hull was not a monolithic entity and that the commercial and political representation 
consisted of disparate interest groups. 
Throughout the nineteenth century Hull experienced a steady growth in 
population and trade. The industries of the town were dominated by shipowners, seed 
merchants and crushers, together with grain and timber merchants. Much of the trade 
of the port was concerned with the handling and processing of commodities in one 
way or another, as a result of which the town lacked the wealthier families which 
were to be found in Manchester and the West Riding of Yorkshire, where 
manufactory trades had their bases. "' 
The owners of the largest privately owned fleet in the world in the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century. the Wilson brothers, Charles and Arthur, were the 
leading businessmen in the port. "' They were both of Liberal inclination, Charles 
being Liberal MP for West Hull for many years. Neither of the brothers took much 
interest in local politics except where it affected their business interests, being more 
concerned to be seen as associates of the aristocracy. Charles Wilson became a peer 
with the title of Lord Nunburnholme in 1905. "' 
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At the time of the arrival of the first railway to Hull in 1840 the town council 
tended to be composed of the middle rank of businessmen and tradesmen of the port. 
Its political tenor inclined to a Liberal viewpoint, but it was liberalism in a confined 
context, reflecting the ideology of those of the commercial classes to whom the 
protection of their own interests was paramount. the ruling clique of middle class 
businessmen being loyal to the concept of free trade and unionism. The complexion 
of the council reflected that of the town, which was a tendency to non-conformit\'. 
thrift to the point of meanness, and a strong temperance movement. The main virtue 
of the council, as perceived by these who constituted it, was its parsimony. It had a 
reputation for frugality and lack of civic enterprise. 149 
The Corporation was attracted by the idea of the promotion of an independent 
railway in which it had an interest. After its initial support for the HSR the 
Corporation supported three schemes in 1845, including one for a railway from Hull 
to Barnsley. It then gave support for three schemes for a railway from Hull to 
Doncaster in 1860-62 and for the Hull South and West Junction Railway, planned to 
cross the Humber into Lincolnshire and the south, in 1872. All of these proved 
abortive. However, the proposal for the HBR in 1879 was at last successful. 
The successful promotion of the HBR was seen as the panacea for all Hull's 
ills, which were perceived by the Corporation and traders as arising from the 
blighting monopoly of the NER. Irving asserts that Hull's attitude was based upon a 
reluctance to face the facts of economic life. "' This may be so but this refusal 
provided a springboard for the HBR in which the councillors who, by and large, 
represented much of the commercial class of the port, had a vested interest. In the 
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case of the local Members of Parliament the scheme for a new railway was supported 
by Liberals and Conservatives alike. 
151 
When, as detailed in chapter 6, the stevedores and dockers went on strike in 
1893) the Corporation panicked. Fear of civil disorder was such that. at the 
Corporation's request. the military and oN, erwhelming numbers of extra police were 
called in, and gunboats were stationed on the Humber. The people of Hull \\CI-C 
shocked when an allegedly Liberal Corporation took these draconian measures. In 
the aftermath of the strike this action led directly to a shift among the workin,, 
classes in Hull away from the Liberals towards Radicalism and the Labour 
movement. By 1894 there was an active, cohesive group on the council representing 
labour interests and the trend continued. "' The dock strike also accelerated a shift of 
power away from the larger industrialists to the smaller traders of the port. Charles 
Wilson was initially seen as representing paternalistic Liberalism. However, his 
activities during and after the strike were perceived as hypocritical, and brought 
about a change in the mood of those who depended on him for their living, a change 
which rippled through the social and political fabric of the town. Wilson's problem 
was the tension inherent in his Liberal-Labour alliance, which boosted his political 
persona and his position as Hull's leading industrialist, situations that were mutually 
conflicting. "' After almost total capitulation by the strikers, disaffection increased 
when it was seen that, despite promises made by the employers, particularly Wilson, 
preference in work was being given to non-unionists in violation of the agreement 
which had ended the strike. 
The result was a shift to the left on the part of the Trades Council. The 
political make-up of the Corporation shifted too, from conventional liberalism to a 
more radical liberalism and a bias in favour of those lesser ranks of the traders of the 
port, who still perceived the NER as the source of all ills. This led to the increasing 
identification of the Corporation with policies dictated by the Chamber of Trade with 
its radical Liberal orientation. "' The Corporation, with increasing Trades Council 
1 1; 1 Park, The Parliamentary Representation (? f Yorkshire, p. I 11. 
15-' Brown, 11'aict-Iront organisation in Hull, 18-0-1900, p. 6. 
15" Ibid., p. 72 
154 Ibid,, p. 6. 
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representation, began to take a divergent outlook from that of the larger merchants 
and traders of the port. A manifestation of this was a loosening of the ties between 
the Corporation and the HBR as the latter began to co-operate kvith the NER. This 
co-operation continued and in 1909 the NER and HBR proposed a joint \vorking, 
agreement for their lines in the Hull area. This was welcomed by the larger traders 
but was defeated by the Corporation using its powers under the 1880 Act. 
The Corporation, by these actions and others which vvill be examined in this 
thesis, moved to a position of isolation. It failed to recognise that the NER \ý-as no 
longer a threat and that there was now co-operation between the two raikýay 
companies, each concentrating on its own particular strengths, which was very much 
in the interests of the port. Despite this the Corporation continued to harass and 
obstruct the NER at every opportunity. 
The Railways Bill of 1920 proposed the grouping of the railways. It 
suggested that the NER and HBR should be included in the Eastern group. Despite a 
petition against it from the Corporation to Parliament the amalgamation went ahead 
and the HBR ceased to exist as an independent railway on 3 I't March 1922. "' 
9. Thesis 
I have suggested that a singular situation developed during the nineteenth century at 
Hull, leading to a municipal authority being granted unprecedented powers by 
Parliament. Whereas the powers were initially used for the benefit of the trade of 
Hull, I will argue that from the mid-1890s onwards the inflexibility of the 
Corporation became a negative factor and that Hull's success as a port was achieved 
despite the actions of the Corporation. The events leading up to the Corporation's 
intervention in railway and dock issues in Hull and its results will be considered in 
detail. 
Chapter 2 discusses the issues surrounding the entry of railways into the port 
of Hull, making it the easterly point of a cross-country route from the port of 
Liverpool. passing through the manufacturing districts of the West Riding of 
15ý CitN Archives, Hull, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee meeting minutes, 2 Oth April 
1922. 
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Yorkshire. It examines the motives of those promoting raiEý-ays forming a link with 
the port of Hull. Unsuccessful attempts to promote competitive railý\-ays are also 
reviewed. Evidence is produced for the argument that. in the period up to 1852, the 
seeds of a railway monopoly were sown. This perceived local monopolý and its 
effect on the traders of Hull forms the theme of the chapter. which probes in detail 
the attitudes of the traders and Corporation of Hull to the railway company serving 
the port. 
Chapter 3 recounts the change from local to regional railNk, ay monopoly %\, ith 
the formation of the NER in 1854. and the subsequent consolidation of that 
company's hold on Hull. Throughout the 1860s and 1870s the NER repulsed all 
attempts to penetrate its territory and restricted competition by means of various 
agreements with other railway companies. Its relationships with these companies is 
analysed. E\, idence is produced for the argument that the NER's complacency was a 
important precursor to the introduction of competition in the shape of the HBR. The 
discontent of the traders of Hull with the rates charged by the NER is explored in the 
context of contemporary national issues regarding railway rates generally. Parallel 
with the development of railway monopoly was that exercised by the Hull Dock 
Company, which is also discussed in detail. Until 1878 the Dock Company suffered 
from a lack of enterprise brought about partly by its inability to raise capital for 
mqjor improvements and partly by inertia and lack vision on the part of its board. 
The thesis argues that the Dock Company was the catalyst for the introduction of 
railway competition. 
The arrival of the HBR and its dock, as detailed in Chapter 4, did not prove to 
be the panacea for all Hull's transport woes. Apart from questionable arrangements 
regarding the finance of the line it became apparent that the project was hopelessly 
under-capitalised. This gave rise to a theme, recurrent during the early years of the 
HBR, of conflict between groups of shareholders representing differing and well- 
defined interests. The factional split between Hull and London proprietors arose from 
the fact that that although most of the railway"s capital had been subscribed in 
London, the Corporation of Hull exercised control out of all proportion to its 
investment, and this \,, -as the gravamen of the London shareholders to whom the 
solution appeared to be to sell the HBR to a major railway company. a proposal 
conslstentlý, opposed by the Hull shareholders and ultimately \'etoed by the 
Corporatioii of Hull using the powers enshrined in the founding Act of the railway. 
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After ten turbulent years counsels of pragmatism at last pre\-ailed and the HBR began 
to move towards prosperity. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss and analyse these e\ ents in 
detail probing the motives of the main players. 
After an unsuccessful attempt in the previous year the NER absorbed the Hull 
Dock Company in 1893, bringing about a situation where two railway companies 
operated competitive docks in the port. This took place against the background of a 
dock strike, ý, vhich initiated a polarisation of political interests Xý-ithin the 
Corporation. This was to have profound effects on the interrelationships of the 
Corporation, the railway companies and the major traders of the port and, in x, iexN- of 
this, the strike and its aftermath are considered in some detail in chapter 6. 
One of the objectives of the HBR had been to make Hull into a major coal 
port, a goal not achieved without difficulty. Chapter 7 probes in detail the manner in 
which both the HBR and the NER proposed and built lines to collieries in West and 
South Yorkshire and the nuances of railway politics involved in the projection of 
joint railways. It was during this period that the antipathy between the NER and HBR 
cooled and competition between them to gain access to new coalfields was tempered 
by a realisation that the companies could work successfully together each capitalising 
on its particular strengths. 
Co-operation between the railway companies was apparent from the mid- 
1890s and the increasing level of this is outlined and examined in chapters 8 and 9. 
Evidence for the argument that the corollary to this co-operation was the 
Corporation"s obstruction of the NER wherever possible, and a loosening of its ties 
with the HBR, is provided by examples of specific disputes where the HBR came to 
be increasingly aligned with the NER against the Corporation. Also discussed are the 
politics and agendas of the parties involved in the Hull joint dock scheme. Finally. 
the thesis considers the events leading up to the absorption of the HBR by the NER, 
an event illustrative of the earlier assertion that the Corporation was no longer a 
friend of the HBR and, due to its determination to maintain railway competition, had 
acted against the commercial interests of the port of Hull. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE GENESIS OF A RAILWAY MONOPOLY, 1840-1852. 
1. Introduction. 
The forty years from 1840 were turbulent ones for the railways, docks and traders of 
Hull. Although the port was initially reluctant to press for railv, -aN connections with 
the West Riding of Yorkshire, the possibility of railway development at other ports 
on the Humber and Ouse awoke in the traders and Corporation an awareness that 
Hull could not continue to function as a major port if its competitors overtook it in 
the race for rail connections. Hull's attitude to railways swung from indifference to 
enthusiasm within a short period. 
The seeds of railway monopoly, with which this chapter is principally 
concerned, were sown early. Within five years of its opening Hull's railway had 
become part of an empire, the York and North Midland Railway Company (YNMR). 
which embraced a strategy of ensuring that other companies did not gain access to its 
territory. Thus, when the Corporation of Hull supported an independent railway from 
South Yorkshire to Hull in 1845 it was made clear to them by the chairman of the 
YNMR that additional railways to the port would be strongly resisted, even if this 
meant that new hinterlands would not be exploited. 
Despite this threat, and experience of the Dock Company's monopoly, 
informed opinion in the port in 1840 accepted the new monopoly, praising its 
efficiency. Not so the Corporation. Its campaign against railway monopoly can be 
said to have started in 1845 and, with an exception made for a railway to Doncaster 
in the 1860s, was to be pursued with vigour and increasing bitterness for close to 
eighty years. 
Three recurrent themes run through the period between 1840 and 1880. 
Firstly the perceived monopolistic arrogance of railway companies; secondly, the 
hostility generated by this in the mercantile and civic bodies of the port and, thirdly. 
the pusillanimity of the Dock Company, which eventually undermined its position as 
a monopolistic provider of port facilities. 
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2. The Leeds and Selby Railway. 
An important link in the chain between the ports of Liverpool and Hull via 
Manchester was the Leeds and Selby Railway (LSR). Prominent among its 
subscribers were the Marshall and Gott families, cloth manufacturers and merchants 
of Leeds. ' It is significant that driving forces behind the first railway in the direction 
of Hull were West Riding businessmen, illustrating, from the start, that railways were 
enmeshed with the wider policies of transport in the Yorkshire and Humber region. 
The railway received parliamentary approval on I" June 1830. ' It was seen as 
an interchange point for feeder vessels plying on the Rivers Ouse and Humber with 
no plans for extension to Hull. The line opened to passengers on 22 nd September 
1834 and to goods on 15 th December. ' Two jetties were built on the River Ouse at 
Selby for the use of passengers embarking onto the river steamers. A third jetty was 
erected in 1835 for the transhipment of coal. An immediate effect of the opening of 
the railway was a reduction in the dues charged by the ACN for water transport, an 
example of the beneficial effect of competition. ' 
The isolated line soon received the attention of an entrepreneur keen to 
develop a regional network. George Hudson cherished dreams of making York the 
centre for all railways in the North. ' In December 1833 a meeting of businessmen, 
including Hudson, was held in York to discuss a proposed railway to connect with 
the LSR, which was then nearing completion. It was hoped that this would result in a 
lowering of the price of coal in York and thereby help the depressed economy of the 
D. Brooke, 'The Promotion of four Yorkshire Railways and the Share Capital Market', Transport 
Historv, Vol. 5, No. 3, (November 1972), p. 246. The Gott and Marshall families subscribed 
f 10,000 and f 6,000 respectively. 
2 MacTurk, A Histon, (? f the Hull Railways, p. 34. 
W. W. Tomlinson, North Eastern Railway, (Newton Abbot edition, 1967), p. 256. 
4 Ibid., p. 260. 
5 A. J. Peacock, George Hudson, 1800-18'1, The Railway King, (2 Vols. York, 1988 & 1989). 
R. S. Lambert, The Railiva. 1, King, 1800-1871, (London, 1964). 
R. Beaumont, The Railiva. i, King, (London, 2002). 
A. J Arnold & S. McCartney, The Rise and Fall qf the Railwqv King, (London, 2004). 
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city. which was falling behind Leeds and Sheffield. ' However, when the North 
Midland Railway was formed in September 1835 to run from Derby to Leeds, 
Hudson and his associates changed their plans. They decided to connect York with 
the North Midland Railway. as this could provide a route i1a Derby and Birmingham 
to London. ' The YNMR was formed in October 1835 to link York with the North 
Midland Railway at Normanton and provide a through route to the capital. The 
chairman of the company was George Hudson. The North Midland Railway opened 
from Derby to Leeds on 30th June 1840 and on the following day the YNMR opened 
throughout! 
The LSR had not connected with any other railway at its inception but it was 
joined by a connection from the YNMR at Milford Junction in May 1839. Further 
sections of the YNMR were completed in 1840, including a connection to the North 
Midland at Methley to allow through running to Leeds. This connection gave the 
YNMR a chance to compete with the LSR for Leeds traffic, although the latter's was 
the shorter route by some 4 miles (61/2km). Hudson proposed that trains should run 
alternately on his route and the LSR, more direct, route. The LSR directors 
understandably declined this. Hudson realised that the LSR could prove a serious 
competitor to the YNMR and therefore attempted to neutralise possible opposition by 
offering the former's proprietors a tempting 31 -year lease at f 17,000 per annum. It 
was an offer too good to refuse, especially as the LSR was suffering severely as a 
result of waterway competition from the ACN. On 9th November 1840 the LSR was 
added to George Hudson's growing empire. ' The consequences were important for 
Hull as another railway, the line from Hull to Selby had opened in July 1840. The 
foundations of a railway monopoly were already in place. 
6 B. Bai]eN,,, George Hudson, The Rise and Fall qf the Ruilival, king, (Stroud, 1995), p. 10. 
7 Ibid., pp. 8-10. 
8 L. James_4 ChronoloKy of the Construction qf Britain's Railways, (London, 1983), pp. 32-33. 
9 K. Hoole_4 Regional Histoi-v qf the Railways qf Great Britain, Fol. 4. The North East, (Newton 
Abbot, 1978), p. 33 1. See also: Tomlinson, North Eastern RailivaT, p. 341. 
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3. The Hull and Selby Railway. 
As noted above, the LSR was seen as a feeder service for steam packet boats to 
Hull. " Passengers were transported on steamships. which had appeared on the 
Humber in 1814, eventually plying to Gainsborough. Thorne. Selby. York and 
Grimsby. '' The passage by steam packet was slow. the trip from Hull to Selbý took, 
at best, five hours. At Selby the service connected with trains to Leeds. " By 183'4 it 
was possible, by leaving Hull at seven or eight a. m. according to the tide. taking the 
packet to Selby and the train over the newly opened LSR, to be in Leeds by one or 
two p. m. Furthermore it was practicable to reach Liverpool by evening time on 
Tuesdays and Thursdays, although the line over the Pennines was at that date 
unfinished. " 
This use of the river for transport was a significant factor in delaying the 
extension of the cross-country railway to Hull. For as long as the river provided a 
satisfactory artery of conveyance it was considered unnecessary to duplicate it with a 
railway. This outlook was typical of the conservatism of the East Riding of Yorkshire 
and particularly of the port of Hull at the time. " A further factor was that Hull 
enjoyed the status of being an overside port, where goods discharged from shipping 
to river craft without coming ashore did not attract duty, whereas goods discharged at 
docks from railway vehicles, did so. " 
10 City Archives, Hull, DPD/l 2/l/29/225, Prospectus for Leeds and Selby Railway. 
,, F. H. Pearson. The Earli! Historl- of Hull Steam Shipping, (Hull, 1896), p. 2. 
12 Hzill, 4dvertiser, 26'h August 1815. 
13 Hull Rockingham, 3 rd October 1834. 
14 An example of the backwardness of Hull appears in White's Directory Qf 1838 (Leeds, 1838), 
which states that: 'Tclegraphs have been long established at Liverpool and found highly beneficial 
to the mercantile and shipping interests, but the port of Hull did not avail itself of such a facility 
until 1838. ' 
15 Dating back to ancient times Hull had enjoyed the privilege of being an overside port. This meant 
that duties were not levied on goods discharged from ships to river craft. This right was perpetuated 
in the Hull Docks Act of 1774 and the HBR Act of 1880, which allowed river carriers to use the 
HBR docks free from wharfage charges. 
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Hull had always looked to the river and the sea for its trade. " Its geographical 
location, remote from any large centre of population, bred a parochialism that 
required the influence of outside factors, more particularly the imminent rise of rivals 
such as Grimsby and Goole, to provide the spur for a railway to Hull. This insularity 
was manifested in an initial unwillingness for a railway connection from the west. " 
However. river travel had its disadvantages, especially for those unfortunate enough 
to be fare paying passengers. The duration of the trip from Selby to Hull could be up 
to nine hours when the wind or tide was against the vessel or, as particularly occurred 
at neap tides, the vessel ran aground. On such occasions travellers were called upon 
to assist in keeping the craft moving rather than settling in the mud. The passengers 
at the cry, *row] *er' walked across the deck, treading on each other's heels and 
suffering much inconvenience. At the same time they hauled on a rope previously put 
ashore and made fast to a post or tree. 18 
This inconvenience to passengers was not the only factor in the decision that 
a rail link to Selby would be of advantage. Hull was casting anxious eyes up-river to 
the port of Goole, which had been established by the ACN in 1826. Railways had 
already been projected from Goole to the West Riding, and if Hull were left behind in 
the race to have a railway it was likely that it would lose much trade to Goole. 
Furthermore, the distance between Hull and Selby was 55 miles (88 km) by river 
against 31 miles (50 km) by rail. " 
There were some in Hull campaigning for a railway. In December 1833, in a 
letter to the Hull Rockingham, John Exley, a customs officer, put forward the 
16 Statistical Society of Manchester, 'Report of the condition of the working-classes in the borough of 
Kingston upon Hull in 1842', Journal of the Statistical Society of London, Vol. 5, No. 2, July 1842, 
pp. 2 12-219. Hul I's preference for river and sea transport was not surprising considering that 
almost 209, o of the male population gained their livelihood as sailors or dock workers. Furthermore 
Hull was a settled community with over 70% of the male population having been resident for more 
than 10 years. More than 95% of the population of the town was English, compared with less than 
801o in Manchester. 
17 E. Gillett & K. A. MacMahon, A History of Hull, (Hull, 1989), p. 302. 
18 Tomlinson, North Eastern RailwaY, P. 2ý7. 
19 MacTurk, A History (? f the Hull Railwavs, p. 42. 
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advantages of a railway to Hull. " In February 1834 the Hull Guardian Socict\ 
pressed for a railway from Selby to Hull stating that its absence would be injurious to 
the business of the port .2'A prospectus was published pointing out that it would take 
less time to travel from Hull to Leeds by train that it did from Hull to Selby bý 
water. " A pamphlet, published by John Malarn, an Alderman of the town, in support 
of a railway to Selby, made great play of the disadvantages of river travel, 
particularly storms, fog and groundings, pointing out that there were many wrecks 
each year of vessels carrying merchandise. 23 
However, because of Hull's bias towards river transport the proposal for a 
railway did not initially achieve a satisfactory response and in March 1835 it was 
suggested that application to Parliament be delayed for a year. There had been 
intense lobbying by the steam packet operators, who were doing all they could to 
discourage the proposed railway, and the mercantile community was not convinced 
that investment in the railway was justified. " 
Events soon changed this opinion. In 1835 the port of Hartlepool in County 
Durham acquired its railway and became a possible future rival to Hull, but a cause 
for more immediate concern was a railway projected from Goole to join the North 
Midland Railway at Burton Salmon. " In view of these threats to its position the 
mood in Hull quickly changed and the railway scheme gathered momentum. George 
20 Gillett & MacMahon, A Hislorv of Hull, p. 302. 
21 Hull Rockingham, 8"' February 18' )4. 
N. Arnold, 'The Press in Social Context -A Study of York and Hull, 1815-1855', (Unpublished 
MPhil Thesis, University of York, 1987), p. 25. The Hull Guardian Society was founded on 3 rd 
May 1827, 'for mutual protection of shopkeepers against swindlers, sharpers and common 
informants, and taking cognisance of other matters affecting the general interests of trade. ' It was 
avowedly a non-political body but it provided a meeting place for a number of radical shopkeepers. 
22 City Archives, Hull, DXR 5/2. Report dated 28 th July 1834 by J. Walker and A Burges, Engineers 
for the Hull and Selby Railway. 
21 City Archives, Hull. DXR5,12, John. Malam, Considerations on railways proving their utilio, with 
e. rplanafory remarks demonstrating great advantages to the agricultural and commercial and 
manqlacluring interestsfirom the projected line between Hull and Selb. v. 
24 Hull Rockingham, l6t11 March 1835. 
J. D. Porteous, 'Urban Genesis and development, the case of canal created river ports of the 
industrial revolution'. (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Universitý of Hull, 1967), Figure 7.5. 
Liddell and James Henwood, bankers of Hull, took the initiative by raising the 
f20, OOO required prior to the submission of a Bill to Parliament. " The toý\11 
demonstrated its new-found enthusiasm by signing for 45% of the share capital on 
the Parliamentary subscription list. The people of Hull and the neighbouring areas 
subscribed for shares worth more than f 150.000. A significant investment of f4.000 
was made by Hull Corporation, thus beginning its involvement in railways serving 
the port. Benjamin Gott and John Marshall, mill-owners from Leeds who had 
subscribed to the LSR subscribed fl, 000 and f6,500 respectively. 2' Their motives 
were presumably to obtain a cheaper and more reliable outlet for their exports. The 
Act authorising the railway received the Royal Assent on 21st June 1836.28 
Despite the easy nature of the terrain there were legal problems concerned 
with land purchase and the railway was not opened formally until I" July 1840, 
making an end-on junction with the LSR. " Public traffic began the following day. " 
The railway had its Hull terminus on the western side of Humber Dock, a position 
which was to be of significance later when additional docks were projected to the 
east of the River Hull. The facilities included a passenger shed, offices, workshops 
and a warehouse, together with a whar f. 3' The coming of the railway changed the 
pattern of freight transport into Hull, particularly from North and East Yorkshire. 
26 Gillett& MacMahon, A History qf I-full, p. 302. 
27 Brooke, 'The Promotion of four Yorkshire Railways and the Share Capital Market', pp. 252-253. 
28 M acTurk ,A Historl, (? f the [lull Raill vqvs, p. 4 8. 
29 F. Whishaw, Railways qf Great Britain and Ireland 1842, (London 1842, Newton Abbot edition, 
1969), p. 164. The extra borrowing was accounted for by additional compensation to Mr. Raikes 
and others to save the Bill in Parliament together with the purchase of additional land at Hull, 
construction of warping drains and other works for the accommodation of individuals, and the 
introduction of heavier rails. Raikes, a Hull banker, was a landowner at Welton, on the route of the 
line. 
Tomlinson, North Eastern Rai/way p. 338. 
30 Ibid., p. 337. 
MacTurk, 4 History qf the Hull Railwa. vs, p. 73). See also Tomlinson, North Eastern Railway, p. 
340. 
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Within six months at least one major road carrier had switched business to rail and 
was offering reduced rates. " 
Despite forming the final link in a railway route from Hull to Manchester the 
HSR's relations with the YNMR were not good. In the course of negotiations with 
the YNMR in 1840. which led to its absorption, the LSR had looked to the HSR for 
support. which had not been forthcoming. Unlike the LSR, the HSR directors \\ere 
not prepared to lease their line and considered that the rates which the other 
participants in the Manchester to Hull railway route thought necessary to keep traffic 
were too low. The question of coercing the HSR into harmony with the other 
companies was discussed at York and it was proposed that the steam vessels plying 
between Selby and Hull should be retained as competition to the HSR. Although 
never noted for their willingness to put ethics above business advantage, two of the 
companies involved, the MLR and the North Midland, declined to take shares in the 
shipping company. But Hudson, representing the YNMR, arranged to purchase and 
operate steam vessels although this action was in direct contravention of an 
agreement between the HSR and LSR that such operations would cease when the 
HSR was opened. The HSR had no means of retaliation. It faced strong competition 
from the ACN in the transport of bulk goods and was now bound to suffer a further 
loss of trade to unexpected river competition from steam packet boats. " This was 
part of Hudson's strategy to eventually acquire the HSR. -` 
The HSR did, however, have a good relationship with the MLR, cemented by 
the interchange of cross-Pennine traffic. An agreement was concluded in December 
1843 on the basis that the MLR was to have a share of 831/4percent of the total net 
profits, with the balance to the HSR. However, it was not possible to comply with 
parliamentary standing orders, making it necessary to submit the Bill containing the 
agreement in the next session. Despite this setback the two railways continued to 
32 HuIlAdvertiser, 29"' January 1841. 'Superior conveyance of goods from Hull to York. Mary 
Newcombe & Son have discontinued their York-Hull waggons and have entered into agreement 
with the Hull & Selby and York and North Midland Railways to forward goods daily at very 
reduced rates. Their new address is: M. Newcombe & Son, Railway Offices, Hull. ' 
Tomlinson, North Eastern Rai/ii, qi% p. 3342. See also Bailey, George Hudson, The Rise andjýll of 
the Railwqi, King, p. 24. 
Peacock, George Hudson, IS00- 18 71, The Railway King, Vol. 1, p. 142. 
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work together under an informal agreement and meetings of shareholders were held 
to sanction another application to Parliament. 35 
This was, however, not to be the end of the matter. as two dissident 
shareholders, Messrs. Mayleston and MacTurk, argued that the HSR should be 
guaranteed a dividend no less than when it was trading as an independent company. 
which was as much as 7%. The chairman of the MLR objected to the principle of a 
guarantee and support for the amalgamation from the HSR proprietors faded away. 
Subsequently, and to the chagrin of the HSR directors, the proposal for 
amalgamation was rejected . 
3' The dissidents decided instead to approach the YNMR 
to seek an alliance. This fell in entirely with the machinations of George Hudson. He 
offered a perpetual lease of the HSR by the YNMR, at an annual rent of 10% of the 
original capital, and from I" July 1845 the HSR was leased to the YNMR. " 
Reaction in Hull varied. The local press was delighted by the new 
arrangement and extolled Hudson's virtues: 'The people of Hull will be glad to hear 
of the leasing of the HSR to the YNMR. Mr. Hudson's method of beating down all 
competition is by cheapness, expedition and superior accommodation. This is a true 
system for the proprietary and the public. "' However, Hull Corporation, conscious 
of its obligations to the port, was not among those rejoicing. It was already sensing 
the dangers of a railway monopoly as the tentacles of Hudson's empire ensnared 
more railways. Indeed, it had petitioned against the proposed lease on the grounds 
that the YNMR arrangements for the working of the HSR, and the tolls charged, 
could be used injuriously to the interests of the port . 
3' The petition was prophetic. but 
ineffective, as it was the one dissenting voice among the many which lauded 
Hudson's action. 
Whereas Hudson's offer appeared to be generous, he was influenced by the 
fact that an amalgamation of the HSR and MLR would be a threat to his planned 
35 MacTurk, A History (? f the Hull RailivaYs, p. 80. 
3 36 Railway Chronicle, 15"' March 1845. 
37 City Archives, Hull, TLP 8,1845 Bill enabling the Hull and Selby Railway to sell their railway to 
the YNMR and MLR. 
HullAcA'crliser, 4'h Jul%, 1845. 
39 Cit\ Archives, Hull, TLP 8, Petition of Hull Corporation against 1845 Agreement betAcen HSR, 
YNMR and MLR raikN aý s. 
regional network. The threat was exacerbated by a proposal from the HSR to build a 
line from Hull to Bridlington. a town and fishing port some 30 miles (48 km) north 
of Hull which the YNMR had also decided to connect to its system, by means of a 
branch from Scarborough, some 20 miles (32 kin) further north . 
4' This xý as bad 
enough in itself but the real threat came from the HSR's projection of a line from 
Beverley on the Hull- Bridl ington branch to connect with the YNMR at or near 
York . 
4' Hudson was not prepared to let the Hull-Bridlington railway fall into the 
hands of a company whose interests could conflict with those of the YNMR, as 
would be the case if it were acquired by the MLR. The Hull-Bridlington railway was 
opened throughout on 2 nd October 1846 by which time it was firrnly within Hudson's 
fold and a railway monopoly at Hull had been created. " 
4. Attempts to introduce railway competition to Hull. 
So far the analysis has concentrated on railways which were built, but a full picture 
of Hull's attitude to railways can only be achieved by looking at unsuccessful 
proposals. More particularly, the attempts to bring new railways to Hull need to be 
considered in the context of the so-called 'railway mania' of 1844-1847, during 
which period, throughout the UK, parliamentary powers were obtained for the 
building of more than 9,000 route miles (14,400 km) of railways and the raising of 
over f500 million of capital. " Although it may be tempting to dismiss the schemes 
40 Herepath's Journal, 25'h May 1845. 'A special meeting of the YNMR chaired by George Hudson 
was held on l7th May to pass resolutions for lines including a railway from near Scarborough 
(Seamer) to Bridlington. ' 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 7, York & North Midland Railway Bill, 1846. 
42 City Archives, Hull, TLP 6, Hull and Selby (Bridlington Branch) Railway Act, 1845. 
M acTu rk, A Histon, of the Hull Railways, p. III 
Jarnes, .4 Chronology qf the Construction (? 
f Britain's Railways, p. 50. The Railway from Seamer to 
Bridlington was opened on 20"' October 1847. 
Hoole,. 4 Regional Historl- qf the Railways of Great Britain, Iol. 4, p. 54. The through route from 
Bridlington via Market Weighton to York was not opened until 1865. 
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continued 
56 
relating to Hull as feverish speculation a closer examination reveals the existence of 
a growing dissatisfaction with the town's dependence on the YNMR. 
One proposal, the Hull and Gainsborough Railway of 1844. would have given 
Hull direct access to the south. The line was to run from Gainsborough to either 
B arto n-upon -Humber or New Holland on the south bank of the Humber ýN ith a ferr\ 
connection to either Hessle or Hull. It was opposed by the landowners and there \ý-as 
little support from the communities in the mainly rural area through which it was to 
pass. The Board of Trade reported against the scheme and effectively ended its 
chances. 44 
A more serious threat to Hudson came when the railway mania was at its 
height in 1845. A scheme promoted by the MLR, and supported by Hull Corporation, 
was the York, Hull and East and West Yorkshire Junction Railway. running from 
York to Hull by way of Pocklington, Market Weighton and Beverley with branches 
to Driffield and Selby. 45 If this railway fell into the hands of the MLR, it would pose 
a serious threat to traffic on the HSR. However the MLR was at the time under 
pressure from competitive schemes in its own area and an agreement to reduce the 
possibility of competition in the East Riding was concluded with the YNMR in 
October 1845. The essence of the agreement was that the MLR, which had taken 
shares to the value of f 125,000 in the York, Hull and East and West Yorkshire 
Junction Railway and another competing scheme, should withdraw its support in 
return for being admitted as a joint lessee of the HSR. All traffic between Hull and 
Manchester should be sent, as far as possible over the lines of the two companies 
with traffic from Manchester to Goole being sent over the Wakefield, Pontefract and 
Goole Railway, a satellite company of the MLR, construction of which had started in 
J. Simmons & G. Biddle, (eds. ), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 
1997), p. 311. 
14 rd th Railway Chronicle, 2-3 November 1844 & 15 March 1845. A letter to the Railway Chronicle of 
22nd February 1845 alleged that 80% of the population along the route of the line opposed it. 
45 Radwqv Chronicle, 18"' October 1845, carried a report of Hull Town Council passing a resolution 
of support for the Hull, York and West Yorkshire Railwa\ and the Hull and Barnsley Railwa\. 
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1846.46 Implicit in the agreement was that there would not be railway competition 
between Hull and Goole. This suited the railxvaý companies involved and preserved 
the railway monopoly of the YNMR although waterway competition -ývas still 
provided by the ACN. 
In August 1845 a provisional committee, which included the Mayor of Hull 
together with Messrs. MacTurk and Mayleston, promoted yet another neýý railkvaý' 
from Hull. The scheme called the Hull and Barnsley Junction Railway ran from the 
HSR at Howden, opening a connection to South Yorkshire, and it stood a good 
chance of commercial success. Because of this, it was perceived as a threat by the 
YNMR. Hudson was so opposed to it that he said that he was 'prepared to carrý. 
goods for nothing for ten years' rather than lose the HSR traffic. " Whether Hudson 
had the power to carry out this threat is debatable. but his rhetoric was persuasive 
enough to set back the Hull and Barnsley scheme. The Bill foundered on non- 
compliance with parliamentary standing orders, and lack of support led to its not 
being re-submitted. " 
Hull Corporation, in association with the Guardian Society, had supported the 
Hull and Barnsley scheme and had corresponded with Hudson on the subject of a 
more direct communication between Hull, Sheffield and Barnsley. Hudson made 
clear his opposition to any railway proposed to serve Hull which he did not control, 
stating: 
The opinion expressed by so influential a body as the Corporation of Hull has, I 
assure you, great weight with me, as it ought to have, but I must say, as I now 
view the matter, it appears to me that we can always afford to carry goods 
between the two districts at a cheaper rate, even if taken 10 or 12 miles round, 
by having only the capital of one railway employed ... I feel quite sure that the 
. 16 J. Marshall, The Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway, Vol. 1, (Newton Abbot, 1969), p. 204. The MLR 
became the LYR in 1847 and absorbed the Wakefield, Pontefract and Goole Railway on its 
opening in 1848. 
47 Tornlinson-Vorih Eastern RailivaY, p. 466. 
48 MacTurk, 4 Histoty (? f the Hull RailwaYs, p. 107. 
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communication now existing and in course of construction at Hull is quite 
commensurate with the present means of transacting business at the port. " 
Hudson was perhaps being disingenuous for he was at the time attempting to 
secure a route from Hull to the south, similar to the failed Hull and Gainsborou, -, h 
scheme of 1844. The Bill was for powers to make a line from the HSR at Hessle to or 
near the city of Lincoln, with a ferry across the Humber. The existing ferry from 
Hessle to Barton-upon-Humber was to be bought and improved. The railway was to 
be called the Hull and Lincoln Direct Railway. 'O It was a defensive measure to 
counter the possible diversion of traffic when the new docks at Grimsby and the 
proposed railway from Grimsby to the West Riding were built. Hull Corporation, 
anxious to open new railway connections to the port, petitioned in favour of the 
Bill. " 
However, the scheme was overtaken by events on the south bank of the River 
Humber. On 28th October 1844 the Great Grimsby and Sheffield Junction Railway 
(GGSJR) was launched. The promoters included directors of the Grimsby Dock 
Company. The GGSJR quickly came to an arrangement with the Grimsby Dock 
Company that the latter would present a Bill to Parliament to extend the docks at 
Grimsby, and the GGSJR would deposit a Bill for its incorporation. 52 
It was at this point that the promoters of the GGSJR heard of Hudson's 
interest in a line across the Humber into Lincolnshire. They were determined to 
prevent incursion into Lincolnshire by the YNMR and acted at once to secure one or 
more ferry routes across the Humber by beginning negotiations for the purchase of 
all ferries on the south bank of the Humber. The price agreed was f 10,300. The 
purchase was, in fact, a private arrangement by the promoters who took over all the 
ferries except Barton-upon -Humber. The GGSJR Bill received the Royal assent on 
49 Rail1A,, q. v Chronicle, 7"' November 1846. 
50 City Archives, Hull, TLP 9, Hull & Lincoln Direct Railway Bill, 1846. 
5' City Archives, Hull, TLP 9, Petition of the Corporation of Hull. 
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ql'Economic Rcscarch, Vol. 23. No. 1, (May 1971). pp. 78-79. 
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3 O'h June 1845 and the company agreed to buy the ferries from the owners for 
f2l, 000. leaving them with a good profit on their speculation. " The presence of the 
GGSJR on the south bank of the Humber together with its ownership of the ferr\ 
points put an end to any chance of the success of the Hull and Lincoln Direct 
Railway. " In January 1847 the GGSJR amalgamated with the Sheffield, Ashton- 
under-Lyne and Manchester Railway to become the MSLR. 55 
Other proposals may be dealt with more briefly. The Hull. Sheffield and 
Midland Direct Railway was proposed in November 1845. It would have run from 
HSR at Staddlethorpe and then by way of a tunnel under the Ouse near Howden to 
join the MR at Kilnhurst, giving access to Sheffield. There was a branch to the ACN 
Ship Dock at Goole. " It failed to arouse interest but it foreshadowed the later 
Staddlethorpe to Thome line of the NER, which will be considered in chapter 3), as a 
route from Hull to South Yorkshire. 
An abortive proposal in 1847 was a line from Brough to join with the YNMR 
line from York at Market Weighton. The leading light was J. S. Egginton, a partner in 
the Hull banking firm of Samuel Smith, Brothers & Co. Not everybody was in favour 
of the line. The vicar of South Cave, through which the line would pass, expressed 
the concern that, 'the scum of Hull would make it one place for their Sunday revels. ' 
In any case, the route was not easy, having to pass through the chalk ridge of the 
Yorkshire Wolds. 57 
From 1847 to 1854 the YNMR consolidated its position at Hull without 
threats of penetration of its rail monopoly. In 1850 it reached an important agreement 
with the ACN by means of which, as far as possible, the navigation took the heavy 
goods and the railway took the light goods to and from Hull. This brought to an end, 
at least temporarily, the competition between the companies, which had been 
511 Ludlam, Railwa. vs to New Holland and the Humber Ferries, p. 12. 
54 City Archives, Hull, TLP 9, Great Grimsby and Sheffield Junction Railway (Humber Ferries) Bill, 
1846. This Bill gave the GGSJR power to purchase and improve the Humber ferries with the 
exception of that between Hessle and Barton-upon- Humber. 
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56 East Riding Archives, Beverley, QDP 139. Deposited plans, Hull, Sheffield and Midland Direct 
Railwaý, 1845. 
57 MacTurk--I Hisfori, ol-thc Hull Railivtns, p. 132. 
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detrimental to them but advantageous to the traders of Hull. " Ho\ýe\er, this 
agreement demonstrated to the townspeople of Hull that even if the YNMR could not 
control all transport at Hull it would do all it could to temper any competition. 
5. The YNMR and its relationship to the town of Hull. 
In 1846 there occurred an event which, in eyes of some in Hull, supported the X'iew 
that the amalgamation with the YNMR had been advantageous. The passenger 
facilities at Hull station were inadequate and the commercial centre of the town was 
developing some distance to the north-east. Furthermore, the site of the station 
resulted in a failure to attract traffic for Beverley and Bridlington, which still used 
coaches. As this was resulting in a loss of passenger traffic the YNMR decided to 
build a new station at Paragon Street in the town centre. In 1846 an Act was obtained 
for the construction of this new station and an hotel together with 4 miles (61/2km) of 
railways connecting the station with the Selby and Bridlington lines. " The station 
was opened on 8th May 1848. It, together with the hotel, covered an area of nearly 
21/2acres (I hectare) with an imposing frontage along its south side containing offices 
and other accommodation with a train shed behind. It cost the YNMR f 51,500. The 
old station, remodelled and enlarged, was used exclusively for goods . 
6' This was a 
substantial investment by the YNMR and a sign that it regarded Hull as an important 
part of its network. It was the first large station built by the YNMR. Newcastle did 
not get a station on the same scale until 1850 when one was built by the York, 
58 Tomlinson, North Eastern Railway, p. 505. 
59 City Archives, Hull, TLP 7, York & North Midland Railway Bill, 1846. 
East Riding Archives, Beverley, AP/5/1, An Act for enabling the York and North Midland Railway 
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Newcastle and Berwick Railway, and York had to wait until one ývas built b,, the 
NER in 1877. " 
However, the conduct of the YNMR soon nullified the goodwill engendered 
by the building of the new station. The growth of a proprietary attitude towards Hull 
by the HSR and its successors, and their cosy arrangements with their water-borne 
competitors were fuelling resentment. After an auspicious start to the association 
between Hull and its railway company, relations had reached a defining point by 
1850. The civic and commercial bodies in Hull had come to realise that the YNMR 
would stop at nothing to ensure that it controlled the only railway, which ran to Hull 
from the west or south. The disaffection resulting from the perceived stranglehold on 
the port caused by the railway company's monopoly was to increase over the next 
thirty years. 
6. From local to regional monopoly - the formation of the North Eastern 
Railway. 
The formation of the North Eastern Railway in 1854 placed a new perspective on 
Hull's position as a major port in the north. It meant that it became only one port in a 
regional network served by a company which controlled railway connections to the 
coast from the Tweed to the Humber. 62 Hull was still a large fish, but in a much larger 
pond. A regional, rather than local, railway monopoly was in the process of creation. 
The events leading to the formation of the NER began with a proposal for a 
railway from Leeds to connect with the newly emerging ports of the North-east. This 
was a potential threat to Hull as it would give the rival port of Hartlepool direct 
access to the West Riding of Yorkshire. The first link in this railway was the Leeds 
and Thirsk Railway which, on 21" July 1845. obtained powers to construct a line 
from Leeds to connect with the Great North of England Railway at Pilmoor, giving it 
access over the latter's rails to Thirsk. However, the company's real objective was an 
extension of the line to join the Stockton and Hartlepool line at Billingharn, giving it 
access to ports in the North-east which were directly in competition with Hull. The 
61 Hoole, Railwai, Stations (? / theNorth East, p. 29. 
62 Figure 10. Rai lways in North & East Yorkshire & Count\ Durharn. 
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name of the company .ý as changed to the Leeds Northern Railwaý in 185 1 and the 
through route was opened on 15 th May 1852. In anticipation of increased traffic a 
large development scheme had been carried out at West Hartlepool including the 
enlargement of the harbour to 44 acres (18 hectares) together with a dock of 14 acres 
(6 hectares), having a steamship entrance from the harbour. The Act confin-ning the 
amalgamation of the dock and railway was passed on 17th May 1853 and created the 
West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway Company. 63 
The formation of the West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway Company 
immediately precipitated a struggle between the Great North of England Railway and 
the Leeds Northern Railway for traffic between the West Riding and the North-east. 
Recognising that a rate war would damage both companies, T. E. Harrison, the 
general manager of the Great North of England Railway. proposed amalgamation. He 
pointed out that amalgamation with the YNMR would also be necessary, otherwise 
the two former companies would have held the key to the through traffic of the latter. 
an arrangement which the YNMR could not be expected to accept. The traffic 
managers of the respective companies produced proposals that met with general 
approval, with the exception that the YNMR would not accept that West Hartlepool 
and Hull should be on an equal footing regarding rates from Leeds. It regarded Hull 
as its port and feared that the proposal would give advantage to West Hartlepool. The 
directors of the Leeds and Newcastle companies pressed the YNMR, pointing out the 
difficulties that would arise if the Stockton and Hartlepool company opposed the 
amalgamation. This pressure resulted in an agreement that rates from Leeds to Hull 
and West Hartlepool were to be equal but special rates were to be given to West 
Hartlepool if it found itself at a disadvantage compared to Hull in any item of traffic. 
The special rates for West Hartlepool applied only to imports and exports. not to 
local goods. " This sort of arrangement was becoming quite common nationally. and 
6, Tomlinson, North Eastern Railivqi% p. 514. 
C. Sharpe, History (? f Hartlepool, (Hartlepool, 185 1), pp. 9-25 & 129-13 1. 
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was a soLirce of grievance to domestic traders whose perception was that raihýa\ 
companies were using their powers to their own advantage and the disbenefit of 
traders. " The arrangement not only led to a rapid expansion of trade at Hartlepool 
but also to suspicion and hostility in Hull where it was felt that Hartlepool was being 
favoured at its expense. However, it ensured that the West Hartlepool company 
supported the amalgamation. " In order to counteract possible opposition from the 
recently opened Malton and Driffield Junction Railxvay. which was worked by the 
YNMR, it was arranged that the former should be admitted to the amalgamation. " 
National politics intervened when the amalgamation Bill was presented to 
Parliament and withdrawn in April 1853 after the Select Committee on Railway and 
Canal Bills recommended a delay in all such Bills. At the same time the HSR pointed 
out that the 1845 lease of its line to the YNMR solely. or jointly with the LYR, had 
never been executed. The HSR directors threatened to oppose the Bill if the lease 
were not completed. They intended to use this as a lever by means of which the new 
company could extract concessions from the LYR. thus restricting future competition 
from the port of Goole. " 
The HSR therefore initially appeared as petitioners against the Bill, but 
withdrew opposition when the YNMR promised to execute the lease within three 
months of an anticipated court decision that the LYR was not bound to enter into the 
joint agreement. " The Bill for the amalgamation and the formation of the NER 
received the Royal Assent on 31" July 1854. " The final piece of the jigsaw fell into 
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place in December 1854, when the LYR was released from its agreement to join in 
the HSR lease provided it agreed not to use the port of Goole to compete ý\ith llull. -' 
The delay of a year in finalising the amalgamation had worked to the advanta'-, e of 
the companies involved. During the period they had worked traffic under the 1853' 
72 
agreement and were able to demonstrate that it was to their mutual benefit. 
Thus, a regional railway monopoly had been created which \ýas to sustain for 
more than a quarter of a century. This, together with the monopoly exercised by the 
Dock Company, to which I now return, was seen by many in Hull as being 
detrimental to the development of the port and the Corporation and traders of Hull 
were to make many unsuccessful attempts to defeat it. 
7. Dock development in Hull, 1840-1853. 
The boost to Hull's trade from the new railway to the West Riding highlighted the 
inadequacy of the dock facilities and in 1844, as a result of pressure from 
commercial interests in the port, the Hull Dock Company successfully promoted a 
bill for the construction of a branch dock on the western side of Humber Dock to the 
north of the railway terminus. " The area of the new dock, however, was only 2/4 
acres (I hectare) and traders expressed the opinion that it, together with the existing 
dock, would still be too small for the increasing traffic requirements of the port. " The 
dock was opened for traffic in December 1846 and became known as Railway Dock. 
As a result of this concern the Dock Company obtained additional powers in 
1844 to build a new dock to the east of the River Hull in the same location as that of 
the failed 1838 scheme. This represented the first eastward extension of the Hull 
docks. " The choice of site was not popular with the railway companies, who 
preferred a new dock on the western side of the town where their facilities were. This 
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point of view had the support of no less a figure than Robert Stephenson, who had 
been commissioned by the MSLR. YNMR and HSR in 1842 to prepare a report on 
proposals for future expansion of dock accommodation at Hull. He came out finnlý 
in favour of docks to the west of the town, which would facilitate railýNa,,, 
connections. " However. there was more room for dock development to the east of 
the River Hull and the proposed new dock had better access to both the Rivers Hull 
and Humber so, despite Stephenson's recommendations, the Dock Company decided 
to site the new dock to the east of the town. 77 
Called Victoria Dock, it opened on 3 rd July 185 0.7' The original entrance to 
the dock was from the River Hull, but an extension constructed on the southern side 
of the dock with an entrance to the River Humber was opened on 21s' March 1853.71 
The Dock Company initially thought that the provision of Victoria Dock 
would ease the situation at Hull but within a few years an increase in trade brought 
agitation for more dock facilities. There was also renewed discontent at the level of 
dock dues in respect of outward wharfage, which had been a concern for over twenty 
years. " A problem was that unlike the docks at Goole, Grimsby and West Hartlepool, 
which were owned by canal and railway companies with multifarious sources of 
revenue, where lower dock charges could be balanced by increases in those sources. 
the docks at Hull were owned by an independent company whose only source of 
revenue was dock dues. 
The positioning of Victoria Dock caused problems for the YNMR and the 
town. The YNMR, whose marshalling and dock facilities were in the west, had to 
construct 3 1/2 miles (51/2 km) of new railway to serve the dock. " The line was 
virtually a semicircle passing round the northern outskirts of the town. It ran on the 
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level with resulting level crossings on everv major road out of Hull. Objections ýýere 
82 
made but were ignored. As far as the civic authorities were concerned. at the time. 
the importance of railways completely eclipsed that of roads with the result that the 
matter was not raised in Parliamentary Committees. a lack of foresight which the 
Corporation would come to regret, unlike the situation in Liverpool where the 
Corporation refused to allow the Liverpool and Manchester Railway Companý- to 
cross streets on the level. " The line, with its numerous level crossings. was to be the 
cause of increasing road congestion in Hull for more than a hundred years. " This 
policy on the part of the Corporation would seem to indicate that although it was 
prepared to give support to independent lines it was, at the time, generally happy 
with the YNMR's position in the town. 
8. Problems faced by the Hull Dock Company. 
Despite the opening of Victoria Dock, by 1852, there was anxiety among commercial 
interests in Hull that its trade was likely to be affected by rival ports such as 
Hartlepool, Grimsby and Goole unless dock dues, which were higher than at those 
ports, were reduced. Hartlepool had railway connections since 1835 and, in 1848, the 
MSLR had completed its line to Grimsby and opened the Royal Dock in 1852. Also, 
in 1848, the LYR had gained access to Goole with its existing docks, owned by the 
ACN. In its report of 1850 the Hull Dock Company was forced to admit that whereas 
the trade of Hartlepool, Goole, Gainsborough and Grimsby had greatly increased, 
that of Hull had remained static. " 
One of Hull's major problems was the lack of return cargoes for ships using 
the port. " Ships were leaving Hull in ballast to sail to Newcastle and other nor-them 
ports to load coal for export. The root cause of this was the failure to develop a direct 
rail link between the port and the South Yorkshire coalfield with its reserves of hard 
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bunker coal. Despite this, it was to be almost twenty years before a direct link to I 
South Yorkshire was built, and even then its full potential would not be utilised. The 
rate of increase in the coal trade was slow. About 10.000 tons of coal was brought in 
by rail in 1849. This increased to 14,586 in 1850 and 25.215 tons in 185 L" 
A further problem at Hull was that of high charges. These ýN ere levied on the 
shipping of the port by four organisations; the Commissioners of Pilots, the Hull 
Dock Company, Hull Corporation, and Trinity House. In 1851 Hull Chamber of 
Commerce circulated an address to thousands of Hull ratepayers setting out its ý'ieWs 
on the subject of dock charges. A committee of fifty, including prominent merchants. 
shopkeepers and shipowners, supported a Bill for a reduction in dock dues. In the 
face of this general support for reduction of charges, agreement was reached with the 
Corporation and Trinity House to reduce their dues and the Dock Company accepted 
that competition meant that the previous high charges at Hull could not be sustained. 
Hartlepool was quoted as a major competitor, rates at that port being 11/2d. (1p. ) per 
ton lower than at Hull on most goods. The Dock Dues Bill of 1852 resulted in Hull 
Corporation abolishing its water bailiff dues, Trinity House reducing its primage by 
one third on inward and two thirds on outward goods, and reductions of between 20 
and 40 per cent in the Dock Company's dues. 88 
The Bill also contained a radical provision to transfer the docks to the 
Corporation of Hull. " As far back as 1844 the Corporation had remarked that, 
'unfortunately for the port the docks are in the hands of a monopoly. who are always 
looking for that which will bring them the greatest dividends. "' This was also the 
perception of the Board of Trade. " The Bill allowed the Corporation to purchase the 
docks, giving one month's notice. To finance the purchase it would have powers to 
borrow at interest such funds as were necessary, the cost to be borne out of the 
borough fund. Commercial interests were broadly in favour of the scheme, but when 
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87 CItN Archives, Hull, DPD/I 2 /6, Dock Company Annual report and Accounts, AGM, 3d February 
185 1. 
89 City Archives, Hull, TLP 
-3) 
1, Board of Trade Report, 15 th February 1861. 
'9 Cit-y' Archives, Hull, TLP 16, Kingston upon Hull Dues and Docks Bill, 1852. 
90 City Archives, Hull. TLP 90 6. Pamphlet issued by Hull Corporation in 1844. 
91 CO Archives. Hull, TLP 3 1, Board of Trade Report, 15 h FebrUarv 1861. 
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the general public became aware of the objectives of the Bill, there was an immediate 
outcry from the ratepayers. A pamphlet launched a bitter attack on the Bill, arguillo 
that: 'The town"s committee have most egregiously miscalculated the temper of 
Parliament as well as their fellow townsmen if they fancy they can place within the 
grasp of either the Corporation, or body of trustees, powers so arbitrary, so excessive 
and so capable of being abused as those which have been enumerated. ' In vieý, N- of the 
hostile public response the plans for the transfer were dropped. " 
Although the Corporation failed in its attempt to create a municipally owned 
dock trust the promotion of the 1852 Bill showed that an alliance of interests could 
force undertakings as conservative as the Dock Company, Trinity House and the 
Humber Conservancy to take action when it was shown that their activities were 
prqjudicial to the port. 
The next chapter will examine the evolution of the railway and dock 
monopoly at Hull. It will chart and examine the strategies of those who sought to 
sustain the monopolies and those whose aim was to defeat them. 
92 City Archives, Hu I I, TILP 16,25even papers on the port charges and dock question, Pamphlet 
published and printed by J. Pulleyn, Silver Street, Hull, 1852. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
THE EVOLUTION OF MONOPOLY, 1852-1879. 
1. Introduction. 
From 1854 the NER had control of the railway serving the port of Hull. Between that 
date and 1879 no independent railway proposed for Hull, and there were many. was 
successful, due in a large part to the opposition of the NER. The only railways 
connected to Hull were two seaside branches of little consequence and a line to 
Doncaster, supported by the Corporation and built by the NER, more as a spoiling 
tactic than a genuine attempt to improve the port's rail connections with the rest of 
the country. By the mid- I 870s it seemed that the NER had come to believe its own 
rhetoric that it was the only railway Hull needed. The weakness of the alternative 
railway schemes proposed in this period was that they ignored the inadequacy of the 
dock accommodation. Additional railways feeding traffic into the port would have 
exacerbated the problems at the docks. This was to be illustrated by a crisis in 1872. 
A crucial development occurred in 1878 when the Dock Company, prompted 
by the NER, acknowledged the inadequacy of dock accommodation and proposed a 
new deep-water dock to the east of the port. The Corporation raised objections that 
wrecked the scheme and, although many probably did not realise it at the time, this 
was the beginning of the end for both the NER monopoly and the Dock Company. 
The position of the Corporation moved from merely backing independent railway 
schemes towards involvement in a strategy whose result was a transformation of the 
dock and railway infrastructure of the port. 
It is clear that the NER was deeply resented in Hull. In particular. the traders 
of the town were incensed by its policy of charging equal rates from the West Riding 
to Hartlepool and Hull, but despite an almost continuous battle over the issue the 
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NER remained adamant. ' This suggests that the widespread support for the NER. 
kk, hich historians such as Tumock have detected among the re, -, Ion's business 
interests, did not extend to the Humber. ' This chapter will attempt to explain why. 
2. Railway development in Hull from 1852 to 1866. 
In 1852 there were no railways from Hull to anywhere but Selby to the west and 
Bridlington to the north. However, this was the period of the emergence of the 
seaside resort and several railway companies were developing their 'own' seaside 
resorts. ' The NER was prepared to tolerate railways from Hull serving this need. 
In 1852 a prospectus was issued for the Hull and Holderness Railway. It was 
to run from Hull to Withernsea on the coast. The leading figure behind this scheme 
was Anthony Bannister, the Mayor and a principal personage in the town, who held 
considerable coal interests in the West Riding. ' The railway opened on 27 th June 
R. J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company 1870-1914,4n Economic Histot),, (Leicester, 
1976)ý p. 12. Between 1854 and 1865 the company's equal rates policy had been discussed on nine 
occasions by parliamentary committees and upheld on each occasion. It was again upheld in 1872. 
P. M. Williams, *Public Opinion and the Railway Rates Question in 1886, ' The English Historical 
Review, Vol. 67, No. 262, (January 1952), pp. 67-71. A challenge to the equal rates policy appeared 
in the debate on the 1888 Railway and Canal Traffic Bill when the Earl of Jersey proposed an 
amendment which would have made the practice of equal rates illegal. Although supported by the 
Hull East MP, Frederick Grotrian, the amendment was defeated by the Lords on 29'1' April 1887. 
2 D. Tumock, An Historical Geography qf Railways in Great Britain and Ireland, (Aldershot, 1998), 
P. 19. 
3 J. Simmons, The Railiva 
,v 
in Town and Country, 1830-1914, (Leicester, 1978), pp. 255-259. 
Hull Central Library. Hessle Local History Socico, Newsletter, No. 23, July 1998. 
The concept of a railway into South Holderness and the establishment of the seaside resort of 
Withemsea was the brainchild of Anthony Bannister a Hull fish merchant, shipowner and coal 
exporter. Bannister was born in 1817. He was apprenticed to John Beadle, a merchant shipowner, 
and rose to become manager of the Humber Union Steam Shipping Company before striking out in 
his own merchant business. 
In 1845 Bannister became a town councillor for the North Myton Ward and was elected an 
Alderman in 1855. He served Hull as Sheriff in 1849 and 1850 before becoming Mayor for the first 
time in 185 1. As NN-cl] as being a Justice of the Peace, he served as Chairman of the Corporation's 
continued 
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1854. ' It was too small to be viable and was soon in financial trouble. The 
shareholders meeting of February 1855 was told that, *cheap construction is the 
secret of the company's success ... but traffic 
is thin. "' From Vt January 1860 it %ý-as 
leased to the NER which bought it outright on I't June 1862. ' 
A railway to the seaside town of Homsea from Arrarn on the Hull- 
Bridlington railway, a distance of 12 miles (19 km). had been authorised in 1846. ' 
However. after the downfall of George Hudson in 1849, the YNMR found itself in a 
position where expenditure had to be curtailed and the scheme was postponed along 
with several others. 9 Two other schemes were projected in 1861, the Be\ýerley and 
Hornsea and the Hedon and Aldbrough, but neither came before Parliament. " 
A railway from Hull to Hornsea was proposed in 1861 and was authorised on 
I Oth June 1862. " Powers were granted in the Act for working arrangements with the 
committee to see through the project for a new town hall. Bannister's interests included establishing 
the Hull Working Men's Club in 1864 and building a new theatre in the same year. 
Bannister lived at High Paul] House in the 1850s and regularly sailed from Paul] to his Hull office 
in his yacht. It would be an exaggeration to say that Withernsea proved to be 'the death of him', but 
there is some irony in the fact that the last full day of his life was spent in the town he had done so 
much to promote. He developed a cold whilst taking part in a regatta and, claiming that he was 
'about all right', spent the next day at Withernsea. In the evening he made the returnjourney home 
by train, first to Hull and then to Hessle where he died on the night of the I 8th of July 1878, aged 
6 1. Withernsea named one of its streets after him. 
5 Herepath's Journal, 12"' May 1855. 
6 Ibid, 17 1h February 1855. 
7 M. Thompson, The Railwavs ol-Hull and East Yorkshire, (Beverley. 1992), p. 10 1. See also G. G. 
MacTurk, A Historl, qf the Hull Railways, (Hull, 1879), p. 137. 
Herepath's Journal, 10th March 1860. The Hull and Holdemess Railway was sold to the NER on 
the following terms: The rent to be equal to 31/2% of the paid up capital of E106,800 in 1860 and 
1861 and 4% in 1862. Thereafter powers were to be sought for the transfer of Hull and Holderness 
stock to NER 4% preference stock. 
8 W. W. Tomlinson, North Eastern Railwqv, (Newton Abbot edition, 1967), p. 472. 
9 A. J. Peacock, The Railway King, Fol. 2, (York, 1989), pp. )22-')92. 
R. S. Lambert, The Railway King, (London, 1964). pp. 241-250. 
Tornlinson, North Eastern Railway, p. 499. 
10 Ibid., p. 607. 
11 Thompson, The Railivai's (? / Hull and East )'orkshire. p. 107. 
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NER. " Due to unexpected difficulties in construction the line was not opened to 
traffic until 28 th March 1864. Trains were operated by the NER. Like the NA'Ithernsea 
line. the Hornsea branch was soon in financial trouble. In September 1865 its 
chairman noted that the half-yearly report disclosed 'a barren state of affairs'. " A 
merger with the NER was sought and a Wharricliffe meeting on 2 nd April 1866 
approved a proposed amalgamation Bill. The NER was to work the line for 55% of 
traffic receipts. 14 The transfer occurred on 16 th jUly 1866. " Thus. although two 
railways had been projected from the NER stronghold of Hull. both were terminal 
branches to the coast and dependent on connections with the NER at their Hull 
termini. It took only 12 years for both railways to become part of the NER, an 
outcome which the latter company doubtless foresaw when they were first proposed. 
Although the seaside railways presented no threat to the NER, a proposal for 
an independent railway from Hull to Market Weighton via Brough in September 
1856 was a different matter. 16 This was a revival of the 1847 scheme and had the 
support of the Corporation and the Mayor, Bannister, who promised to use his 
influence with the NER to gain its support. Evidently his influence was less than he 
supposed as the NER vigorously opposed the scheme. 17 In view of this opposition the 
12 Hull Times, I I'll October 1862. 
13 Herepath'sJournal, 27"' May 1865 &3 oth September 1865. 
14 Railway Times, 2 I't April 1866. 
J. Simmons & G. Biddle (eds. ), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 
1997), p. 561. A Whamcliffe meeting was a meeting of proprietors to approve a Bill promoted by a 
company. It was named after Lord Wharricliffe (1776-1845) under whose influence the Lords made 
an order requiring the directors of any company wishing to extend its powers to secure the 
agreement of at least three-fifths of the shareholders at a special meeting before taking the proposal 
into Parliament. The order went into force in 1846, shortly after his death. 
15 City Archives, Hull, TLP 98, Hull and Hornsea and NER Bill for amalgamating the undertaking of 
the Hull and Hornsea Railway Company and the NER. (1866). 
16 East Riding Archives, Beverley, DDMT 649, Poster for Hull - Market Weighton Railway. 
Herepath'sJournal, 5"' July 1856, reported on a proposal for Hull to Market Weighton RailýNaý. It 
was to run from BrouQ1, h to Market Weighton, a distance of 10 miles. The cost was estimated at 
E6,000 per mile. 
Tomlinson, North Eastern RailwaY, p. 553- 
17 MacTurk , .4 
Historl, (? I'the Hull Railways, p. 133. 
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promoters withdreýý- The NER opposed the scheme because it wished to connect 
Market Weighton with Beverley and thus provide a route from York to Hull o\, Cr its 
own lines. The YNMR had obtained powers to build the line from Market Weighton 
to Beverley in 1849 but a committee of investigation had presented the shareholders 
with an adverse report, with the result that the powers lapsed and the line \Nas not 
finally built until 1865. " This episode clearly illustrates that the NER was prepared 
to tolerate lines that it did not consider a threat to its monopoly but would 
energetically oppose those which it did. 
3. A new dock for Hull and a proposal for a Dock Trust. 
One reason for the lack of enthusiasm for new railways to Hull was that they would 
feed more traffic into an inadequate dock system. What was required was increased 
dock accommodation. In 1860, in an attempt to address this problem, the West Dock 
Company was formed by a group of local businessmen, with the backing of the 
Corporation, to construct a new dock on the foreshore to the west of the entrance to 
Humber Dock. Whether the new dock was a serious proposal or a ploy to jolt the 
Hull Dock Company out of its complacency is open to debate. Nonetheless, the Dock 
Company was galvanised into action. It introduced a plan for a new dock on the 
same site as that proposed by the West Dock Company. The rival schemes came 
before Parliament and it was the scheme of the Hull Dock Company that prevailed, 
the rival scheme being withdrawn. reinforcing suspicions that it had not been a bona- 
fide proposal. " 
The Bill received the Royal Assent in 1861 but several conditions were 
imposed . 
2' The most important of these, in view of subsequent events, was that the 
Dock Company should consent to the sale and transfer of its undertaking to a public 
18 K. H oo I e, 4 Regional Histoty qf the Railways qf Great Britain. Vol. 4, (Newton Abbot, 19 7 8). p. 
54. 
19 City Archives, Hull, TLP -33], 
West Dock Company Prospectus. 
Hull Thnes, 20"' April 186 1. 
Citý Archives, Hull, TLP 3 1, Kingston upon Hull Docks (Ne\\ Works) Bill. 186 1. 
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body in the e%, ent of Hull Corporation bringing a Bill into Parliament for that 
purpose, and giving security for the payment of the purchase money. 
Restrictions were placed on dividends to be paid, which were limited to 5% 
until the new dock was opened. After the opening 6% could be paid. If the Dock 
Company was prepared to reduce its rates on shipping and goods by 30% then the 
dividend could be increased to 7%, which was the maximum to be allowed. " This 
was an indication of Parliament's opinion that the Dock Company had preý'Iously 
been operated too much to the advantage of the shareholders and to the detriment of 
traders. Also imposed was a schedule of rates on all goods shipped or discharged. 
The shock of the promotion of a rival dock caused the Dock Company to 
further consider its position, and in 1861 its directors admitted that accommodation 
had been deficient for some time past. and in addition to the new western dock they 
had decided to extend Victoria Dock. 22 The extension of 12 acres (5 hectares) to the 
east of Victoria Dock was started in June 1862 and completed in 1864.23 
Work on the new western dock began in 1863 but by 1866 the Dock 
Company was running short of capital and promoted a Bill to raise a further 
f3 50,000. Hull Corporation, wishing to keep alive the idea of a dock trust. petitioned 
against the Bill on the grounds that the Dock Company had not exercised due 
diligence under the Act of 1861 . and should 
immediately be vested in a public trust. 
Despite this the Bill received the Royal Assent on II th June 1866. " The new dock, 
,?, )nd jUIV . 
25 named Albert Dock, finally opened on 22 ý 
1869 
Still determined to pursue its scheme, in 1866 the Corporation introduced a 
Bill for the vesting of the docks in trustees. giving the borough rate as a security. The 
Bill was opposed by the Dock Company and the principal ratepayers, who did not 
want to be saddled with the financial burden of purchasing the docks. They 
21 City Archives, Hull, TLP 3 1, Board of Trade Report, 15 th February 1861. 
22 City Archives, Hull, DPD, 'l 2/6. Dock Company Annual report and Accounts. AGM, 3 rd February 
1862. 
23 Ibid., Dock Company Reports, 2 nd February 1863 &2 nd February 1864. 
'4 Citv Archives, Hull, TLP 90, Hull Docks Act, 1866. 
'5 Hull Times, 223 
rd j ul 1869. 
Figure 28. Albert and William Wri0ht Dock. 
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considered that the schenie would lead to a massive increase in the borough rate. 26 
The Dock Company alleged that the Bill in question ýNas unauthorised by the Dock 
Act of 1861 and so unfair that the directors thought it right to oppose it. 27 Parliament 
agreed and decided not to grant Hull Corporation the powers it sought. 28 
Having gained this victory the Dock Company strengthened its position vis-6- 
O's the Dock Trust issue when, in 1867, it received a subscription of f9,000 from 
Trinity House and f-50.000 from the LYR. After this subscription George Wilson, the 
chairman of the LYR, was appointed as its representative and took a seat on the Dock 
Company board. " This increase in railway representation on the board was to be 
extremely significant when the Dock Company was invited to construct a new dock 
in 1879. 
4. The NER's attempts to control and maintain monopoly. 
By 1854 the NER had secured sole access to the port of Hull by rail, but was 
concerned about possible competition from the LYR and MSLR. As we have seen 
the LYR port of Goole was a rival to Hull and since the late 1840s the LYR and the 
ACN had been co-operating to send traffic from West Yorkshire. This was causing 
concern to the NER as not only were the ACN rates lower than those charged by the 
railway for some traffic, but also the goods were loaded into sea-going vessels from 
river craft, thus escaping the payment of dock dues. However, as mentioned earlier, 
as part of the 1854 agreement for ending the joint lease of the HSR, the NER had 
obtained an undertaking from the LYR that it would not use the port of Goole to 
compete for traffic going to Hull. 30 
26 Hull Times, 21"& 281h April 1866. 
27 City Archives, Hull, DPD/l 2/6, Dock Company Annual report and Accounts, AGM, 3 rd February 
1866. 
28 Ibid., Dock Company Annual report and Accounts, AGM, 2 
nd February 1867. 
29 , rd Ibid., Dock Company Annual report and Accounts, AGM, _1 
February 1868. 
30 Toni linson, Vorth Eastern Railivaj), p. 55 1. See also. D. Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railwaý 1854- 
1880. A Study in Railway consolidation and competition', (Unpublished PhD Thesis. Leeds 
UniversitN. 197 ])ý p. ') 1. 
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The MSLR had opened its own dock across the River Humber at Grimsb" 
and was competing for traffic from South Yorkshire and the North Midlands. It had 
two screw-driven steam lighters plying between New Holland and a goods depot in 
Hull on land owned by the NER. " However. the MSLR found the use of ferries to 
sustain the competition expensive and its long-terrn strategy was to coerce the NER 
into a suitable agreement. The first step towards this was the giving up, in December 
1854ý by the NER of its relatively unimportant passenger ferry service from Hessle 
to Barton-upon-Humber, leaving the MSLR in sole charge of Humber passenger 
ferries. 32 
There followed an important series of agreements over rates. As Channon has 
shown, railway companies in the mid-nineteenth century were keen to maximise 
their returns by way of such collusion. '3A rate and pooling agreement, known as the 
first Humber Agreement, was concluded in January 1855 between the NER, MSLR, 
LYR and LNWR. Under this the signatories divided receipts on certain goods from 
places in Lancashire, including Manchester and Liverpool, to Hull and Grimsby. This 
effectively ended the competition which had previously existed between the 
companies for the carriage of goods from Lancashire, the West Riding of Yorkshire 
and the North Midlands to the ports of Hull, Grimsby and Goole. In December 1855 
representatives of the LNWR, MR, NER and MSLR met at Derby to discuss traffic 
arrangements between Sheffield and Hull, and for traffic which the MR collected on 
its own lines and those of other railways including the LNWR. This was, in fact. all 
traffic from South Yorkshire and the Midlands. The subsequent agreement, known as 
the Midland Agreement, was for an equal division of traffic between the NER 
Norinanton route and the MSLR New Holland route on traffic from south of 
Sheffield, and for the division of Sheffield traffic in the proportions of 60% to the 
G. Dow, Great Central, 1'01.1, (London, 1959), p. 171. 
Central Library, Hull. Chamber of Commerce and Shipping Report ,I 9th May 1848. 
Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railway 1854-1880. A Study in Railway consolidation and 
competition', p. 224. 
G. Channoii, Railiva. vs in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, (Aldershot, 200 1), pp. I 10- 
12 33. 
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NER and 40% to the MSLR. MR traffic from Bradford to Hull was to go by either 
route for the same rates. These arrangements came into force on I" January 1856.34 
This was not the total extent of collusion among the raikvays serving Hull. At 
the same time another agreement, the second Humber Agreement, was being drawn 
up between the MSLR, the NER and the LYR to divide receipts from traffic between 
Hull and Grimsby and Manchester, Liverpool, Stalybridge and Ashton-under-Lyne. 
Receipts were to be split between the MSLR on the one side and the NER and LYR 
on the other. In addition it was agreed that neither Goole nor any other port on the 
North East Coast was to compete unduly with Hull and Grimsby. 35 The agreement 
was extended by the Hartlepool Agreement in 1856 to include all the ports between 
the Tees and Tyne. The negotiation was an ongoing process. the final agreement 
being produced in 1870. " 
Representatives from all the companies involved in the agreements met at 
regular intervals in what became known as the Humber Conference. By this means 
they were able to regulate the traffic to all the ports between the Humber and the 
Tyne and monitor rates charged by ship owners to ensure that these had a minimal 
effect on railway charges. 37 
Together with the control of rates came a predictability of receipts. 
Companies were enabled to send goods by other companies' routes, if they found 
this to be more advantageous or remunerative. The division of receipts allowed by 
the agreements worked to the advantage of the railway companies but not necessarily 
to the merchants and shipowners of Hull, who felt that this restriction of competition 
was a disadvantage to the expansion of their businesses. In Hull apprehension was 
34 Channon, Raih4,, q_vs in Britain and the United, ýtates, pp. I 10- 112. 
Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railway 1854-1880. A Study in Railway consolidation and 
competition', p. 222. 
36 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 527/568, NER agreements with MSLR, etc. 
Agreement dated 02,101/1865 with MSLR, LNWR and LYR. 
Agreement dated 02/01/1870 with MSLR. 
Agreement dated 02/01/1870 with MSLR, LNWR and LYR. 
Appendix 2. Extract from the Humber Agreement 1870. 
37 P. S. Bagwcll, The Railway Clearing House in the British EconomY, 1842-1922, (London, 1968). 
pp. 160-16-33. 
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caused by two factors: firstly, the rapid expansion of Goole. Grimsby and \ý'est 
Hartlepool and secondly, problems due to the perceived inefficiencY of the Dock 
Company. The only opposition to the NER at Hull was from the ACN and coastal 
shipping. Railway competition had been eliminated. 
Even water-borne competition was under threat. Competition with rail"-ay 
companies was crippling the ACN. Total tonnage carried had fallen from _32,000 
in 
31 1850 to less than 23,000 in 1854. In 1856 talks began on a proposal for the NER 
and LYR to jointly purchase the ACN. Agreement could not be reached and the LYR 
withdrew from the negotiations in 1857. The NER offered to take a lease of the ACN 
alone, but the proprietors refused to allow the ACN to become part of the NER. They 
were no doubt influenced by the hold the NER had on Hull. Had the NER withdrawn 
from the negotiations it is likely that the ACN would have been absorbed by the 
LYR. The result was, ironically, a strengthening of the ACN's position. The 
navigation managed to struggle on and negotiated new agreements with the NER 
regarding the coal trade in 1862.39 In 1864 the ACN introduced container boats for 
the bulk carriage of coal and other goods. and thereafter was able to compete on 
equal terms with the railway companies . 
4' By 1875 it was carrying more than 
200,000 tons annually. " However, this was competition between two modes which 
were careful not to enter into ruinous rate-cutting. 
5. The consolidation of the NER monopoly. 
Despite the NER's near monopoly it was still open to competition from established 
railway companies seeking to enter its territory. The LNWR's designs on West 
Hartlepool in the mid- I 860s threatened a challenge to the NER, s regional monopoly. 
In 1863 the NER absorbed the SDR, which left only one independent railway system 
38 M. Clarke, personal communication, Aire & Calder Navigation statistics. 
39 J. D. Porteous. 'A New Canal Port in the Railway Age: Railway Projection to Goole, 1830-1914'. 
Transport History, I" Series, Vol. 2, No. 1, (March 1969), p. 4-3 ). 
40 H. Crabtree, M. Clarke, (ed), Railwa. i, on the Water, (Goole, 1993), pp. 18-29. 
London & North Eastern RaiIii'qv,! IIaQa--ine, (August 1935), pp. 442-444. 
41 M. Clarke, personal communication, Aire & Calder Navigation statistics. 
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in the North-east. 42 This was the West Hartlepool Railway and its ally. the C le% eland 
Railway. The West Hartlepool Railway was in serious financial difficulties and had 
approached the LNWR for help. offering running powers to West Hartlepool and its 
dock. Although they had initially approached the LNWR the directors subsequently 
decided that amalgamation with the NER would be advantageous, a sentiment 
reciprocated by the latter. " 
The West Hartlepool Company had been formed in 1852. Its business affairs 
had been run in a scandalous manner. The company exceeded its borrowing powers 
by at least f2,380,000. As security for a loan of f, 100,000 made to the company by 
the LNWR in 1862, one side of the dock was illegally conveyed to that company, in 
contravention of parliamentary standing orders. So serious were these events that a 
report by a Lords Select Committee charged to investigate the affairs of the West 
Hartlepool Company concluded that if the chain-nan, Ralph Ward Jackson, or his co- 
directors were found guilty of charges brought against them, the authority of the 
House should be exercised to ensure their prosecution. " 
Contemporary opinion judged that these activities at West Hartlepool 
amounted to unfair competition. In 186-33 a letter accused the Hartlepool Railway and 
Dock Company of, 'landing and delivering merchandise for nothing merely to injure 
Hull, and issuing illegal bonds to finance this system. "" 
It was clear that amalgamation was the only way forward. Even Jackson, who 
had been forced to resign, suggested in a letter to the Railway Times that the time had 
42 City Archives, Hull, TLP 77, Act for the amalgamation of the Stockton and Darlington Railway 
Company with the North Eastern Railway Company dated l3th July 18633- 
43, Tomlinson, North Eastern Railway, p. 614. 
44 City Archives, Hull, TLP 77, Select Committee of House of Lords Report dated I't June 1863. 
Darlington Local Studies Library, Pease Papers No. 6, contains a letter dated 3 Oth August 1871 
from Ralph Ward Jackson to the NER in which he refutes a charge by the latter that he 
appropriated f 15,615 2s. 6d. (f 1516.12) from the West Hartlepool Company for his own use. He 
complains of harassment by the NER. The case had been filed in Chancery by the NER on 27th 
November 1866. 
Darlington Local Studies Library, V415J, NER v. R. W. Jackson. Judgement of Lord Chancellor 
I Td Bacon on -3 
December 1870 found that Jackson had appropriated f 8,000 of Dock Company funds. 
The NER also stied for a further E5,800 paid by the cornpan-y to Jackson. 
Hcrcpalh's. Journal, Xh July 1863. 
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come for amalgamation. The periodical agreed with him on the subject of 
amalgamation, but not with the LNWR, saying: -somebody must act in defence of 
West Hartlepool and if the directors will not do so then they must submit to the 
uncalled-for intrusion of Mr. Jackson. Hoxý-ever. the NER would heartily appreciate 
West Hartlepool inasmuch it would give them their own port. "' By 14 th November 
1864 terms had been agreed with the NER. Part of the agreement was that equal 
traffic rates would apply to all the ports served by the NER. " 
As a result of this the Bill for the proposed amalgamation met xvith stiff 
opposition from commercial interests in Hull. A deputation from the port opposing 
the Bill appeared before the Commons Committee. But not all in Hull were against 
the scheme. William Wright, deputy chairman of the Hull Dock Company, which had 
recently received a subscription of f, 50,000 from the NER, and Anthony Bannister, a 
Hull coal merchant with substantial interests in collieries served by the NER, and a 
member of Hull Corporation, both supported the Bill. " The opposing deputation 
thought that they had got protective clauses inserted when the chairman of the 
committee said that they had the committee's decision. Howe"'er, on the following 
morning he changed this to 'the committee had noted the opinion expressed'. 
Whether this was the result of a misunderstanding or a case of the chairman having 
second thoughts is not clear. The opposing deputation announced that they would 
pursue their case in the Lords since it was clear that majority opinion in Hull 
continued to be steadfastly opposed to the Bill, at least on the terms proposed. The 
conduct of Bannister in giving evidence against the Hull deputation led to him being 
censured by the Chamber of Commerce and forced to resign from the Parliamentary 
Committee of Hull Corporation. " 
46 RailivaY Timcs, )01h April 1864. 
47 Clity Archives, Hull, TLP 77, Act for the amalgamation of the Stockton and Darlington Railway 
Company \ýJth the North Eastern Railway Company dated 13 th jUly 1863. 
48 G. R. Hawke, Railwaývs and Economic Growth in England and Wales, (Oxford, 1970), p. -3 )29. 
HmN ke states: In 186-33 the NER noted, 'Mr. Anthony Bannister, having asked the companý to 
reduce the rates between Silkestone and Haigh Moor coal to Withemsea in order to enable him to 
compete with water borne coal, it is resolved that a reduction of I '- (5p. ) per ton be made on 
condition that Mr. Bannister makes a proportionate reduction in the selling price of the coal'. 
49 Hull and Eastern Counties Herald, 18"' May 1865. 
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Hull Corporation. with the backing of the Chamber of Commerce and local 
merchants and traders, continued to allege that the NER's equal rates policy WOUld 
be injurious to Hull. The Corporation argued publicly that the NER's subscription of 
f50, OOO to the Hull Dock Company had been to neutralise its opposition to the 
scheme. A public meeting held in Hull on 7 th May 1865 unanimously resolx, ed to 
petition the Lords. The petition was scathing regarding the Dock Company's position 
vJth regard to the NER. It pointed out that in consideration of the NER*s f50, OOO 
subscription either Wright, or the secretary, William Huffam, would be available to 
give evidence in favour of the Bill. It went on to allege that although Wright would 
do as the NER wished it was unlikely that Huffam. would do so as he was a man of 
principle. The inference regarding Wright was unstated, but obvious. Although the 
Corporation did not do so it might have pointed out that Wright had appeared 
supporting the opposite side of the argument in May 1862, when he had given 
evidence before the Commons Committee examining the Hull Doncaster Railway 
Bill. Then he had complained of the NER favouring Hartlepool over Hull with regard 
to rates. ý` 
The NER was prepared to pay a high price to secure a monopoly of the 
North-east. The West Hartlepool Company's half-yearly report of 25 th February 1865 
stated that from July 1865, the NER would guarantee a dividend of 4%. The West 
Hartlepool directors had found that for the company to attain such a rate of dividend 
independently, the past rate of increase in traffic would have to be maintained for 
many years. However, a considerable portion of the increase had been derived from 
The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 527/1275. The NER kept a file of cuttings of newspaper 
articles which reported the enmity caused by the equal rates policy toward Hartlepool. The Hull 
Packet of 12 1h May 1865 carried reports of the defection of Bannister and Wright and blamed them 
for the failure of the protective clauses. Wright confessed he had changed his opinions but the 
article pointed out that Bannister originally opposed the policy and then appeared before Parliament 
supporting it. He had even led a deputation to York opposing equal rates. It was suggested that if 
the NER got the Bill he could have his coal carried more cheaply, an allegation that Bannister 
denied. 
50 City Archives, Hull, TLP 36, Hull Doncaster Railway Bill Parliamentary Proceedings, 27h Maý 
1862. 
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sources no longer capable of growth. In the circumstances the board considered that 
a guaranteed dividend of 4% could not be rejected. 51 
Whatever the reasons for the NER's position it could not expect support from 
Hull Corporation. nor from traders who demanded not only that the NER should 
charge a uniform mileage rate from all its ports to the Lancashire manufacturing 
districts but also that the dues and other charges levied on shipping at West 
Hartlepool should not be less than those levied at Hull. At the Commons stage 
clauses embodying these demands were inserted in the amalgamation Bill. 52 Tliey 
were opposed not only by the two railway companies but also bN- Wright. 
representing the Hull Dock Company, and Bannister, on the grounds that he was 
representing the coal interest and did not want West Hartlepool to fall into the hands 
of the LNWR. " 
The Hull interests assumed that they had been successful in having the 
protective clauses inserted in the Bill but the clauses finally inserted were diluted to 
the extent that they did nothing to safeguard Hull's position. Hull secured only a 
promise that the NER would not charge more for any services rendered at Hull than 
it would for the like services rendered at West Hartlepool. 54 
When this news reached Hull meetings were held with a view to continuing 
opposition to the Bill in the House of Lords. " Bannister's faction argued against this, 
saying that if West Hartlepool fell into the hands of the LNWR this would provide 
51 City Archives, Hull, TLP 77, West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway Company half-yearly report 
dated 24' h February 1865. 
52 Ibid., The main protective clause suggested by the Hull interests was as follows: 'And in order to 
secure the impartial treatment of ports and places on or near the railways of the company. Be it 
enacted that all tolls, rates, and charges upon or in respect of the railways of the company shall be 
charged equally to each class of traffic in proportion to the mileage passed over by the traffic and 
the terminal charges at all stations and termini shall be alike for like traffic under like 4= 
circumstances and no reduction or advance in any such tolls, rates, charges or terminal charges 
shal I be rnade either directl,, I or indirectly in favour of or against any particular port or place or in 
favour of or against traffic pursuing or destined for any particular route'. 
53 Easicrn A lorning,, Vcws, 16"' May 1865. 
54 Cit,, Archives, Hull. TLP 77, Act for the amalgamation of the West Hartlepool Harbour and 
Railway Company and the Cleveland Railwaý Company with the NER dated 5t" Julý 1865. 
S5 Easlciw Ilornh7g, %*ews, 29"' May 1865. 
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competition to Hull. Furthermore they asserted that Hull enjoyed the same advantage 
over Liverpool in Lancashire traffic as the amalgamation would giý, e 'ýA'est 
Hartlepool in traffic from the West Riding. The problem. they argued, was not 
monopoly pricing but lack of coal traffic and poor dock facilities. There ýýas some 
truth in this assertion. yet the Hull traders and the Corporation expressed support for 
a petition to the Lords. Although the Dock Company did not oppose the Bill in the 
Lords. one of its directors, later to become its chain-nan, did. E. P. Maxsted, a com 
merchant of Hull, drew attention to a report by the NER's own chainnan which 
stated that in order to pay the 4% dividend guaranteed to the West Hartlepool 
shareholders, it would be necessary for the company to double its traffic to that port. 
extra traffic which could only be gained at the expense of Hull. " It was all in vain as 
the Lords rejected the petition for the protective clauses. " 
The NER had now achieved a complete railway monopoly extending from 
the Humber to the Tyne. Almost all railways east of the Pennines were in its 
ownership. It had overcome challenges from the LYR, MSLR and various 
independent schemes. The accommodations it had negotiated with possible rival 
companies had removed the threat of effective competition within its geographical 
area of control. It had, in the process of achieving this position, made implacable 
enemies of most of the merchants, ship owners and the Corporation of Hull. That the 
NER had, in the eyes of the last, aligned itself with West Hartlepool, the port that 
represented the greatest threat to Hull, was seen as an act of base treachery. Hull was 
very conscious of its position as the third port of the country and resented what was 
seen as an attempt by the NER to give advantage to the upstart port of Hartlepool, 
both by its policy of equal rates and its amalgamation with the West Hartlepool 
Railway. " On the other hand the NER argued that it had done its best for Hull and 
56 City Archives, Hull, TLP 77, Amalgamation of the Undertaking of the West Hartlepool Harbour 
and Railway Company and the Cleveland Railway Company with that of the NER. Lords 
,d Parliamentary Committee proceedings, _) 
June 1865. 
Figure 7. Edward Philip Maxsted. 
1 
57 Eastern ;I forning, Veivs. 4"' July 1865. 
58 D. J. Starkey. Shipping, l fovemenis in the Ports qf the t 'niied kingdom, 1, ý71-1913, (Exeter, 1999). 
p. 18. Objectively, Hartlepool Could never be seen as a rival to Hull. In 1881 it handled less than 
lialf the tonnage of Hui] and this had fallen to less than one quarter bN 1906. 
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that the problems it faced were largely on account of the inadequacy of the dock 
facilities and management of the Hull Dock Company. Nonetheless feelings ran high 
iii Hull. Letters to the newspapers condemned the NER. One signed, -A Merchant' 
asked: Is there no way open for this town to assert its rights against the gigantic 
monopoly of the NER? Is it right that a town should be sold and handed over to the 
tender mercies of the NER and trade sacrificed to Hartlepool? "' Such perceptions 
carried far more weight than any conclusions drawn by disinterested observers. 
From 1865 onwards the NER was to be subject to constant harassment by 
demands for an independent railway to Hull. Rather than diminish as time passed, the 
level of protest against the NER from merchants, shipowners and the Corporation 
increased. The mood was not improved by the Royal Commission on Railways of 
1865-67, which vindicated the position of the NER, despite attacks on the railway 
policy of the latter given in evidence by Hull businessmen. 60 
The fact was that the NER was part of a transport oligopoly rather than a 
monopoly as far as Hull and, indeed, the other ports of North-east England were 
concerned. Specific to Hull was the waterway competition offered by the ACN 
which, after 1864, was able to compete very successfully with the railway, 
particularly in bulk goods, and was a cause of lower rates on the railway between 
Hull and the industrial West Riding. But the main source of competition, at all of the 
NER ports, was coastal shipping. This remained an expanding industry until 1913, 
after which it declined by almost 50% at the end of the Great War. " It was in most 
cases a more economical means of bulk transport than the railways as it offered 
economies of scale. In Britain in 1910, for example, the ton-mileage of freight traffic 
59 Eastern Alforning Neirs, 16 Ih May 1865. 
60 D. Brooke. 'The Struggle between Hull and the North Eastern Railway', Journal Qf Transport 
Hivoi-v, Vol. 1, No. 4, (September 1972), p. 224. 
61 P. Ford & J. A. Bound, Coastivise shipping and the Small Ports, (Oxford, 195 1)ý p. 2. 
I rd J. Armstrong, Journal qf Transport History,, -5 
Series, Vol. 8, No. 2, (September 1987), p. 176. 
Armstrong compares the coastal trade in 1910 with that of canals and railýý aN s. showing that 
coastal shipping carried about 25 percent of the tonnage of the railways and more than twice as 
much as canals. 
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carried by coastal shipping was 59%, by railways 39%, and canals 2%. 62 
Significantly. some of the strongest competition was over the flows of coal from the 
ports of the North-east. 
63 
The perceived monopoly was more diffuse at Hull as the NER \\cre not 
masters of the docks. But even so. the NER"s policy towards the Dock Company, 
however understandable from a business perspective, did nothing to improve its 
standing with the town's commercial interests. The NER subscription in 1865 of 
E50,000 to the Dock Company presaged negotiations regarding a lease or 
amalgamation . 
6' This heightened fears of monopoly. Although it had been assumed 
that Hull Corporation would put aside its grievances in the interests of the port and 
support the NER in its negotiations with the Dock Company. this was not so. The 
Corporation still favoured a dock trust and had rights under the Dock Act of 1861 to 
be infon-ned of negotiations concerning amalgamation. A meeting of representatives 
of the NER, Hull Chamber of Commerce and Hull Corporation was held on 25 th 
September 1865, but agreement could not be reached as onerous clauses, imposed by 
the Corporation, resulted in NER withdrawal from negotiations with the bodies 
representing civic and commercial interests in Hull. 65 
The question of rates became increasingly entangled in national debates on 
the issue. Hull Chamber of Commerce vainly attacked the NER rates policy at Hull 
in evidence to the Royal Commission on railways on several occasions in the 1860s 
and 1870s. In October 1867 the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Stephen 
West, drew attention to the position of the port with respect to the NER. He said that 
they had laid before the Railway Commissioners their case and stated their 
grievances, which seemed to be thoroughly understood by the Commission. It was 
62 P. S. Bagwell & P. Lyth, Transport in Britain - From Canal Lock to Gridlock, (London, 2002), p. Z: ý 
59. 
63 J. Armstrong & A. Kunz, Coastal ýhipping and the European Economy, 1750-1980, (Mainz, 
2002), p. 14. 
64 Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railway 1854-1880. A Study in Railway consolidation and 
competition', p. 250. 
65 Eavel-17 I lorning Yews, 91h October 1865. 
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therefore regretted all the more by the traders that the decision of the Commissi ion 
had gone against them. 66 
The problem was not peculiar to Hull. By 1872 a Joint Select Committee of 
Parliament found that: 'It may be taken as a general rule that there is now no actiN C 
competition between different railways in the matter of rates and fares. * 67 The 
complaints rumbled on and developed into a more general discontent with the whole 
system of railway price fixing, which was considered by many traders to be 
detrimental to commerce generally. The railway companies' reaction in many cases 
was to assume a 'public service' stance. 68 
The NER could be described as a discriminating railway monopolist in that 
its rates were determined by reference to the charges that traffic would bear. " This 
represented the maximum figure the company could get for its services taking 
account of the competitive position it faced in different areas of business. " This is a 
valid argument but it does not take account of the fact that by means of agreements 
with other railway companies the NER was part of a cartel, created to safeguard its 
position and to stifle competition from railways and inland waterways. 
None of this, however, helped the Hull traders because most of the movement 
of their traffic, with the exception of that carried by the ACN, occurred in areas 
where the railway company was not subject to competition. In June 1885, just before 
the imposition of rates on a national scale under the 1888 Act, Hull Chamber of 
66 Central Library, Hull. Chamber of Commerce and Shipping AGM, I Wh October 1867. 
67 Bagwel I, The RailwaY Clearing House in the British Economy, p. 263. 
68 Channon, Railways in Britain and the USA, p. 126. 
69 G. R. Hawke, 'Pricing policy of railways in England and Wales before 188 F, in M. C. Reed, (ed. ). 
Railivays in the Iictorian Economy, (Newton Abbot, 1969), pp. 76-110. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 177. The note appended to the list of rates submitted by the NER to the 
Railway Commission in 1888 stated: 'Charges are not regulated by a mileage charge, nor solely 
according to distance. Within the limits of the company's legal powers they are determined bý the 
considerations in the special circumstances of each case, of what will fairly remunerate the 
company for their current and capital expenditure, and of what the traffic is able to bear'. 
70 Irving, Thc, 'Vorth Eastern Railivqv Company 18-0-1914. . 4n 
Economic History. p. 128. 
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Commerce was still arguing that the NER showed undue preference to the northern 
ports. " 
6. The Hull and Doncaster Railway. 
One way in which Hull might have redressed the alleged preference shown b\ the 
NER was to develop railway connections with the south. where it held a 
geographical advantage over the northern ports. But until the opening of the Hull to 
Doncaster railway in 1869, it suffered from poor railway connections with the south. 
There was a route by N\.,, ay of the ferry across the Humber, and then by the MSLR or 
GNR to London. However, to avoid crossing the Humber the circuitous route was by 
the NER to Milford Junction. then over the LYR and GNR to London. Milford 
Junction had been notorious for its poor connections since Hudson's days. What was 
needed was a direct link from Null to South Yorkshire, with its vast coal reserves, 
and on to the capital, which would greatly benefit both goods and passenger traffic. 
In 1855 a scheme was proposed for the Hull, Goole and Doncaster Railway 
which hoped to raise Hull to the position of a major coal shipping port. " The scheme 
rnet with little support and nothing came of it. " In 1860, ever anxious to open 
another railway route to Hull, the Corporation supported a proposal for a railway 
from Staddlethorpe on the Hull-Selby railway to Doncaster. This would not only 
provide a more convenient route to London but would give South Yorkshire coal a 
direct route to Hull. Despite the backing of the Corporation the scheme received little 
financial support as, at this time, Hull was preoccupied with proposals for the 
construction of the new dock on the western side of the town. Predictably the NER 
opposed the railway scheme saying that money would be better spent on the 
provision of increased dock facilities. " This was a valid point, but raised suspicions 
in Hull that the NER was attempting to thwart the scheme and was using the dock 
question as a pretext for this. 
71 Central LibrarN. Hull. Chamber of Commerce Report and AGM, -')O'h 
October 1885. 
72 Tomlinson, North Eastern Railivqv, p. 55-33. 
73 
Mac Turk, 
.4 
Histoty (? f the Hull Railways, p. 14 1. 
74 
Ibid., p. 144. 
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The South Yorkshire Railway (SYR) promised financial support for the ne\\ 
railway but supporters were few. The scheme collapsed in April 1861 but not before 
it was discovered that the SYR had been conductino sub rosa negotiations with the 
MSLR to work the line. " This galvanised the NER into action. It had opposed the 
earlier independent line as a matter of principle. not taking it seriously, but with the 
threat from the MSLR, a major competitor, it felt compelled to safeguard its interests 
and announced that it would promote a new line in the next parliamentary session 
and, in order to reduce the chances of the revival of the 1860 scheme, would defray 
the parliamentary expenses of its promoters. 76 Thus, in the autumn of 1861 the NER 
proposed a line from Staddlethorpe to Rawcliffe on the LYR Wakefield-Goole line 
and on to the GNR at Askern Junction. The Chamber of Commerce opposed the 
NER proposal on the grounds that it considered that Hull needed an independent 
railway. 77 
In order to forestall opposition from other railway companies the NER began 
negotiations with the MSLR and LYR. However, both latter companies saw the 
opportunity of a route to Hull and required any new line to be a joint promotion. The 
NER would not acquiesce and failure to reach agreement led to four proposals to 
Parliament for lines from South Yorkshire to Hull, one from each of the companies 
and one independent scheme. " 
The independent line was the Hull and West Riding Junction Railway. which 
ran from Cottingham on the NER Hull to Bridlington line some 4 miles (6/2 km) 
north of Hull to a junction with the GNR near Doncaster. Independently promoted 
railways had received little support in the past and this was no exception. It was 
withdrawn in March 1862. " 
75 Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railway 1854-1880. A Study in Railway consolidation and 
competition', p. 236. 
76 MacTurk, 4 Histoiýv (? f the Hull Railwq. vs, p. 144. 
77 Citv Archives, Hull, TLP 35, North Eastern Railway (Hull and Doncaster Branch) Act, 1862. 
-8 Tomlinson, North Eastern Railiva 
, v, 
p. 606. 
79 Citý Archives, Hull. TLP 40, Hull and West Riding Junction Railway Bill. 
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The proposal by the SYR was for a line from Thome. by way of RaAXcliffe. to 
Howden on the Hull to Selby line whence it paralleled the NER line for some 20 
miles (32 km-) to a station at Hessle Road in Hull. " 
The LYR line was in two sections. The first section from Askem Junction 
connected with the LYR line at Rawcliffe. The second ran from Goole to join the 
Hull to Selby line at Cave Sands, near the existing station of Broomfleet, 14 miles 
(221/2 km. ) west of Hull. The Corporation petitioned against this as the NER had 
produced a similar proposal. The Hull Dock Company supported the LYR proposal 
as it suspected that that the NER was desirous of conducting the timber trade, 
previously carried on at Hull, at the port of Hartlepool. Although the LYR route 
offered the prospect of alternative business, the LYR had Goole as its main eastern 
outlet and had not applied for running powers over the NER Hull to Selby line. This 
gave the impression that its proposal was merely a spoiling tactic to force the NER 
into a compromise. " 
The merchants and the Corporation of Hull recognised that they needed a 
railway connection with the south. The question was which scheme should they 
support? There was suspicion of the SYR scheme because of that company's close 
relationship with the MSLR. the owners of Grimsby Docks. They suspected that the 
scheme was not for the betterment of Hull, but rather to enhance the position of the 
MSLR as a supplier of coal to the Humber ports. " 
Hull Chamber of Commerce decided not to support the LYR scheme. 
However, the equal rates policy of the NER still rankled and the chamber could not 
bring itself to support the NER. It distrusted the SYR because of its close relationship 
with the MSLR, and decided not to endorse any of the schemes. " 
The Corporation, for once, was more pragmatic. Despite its antipathy to the 
NER, it considered that support for its railway would secure the best chance of a 
connection from Hull to South Yorkshire and therefore decided to support the NER 
80 Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railway 1854-1880. A Study in Railway consolidation and 
competition', p. 237. 
81 CItv Archives, Hull, TLP 36, LYR Doncaster, Goole and Hull Junction Lines Bill, 1862. 
Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railway 1854-1880. A Study in Railway consolidation and 
competition', p. -138. 
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proposal. " Many of the Hull shipowners were also in favour. Onl-, the Dock 
Company showed outright opposition to the NER scheme, arguing that the toN\11 
needed an independent rail\ýay. " 
When the proposal came before the Commons Committee the NER, in order 
to allay suspicions in Hull that it was not a bonafide proposal, gave an undertaking 
that if it received permission it would not let its powers lapse. The Committee 
decided in favour of the NER on 14 th June 1862 . 
86 However. when the proposal \\-eiit 
to the Lords it was opposed by the LYR and the SYR, which both argued that a better 
line would be built if the scheme were delayed for a year. The Lords agreed and the 
Bill was rejected. 87 
The NER set out to prevent a repetition of the previous dispute. It proposed a 
new line. based on the 1860 scheme, with a route from Staddlethorpe to Thorne with 
connections to the LYR at Goole. " The NER began negotiations with the LYR, 
MSLR and SYR. Those with the LYR centred on an equal rates policy for Hull 
traffic whether sent by Goole or Normanton. The NER guaranteed use of its 
proposed new station at Goole to the LYR together with running powers to Hull. " 
The agreement with the SYR required the latter to improve its railway from Thorne 
to Doncaster and grant running powers to the NER when the Staddlethorpe-Thorne 
railway was constructed. In return the SYR received running powers over the Hull- 
Selby line. " These negotiations took time and an agreement was not drawn up until 
83 HullAdvertiser, 15 th March 1862. 
84 Hull. 4dverfiser, 22"" March 1862. 
85 City Archives, Hull, TLP 35, Petition of Hull Dock Company against the 1862 NER Hull- 
Doncaster Railway Bill. 
86 Hull A dvertis er, 28'h June 1862. 
87 City Archives, Hull, TLP 35-36, North Eastern Railway (Hull and Doncaster Branch) Act, 1862. 
88 Hull Times, 16'h August 186-1. 
89 City Archives, Hull, TLP 50, Agreement dated 28'h March 1863 between NER & LYR. 
The LYR began using the NER station at Goole for its passenger traffic as soon as it was 
completed in 1869. The LYR station of 1848 which was within the ACN estate remained open for 
goods until 1879 when it was demolished to make waý for the construction of a neNý dock. 
90 City Archives, Hull, TLP 50, Agreement dated 20th October 1862 between NER & SYR. 
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1863 by which time the SYR had been absorbed by the MSLR. The NER then 
presented a Bill for the line. The MSLR and LYR took the precautionary measure of 
applying for lines over the same route but later withdrew their Bills. " The onl\ 
serious opposition came from the Hull Dock Company, which objected on the 
grounds that the NER controlled all railway access to Hull and an independent 
company should control the proposed line. Despite this the Bill received the Royal 
Assent on 28"' July 1863.92 
This was not the end of the matter, however. In 1864 the NER applied for an 
Act to construct a railway from York, via Selby to join the GNR at Askern Junction 
with connections to the LYR at Hensall and the West Riding and Grimsby Joint Line 
(GNR & MSLR) at Joan Croft Junction, near Doncaster. " Commercial interests in 
Hull immediately suspected that this was a plan by the NER to send traffic from Hull 
via Selby to Doncaster and thus give an excuse for not completing the Hull to 
Doncaster railway. This suspicion was reinforced when H. S. Thompson, the 
chairman of the NER, appearing before a Lords Committee on II th May 1864, was 
asked if he had said that if the NER got this Bill, instead of carrying traffic by way of 
Thorne it would carry it by its own railway via Selby to Hull. Thompson replied that 
he had not said that it would do so but that it could do so, as this would avoid the 
MSLR. As a result of petitions from Hull, initiated by Thompson's response, a clause 
was incorporated in the subsequent Act which stipulated that it should not be lawful 
for the NER to open the railway until it had opened the Hull and Doncaster Branch. 
The York to Doncaster line was not finally opened until 1871.94 
This was partly because owing to delays in land acquisition and construction 
the Hull-Doncaster line had not opened until 30th July 1869.9' The delays gave rise to 
further suspicions in Hull that the NER was deliberately delaying construction of a 
line that it had not wanted in the first place. These suspicions were reinforced when, 
on the opening of the line, the NER continued to send timber and heavy goods for the 
91 DoNv, Great Central, I'ol. 1, p. 248. 
92 City Archives, Hull, TLP 50, NER Hull - Doncaster Railway Act, 1863. 
93 City Archi'vcs, Hull, TLP 73), NER York and Doncaster RailxNa\ Act, 1864. 
94 Ibid., NER York and Doncaster Rallwa\. Lords Committee proceedings. 
95 Tomlinson, V01-117 Easiern Railivq. V, p. 6314. 
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Midlands \-ia Milford Junction and Nornianton. Critics alleged that this was done to 
obtain maximum mileage charges. " There may have been some truth in this but there 
was a genuine reason for the delay in building the line. The NER had lost nearly a 
year of construction time in the Thorne area as it was unable to obtain possession of 
the land whilst warping was being carried out. " Delays due to warping were reported 
to shareholders meetings throughout 1868. " 
It was a fact that the NER had never wanted to build the line to Thorne. It had 
been done as a spoiling tactic aimed at the LYR and MSLR, rather than as a project 
carried out for the benefit of Hull. It appeared to many that the NER failed to use the 
line to its full potential because it wished to prove that it had been unnecessary, 
rather than for sound economic reasons. The line was not used by the NER to tap the 
South Yorkshire coalfield for forty years, until it eventually formed a jumping-off 
point for the South Yorkshire Joint Railway in 1909. (The South Yorkshire Joint 
Railway will be considered in chapter 7 of this thesis). However, a more satisfactory 
explanation may be found when the business interests of the NER directors are 
considered. The NER was not anxious to develop the South Yorkshire coalfield in the 
1860s. as several of the directors, notably Joseph Pease and Isaac Lowthian Bell, had 
considerable interests in the Durham coalfield. The coal produced from the Durham 
collieries was shipped fi-om Newcastle, Hartlepool and Middlesbrough. '9 The NER 
had inherited the links to the West Yorkshire collieries with its absorption of the 
YNMR. Any increased exploitation of coal from South Yorkshire collieries would 
result in more coal being shipped through Hull, to the detriment of the Durham 
coalfield and those members of the NER board who had interests there. 
Thus, the NER continued to transport mainly the soft West Yorkshire coal to 
Hull. This was unsuitable as bunker coal compared with the hard South Yorkshire 
96 Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railway 1854-1880. A Study in Railway consolidation and 
competition', p. 244. 
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-v, ariety. In defence of this policy it may be argued that the NER continued to suffer 
from the lack of facilities for handling coal at Hull Docks due to the deficiency of 
equipment provided by the Dock Companyl, which would have been unable to handle 
a large increase in the tonnage of coal brought to Hull. 
7. The calm before the storm, 1865-1872. 
The desire for an independent railway to Hull was still strong. In September 1865 a 
proposal appeared in the local press for a new railway to be known as the Hull, 
Lancashire and Midland Counties Railway. "' The line would cross the River Humber 
at Hessle by means of a bridge of I 1/2miles (21/2km. ) in length and connect with the 
MSLR. To be viable the scheme relied on obtaining running powers over the MSLR 
and the GNR. This, however, was a minor weakness compared with the engineering 
difficulties involved in the construction of a bridge over the Humber which had to 
allow river navigation. There was opposition from the Humber Conservancy, Trinity 
House and the port of Goole, and little support in Hull. "' No more was heard of it. 
Almost immediately another scheme, the Hull, West Yorkshire and Lancashire 
Railway. was advertised. 102 This ran from Hull 11a Kirkella and South Cave to join 
the Hull-Selby line at Staddlethorpe, whence Goole and Doncaster would be reached 
by means of running powers. 103 This proposal was seen as a means of putting 
pressure on the NER to provide better service by quadrupling its lines between Hull 
and Staddlethorpe rather than as a genuine scheme. It paralleled the NER line. taking 
a northerly route to Staddlethorpe. In doing so it passed through the chalk ridge of 
the Yorkshire Wolds and would require considerable engineering works. It obtained 
little support and was abandoned. "' 
By the mid-1860s the NER was on the crest of a wave of confidence and 
complacency. At the shareholders' meeting in February 1866 the chairman noted that 
loo Easicrn Morning News, 8'ý September 1865. 
101 Ibid, 12"' September 1865. 
102 Ibid., 16'1'November 1W. 
I () 11 Citv Archives, Hull, TLP 302, West Yorkshire and Lancashire Railxvaý Bill. 
104 Hull Timcs, 20"' January 1866. 
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the most remarkable feature of 1865 was the successful result of the parliamentary 
session. The company had never applied for a new line or amalgamation where they 
had not succeeded and no attempt to invade their district had been successful. 105 Nor 
was the NER averse to making investments. The trade of the Hartlepools had 
outgrown the facilities and a Bill was introduced for improvements at those ports. "' 
Further investment occurred at Middlesbrough. When the SDR had been 
incorporated into the NER in 1863 the latter had acquired Middlesbrough docks and 
in 1869 it embarked on a programme of dock improvements at a cost of f, 120,000. "' 
This news was hardly calculated to raise the prestige of the NER in Hull, but its 
development of the northern ports demonstrated the advantages it enjoyed where it 
had ownership of a port at which it was prepared and able to make large investments, 
as against the situation at Hull where it did not own the docks and was thereby 
constrained in its investment policy. 
The NER was, though, willing to spend money on maintaining its hold on the 
railway access to Hull and, in August 1871, gave notice of its intention to complete 
the purchase of the HSR by I't March 1872. "' The NER and its predecessor had held 
powers to buy the railway for 25 years but it was only in 1871 that the directors 
finally decided they could afford the outlay. The cost was f 1.880,000. "' It was 
money well spent, as the NER was keen to confirm its hold on East Yorkshire. 
There was a lacuna in new railway proposals. This was due largely to the 
opening in 1869 of Albert Dock and the Hull-Doncaster Railway. Both the civic and 
commercial bodies in Hull had co-operated with the NER in the Hull-Doncaster 
Railway, and although it would be incorrect to say that an atmosphere of goodwill 
existed, relations with the NER were slightly less acrimonious for a while. The new 
railway and dock initially alleviated Hull's transport problems. 
The NER permitted itself a little self-congratulation and basked in the wann 
glow of its rectitude. At the shareholders' meeting in August 1871 the chairman, in a 
105 Railivqv Times, 24"' February 1866. 
106 Ibid., 18'h February 187 1. 
107 J. 11. Proud, The Histoi)) (? I'Middlesbrozigh Dock, (Hartlepool, 2000), p. 6. 
108 RailwaY Times, 26"' August 1871. 
'09 Railiva-vNcit's. 9"' September 1871. 
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homiletic address. asserted that there was no place which the NER had fostered or 
stimulated to the prejudice of awy other place. The companY %ýas the owners of docks 
at Newcastle and Hartlepool, but notwithstanding that had subscribed large sums 
towards the enlargement of docks at Middlesbrough and Hull, and had demonstrated 
the advantage of the amalgamation of a number of small companies bN putting all the 
ports on the North East coast, with which it was connected, onto a level and equal 
footing. This panegyric was spoilt somewhat when a shareholder complained about 
the crowded state of Tyne Dock and the want of greater facilities for carrying out 
trade. Complaints were frequent and merchants were anxious that the directors 
should consider the matter. The chairman replied that the directors were aware of the 
congestion at Tyne Dock and were making efforts to work traffic in the best way they 
could. The same situation applied at Hull, although the state of affairs had been kept 
under control. "' 
8. The crisis of 1872 and the Hull South & West Junction Railway. 
The interval of serenity in relations between Hull and the NER ended abruptly in 
October 1872. Suddenly there was chaos and it became obvious to all that the NER 
had most signally failed to keep the situation at Hull under control. In the autumn of 
that year the lines from the docks as far as Ferriby. some 7 miles (I I km. ) west of 
Hull were blocked with wagons, both empty and loaded. Passengers were compelled 
to leave their railway carriages and walk into the town. Letters of complaint appeared 
in the local press from those who signed themselves 'Victim' and 'One of the 
discontented. "'' The newspaper editors were outraged and the familiar refrain began, 
an exemplar of which was the Eastern Morning News editorial, which, dramatically 
and in a mixture of metaphors, cried: 
Slavery! Slavery! Slavery! - Such is the penalty that Hull suffers for selling its 
own offspring into bondage. The Hull and Selby Railway kvas the key of the port, 
''0 Railway TiilhS. 26"' August 1871. 
Hull Times, 26 th October 1872. For extracts from the correspondence see MacTurk , .4 History ol 
the Hull Railivays, p. 15 1- 
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the last thing which Hull men should have allowed to be snatched away from 
them. In it they sold their mess of pottage and have been bondsmen ever since. . -ý 
new railway Hull must and will have. The NER have only shown themselN, es as 
an enemy to the trade of the port! 112 
This was in contrast to the state of affairs some twenty-seven years previously when, 
as noted earlier. the press had vociferously supported of the handing over of the HSR 
to the YNMR. 
The cause of the delays, according to the NER, was a sudden unexpected 
increase of trade at Hull and the failure of the Dock Company to provide enough 
quay and shed accommodation. The public perception was that the NER through 
complacency. lack of forethought, planning and management had precipitated the 
crisis and was now seeking to blame the Dock Company for its shortcomings. The 
Dock Companý,. wisely, said nothing. 113 
The crisis was serious enough for a deputation of NER directors to visit Hull 
on 6t" November. They insisted that the NER desired to do whatever further was 
required to advance the trade of Hull, although they did point out that it had already 
spent large amounts of money on the port. '" The directors visited the Princes, 
Humber and Albert Docks and expressed disappointment with arrangements for 
conducting the coal trade. There was, however, some doubt that the visit had 
achieved the desired effect as an anonymous correspondent who wrote to the Railway 
News commented: 
I may mention that the NER directors have come to Hull today. having at last 
become conscious that such a place as Hull exists ... myself and several others 
invited (indirectly) decline the honour of conferring with the NER. They have 
treated us \vith contemptuous indifference for too long. "' 
112 Easlern Ifol-IliI7, Q vcws, 216"' October 1872. 
MacTurk, A Hislon, ofthc Hull Railwavs, pp. 151-15-3. 
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It seerns that the damage limitation exercise by the NER had come to naught, at 
least in the case of the correspondent above. Its failure to deal satisfactorilý %\ ith the 
transport needs of the port was to increase the disenchantment of the traders of Hull 
with the NER. 
rd A meeting of the Hull Chamber of Commerce was held on 2-3 October 1872 to 
discuss the transport crisis. Frederick Brent Grotrian, a leading merchant and ship 
owner. . proposed a new railway to 
Hull. "' He had obtained tx,, -o subscriptions of 
E20,000 each, which he asserted was a dramatic refutation of the charge of apathy. 
Alderman Lumsden, who had been elected a director of the NER in June 1872, made 
a statement of monumental hubris, when he said that the company was perfectly able 
to deal with the business of the port and he believed that it was better for Hull that 
one company should handle the business rather than two or three, to which there 
were cries of No! No! He said that despite the complaints. there were 27 miles (43 
km. ) of sidings at Hull, whereupon the chairman pointed out that Cardiff had 36 
miles (58 km. ) and despite the NER promising more siding accommodation at Hull 
for several years, nothing had been done. ' 17 
The earlier rail crisis and the NER's response convinced the Chamber of 
Commerce that an alternative railway was needed and on 28 th October a committee, 
which included all the leading merchants, shipowners and traders in the port, was 
formed to consider an independent railway. "' On I't November a proposal was put 
forward for a railway, commencing on the east side of Hull and passing through a 
116 )orkshire Leaders, Social and Political, Vol. 1, (Leeds, 1892), pp. 204-207. 
'Frederick Brent Grotrian [1838-1905] of West Hill House, Hessle, Hull and Gilling Castle, North 
Yorkshire was the only son of F. L. C. Grotrian of London. He was the head of the firm of Messrs. 
F. B. Grotrian & Company, Russia and India merchants and shipowners of Hull. For many years 
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instrumental in establishing a Conservative Club in Hull. He was active in the Hull Chamber of 
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Figure 6. Frederick Brent Grotrian. 
1 17 Central Library, Hull. Chamber of Commerce & Shipping Report dated 18 th October 1872. 
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tunnel in the chalk strata beneath the river to Join the MSLR near Brigg. thus giving 
access to Doncaster and the south. "' The committee recommended that John Fmvler. 
a leading consultant. be appointed as the engineer for the line. "' 
The line was to be known as the Hull South and West Junction Railway. 
121 
Directors included leading businessmen such as Charles H. Wilson, Arthur \Vilson 
and Frederick Grotrian representing the shipping interest. 122 C. H. Wilson gave 
evidence in support to the Commons Committee and his company subscribed 
f 20,000 towards the scheme. He indicated that his company was prepared to double 
the subscription to get the line going. 12' The shipping firm of Bailey and Leetham, 
later to be taken over by Wilson's, also contributed f20, OOO. The Bill allowed Hull 
Corporation to contribute up to f-10,000 out of its funds or to hold shares 
"9 Figure 16. Proposed Hull South and West Junction Railway. 
120 MacTurk, A History (? f the Hull Railiva. vs, p. 155. 
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and set up his offices and home at 2 Queen Square Place, Westminster. 
In Britain there was hardly a significant railway company which did not seek his advice. At 
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Fowler appreciated the value of research, and encouraged innovative design in his practice. He 
was one of the leading advocates of the use of steel, and was a member of the committee of civil 
engineers set up in 1868 to investigate its engineering properties. He was also a pioneer in the use 
of concrete. 
Eastern, 'Ilorning, Vcirs, 7"' November 187. 
S. Lee, (ed. ). Dictionary qf Yaiional Biography 1901-1911, (Oxford 1912). p. 685. 
University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives. DENA'4.3. Memo b,, Mr. J. North, 
Department of History, University of Hull. 
99 
accordingly. The success of the railway depended on obtaining running powers over 
the MSLR, GNR. NER and LYR. "' The Easlern Allorning Xeiv, s. somewhat 
prematurely. regarded the new railway as an accomplished fact. "' It subsequentl\ 
asserted that the immediate result would be to release the town from the effects of a 
blighting monopoly. "' 
The proposal for the new railway alan-ned the NER. In February 1873 George 
Leeman, the deputy chairman. in a speech which was b. -v turns fractious and 
patronising, pointed out the ingratitude of Hull. 12' He claimed that that the NER had 
made one of its most expensive lines from Hull to Doncaster and Hull showed its 
gratitude by promoting a rival scheme. If the people of Hull chose to throw monoy 
away on a useless scheme, the cruellest thing the NER could do would be to let them 
have their Bill and involve themselves in the misery of getting together the money. 
However, this may not be the wisest course for the NER, which would strenuously 
oppose the Bill. 128 
The NER immediately took steps to ensure the defeat of the Bill. Its efforts 
included lending the Hull Dock Company E50,000 and purchasing land near Albert 
Dock for new grain warehouses for f 30,000. But the NER's report in February 1873 
showed spending of f353,624 on improvements at Hartlepool, Tyne Dock and 
Middlesbrough; news that was hardly calculated to silence dissenting voices in 
Hull. 129 
As a matter of course the NER opposed the Bill for the Hull, South and West 
Junction Railway in Parliament but, despite this, the Commons Committee passed it 
on 23 rd May 1873. The promoters hoped that the NER would withdraw gracefully so 
124 City Archives, Hull, TLP 309, Hull South and West Junction Railway Bill, 1873). 
125 Eastern Morning News, 17"' November 1872. 
126 Ibid., 28t" November 1872. 
127 Tomlinson, North Eastern RailwaY. p. 75-33. George Leeman was a bitter rival and political 
opponent of George Hudson and assisted in his deposition. He took over Hudson's chairmanship 
of the York, Newcastle and Berwick Railway. He transferred to the NER Board in 1854 and 
becarne deputy chairman in 185-5 and chairman in 1874. He resiorned his chairmanship due to ill Z=I 
health in 1880 bUt remained on the Board until he died in 1882. 
Railway Ncivs, I 5t" February 187-33. 
Ibid, 15 Ih February 1873. 
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that some goodwill could be retained. "' The NER, however. had no such intentions. 
The MSLR, together with the LYR had petitioned against running powers over their 
lines contained in the Bill but the promoters had pointed out that the new line would 
be of advantage to the MSLR, and the latter had moved towards a more neutral 
position regarding the line. The NER set out to reinvigorate opposition from the 
MSLR. Firstly it signed an agreement with the MSLR which amended the latter's 
contingent running powers to Hull to full running powers. Secondly it supported 
proposals by the MSLR to build its own goods station in Hull. "' 
These measures were unnecessary, for when the Bill came before the Lords 
Committee on 3 rd July the NER concentrated its attack on the major engineerino 
feature, the Humber tunnel. Fowler had produced a design for a brick tunnel in the 
mud about 10 feet Q m. ) below the riverbed. He decided to use a pneumatic caisson 
to construct the tunnel. 13 2 This method had not previously been used for the 
construction of an underwater tunnel. Sir John HawkshaNA- appeared for the NFR. 133 
Eastern Alorning News, 26"' May 1873. 
Ibid., 25"' March 1874. 
1 33 2 D. Beckett, Brunel's Britain. (Newton Abbot, 1988), pp. 109-110. 
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Railway, giving parliamentary evidence for the first time on this line in March 1836. 
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He asserted that it would be impossible to lay watertight brickwork in those L- 
circumstances. "" The Lords felt that the scheme was too experimental and. on 23 rd 
July 1873. rejected the Bill. "' 
The supporters were aghast. Again their plans for an independent railway to 
Hull had been thwarted. They obtained little consolation from the fact that the NER 
had been forced to concede full running powers into Hull to the MSLR. Although the 
NER had won this battle the war went on. The local press exclaimed. 'The dragon of 
York must be destroyed! ' 136 
However, if the railway had been constructed it would have exacerbated the 
situation rather than address the cause, which was a deficiency in dock facilities and 
accommodation. It would have allowed more traffic to flow into a system that was 
demonstrably unable to cope with it. 
The NER permitted itself a little quiet congratulation and felt able to 
patronise the promoters of the railway in particular and Hull in general. George 
Leeman remarked that the NER board had expressed a confident opinion that the 
new railway was not necessary, and that there was no difficulty on the part of the 
NER in dealing with Hull traffic. Some who promoted the Bill seemed to think that 
the NER fostered the Hartlepools at the expense of Hull. No greater mistake could 
be made. The NER had now granted running powers to the MSLR over the NER 
lines between Thorne and Hull and the company would be prepared to entertain any 
similar proposition by any other company that might desire to enter Hull. "' 
He was heavily involved in the activities of the Institution of Civil Engineers. He was president 
1862-3, and was one of the most prolific contributors to its discussions. He was a member of other 
learned societies including the Royal Society (elected 1855), the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the 
Royal Geographical Society, and the Geological Society. . 
He formally retired on 3 1" December 1888. 
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9. The last years of railway monopoly, 1873-1879. 
As a consequence of the 1873 agreement between the NER and the MSLR, in 1874 
the latter decided to build its own goods station in Hull. This was to be reached bý, a 
short branch from the NER line, but involved the construction of a level crossing. 
When Hull Corporation heard of this they inforined the MSLR that if this \N'as a 
genuine attempt to compete with the NER in Hull. then they would do all they could 
to help, but if not. they would not make things easy for the MSLR. This placed the 
latter in a difficult position because of its friendly relationship with the NER, and a 
compromise was reached when the NER agreed to build a large warehouse on its 
own land for the sole use of the MSLR, which would pay the interest on the capital 
expended by way of a fixed rental. "' The result was that MSLR obtained a goods 
station in Hull for which it paid rent of f 7,200 per annum. "' The MSLR exercised its 
running powers and began working passenger traffic through to Hull on I" August 
1874 and goods traffic on I" August 1879. M The fact that five years elapsed between 
the running of passenger and goods traffic reinforces the argument that, because of 
the Humber agreements, no real competition existed between the NER and MSLR, at 
least in the case of goods traffic. In addition to this, yet more small concessions had 
been wrung from the NER. It intended, occasionally, to hold NER board meetings at 
1118 Brooke, 'The North Eastern Railway 1854-1880. A Study in Railway consolidation and 
competition', p. 244. 
G. Dow, Great Central, Iol. 2, (London, 1962), p. 70. 
139 Eastern Morning News, 14 Ih jUly 1882. Evidence of Robert G. Underdown, traffic manager of the 
MSLR, in Commons Committee proceedings opposing the HBR Extension Bill, 1882. Underdown 
was a member of the Humber Conservancy from 1868 to 1885. 
140 Dow, Great Central, l'ol. 2, p. 70. 
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Hull. "' Furthermore, in order to get the major shipowners on its side Charles H. 
Wilson was appointed to the NER board in February 1874.142 
In 1873. as an additional step to discourage further incursions of independent 
railways into Hull, the NER conducted a sur,,, ey for a line from Hull through Kirkella 
to join its existing line at Staddlethorpe. This was the same route as the Hull, West 
Yorkshire and Lancashire Railway proposal of 1865.143 In 1874 an Omnibus Bill. 
including the line to Kirkella, came before Parliament. Hull Corporation was 
immediately suspicious that it was merely a ploy to occupy ground so as to place 
further obstacles in the path of any proposed independent railway. The Corporation 
also alleged that the line would give rise to further level crossings in the town. Public 
meetings were held on 3 oth March and Is' April 1874 at which it was resolved to 
petition against the Kirkella proposal. "' 
The Chamber of Commerce harboured similar suspicions and pointed out that 
if the NER wished to improve capacity, as it implied, a simpler way to achieve this 
would be to quadruple the lines on the Hull-Selby branch. The Bill went before the 
Commons Committee on 3 Oth April 1874. Anthony Bannister and E. P. Maxsted 
appeared in support of the Bill. T. E. Harrison the chief engineer of the NER 
admitted that there was nothing at present to warrant the expenditure on the line and 
that its purpose was to induce building along its length. F. B. Grotrian, opposing the 
scheme. said that in 1873 there had been a challenge to the NER monopoly which 
had nearly succeeded and he was convinced that the Kirkella scheme was a block to 
141 Central Library, Hull. Chamber of Commerce and Shipping AGM, 1" November 1873. 
The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 527/252, NER Directors' Minute Book 1873-1874. The first 
board meeting was held in Hull on 5 th December 1873. 
1.12 Tomlinson, North Eastern Railwa-v, pp. 768-770. Wilson resigned from the NER in December 
1879. His brother, Arthur was appointed to the NER board in October 1893. The constitution of 
the NER board overwhelmingly represented the North-east of England. 
The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 527/252, NER Directors' Minute Book 1873-1874. C. H. 
Wilson attended his first meeting on 2 oth August 1873. 
143 Railwqi ' Th? WS, 2 1" August 18 73. 
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secure the continuation of the NER monopoly. On I" May the Committee rejected 
the Kirkella branch. 
145 
Despite what it saw as a minor setback, by 1876, the NER thought it had 
solved its problems at Hull. In February George Leeman argued that. contrary to 
local opinion, the NER had increased the tonnage handled at Hull which, in the last 
half-year. was more than that of all the northern ports combined. He said that the 
NER knew better than to quarrel with its customers and had long been ready to aid 
any legitimate efforts for extending the shipping or other facilities of Hull. "' 
So that was it. According to its chairman the NER was the panacea for all 
Hull's ills and no further railway development was necessary. This would have been 
admirable if only the civic authorities and the mercantile community in the port had 
believed one word of the chairman's remarks. They were soon to demonstrate, in no 
uncertain manner, just how ungrateful they could be to the all-providing NER. 
10. The Hull Dock Company and the port to 1879. 
As this thesis has argued throughout, the provision of railway access to Hull can-not 
be fully understood without also considering the issue of dock accommodation. It is 
therefore appropriate to return once more to this subject. 
In 1869, at the time of the opening of Albert Dock, C. H. Wilson became a 
director of the Hull Dock Company and began to press for increased dock 
accommodation. As he was the largest shipowner in the port the directors of the 
Dock Company commissioned a report from their resident engineer, which 
recommended that a dock be constructed to the west of Albert Dock at an estimated 
cost of f212,000. The new dock was to communicate with Albert Dock and would 
have an area of 10 acres (4 hectares). The dock was opened on 24 th May 1873 and 
named William Wright Dock after the chairman of the company. "' 
"5 City Archives, Hull, TLP 1] 9, North Eastern Railway (New Lines) Bill, 1874. Parliamentary 
proceedings, April-May 1874. 
146 RailwaY News, I 91h February 1876. 
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1874 
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It was at about this time that relations between W'ilson's. and the Dock 
Company began to deteriorate. C. H. Wilson, in particular. had felt for some time that 
the Dock Company exercised a negative influence on the development of the port 
and that interests within that undertaking had been instrumental in the defeat of the 
Hull South and West Junction Railway Bill, of which he had been a leading 
supporter. Although it was necessary to show a public face of harmony and co- 
operatioii Wilson was prepared to argue privately that the existing docks were neither 
deep nor wide enough for the new ships coming into service, and lost no opportunity 
to criticise the Dock Company management. "' 
In 1874, in order to strengthen their positions in the Dock Company. the NER 
and LYR obtained parliamentary powers to subscribe a further f 50,000 each towards 
its share capital. The MSLR also subscribed f 50,000 and in return was allowed to 
appoint a representative to the Dock Company board. "' This gave the NER, MSLR 
and LYR considerable influence within the Dock Company. 
The Dock Company, under pressure from the traders of the port. had been 
considering an eastward extension of Hull docks for some time. and in 1878, 
promoted a Bill to purchase some 400 acres (162 hectares) of land and construct a 
deep-water dock at Saltend, outside the town boundary, with an entrance to the 
Humber, and to dredge the river to keep the dock entrance open. "' 
The Corporation, with its usual suspicion of any scheme of the Dock 
Company, was anxious about the proposal to compulsorily acquire a large area of 
land and concerned that the new docks would be outside the town boundary. 
Bannister spoke in favour of the Bill but the majority voted to petition against it to 
establish the locus standi of the Corporation. "' 
On the II th March the Corporation held a vote of 56 members of the council 
of whom 38 voted; 22 against the Bill and 16 for, yet there was little support among 
Figure 28. Albert and William Wright Dock. 
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the commercial and wider community for this action by the Corporation. 152 A letter to 
the Eastern Morning Nevvs summarised the general feeling. It asked the newspaper: 
Will you oblige by inserting the enclosed list of those members of the 
Corporation who, on II th March, failed to do their duty by absenting 
themselves? If these gentlemen had attended I am sure that the vote would not 
have been in favour of wasting the ratepayers' money in useless opposition to 
the laudable efforts of the Dock Company. "' 
Considering public sentiment the Corporation agreed not to oppose the Bill, 
provided that land it owned would be offered to the Dock Company who would then 
withdraw the proposal for taking the foreshore outside the town and make a dock on 
land offered by the Corporation. The Dock Company would not agree to this, nor 
would it abandon the Bill. 154 
When the Bill came before the Commons Committee, counsel for the Dock 
Company pointed out that although the Corporation had been given power by the 
1861 Act to take up to 02,000 in the Dock Company it had never taken any share 
and had shown indifference or opposition to all of its plans. By way of contrast the 
Dock Company was a key source of income for the Corporation paying high rents, an 
example being 0,600 per annum for Albert Dock. To buy land from the Corporation 
for a western extension would be very costly. The Corporation was likely to ask up to 
f 3,000 per acre for land at the western side of the town. The cost of the land for the 
eastern dock would be f 100 per acre for the green land and f, 60 per acre for the other 
land. The Dock Company argued that the greatest deficiency in Hull at the present 
time was the lack of quay accommodation. "' 
In cross-examination Wright, the Dock Company chairman, admitted that the 
docks were overcrowded and extra land was needed, but stressed that it must be at a 
competitive price. He said that the NER had initiated the scheme for the eastern 
152 Hull and Eastern Counties Herald, 21 "February 1878. 
153, Eastern AlorningYcivs, 13"' March 1878. 
154 Citv Archives, Hull, DPD/l 2'6, Dock Company Annual Report, 2 nd February 1879. 
155 Citv Archives, Hull, TLP 132,1878 Docks Bill Parliamentary Proceedings. 
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dock. Supporting the proposal E. P. Maxsted. the deputy chain-nan. said if the 
company got its Bill, it intended to construct a large dock chiefly for the shipment of 
coal. The Dock Company"s engineer said that the accommodation was at present 
%, er-v bad. especially for the coal traffic. George Leeman, of the NER, stressed the 
need for additional accommodation, particularly for coal traffic. "' 
The preamble of the Bill was proved but due to the opposition of Hull 
Corporation onerous conditions were imposed. The Dock Company hoped for a 
relaxation of these conditions in the Lords. However, the Corporation continued its 
opposition and the Dock Company proposed to withdraw the proposal for the eastern 
docks from the Bill, but the Corporation would only agree to this if its costs were 
paid. The effect of all this was to cause dissension within the Dock Company. When 
the Bill was finally considered in its complete form Lt. Colonel Gerard Smith, a 
director, moved that it be referred to the shareholders. "' W. I Dibb successfully 
opposed this. Smith then withdrew his resolution and the Dock Company directors 
decided, without consulting the shareholders. to withdraw the entire Bill. "' 
On 2 nd February 1879 Wright resigned as the chairman of the Dock Company 
and was succeeded by Joseph Walker Pease, a Conservative in all respects. `9 The 
156 City Archives, Hull, TLP 132,1878 Docks Bill Parliamentary Proceedings. 
157 Lt. Colonel Gerard Smith was the chairman of the HBR from September 1880 to October 1895 
with the exception of the period from February to July 1889. He was a partner in the Hull banking 
firm of Samuel Smith, Brothers & Co. and was MP for High Wycombe from 1883 to 1885. He 
was knighted in 1895 on the occasion of his appointment as Governor of Western Australia. He 
relinquished this post in 1900 and returned to England. He took no further active part in the affairs 
of the HBR and died in 1920. 
Figure 3). Gerard Smith. 
158 City Archives, Hull, DPD/12/6, Dock Company Annual Report, 2 nd February 1879. 
1 S() Hull Daily, Allail, 9th May 1997. Joseph Walker Pease (1820-1882) was elected Conservative MP 
for Hull in a by-election in October 1873. However, before he could take his seat Parliament was 
dissolved in Januarv 1874. In the ensuing general election in February 1874 Pease suffered the 
misfortune of standing against the Liberal candidates Charles Henry Wilson and Charles Morgan 
Norwood, and was bottom of the poll. He was an MP for onk three months and never sat in 
Parliament. 
G. R. Parke, Parliamentary Representation qf Yorkshire, (Hull, 1886), p. 110. 
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policy of the Dock Company under Wright*s chairmanship had been of advocating 
the purchase of additional land and endeavouring to anticipate the needs of the port. 
This policy was to change radically and instead of taking advantage of a temporar\ 
depression of trade to press on with improvements all new work was suspended, 
despite the overwhelming amount of evidence presented to Parliament that better 
facilities were required. 
The resignation of Wright brought about a political change in the constitution 
of the Dock Company board. Wright, together with C. H. Wilson and Gerard Smith 
formed the caucus of a Liberal group, which had a majority on the board. Wright's 
resignation, and subsequently that of Wilson and Smith. who supported a ne,. N dock, 
weakened this and changed the balance of power. "' If the 1878 proposal for a deep- 
water dock at Saltend had succeeded, it could have proved to be the saviour of the 
undertaking. As will be seen, the Dock Company was to have one more chance in 
1880 to build a deep-water dock but, with a conservative majority and 
representatives of railway companies hostile to the proposal on the board, the 
opportunity was to be missed The defection of Wilson and Smith, and the part they 
subsequently played in bringing a new railway and dock to Hull, sealed the fate of 
the Hull Dock Company. 
11. The seeds of competition. 
The year of 1879 was momentous for the port of Hull. Early in the year it seemed 
that the Dock Company was at last showing initiative by proposing the construction 
of a deep-water dock to the east of the port with coaling facilities. This had been 
prompted by Wilson and the NER, whose railway would have served the new dock. 
The NER was triumphant, having seen off the proposal for the Hull South and West 
Junction Railway. However, in doing so it had alienated Wilson, who had been a 
keen supporter of the scheme. It had failed in its attempt to block the possibility of an 
T. Tindall Wilding, Old and New Hull. (Hull, 1884). p. 157. By an ironic coincidence Pease's 
town house in Charlotte Street, Hull became the head office of the HBR. 
160 Civy Archives, Hull, DPD 12'6. Dock Company Report 1879. 
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independent route to Hull via Kirkella when a parliamentary committee had seen 
through the company's sophistry in proposing the scheme. The consequences of the 
NER's failure here were enormous and would soon become apparent. 
By the end of the ý, ear the plans for a ne,, N, dock were in ruins. The 
Corporation was the principal agent in wrecking the Bill. It is possible to speculate, 
although there is no evidence to support such conjecture, whether the agenda of the 
Corporation, after the failure of the Hull South and West Junction Railway Bill. was 
to obstruct the Dock Company in the hope that the failure of the 1878 Dock Bill 
would lead to an independent railway and dock for Hull. If so. it was to be a 
spectacularly successful strategy and the Dock Company played into its opponent's 
hands. 
The facts, obvious to all, were that the progressive liberals on the Dock 
Company board, Smith, the wealthiest banker in Hull and Wilson, the largest 
shipowner, were both strongly in favour of a new dock. Had Wright stayed at the 
helm the dock scheme may have been resurrected, but the appointment of Pease 
estranged both Smith and Wilson and took the Dock Company back to the days of 
complacency and inertia. The NER could do little but stand by and watch the Dock 
Company commit commercial suicide. An era of railway and dock monopoly was 
about to end. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE END OF MONOPOLY, 1879-1885. 
1. Introduction. 
The years between 1879 and 1885 saw great changes in transport at Hull. In 1879 it 
was served by what were perceived as a monopolistic railway company and an 
inefficient and grasping dock company. By 1885 it was served by two railways, one 
of which owned a deep-water dock. This latter circumstance was not achieved 
without much tribulation. Initially the Dock Company was the catalyst. The failure of 
the 1878 dock scheme and the subsequent change of policy by the Dock Company 
led directly to the proposal for a new railway and deep-water dock for the port. 
Disaffection increased when the Dock Company directors, with stunning hubris. 
stated that they considered no further dock accommodation was required in total 
contradiction of evidence presented to Parliament by their own chairman, deputy 
chairman and engineer. The result was the successful promotion of the HBR despite 
the best efforts of the NER to thwart it. The new company was the product of an 
alliance of financial and commercial interests, led by the largest shipowner and the 
wealthiest banker in the town. 
After initial jubilation and heady plans for expansion the years between 
parliamentary sanction for the line and its completion were difficult ones. The signs 
of under-capitalisation of the enterprise were soon apparent, resulting in a temporary 
suspension of the works when there was insufficient money to pay the contractors, 
the financial arrangements with whom were dubious to say the least. The period also 
saw the splitting into factions of the proprietors, a result of the conflict between those 
who saw the railway as an investment and those, including the Corporation, who 
thought of it as a symbol of the port of Hull. This conflict was to dog the HBR for 
many years after the completion of the line in 1885. 
2. The Hull, Barnsley & West Riding Junction Railway & Dock Company. 
After the Commons threw out the NER Bill for the railway to Kirkella in 1874 
relations between the municipal and commercial interests and the NER remained in a 
state of antagonism manifested by the former and indifference by the latter. Thus. for 
example, when in 1879 the Hull Board of Health requested the NER to build a 
station at Newington, a rapidly growing area on the western. outskirts of the town. it 
declined, saying that the cost of some f500 could not be justified by the expected 
volume of customers. Critical letters appeared in the press, where an editorial was 
quick to point out that the NER would readily spend the money if it were at 
Hartlepool. ' 
A more significant problem was the high cost and deficiency of coal 
transported to the port. The NER had supported the 1878 Dock Company proposal 
and had submitted a Bill for powers to construct a line to the dock. The Bill allowed 
the NER and the Dock Company to enter into agreement with respect to the 
maintenance, management and use of any works in connection with the operation of 
the railway, and the fixing of tolls to be levied in respect of traffic. ' It is clear, 
therefore, that the NER was sincere about co-operating to improve the situation, but 
the failure to improve the docks stimulated interest in an independent line to Hull 
together with the provision of increased dock facilities. 
In 1873 Lieutenant-Colonel Gerard Smith, after serving with the Scots 
Fusilier Guards, came to Hull and. as noted in the previous chapter, joined the family 
banking firm and became a director of the Hull Dock Company in which he was a 
large shareholder. From 1875 onwards Smith discussed with other interested persons 
the idea of an alternative railway into Hull and, in May, 1879 an announcement 
appeared in the local press that a scheme was being contemplated to afford increased 
facilities for the shipment of coal by means of a dock to be constructed on land 
belonging to Hull Corporation. ' 
Easicrn. 1forning, Ycli's. 15 th May 1879. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 13 1. NER Various Powers Bill, 1878. 
Easfern, llorningNews, 16 fh May 1879. 
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It soon became apparent vho was behind this. At a meeting of the Dock 
Company on 8t" June Smith, without having previously consulted his t-Clloýý 
directors, intimated that he and others were in association to construct a railway from 
Barnsley to Hull, with a dock on land to be purchased from the Corporation. ' A new 
dock of 46 acres (19 hectares), to the east of Victoria Dock, and 66 miles (106 km) of 
railway from Hull to Barnsley were proposed. The connecting railway would pass 
round the north of the town on an embankment with a passenger station at Kingston 
Square and would run by way of South Cave and Howden to Cudworth, near 
Barnsley. There would be junctions with the LYR at Hensall, the GNR & MSLR 
joint line at Hernsworth and the MR at Cudworth. 5 The estimated cost of the scheme 
was almost 0 million, which included f 900,000 for the dock. On 15 th December the 
Corporation agreed to sell to Gerard Smith, Henry Hodge and Henry Briggs, on 
behalf of the new railway and dock company. 126 acres (51 hectares) of land, for the 
1 00.6 sum of f5 At an average of just over f400 per acre this was a very favourable 
price considering that the Corporation had been asking the Dock Company 
something over 0,000 per acre for land needed for its 1878 scheme. 7 It emphasised 
the Corporation's support for the new scheme. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 135. The founding committee of the HBR was: Colonel Gerard Smith, 
(Banker) Chairman; William Rayment (Ships Chandler) Secretary; Henry Briggs (Shipowner); 
Edward Leetham, (Shipowner); John Fisher, (Timber Merchant), T. Reckitt, (Merchant and 
Manufacturer); C. Wells, (Auctioneer); C. Copland, (Merchant); Dr. K. King, (Mayor of Hull); 
Colonel Brooshooft, (Landowner); W. Day, (Colliery proprietor); A. Eggington, (Banker); J. S. 
Eggington, (Banker), W. Field, (Merchant); W. A. Massey, (Shipowner and Coal Merchant); J. B. 
Pope, (Colliery Proprietor); L. Stephenson, (Silk Mercer); J. Stuart, (Seed Crusher), J. C. 
Thompson, (Engineer); C. Wells, (Coal Merchant and Shipowner); G. Whitehead, (Engineer and 
Forge Owner); R. Willows, (Silk Mercer) and W. E. Woolf, (Shipowner and Coal Merchant). 
5 Hoole Archives, Darlington, KH 1161. There were to be extensive interchange sidings at the 
connection with the LYR at Hensall, which were subject to an agreement dated I 9th June 1885. 
Figures 17 & 18. The proposed Hull & Barnsley Railway. 
6 City Archives, Hull, TLP 135, Sale of land by Corporation to HBR 1879. 
7 G. D. Parkes, The Hull and Bari7s/ey Railwqv, (Lingfield, 1946), p. 2. Parkes states that the land for 
the dock was sold for L400 per acre. In fact, the bill of sale for the land (City Archives, Hull, TLP 
133 5) shows that the land was sold as follows: 39 acres ( 151 :! hectares) at f900 = 05,100; 21 acres 
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In November 1879 these proposals were put to the Hull Dock Company, 
ýNhich was invited to participate in the project. The directors decided not only against 
participation, but also to oppose the scheme. The reasons given were: firstlY. theý 
believed that the Dock Company already had works in hand nearly approaching 
completion which, when open, would meet any increase of trade which was likelý to 
arise in the next few years, secondly, they believed that the construction of the 
proposed dock would entail an outlay of at least a million pounds or more, and theý 
did not feel justified in taking this on; thirdly, they objected to the reservation of land 
on either side of that sold by the Corporation and were dissatisfied with the land and 
water access to the proposed dock from existing docks, and fourthly. they were 
concerned about the doubtful title to the foreshore between high and low water mark 
and the general terms of the agreement. They considered by a unanimous vote (Smith 
not being present) that it would be undesirable for the Dock Company to be saddled 
with such an undertaking and that the promotion of a rival dock would not be 
profitable to its promoters and would be detrimental to the interests of the Dock 
Company. ' 
The Dock Company's support was elsewhere. In autumn 1879 another 
scheme had been proposed for an independent railway to Hull. This was the Hull, 
Huddersfield and West Riding Railway. It was to begin at Victoria Dock, with a 
branch to Albert Dock, then follow the HBR route as far as Hemsworth whence it 
would run to Huddersfield. It was, in the words of its promoters, a line, 
. unencumbered with a dock', a feature that they obviously did not consider a 
weakness and which was likely to endear it to the Dock Company. Furthermore, 
comments about the HBR being *a railway on stilts' indicated that the new line was 
to be at ground level, meaning even more level crossings. As well as the Dock 
Company, the railway had the support of the Corporation of Huddersfield and the 
(8l, '-- hectares) at f-300 ý f6,300 and 66 acres (261/2hectares) at f 150 = f9.900 making a total 
purchase price of f5 13 00. 
8 City Archives, Hull, DPD/l 2/6. Hull Dock Company Annual Report, 2 nd February 1880. 
114 
LNWR. ' Its leading promoter was A. K. Rollit, a well-known local solicitor and 
member of Hull Corporation. " 
In November 1897 a meeting was held between the promoters of the HBR 
and of the Hull and Huddersfield railway at which the latter proposed an 
amalgamation of the two schemes, with railways to both Huddersfield and Barnsleý,. 
and abandonment of the dock scheme. " Smith, for the HBR, dismissed the 
Huddersfield proposal. saying that Rollit had been *unpatriotic' in proposing an 
alternative scheme. This caused a rift between the two men resulting in acrimonious 
correspondence in the local press as a result of which Rollit withdrew the scheme. " 
Despite the friction between Smith and Rollit the latter was to become an 
enthusiastic supporter of the HBR by the time of its opening. It seems likely that 
Rollit, a leading figure in the town, felt that he had been upstaged by Smith and 
wished to have some of the credit for bringing an independent railway to Hull. 
9 Eastern Morning News, 3 rd October 1879. 
10 Hull Times, 18'h October 1879. 
P. A. Hunt, The O. ýfbrd Dictionary of National Biography Online, (Oxford 2004), 
(November 2004). 
................... ................. ..... ........................... . 
'Sir Albert Kaye Rollit, (1842-1922), businessman and politician, was bom at Hull. Rollit was 
admitted as a solicitor in 1863, practising in Hull in partnership with his father and later with his 
brother, Arthur Rollit. He later had a City of London practice. He became a steamship owner in 
Hull, where he was mayor on two occasions. A leading provincial Conservative, Rollit was 
knighted in 1885 during Lord Salisbury's administration. He sat as Unionist MP for Islington South 
from 1886 to 1906, describing himself as 'a progressive and independent conservative'. His support 
for free trade led to his defeat by a tariff reformer in 1906, and he joined the Liberal Party, standing 
without success for Surrey (Epsom) in 19 10. On leaving Parliament, Rollit worked for British 
participation in international commercial expositions and travelled in southern Europe, where his 
work in the Balkans was recognised by the governments and monarchs who received him. He 
obtained the order of Francis Joseph from Austria-Hungary (with whom he urged commercial co- 
operation), received the grand cross of the order of St. Sava in 1907 from Serbia, and was consul 
general for Romania in London from 1911. As a supporter of commercial arbitration, Rollit was 
trusted by both sides of industry. He arbitrated in the London Dock strike of 1911, when he upheld 
the dockers'claim for improved pay'. 
Figure 8. Albert Kaye Rollit. 
Hull Times, 8 th November 1879. 
1h & nd lbid, 15 22 November 1879. 
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However, he backed the wrong railway. missing the points that the dock was the 
essence of the HBR scheme and that more level crossings over major roads in Hull 
would dismay the Corporation, traders and general public alike. 
On 8"' November the Dock Company announced that the option to construct 
the dock had been declined as it was convinced, *that there was no necessity for its 
construction. "' This volle-face seems incredible when less than two years earlier the 
same company was promoting a scheme for eastern docks in order to relieve 
congestion and improve coal-handling facilities. " 
The Dock Company management's judgement was equally poor. The 
chairman, Pease, said that he would not put one penny of his own money into the 
new dock. In any case the Dock Company believed it had quite enough land in its 
own estate without buying any more. It could supply the whole system of docks for 
years to come. The new dock was jokingly referred to as *Colonel Snipe Pond'. The 
directors were complacent, expressing total satisfaction with the existing docks and 
their operation. " This opinion was not widely shared. The Raiht'qjý Times, for 
example, was unimpressed by the Dock Company's arguments, pointing out that: 
Hull suffers to no slight degree by lack of dock accommodation which is 
illustrated very forcibly by the fact that while the Mersey Dock Board in 1873 
satisfied Parliament that its best dock, by accommodating in the previous year 
20,700 tons of shipping to the acre, was more than *fully utilised', yet in 1869 -a 
year of no great commercial activity - the Hull docks accommodated nearly 
30,000 tons of shipping to the acre, or almost 50% more than the Mersey docks, 
whose space was declared to be fully utilised. " 
On 16"' December the Bill for the new railway and dock was deposited before 
Parliament. This precipitated an upheaval in the senior ranks of the Dock Company. 
At the Annual General Meeting, on 2 nd February 1880, Smith was accused of 
13 Radwqy News, 13'h November 1880. 
14 K. Hoole, (ed. ). The Hull & Barnsley Railii, qy. Vol. 1, (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 50. 
15 Raihi'aYXcii, s. 13"' November 1880. 
6 Railway, Times. 20"' November 1880. 
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promoting a rival dock company, the opposition being led by E. P. Maxsted, \ý ith 
support which included directors appointed by the NER, MSLR and LYR, who held 
E150,000 of Dock Company stock, and had interests in Grimsbý and Goole. as Nýell 
as in maintaining the NER monopoly in Hull. This was the same Maxsted who had 
urged before the Commons Committee, a year ago, that more dock accommodation 
in Hull was 'absolutely necessary. " Smith was due for re-election and Maxsted 
succeeded in having him rejected by one vote. " It was, however, to be a Pyrrhic 
\, ictory for the Maxsted faction. Smith was now free to gather support for the neýN- 
railway and dock and he set about this with a vengeance. Significantly, at the same 
time, C. H. Wilson resigned from the boards of both the Dock Company and the 
NER, and was prepared to throw his considerable influence behind Smith in his 
agitation for the new railway and dock. " Other prominent figures, including 
Christopher Sykes, the Conservative MP for Beverley also supported the scheme. " 
Support also came from coal owners and miners' associations, who had been 
complaining for years about the high charges of the NER. These were some 30% 
higher for South Yorkshire collieries than for those in the Leeds and Bradford area. " 
At a meeting held in Mexborough on 26 th March 1880, presided over by J. 
Buckingham Pope, the chairman of the Denaby Colliery Company. Smith alleged 
that the railway rate for coal from South Yorkshire to Hull was 3s. 6d. (17v2p. ) as 
against 2s. 3d. (12p. ) for coal from Non-nanton. 22 A factor here was the competition 
in the carriage of West Yorkshire coal from the ACN, which did not apply to South 
Yorkshire coal. The Dock Company levied similar high rates. The South Yorkshire 
and North Derbyshire Miners' Associations were told that the Hull Dock Company's 
dues on coal were Is. (5p. ) per ton as against 8d. (3/2p. ) per ton at Grimsby and 6d. 
(2'/2p. ) per ton at Hartlepool. Not surprisingly, on 28 th October the South Yorkshire 
17 City Archives, Hull, TLP 132, Hull Docks Bill, Proceedings of Commons Committee 28 th March 
1878. 
is Hull News, 7 th February 1880. 
,9 City Archives, Hull, DPD'l 2 6, Dock Company Report 1880. Lt. Col. Saner was elected as a 
director in place of Smith and C. H. Wilson's brother, David, took his place. 
20 City Archixes. Hull, TLP 135, Meetings in support of the HBR. 
21 Eastern I lorifing, Vcws, 21 s'June 1879. 
22 Citý Archives, Hull, DXR 711, Reports of HBR meetings. 
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Steam Coal Owners Association. meeting at Barnsley. unanimously carried a motion 
_ 23 in favour of the new raikva... 
Most importantly, on 12 th November, Hull Corporation unanimously passed a 
resolution that: *United action on the part of the ratepayers and inhabitants is 
desirable in support of the scheme, fraught as it is with consequences of the highest 
importance to the inhabitants and calculated to materially benefit the interests of the 
town and port. ' This was followed by meetings in various wards of the town. which 
expressed more support for the proposal. Nowhere was this more vociferous than in 
the Newington ward where Alderman Massey moved the resolution in support. 2' In 
November 1879 Smith, no doubt bolstered by his promotion of the new railway, was 
formally installed as Sheriff of Hull. 25 
There could be no doubting what the NER thought of the new railway. At the 
shareholders' meeting in February 1880 James Kitson, presiding, said: 
It is proposed to incorporate a new company for making a railway from Hull to 
the neighbourhood of Barnsley. The same company proposes to construct a dock 
at Hull. The capital to be expended on this scheme appears to be, with borrowing 
powers, some four million pounds. The directors [of the NER] feel that there is 
no necessity for the expenditure of any capital in the construction of railways in 
the district. The NER have supplied ample railway accommodation in 
connection with Hull. Every town and district of importance can be reached 
from Hull by means of railways already established. The scheme is one which, 
in the interests of this company, the directors consider it necessary to oppose. 
The board is unanimous that it is their duty to oppose this railway. " 
It may have been significant that although Kitson said that no further railways 
were necessary he made no comment about dock accommodation. At this time the 
hidebound attitude of the NER was being criticised by the press even in its own 
23 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, Reports of HBR meetings. 
24 Ibid., Notices and minutes of HBR meetings, 1879. 
25 HzdINc", s, 22 
nd November 1879. 
26 Railwqv Times, 122"' February 1880. 
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heartland. The Northern Echo opined: 'There are those who do not hesitate to sa\ 
that there is a need for new blood on the NER Board. Some of the directors have 
given good service but their ideas have become antiquated. It has been described as 
grasping. arbitrarN, and repellent on the one hand and tardy, timid and short si,, hted 
on the other. 127 
The scene was set for a hard parliamentary battle. On 8 th June 1880 the Select 
Committee of the House of Commons began to take evidence concerning the 
proposed Hull and Barnsley railway. Hull Corporation sought a large amount of 
control over the new railway, which could not lease or enter into any joint purse 
agreement without the written consent of the Corporation. The Corporation was to 
appoint two directors to the board. In addition, the Town Clerk, or other council 
officer.. would be allowed to vote at HBR meetings" 
The NER and the Dock Company vehemently opposed the new railway. The 
NER objections were predictable. It protested that it had always looked after the 
interests of Hull and not only was a new railway unnecessary but it would not be 
financially viable. It also denied that the NER represented a monopoly, citing the 
running powers had been granted to the MSLR, GNR, MR and the LYR. Indeed, it 
pointed out that the running powers of the three latter companies had not been 
exercised, arguing that its operations at Hull were so efficient that access by the other 
companies had proved unnecessary. The NER's detractors argued that this was far 
from being the case and these allies of the NER had a vested interest in continuing 
their cosy cartel. This, to a great extent undermined the public rhetoric of the NER, 
as there was much truth in the assertion that the Humber Agreements and other 
arrangements had, for many years. stifled railway competition as far as Hull was 
concerned. This was widely believed, although Henry Tennant, the general manager 
of the NER defended the agreements, arguing that their aim was to remove any 
ob. lection on the part of other companies to making the most use of Hull. " 
The NER pointed out that it had received little or no financial benefit from 
the construction of the Hull-Doncaster line, which had cost f 1/2million. It alleged 
27 Railwcw Times, 26 th jUjý', 1879. (Reproduced from the Northern Echo). 
28 Hoole, (ed. ). The Hull & BarnsIcY Railvi, ql-, Vol. 1, p. 3 1. 
29 Eastern I forningNews, 26 Ih February 1880. 
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that, as a coal route, this was superior to the HBR line with easier access to more 
collieries and that the HBR line tapped no area of commercial or industrial 
significance and would rely to a large extent on traffic from other companies. This 
was a completely spurious argument as the HBR tapped an area of South Yorkshire 
where many collieries could be reached by arrangement with the MR. Counsel for 
the HBR refuted the claims of the NER and asserted that the HBR was primarily a 
coal line and would become a very successful one. The estimate of the reserves to be 
tapped by collieries initially served by the HBR was 1,501,500 tons of steam coal 
and 1,630,600 tons of house and engine coal making a total of 3.132,100 tons. This, 
it was argued, fell far short of the total potential tonnage which could be achieved by 
the line. The total estimate of coal within a mile of the line was 683,370,300 tons 
including 34,502,418 tons of Barnsley hard coal. " 
The NER was not the only railway to oppose the HBR. The MSLR was the 
only company to exercise its running powers to Hull and so it opposed the scheme, 
as it would break that company's virtual monopoly of the transport of South 
Yorkshire coal to the Humber via the Don Navigation, which it owned. " 
The Dock Company's attack on the Bill was extremely difficult to sustain. It 
was unable to provide a convincing argument to show why it was opposing a new 
dock when shortly before it had been seeking to extend dock accommodation in the 
same area of Hull. Henry Dibb, for the company, was forced to admit, under cross 
examination, that Hull Corporation had offered land to the Dock Company a short 
time previously. He tried to explain this away by saying that, at the time, the 
directors were in no mood to risk the outlay on new docks. 32 
Another witness stated that Hull had very little coal traffic compared with 
other ports and great expansion of this trade was possible. " There was also the 
problem of what were seen as extortionate dock charges at Hull compared with those 
30 City Archives, Hull, TLP 135, Coal Reserves Report, Wakefield, l3th May 1880. 
E. Maule Cole, Notes on the Geology of the Hull, Barnsley and fFest Riding Junction Railway and 
Dock, (Hull, 1886). pp. 5-12. 
31 Eastern A lorningiVews, 26"' February] 880. 
32 Eastern AlorningNews, 22 nd June 1880. 
Eastern Aforning, Vcws, 24 th June 1880. Evidence of P. Williamson, rafl%ýaý valuer. supporting the 
HBR. 
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at Grimsby. In 1879 the charges per ton of coal at Hull were between Is. 3d. (61/2p. ) 
and I s. 7/2d. (8p. ) compared with 3d. (I 1/2p. ) at Grimsby. However. we should note 
that according to Smith's evidence to the Miners' Associations cited above. the 
difference was for 1880. Not only coal was affected. The dock dues at Grinlsbý were 
lower on the great majority of traffic. " To make matters worse the Hull Dock 
Company had introduced regulations in 1876 making it compulsory for coal to be 
loaded into hopper waggons. Although this made for easier discharge at the docks. it 
made extensive alterations to the waggons necessary and reduced their capacity by 
something like 25%. There were no such restrictions at Grimsby. As a result of the 
inadequacy of the dock facilities and the high rates, combined with a lack of coal 
traffic from South Yorkshire over the NER, many ships were forced to leave Hull in 
ballast and look for coal from other ports. 5 For the shipowners, C. H. Wilson spoke 
strongly in favour of the Bill, stressing the need for a deep-water dock. 16 
The closing speech by Sir Edmund Beckett for the NER was a bitter 
denunciation of the scheme and was considered to have made a poor impression on 
the committee. He used phrases such as, 'the HBR propose to live by robbery of the 
NEW and, 'did any man in his senses suppose that anything was to be gained by 
promoting another railway to Hull"' Beckett went on to allege that the Corporation's 
strategy was to run down the Dock Company so that it could be sold at a low price 
and the promotion of the new line was a part of this plan. " 
The Bill passed the Commons Committee on 9th July 
1880.18 It then went 
before the Lords Committee on 23 
d July and passed through quickly but, taking 
account of representations by the MSLR, the running powers over the MR to 
-, 4 Eastern Morning News, II Ih December 1879. 
35 Ibid, l5th June 1880. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 36. This same complaint had been made as far back as 1862 when John 
Lumsden, a member of the firm of Brownlow and Lumsden, steamship owners and president of the 
Chamber of Commerce, in evidence before the Parliamentary Committee for the 1862 LYR 
Doncaster, Goole and Hull Junction Lines Bill, said that many ships left Hull in ballast owing to 
coal not being obtainable. 
,6 Eastern Morning Nci i's. 17"' June 1880. 
37 117id., 2 nd August 1880. 
38 lbid, I 01h & 1211, jUlý 1880. 
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Barnsley were disallowed leaving them intact only to Cudworth. " Furthermore. a 
clause was inserted whereby the Dock Company was to be given an opportunitý, to 
adopt the dock part of the scheme if it so desired. The Bill received the Royal Assent 
on 26 th August 1880. " 
3. HBR victory and euphoria. 
There was jubilation in Hull at what was seen as a breaking of the NER monopoly. " 
The prospectus made clear who was behind the company. There were to be fourteen 
directors, two of whom were to be appointed by Hull Corporation. The majority of 
the directors represented the merchants and ship owners of the port. " The coal 
interest was represented by William Day, of Monk Bretton colliery. The authorised 
capital was f 3,000,000 in shares of f 10 with powers to borrow a further f 1.000,000. 
According to the prospectus the projected yearly earnings were f 6,000 per mile and a 
dividend of 8% was expected as against an average of 7.18% paid by the NER. The 
dock earnings were estimated at f 105,110 per year, this being based on a figure of 
f 2,285 per acre per year which had been earned by the Albert Dock. The line 
connected either directly or via the MR with 13 collieries and would make Hull a 
major coal port. " 
39 City Archives, Hull, TLP 135, Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway and Dock Act, 
1880. The original Bill contained running powers over the MR and MSLR to Barnsley, the MSLR 
to Manchester, the Cheshire Lines Committee to Liverpool, the West Riding & Grimsby (GNR & 
MSLR Joint) to Wakefield, the LYR and LNWR to Huddersfield, the LYR to Pontefract, the 
Methley Joint (GNR, LYR & NER) to Lofthouse, the MR to Sheffield and the Swinton & 
Knottingley Joint (MR & NER) from Moorthorpe to Swinton. The Commons committee rejected 
all these with the exception of the MR from Cudworth to Barnsley, which was then disallowed by 
the Lords Committee. 
40 Ibid. 
41 City Archives, Hull, TLP 132, Programme for 'Great Demonstration' in Pearson's Park on 19 th 
August 1880. 
42 The ori-, inal board contained five from the mercantile and banking interests of Hull and three ship- 
owners. 
41 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/10, HBR Prospectus. 
122 
Such prospects were enough to ensure that initial enthusiasm among investors 
was high and at the close of subscriptions on 9th December the total number of 
applicants was 9,838. The number of shares payable by instalment applied for ýNere 
639,834. and those to be paid up in full, 87,369, a total of 727.203 shares 
representing capital of f7,272,030. Investors from London applied for 501,592 
shares representing a capital of over f5,000.000. a fact which was to prove of great 
significance in a short time. Applied for in Hull were 148.323 shares, which meant 
that Hull had subscribed almost fI 1/2million towards the neNA railway. Many of the 
Hull subscriptions came from the middle and working classes. " The costs of 
promoting the Bill had been about f 58 '000.45 
The enthusiasm of the major shipowner in the port may be gauged from the 
fact that at the first shareholders meeting of the HBR, C. H. Wilson contributed 
f2,500 to help with promoters' expenses. " The railway press was enthusiastic. The 
Railivq, y Neivs proclaimed: 
The people of Hull may congratulate themselves in having secured the passage 
of a Bill which should tend to increase the wealth and prosperity of the town and 
they owe a debt of gratitude to Colonel Smith and Mr. Lawrence, whose 
experience of railway matters gained in the service of the MSLR has been of 
great value to the supporters of the scheme, for their exertions on their behalf. " 
44 Eastern Morning News, 26 th February 1881. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 322, HBR Proprietors Address Book, December 1888 (with manuscript 
amendments to I 33'h February 1889). A sample analysis shows that almost 20% of those listed as 
shareholders came from the working class. 
45 Railway Times, 5"' March 1881. 
46 Universiv, of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives, Rhoda Lamb, Diploma in Social Studies, 
University of Hull, 1974. p. 46. 
The National Archives, Kew, RAIL -3 3 
12/7, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1880-1886. C. H. Wilson 
was appointed as a director of the HBR on 2 9th December 1880 and on 2 nd February 1881 
expressed a w-ish to retire owing to pressure from parliamentary activities. 
47 Railwqv News, 14 th August 1880. 
Joseph Lawrence was the HBR Company Secretary from its inception until 1881. 
The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 312 7. HBR Directors' Minute Book 1880-1886. Lawrence 
retired on 22 1" 
January 1881 and was replaced by James Daniell. 
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The success of the HBR was seen in Hull as the culmination of battles with 
the NER over railway monopoly and the first time that the NER had been defeated 
on its home ground. The new railway was to be extremely expensive and it may be 
conjectured that if it had been promoted as a coal line only, it would not have 
succeeded in Parliament. The crucial ingredient in the scheme was the neý\ dock, 
which Hull desperately needed. It was supposed, especially in Hull. that the railway 
would enter into healthy competition with the NER. Indeed, the Lords made the 
assumption that the new dock would be profitable when it gave the existing Dock 
Company powers to take over the scheme. " 
The euphoria in Hull was such that few, other than supporters of the NER, 
questioned the viability of the project. The pride engendered by the success of the 
scheme masked some of the negative aspects of the operation of the new line and 
dock. The net revenue of f, 6,000 per mile per annum, yielding a dividend of 8% was 
wildly over optimistic. It certainly made no allowance for likely retaliatory action by 
the NER and the Dock Company. The HBR was alone among railways. It had no 
allies in the area among larger railway companies who saw no reason to abandon 
existing arrangements, which worked well for them. The general manager of the 
NER had, as might have been expected, made the gloomy but accurate prediction to 
the Commons Committee that even if the HBR secured the whole of the freight 
revenue into Hull then accruing to the NER, together with that of the Dock 
Company, it would still not be able to pay an adequate dividend on the proposed 
capital. " There were certainly no congratulations from the NER. At the shareholders' 
meeting in August 1880 it was announced that f6,000 had been spent opposing the 
HBR Bill. The Mayor had stated that Hull had been under the thumb of one company 
for 21 years. The NER did not agree with that but grudgingly admitted that Hull now 
had its victory -a victory which would cost upwards of five million pounds. " 
48 City Archives, Hull, TLP 135, Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway and Dock Act, 
1880. 
49 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barns1c. 1' Railway, Vol. 1, p. 35. 
50 Railwqi, Ncws, 7 th August 1880. 
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4. Financial arrangements for the construction of the HBR. 
The cutting of the first sod by the HBR chairman, Colonel Smith, took place on 15 Ih 
January 1881. The ceremony was carried out on a bleak winter daY in front of an 
enormous crowd and was followed by the usual banquet for the dignitaries. " A 
correspondent in the Hull Daily Mail later opined, 'One would think bN, the number 
of people present that the HBR was going to carry people to heaven. '52 
The contractors for the construction of the line were Lucas & Aird, whose 
partnership dated from 1860, and who had already been responsible for much railway 
and dock construction. " The circumstances of their appointment were curious. At a 
meeting on 3d November 1880 the directors had decided that tenders were to be 
invited from 'selected contractors of high standing'. not fewer than five in number. 
On 15t" November1880 this was rescinded and Smith was authorised to proceed to 
London and arrange a draft contract with Lucas & Aird on the basis of a verbal 
understanding already existing between Smith and Charles Lucas. 54 
Some hints of what was going on were offered by the anonymous writer of a 
manuscript history of the HBR, probably a disgruntled London shareholder, in a 
diatribe against the HBR board and the Hull directors in particular. This alleges that 
James Staats Forbes, later to become a managing director of the HBR, admitted that 
he was present at the Westminster Palace Hotel in London on 3 rd December 1880 
when the contract was signed between the HBR and Lucas & Aird. Forbes was 
alleged to have assisted the company with the prospectus and contract. The contract 
was not for a lump sum but for a schedule of prices. " Lucas & Aird had been 
51 Eastern Morning News, 16'h January 188 1. 
ý-) Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley Rai/wqv, Fol. 1, p. 43. 
53 R. S. Joby, The Railway Builders, (Newton Abbot, 1983), p. 13 1. The Lucas & Aird partnership 
comprised three undertakings. John Aird & Son dealt with gas and water construction, Lucas Bros. 
were more concerned with public and general building, and the railway construction an-n was Lucas 
& Aird which specialised in major railway work. Contracts included the Tilbury and London 
Docks, the West Highland Railway and the Manton to Kettering line of the Midland Railýýaý. 
54 The National Archives. Kew, RAIL 3 12'7. HBR Directors' Minute Book 1880-1886. 
55 East Riding Archives, DDML 11/7, Anonymous manuscript history of the HBR, 1886. This 
manuscript covers the period from 1880 to 1886. 
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involved between 1876 and 1880 in works on the Metropolitan & District. and 
London, Chatham and Dover railways. Forbes was associated with both of these 
companies, being chairman and managing director of both in 1872-1901 and 1873- 
1898 respectively. " 
This was not the only questionable provision entered into by the HBR. An 
unusual inclusion in the contract was that Lucas & Aird would guarantee to pay 5% 
interest on the paid-up amounts until 31st December 1884 when it was anticipated 
that the work would be complete. " This was an inducement, designed to attract 
investors. Several applications were received for payment in advance of calls, which 
the directors refused. On 0' March 1881, Robert Fisher of Manchester, an auditor 
with the MSLR, who held 100 shares in the HBR, brought an action in Chancery to 
restrain payment, alleging that the HBR was not entitled to pay interest out of capital. 
He further alleged that the contract entered into with Lucas & Aird was illegal, as 
provisions for such payment breached parliamentary standing orders. 58 An injunction 
to restrain the HBR was subsequently granted by the Master of the Rolls and the 
Standing Orders Committee subsequently decided that the orders could not be 
56 J. Simmons & G. Biddle, (eds. ). The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 
1997), p. 167. 
T. R. Gourvish, Dictionary of Business Biography, (London, 1984), p. 392. 
'James Staats Forbes (1823-1904) trained as an engineer with the Great Western Railway becoming 
goods superintendent at Paddington. He next became manager of the Dutch Rhenish Railway, 
which gave him an insight 'into methods of railway management less purely traditional than in this 
country. ' In 1861 he was appointed general manager of the London, Chatham & Dover Railway. 
He joined the Board in 1871 and in 1874 became chairman. He became chairman of the 
Metropolitan District Railway in 1872. He held positions in other railways (including the HBR) 
and in electricity and telephone companies. By 1884 he was reported to be earning f 15,000 per 
year. A man of taste and discernment, he sometimes lacked conviction; this he made up for with a 
charm and eloquence which made him a shrewd negotiator'. 
T. R. Gourvish, 'The performance of British railway management after 1860: The Railways of 
Watkin and Forbes', Business Historv, Vol. 20, No. 2, July 1978, pp. 186-200. 
Figure 5. James Staats Forbes. 
1 
57 Railway News, 4"' December 1880. 
58 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 33 12/7, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1880-1886,4 th April 
1881. 
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dispensed %ýith. ` Fisher alleged that Lucas & Aird's prices were excessive because in 
order to recoup interest, which they had guaranteed to pay. they had added E350.000 
to the contract price together with f 100,000 for 'expedition in construction'. He also 
accused the HBR of misleading its shareholders, who did not understand that a 
concealed arrangement with the contractors meant that they were receiving interest 
out of their own capital. This was, in his view, an attempt by the HBR board to 
extricate themselves from difficulties arising from promises made in the prospectus. 
which could not be fulfilled. " 
If he was acting in a personal capacity it is difficult to guess at Fisher's 
motives, as by bringing the action he was depriving himself of interest on his shares, 
but it may be significant that he was employed by the MSLR, a company strongly 
opposed to the HBR, which it saw as a threat to its South Yorkshire trade. In any case 
the HBR announced that it would apply for a Bill to enable it to pay interest out of 
capital. " By February 1882 the HBR had paid Fisher's costs and part of the 
settlement had been an undertaking from Fisher that he would not oppose the Bill. " 
The upshot was that when, in August 1882, a call of f2 per share was made, Lucas & 
Aird, voluntarily consented to pay the interest on the money. " Work proceeded apace 
and by the end of the year 3,000 men were employed in building the line and 1,000 
on the dock. In a leading article the Railway Times opined: 
From our point of view and that of the public it is of importance to note the 
gratifying circumstances that in every way the work of the company appears to 
have progressed so far in a businesslike and expeditious manner, and that by its 
undertakings, so far as they have been completed, the company has given every 
earnest of the realisation of the expectations which were the original basis of its 
formulation. " 
59 East Riding Archives, Beverley, DDML 1 F7, Anonymous manuscript history of the HBR, 1886. 
60 Eastern illorningiVews, 2 nd April 1881. 
61 City Archives, Hull, TLP 139, HBR Capital Bill, 1882. 
62 RailwaYVews, 4"' March 1882. 
63 Ibid, 9"' September 1882. 
64 Railway Timcs, 7"' January 1882. 
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In August. 1881 Col. Brooshooft and C. J. Newbald, the latter being a 
representative of the Wilson shipping line, resigned from the HBR board and their 
places as directors were filled by W. A. Massey and Lord Beaumont. " These 
replacement members. particularly Massey. were to be very significant in the future 
conduct of the HBR as will be seen in chapter 5. " 
The HBR had got off to an auspicious start with little or no sign of the troubles 
ahead. 
5. Proposals for expansion of the HBR. 
Intoxicated by their success the directors decided to implement a proposal for an 
extension from the main line to Halifax and Huddersfield, providing a direct 
connection with the LNWR. A Bill was promoted for this together with a fish dock 
of approximately 13 acres (5 hectares) at Marfleet, to the east of Alexandra Dock, 
with a canal or cut connecting the fish dock with Alexandra Dock. Surprisingly, 
considering the antipathy of the NER, the Bill was unopposed and received the Royal 
Assent on 18 th August 1882. " 
The proposed extension of the HBR to Huddersfield and Halifax attracted the 
attention of the MR which only touched the lucrative area of the West Riding at 
Leeds and Bradford. The MR would find running powers over the proposed 
extension line a convenient way of expanding its network and agreement to these 
powers by the HBR could gain it a useful ally among the large railway companies. In 
February 1882 the MR board agreed to an exchange station at Cudworth. In 1883, 
when calls for capital were about to be made, Smith asked the MR for reassurance 
that the company would use its running powers over the new extension. The MR 
65 Railwaj, Times, 3 rd September 1881. 
University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives, DEW 2/9/37. C. J. Newbald was the General 
Manager of Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. 
66 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, Half Yearly and other HBR Meetings. 
Figure 4. Watson Arton Massey. 
67 City Archives, Hull, TLP 3233, Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Rail"N'ay and Dock Co. 
Act, 1882. 
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assured him that it would. In January 1884 the MR agreed that the HBR might 
publish the MR intention to use the new line in order to help raise capital. " 
Also promoted in 1882 %vas a railway called the East and \Vest Yorkshire 
I 
. 
11nion Railways which ran from the GNR at Ardsley, south of Leeds. to a junction 
with the HBR at Drax. " The scheme was promoted by coal owners and landowners 
in the West Riding who were dissatisfied with the transport facilities to the port of 
Hull provided by the NER and ACN. The first chainnan of the company was Lord 
Beaumont, a director of the HBR, who owned the estate of Carlton Towers, close to 
Drax. The secretary was Sebastian Meyer. who had been assistant secretary to the 
HB R from 18 8 1. " The company sought running powers over the GNR. MR, NER & 
HBR. " On 8"' December a deputation representing the promoters asked Hull 
Corporation to petition Parliament in favour of the Bill, as a result of which petitions 
in support were sent to the Commons and Lords. 72 It was stated that, based on only 
two thirds of the proposed traffic of the HBR, the line would pay 10%. 7' The 
promoters of the railway hoped that it would do for West Yorkshire what the HBR 
would do for South Yorkshire. Although it was described in the Hull press as 'the 
railway from nowhere to nowhere', it was supported by commercial interests in the 
port. " C. H. Wilson was reported as saying, *what they have to look forward to in 
Hull is the relief they may expect when the HBR and its new deep water dock are 
opened. and when the HBR and this new railway are brought into connection with 
the other great railway systems, the LYR, GNR, MR and others. 175 
The HBR initially offered financial support for the scheme, but later, because 
of its own problems, found itself unable to help. Thus, in April 1884 the HBR 
informed the East and West Yorkshire Union Railways that it could not enter into any 
68 P. E. Baughan, The Midland Ruilwqv North of Leeds, (London, 1987), pp. 281-282. 
69 Hoole Archives, Darlington, KH 1785, East & West Yorkshire Union Railways Act, 1883. 
70 A. L. Barnett, The Light Railwa. 1, King of the North, (London, 1992), p. 13. 
71 City Archives, Hull, TLP 301, East and West Yorkshire Union Railways Bill. 
72 Ibid., Letter dated 9"' December, 188 1 and petitions by Hull Corporation. 
7 ý', Ibid., East and West Yorkshire Union Railways prospectus, October 1882. 
74 Eastern. 1 forning, Vcivs, I oth June 1882 
75 )'orkshire Post, I V" November 188 1. 
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further financial obligations until its own railway and dock were completed. " 
Despite preliminary optimism the scheme for the railway was abandoned in 1889. " 
There had already been other schemes trying to exploit traffic opportunities 
opened up by the HBR. In 1879 the Church Fenton, Cawood and Wistow RailWaV 
had obtained an Act for a line 51/2miles (9 krn. ) long. However, with the passing of 
the HBR Act in 1880 the promoters applied for a Bill to extend their railway a 
further 8 miles (13 km. ) from the terminus at Wistow to a junction with the HBR at 
Drax. Initially the NER and HBR opposed the Bill but, after negotiations, the latter 
agreed to work the line for 50% of the profits, hoping to gain access to York and 
Harrogate . 
78 Despite a change of name in 1883 to the Selby and Mid-Yorkshire 
Union Railway, the line was not built. 79 In the same year another railway with similar 
aims called the Leeds, Church Fenton and Hull Junction Railway was proposed from 
Leeds to a junction with the Church Fenton, Cawood and Wistow Railway, hoping to 
obtain running powers over that line and the HBR. " The line passed mainly through 
agricultural country serving no settlements of any size. It failed to obtain its Act. 
These failures brought to an end any possible foray by the HBR in the direction of 
York and Harrogate. 
In 1883 an even more unlikely proposal would have taken the HBR into 
Lincolnshire. The Hull and Lincoln Railway ran from a connection with the HBR at 
Kirk Ella, just outside Hull, crossed the Humber by means of a bridge carried on 36 
piers and formed a junction with the GNR at Lincoln. Gerard Smith and C. H. 
Wilson joined forces in support of it when it came before the Commons Committee. 
Wilson's company was a shareholder in Shireoaks Colliery in north Nottinghamshire 
and was a consumer of the coal it produced. This was presently shipped to Hull via 
New Holland in lighters. Furthermore, Wilson's carried agricultural machinery from 
Hull to the Baltic. This came from Lincoln, Grantham and Gainsborough, and 
76 A. L. Barnett, The Light RailwaY King of the North, p. 14. 
77 Hoole Archives, Darlington, KH 1785, East and West Yorkshire Union Railways Extension of 
Time Act, 1888. 
CItv Archives, Hull, TLP 170. East and West Yorkshire Union Railways Act, 1889. 
78 Citv Archives, Hull, DXR 71, HBR Shareholders' meetings. 
79 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsleýy Raihi'ay, I'ol. 1, p. 153. 
80 City Archives, Hull, TLP 33 13, Leeds, Church Fenton and Hull Junction Railway prospectus. 
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transport would be much eased by the proposed raihNay. " The scheme was also 
supported by Frederick Grotrian and John Witty. a dye manufacturer ýNho was the 
Mayor of Hull 
Predictably the scheme aroused much opposition from the NER, the users of 
the Humber and the port of Goole, whose river traffic would be adversely affected b). 
the bridge. Henry Tennant, the general manager of the NER was dismissix, e of the 
railway's prospects. He reiterated that the Hull-Doncaster branch of the NER, which 
had cost f 1/2 million to build. had brought little extra traffic, as there was 
considerable competition from water traffic for the Hull to London trade. 82 
Fierce opposition also came from the Dock Company and the Humber 
Conservancy concerning the hazard to navigation caused by placing the piers in the 
river. The ACN, which owned eight vessels trading out of Goole, objected that the 
proposed headroom would seriously hamper their activities. The ACN had been 
preparing plans to allow ships of up to 3,000 tons to reach Goole and in 1884 took 
over the r6le of conservator of the lower Ouse from York Corporation. The 
company's scheme to improve the navigation to Goole, to be called the Ouse 
Seaway, was ambitious and was to take ten years . 
8' Being prepared to deepen the 
river to accommodate larger vessels the last thing the ACN wanted was the 
obstruction caused by a bridge. Against all this opposition the Bill for the railway 
had little chance of success and the Parliamentary Committee rejected it on 22 nd June 
1883.84 There was great rejoicing in Goole. The editorial in the Eastern Morning 
81 University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives, memo by J. North, Department of History, 
University of Hull. 
82 Simmons & Biddle, (eds. ), The Oxford Companion to British Railway Histoty, p. 504. 'Henry 
Tennant (1823-19 10) entered railway service with the Brandling Junction railway in 1844 and held 
the combined posts of traffic superintendent and accountant on the Leeds & Thirsk and Leeds 
Northern Railways. He was involved in the formation of the NER in 1854 and was its accountant 
until 1871 when he became general manager. In 1891 he retired and took a seat on the NER Board. 
He knew little of the world outside North-east England and from his position on the Board 
obstructed the reforms of his successor George Gibb. He was elected deputy chairman at the age of 
81 and remained on the Board until his death at the age of 86. 
83 B. F. Duckham, The Yorkshire Ouse, (Newton Abbot, 1967), p. 136. 
84 Citý Archives, Hull, DXR 21, Hull & Lincoln Railwaý Bill, Parliamentary proceedings. 
I'll I 
News called the Bill, 'a calamity opposed by the Dock Company and Humber 
Conservancy against their own town'. 
85 
As the only company apart from the NER with a goods station in Hull, the 
MSLR had been neutral in its attitude to the Hull and Lincoln Railway Bill. The 
chairman, Edward Watkin, thought that it would not get enough support to succeed, 
but said that if the line were connected to other railways and the MSLR could have 
running powers, his company would not oppose it. " The Bill's failure revived 
interest in a crossing of the Humber and the MSLR invited the NER to co-operate in 
a survey into the feasibility of a tunnel under the river. Powers were obtained in 1883 
for trial borings and by mid-1885 sufficient data had been obtained for an estimate to 
be prepared. However, Henry Tennant of the NER was not prepared to support the 
scheme. As a result of this the MSLR abandoned the Humber tunnel project for the 
time being. Watkin revived the idea in 1891, only to receive a further rebuff from the 
NER . 
8' Thus ended the scheme for a Humber tunnel. 
6. The crisis years of the HBR, 1883-1884. 
The fact that the HBR was heading for a financial crisis was first signalled in August 
1883. Smith reported that he had travelled to Hull from Stairfoot Junction and found 
the railway complete except for the Ouse crossing and some half-mile of track. He 
anticipated that it would be possible to partially open the railway by the following 
spring. " That was to be the only good news for some time. On a gloomier note came 
news that the company's borrowing powers were almost exhausted and f 960,000 had 
been spent. A Bill had been brought forward with a view to compensating Lucas & 
Aird for the amount they had advanced on behalf of the HBR. The company had 
hoped that after the fight over the HBR Act of 1880 the NER have been less 
obstructive, but it had opposed the Bill after saying that it would support it. In an 
85 ,d Eastern Morning News, 2) June 1883. 
86 D. Hodgkins, The Second Railway King. The Life and Times of Sir Edward Watkin 1819-1901. 
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88 Civy Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 25"' August 1883. 
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acrimonious speech, Joseph Whitwell Pease of the NER had accused the HBR of 
everything short of dishonest-v in its financial dealings. Smith said that the manager 
of the GNR had told him that promises had been obtained from 1336 railýý-ay 
directors. who were also MPs, to vote against the HBR Bill. He hoped, howex, er. that 
it would be possible to negotiate with Lucas & Aird and prevent further litigation. " 
The issue began to take on a political dimension when J. Buckingham Pope. 
at that time a strong supporter of the HBR and one of the members of the founding 
committee, argued that the provisions preventing the payment of interest out of 
capital militated against the promotion of new railway companies such as the HBR. 
whilst protecting the interests of existing companies. " The opposition of the raiNv-ay 
interest in Parliament was perfectly consistent with this analysis. 
Closer to Hull, Smith argued that it might be necessary to consider the 
financial viability of the Halifax and Huddersfield extension lines. " Yet despite this 
financial crisis it had been decided, at extra expense, to site the passenger terminus 
nearer to the town centre at Charlotte Street, the site of the company's offices. " 
Deteriorating finances generated a damaging split among the shareholders. 
On I 9th February London shareholders formed themselves into a committee under 
the chairmanship of Sir Francis Head. They demanded economies. The London 
faction contained bankers and speculators alarmed by a lack of return on their 
investments. These were the larger shareholders and debenture holders and included 
the contractors who had become involuntary shareholders because of the way the 
railway had been financed rather than by choice. " They had increased their voting 
power by the simple expedient of stock splitting, a common tactic at the time. 9' The 
89 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 25 th August 1883. 
90 J. B. Pope, Railii, qv Rates and Radical Rule, (London, 1884), p. 3 10. 
91 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 25 th August 1883. 
92 East Ridin- Archives, Beverley, DDML/I 1,13 Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway 
and Dock Act, 18833. 
93 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 312/7, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1880-1886,1 Oth March 
1884. 
94 T. Albom, Conceiving Companies, (London, 1998), p. 205. 
In a stock split, the pricc of the stock will decrease, but the number of shares will increase 
proportionately. For example, if a shareholder owns 100 shares of a company at f 100. in a stock 
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financial situation was critical. The railway works had been more expensive than 
anticipated. Against an estimate of f-1,619,000 for the railway, f 1,582.000 had 
already been spent. " 
Ho,, \ever. one voice was raised in support of the directors. C. H. Wilson said 
that remarks had been made which tried to show that the board of directors consisted 
of dummies, in the hands of their chain-nan. However. he felt it his duty as one 
largely interested in the welfare of the port of Hull to support the HBR and urged 
opposition to the London faction. His firm was the largest payer of dock dues in the 
port of Hull and he had full confidence in the HBR directors. This was a very 
significant and brave show of faith in what was becoming a distinctly shaky 
enterprise. " 
This was not the end of the matter, however. Sustained pressure from the 
London shareholders forced an agreement, in March. that expenditure should be 
curtailed. " The London faction was only temporarily appeased by the proposed 
cutbacks. Their attitude was that the directors had got the company into a mess and 
must get the company out of it. However, the directors acknowledged their faults and 
agreed that capital expenditure should be curtailed as much as practicable. " The 
Railway Times applauded Smith's diplomacy. In a leading article it opined: 
An honourable capitulation is often indicative of greater moral courage than 
stubborn resistance. Thus, we are inclined to regard the arrangement between the 
proprietors and directorate of the HBR, as one which under all circumstances 
must be accepted with satisfaction. " 
split situation, the same shareholder will own a total of 200 shares at E50 a share after the split. A 
stock split has no effect on the value of what shareholders own. If the company pays a dividend, the 
dividends paid per share will also fall proportionately. 
9,; City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 25 1h February 1884. 
96 Ibid., HBR Shareholders' meeting. 25"' February 1884. 
97 Ibid., HBR Shareholders' meeting. Xh March 1884. 
98 Ibid., HBR Shareholders' meeting, I 9(h March 1884. 
99 RailwaY News, 15'h March 1884. 
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But by April the two factions had taken their stands. The Hull shareholders 
stood squarely behind the existing board and a resolution was passed stating that: 
This meeting, having considered the circulars of the board and of Sir Francis 
Head, is of the opinion that the interests of the shareholders generally will be 
best consulted by supporting the action of the present board in Whom this 
meeting desires to express the fullest confidence, and pledges itself to take all 
necessary steps for that purpose. "' 
The London faction wanted greater control over the board and Sir Francis 
Head intimated to Smith that he had a person in mind whom he proposed should be 
appointed as an observer. Head asked what salary the company would pay, and Smith 
replied that for a man with railway and financial experience they might give f 250- 
000 per year. Head said that the committee thought that the remuneration should be 
at least f 500 per year. He then handed in the nomination to which he thought there 
might be some objection because it was his son, James Head. Smith replied that this 
would not be an objection but asked about the nominee's railway and financial 
experience. Head said his son had just returned from America where he had much 
experience of men and business and would amply carry out the intentions of the 
proprietors and the committee. "' 
The attempt to have Head's son appointed as an 'observer'. in addition to 
being blatant nepotism, was designed to secure a greater degree of control by the 
London faction and it was seen as such by the Hull shareholders. "' In April Head 
explained to a stormy meeting of shareholders that there had been misapprehension 
concerning the appointment of his son. He maintained that it was understood that the 
gentleman nominated should be the delegate of the London committee but should be 
appointed not to direct, but to observe. To this there was ironic laughter from the 
floor. Not only had Head's son only recently become a shareholder but he had little 
or no experience of railways or financial affairs. Furthermore his remuneration was 
100 Radway Times, I 9th April 1884. 
101 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 6h March 1884. 
101 Railivcýv Times, 26t" April 1884. 
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to be greater than other members of the board. From the point of view of the Hull 
faction there were other costly and inadmissible conditions. The London faction had 
clearly gone too far h-v seeking to appoint Head's son. A resolution requiring the 
directors to act in accordance with the wishes of the London Committee was 
rejected. The response of the latter was to claim that expenditure on the railway and 
dock would largely benefit Hull and not the shareholders. "' 
Some way out of this impasse was clearly needed and in an attempt to obtain 
an independent assessment John Grierson, the general manager of the Great Western 
Railway. was invited to inspect the works and report on where economies could be 
effected. Grierson presented his report to the directors on 16 th April. "' He estimated 
that after making all possible economies the sum of f 1,191,648 was required for the 
completion of the railway and dock. By June an additional f 825,000 would be 
needed for land purchase, rolling stock and payments to the contractors. 
More money was desperately needed and a prospectus issued on 16 th June 
1884 offered the issue of f 1,800,000 preference stock and described the company's 
prospects in glowing terms. "' Not surprisingly. in view of the widely reported 
disputes among the shareholders, the public response was poor and only f73.705 of 
stock was applied for. "' Although, in the 1880s, more successful railways were 
drawing in a steady stream of new investors, the HBR, despite promises of good 
things to come, was not an attractive proposition. 107 
The continuing financial crisis allowed Head and the London faction to berate 
the board at every opportunity. On 16 th July, Head complained that they had been 
told that f4 million pounds would finish the concern, but were now informed that 
fI '/2million more was needed. He further complained about what he saw as Hull's 
over-representation on the board of management, stating that Hull Corporation, in 
consideration of their holding of f, 100,000, had two seats on the board and the right 
of veto on any arrangement that the HBR might make regarding selling, leasing or 
103 Citý Archives, Hull, DXR TI, HBR Shareholders' meeting, I 9th April 1884. 
104 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsle. v Railway, Fol. 1, pp. 63-64. 
105 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Prospectus, 16'h June 1884. 
106 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & BarnsleY Railwav, Vol. 1, p. 64. 
lo, Albom, Conceiving Companies, pp. 239-240. 
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working the line. His complaint was that the people of Hull and Yorkshire. although 
too wise to subscribe to the railway. thought it was brought forward solely in their 
interests. This policy of identification with Hull had been the ruination of the 
company and he wished to see its affairs managed in a manner that had at heart the 
financial interests of the company. He urged that the HBR raise no additional capital 
until it had freed itself from Hull Corporation and then, if the NER or any other 
company was willing to take it over and complete the works which they could do at a 
much less cost than proposed, the HBR would be able to treat. James Stuart, one of 
the Hull Corporation directors, said in reply that the Corporation would have no 
objection to the transfer of the HBR to anybody, with the exception of the NER and 
MSLR. "' 
The Corporation, afraid of the re-imposition of monopoly, endorsed Stuart's 
remarks. It was prepared to consider an amalgamation with the MR or LNWR, 
provided that the independence of the port could be preserved. This discussion now 
became irrelevant as the situation was overtaken by events. The contractors had 
informed the HBR board in February that unless arrangements could be made for 
meeting monthly payments, they would be obliged to stop work. It was decided in 
March to issue Lloyds Bonds at six months to meet the HBR's liabilities. "' These 
bonds were suspended when the June issue of preference stock failed. The 
contractors were now owed f, 420,000 and were becoming the largest creditor of the 
'0, Railway Times, 19'1' July 1884. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 322, HBR Proprietors Address Book, December 1888 (with manuscript 
amendments to l3th February 1889) shows that Francis Head held no ordinary shares in the HBR 
in December 1888. 
109 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 3) 12/7, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1880-1886,14 th March 
1884. 
Simmons & Biddle, (eds. ), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, p. 275. 
'Lloyd's Bonds were a method devised by J. H. Lloyd (1798-1884), a barrister much involved in 
railway promotion, to assist railway companies by indirectly enlarging their borrowing powers. In 
such a bond the railway company acknowledged that a debt of a certain sum was owing to a 
contractor in order to complete the line, and he agreed to postpone the settlement of it until a date 
in the future written into the bond, when it would be discharged with interest at a stated rate. On 
the securitv of the bond the contractor could expect to raise a loan himself, either from a bank or 
sorne other financial house, sufficient for hirn to finish the work'. 
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company. It was feared that this might enable them to force an undesirable 
amalgamation on the HBR. On I" July the directors ordered that no further payments 
be made and work on the railway ceased. '" 
Smith explained the situation at the half-yearly meeting on 3 Oth August. There 
was no money to pay the company's liabilities and all work had been stopped. Unless 
further capital could be raised the HBR could not continue. He noted that during the 
last session of Parliament there had been a proposal to build a railway called the 
Scarborough and West Riding Railway. which was to run from the HBR at Howden, 
by way of Market Weighton and Driffield to Scarborough. The Bill had failed, from 
lack of support and doubts as to whether the HBR would ever open as a functioning 
railway. ''' These were dark days for the HBR. However, help was at hand. 
7. The completion of the line. 
As well as being chain-nan of the HBR, Smith was also MP for High Wycombe and 
in this capacity made another approach to Parliament to relax standing orders which 
prevented the payment of dividends from capital. As f4 million had already been 
expended and would be irretrievably lost unless new capital were provided, 
110 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 3 Oth August 1884. 
... Railway Times, 3 rd November 1883. The following extract from the Leeds Mercury appeared: 
'There has been a report of a proposed HBR extension from near Staddlethorpe to Scarborough. 
The route has been surveyed by practical men and all the landowners involved have been 
approached and have expressed themselves as being favourable to the scheme. It is expected that 
the official notice will be published in a week or two. ' The item was denied in following week's 
issue of the Railway Times. 
This proposal led to the formation of the Scarborough and West Riding Junction Railway, which 
planned a line from Howden on the HBR to Scarborough. The only section completed in 1885 was 
from Driff ield to Market Weighton, which connected to the NER at both ends. 
In 1893 the Scarborough, Bridlington and West Riding Junction Railway proposed railways from a 
junction with the NER near Staddlethorpe to the HBR at North Cave, continuing to ajunction with 
the NER at Market Weighton. The scheme never came to fruition. 
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application was made to introduce an appropriate Bill. On 13 th August 1884 
Parliament agreed to a further issue of stock to the value of fl. 500,00O. "' 
The success of this Bill was, to a large extent due to work in the lobbies bv 
James Staats Forbes, who was appointed as joint managing director of the HBR in 
August 1884 together with Samuel Swarbrick, late general manager of Great Eastern 
Railway (GER). "-' The extent of the power which Forbes and Swarbrick were to have 
over the affairs of the HBR may be gauged from a letter written by Smith to Forbes 
on 20th May 1884, which contained the following: 'As to control, I surrender it to 
you and Mr. Swarbrick with the utmost confidence, but I am charged by them [the 
board] to ask you to concede that I should remain until the opening of the 
undertaking, and that you and Mr. Swarbrick should join us as joint managing 
directors. "" The board had hoped that the reputations of Forbes and Swarbrick 
would revive the fortunes of the HBR. Until the appointment of these two 
experienced railway officers the HBR board had lacked credibility as it was 
composed mainly of people with little experience of running a railway and even less 
of rescuing it from a difficult situation. 
Despite the faith of Smith and others of the HBR board, the appointments 
provoked a mixed reception. A letter from 'A Shareholder' expressed the optimistic 
view that: 'Now that Mr. Forbes and Mr. Swarbrick have joined the HBR I hope we 
will see a better price for our shares. I have increased my holding today by 
purchasing fifty and I hope this will be the case with others who have bought at 
higher prices than ruling at present. "" The Railway Times, in less charitable mood, 
commented, 'One more string to Mr. J. S. Forbes' bow -a joint managing director of 
'12 East Riding Archives, Beverley, DDML/I 1/3, Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway 
and Dock Act, 1884. 
W, The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 312/7, HBR Directors" Minute Book 1880-1886,26 th August 
1884. 
East Riding Archives, DDML 11/7, Anonymous manuscript history of the HBR, 1886. Forbes was 
appointed as a director in November 1883 and Swarbrick in February 1884 at a salary of f2,500 
per year. Their contract was for 5 years and the HBR agreed to pay Forbes f 5,000 for giving up 
other important engagements. 
114 The National Arch ives, KeýN, RAIL 312 '57, Various correspondence with Forbes, 1884. 
115 Raih4, aY, '%'eii's, 28"' May 1884. 
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the HBR. What nextT In a subsequent issue it went on to point out that since Forbes' 
appointment to the HBR board the share price had dropped by 10%. "' Nonetheless, it 
seemed that credibility had been restored to the HBR as the issue of the nc\\ stock 
proved a success and, in November, work quickly resumed on the dock and 
rai I way. '" 
In October. 1884 C. H. Wilson addressed the Chamber of Commerce in ý, Nhat 
was a remarkably prescient speech. He said that had been a keen supporter of the 
HBR but had become convinced that it could not stand alone. He hoped to see a 
greater development of the dock system in connection with railways and felt it was 
vital for Hull that the dock system be connected with important railways. Whether 
this would end in the HBR becoming connected with the MR, or with a combination 
of railways, was a matter of vital interest to the port. It followed that the Dock 
Company would also have to become corporately connected in some way or other. In 
all probability he imagined that this would be the NER. He hoped that this would 
enable the Dock Company to reduce dues and enable Hull to compete on better terms 
than at the present time with all competitive ports. "' 
In the short-term nothing happened. There was progress elsewhere. however. 
On 29'h May 1885 the directors and members of Hull Corporation made an 
inspection of the HBR works. At the luncheon, after the tour, the Mayor. Dr. A. K. 
Rollit, in proposing a toast said that, 'the relations between the Corporation and the 
company had always been close and good, and that course on the part of the 
Corporation had been both prudent and patriotic. "'9 Subsequent events seemed to 
prove him right. 
The new dock, called Alexandra Dock, was opened on 16 th jUly 1885. "' The 
Corporation, in particular, was jubilant. The Mayor requested in the local press that 
the inhabitants of the borough observe the day as a public holiday. 'in order that all 
116 RadwaY Times, 31" May & 7h June 18 84. 
117 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsle. l- Railiva. v. Vol. 1, p. 72. 
118 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping AGM 21" October 1884. 
119 Rai/waYNews, 6 Ih June 1885. Rollit had been called 'unpatriotic' by Smith in 1879 when the 
former backed the Hull and Huddersfield Railway. 
120 Figure '30. Alexandra Dock. 
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may have the opportunity of witnessing the proceedings in connection ý, \-Ith the 
opening of the railway and dock'. "' The railway was opened to goods traffic on 2 Oth 
July and to passengers on 27 
th July. 122 
The openings were of tremendous significance for the port of Hull. They 
marked the start of railway competition and gave Hull a sense of having its own 
railway, no longer being part of an empire controlled from York and with its roots in 
the North-east, and a perception that Hull had been forced to fight for its position as 
the premier port on the east coast after London, and had prevailed. Hull was now to 
be the master of its own destiny, a sentiment reinforced by the close involvement of 
the Corporation with the HBR. 
The struggle to open the railway had been beset by financial problems and 
bitter fighting over whether the railway existed chiefly for the benefit of Hull or the 
London-based proprietors. This struggle was, in part, between geographically distinct 
groups of investors, but this very distinction underpinned another in tenns of the type 
of investment. As a generalisation the London group consisted of investors searching 
for a profit on the railway business who were, at best, unwilling holders of stock in 
terms of payment for work performed. Investors in Hull and Yorkshire were far more 
likely, at least in the case of those with large holdings, to be content with modest or 
no returns as long as the new railway enabled their businesses to trade more 
profitably. 
It had taken all the skill of entrepreneurs such as Forbes to see the HBR 
through to completion. Indeed, some of the manoeuvrings of the board and the 
contractors were at the limits of what could be considered good business practice, 
even at the time. Especially suspect were the manner in which the contract had been 
let to Lucas & Aird and the later undertaking to pay interest capital. The hand of 
Forbes may be seen in these arrangements, although we will probably never know 
how deep his involvement was. But had it not been for his skill in parliamentary 
committees and lobbies the HBR may not have come to fruition as most of the other 
board members were totally out of their depth in dealing with the financial 
difficulties besetting the HBR. 
121 Railwav,, Vcivs, 18 th jUIV 1885. 
122 Hull, Vcws, I" August 1885. 
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The appointment of Forbes and Swarbrick to the board was to prove a 
defining moment in the factional struggle between the proprietors. The ne\\ board 
took a wider view of the part the HBR could play on the railway scene and squabbles 
between shareholders were to become increasingly irrelevant. As I will show in the 
next chapter, this was because the HBR, aided by Hull Corporation, was soon to be 
forced to fight to maintain an independent existence. 
The successful promotion of the HBR also had a profound effect on the Dock 
Company, which became increasingly anxious as progress was made on the 
construction of the new dock. It was obvious to all that the company had nothing to 
match the magnificent dock of the HBR, and the future looked bleak. The policy of 
the Dock Company in this regard will be examined in the next chapter. 
Secure in its regional monopoly the NER was little concerned by the opening 
of the HBR, which it saw as barely more than an irritant. However, it was mindful 
that the HBR could become more of a threat were it to ally itself with other railways 
so the NER would initially, by bullying tactics which will be described in the next 
chapter, attempt to make life difficult for the new company. 
In the summer of 1885, however, the battle to beat the monopoly of the NER 
seemed to be won. This was true in the narrowest sense, but the HBR was soon to 
become involved in battles, the bitterness of which made the struggle of Hull traders 
and the Corporation seem as nothing. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
THE EMERGENCE OF COMPETITION, 1885-1890. 
1. Introduction. 
The years between 1885 and 1890 saw the nadir and the recovery of the fortunes of 
the HBR. Until 1888 they were marked by financial crises leading to receivership, 
bitter in-fighting among the directors and shareholders, and a policy by the NER and 
its allies which could at best be described as uncooperative and at worst outright 
hostile. There were real take-over bids and imagined ones. Throughout all this the 
Corporation steadfastly adhered to its r6le of the guardian of the independence of the 
HBR. After all these tribulations the company was re-structured in 1889, leading to 
its recovery and later success. Meanwhile the Dock Company sank further in the 
financial mire as a result of a rates-war with the HBR. It offered itself to any railway 
company which would come to its aid, but was unsuccessful. The idea of a dock 
trust, including the new HBR dock was once more suggested by the Corporation in 
1888. However, it was not the ratepayers who thwarted it on this occasion, but the 
recalcitrance of the HBR and the Dock Company. 
2. Financial difficulties faced by the HBR, 1885-1886. 
Things seemed to start well for the HBR. By August 1885,64 ships had entered 
Alexandra Dock. The coal rate from South Yorkshire of 3s. Id. (151/2p. ) had been 
reduced to 2s. 2d. (I I p. ) and Hull was on the way to becoming an important coal 
port. ' However, general goods traffic got off to a slow start. By February 1886 much 
of the enthusiasm had evaporated as the difficult position of the HBR became 
apparent. In the first five months of operation Neptune Street depot handled 42,972 
tons of general goods and 7.853 tons of coal. Sculcoates depot handled 
approximately 20,000 tons in total. The half-yearly receipts to 31" December 1885 
City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 26 th August 1885. 
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%ýýere f53,280 from a gross tonnage of traffic of 191.198. This was a %, ery poor result 
and a drastic improvement was needed. When the figures were announced to the 
shareholders an acrimonious tone emerged, which set the precedent for some time to 
come. There were complaints of high expenditure and low income. 2 It was apparent 
that the HBR was not in a financial position to undertake the Halifax and 
Huddersfield extension and an Act was obtained for an extension of time. ' 
It was at this time that the Ralhi, qil, Times began its sustained castigation of 
the management of the HBR in general and Forbes, who appeared to be its b&e-noir, 
in particular. Its first salvo came in an ironic leading article published after the results 
showing a net loss of f68,735 for the first complete half-year trading were 
announced. The periodical opined that: 
It will be a long time before the HBR becomes a rival to the NER. We notice 
further, notwithstanding that the chairman had the presence of mind to 
congratulate the shareholders on the 'Profit' earned by the concern. Happy Hull 
in having such a railway and dock, and fortunate the company in possessing a 
director in the shape of Mr. Forbes who, with characteristic lightness of heart, 
pledged himself and Mr. Swarbrick that in a short time all reasonable ground for 
complaint as to the working of the company should be rernoved. ' 
The arrival of an independent railway upset the terms agreed between the 
signatories to the Humber Agreements. On 12 th April 1886 the LYR began to 
exercise its long-dormant running powers into Hull, setting up a carting depot, thus 
competing for traffic and entering the rate war between the NER, HBR and the Dock 
Company. 5 Furthermore, the use by the LYR of these running powers reduced the 
amount of traffic exchanged with the HBR at Hensall, and to make matters even 
worse for the HBR the NER reduced its rate for coal by 3d. (11/2p. ) per ton in 
2 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1. HBR Shareholders' meeting, 20'h February 1886. 
East Riding Archives, Beverley, DDML/I 1/33. Hull, Bamsley and West Riding Junction Railwaly 
and Dock Act, 18V. 
4 Railwai, Times, 27 th February 1886. 
5 J. Marshall, The Lancashire and Yoi-kshire Railivqv, IoL 2. (Newton Abbot, 1970), p. 209. 
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February 1886 and by a similar amount in August. ' In addition, in August 1886. 
Smith alleged that the HBR was suffering from a boycott by other railwa\ 
undertakings, citing large discrepancies of tonnages sent to and received from 
various companies. ' The HBR finances also suffered from a rate war with the Dock 
Company, whose rates had fallen steadily from 8.45d. (3.52p. ) in December 1885 to 
4.84d. (2.02p. ) in June 1886, forcing corresponding decreases at Alexandra Dock. ' 
The Railway News pointed out that the half-year results were deplorable. 
Gross receipts were f 66,93 5, the working expenses were f 59,73 7 or about 90%. The 
balance was f 7,198. Debenture and other charges were f 70,93 1, leaving a deficit of 
f 63,73 3. The cumulative debit balance was f 115,842. ' It had become obvious that 
the company could not afford the passenger station at Charlotte Street as proposed in 
the 1883 Act and a Bill was proposed for its abandonment. 'O 
The financial consequences were not only felt by the HBR. In the same half- 
year the NER had been forced to spend f2,000 carting goods from Alexandra Dock 
to the NER station. This could have been avoided if a proposed connection at 
Sculcoates had been operational. The HBR had laid the rails and built the 
embankment but had not put in the junction. In an attempt to redress the situation the 
NER submitted a Bill for completion of the junction and running powers to 
Alexandra Dock. '' John Dent, the NER chairman observed: 
6 K. Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnslev Railwav, Vol. I, (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 88. 
7 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 26 th August 1886. 
Traffic from HBR ('000 tons) to: Traffic received ('000 tons) from: 
MR 35 10 
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LYR 26 10 
MSLR 12 
8 Ibid., HBR Shareholders' meeting, 26 th August 1886. 
9 Railivqv, Vews, 21" August 1886. 
10 East Riding Archives, Beverley, DDMLI 1 33 Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway and 
Dock Act, 1886. 
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We recognise that the HBR exists and if, in the future management of their 
undertaking. they will conduct its affairs legitimately and with a vieýý to 
profit, they will not find the NER inconsiderate neighbours: but it will not 
be safe for them to assume that the NER will permanently hold their hands 
if other principles of management are persevered in by the HBR. We will 
treat them fairly, as fair neighbours if they will fight fair. If they do not fight 
fair then they must take the consequences. 12 
Thus did the mighty NER threaten the puny upstart. However it ýN-as to 
underestimate the HBR, and Forbes in particular. when the companies tangled with 
each other in the Sculcoates dispute. 
3. The Sculcoates dispute. 
The Sculcoates dispute represented in microcosm the shifting balance of power 
between the railway companies and interested parties and so is worthy of 
examination in some depth. 
In accordance with the terms of the HBR Act of 1880 construction had begun 
of a connection from the HBR at Sculcoates to the NER at Wilmington. " The HBR 
then realised that this connection could be used by the NER to the disadvantage of 
the HBR as it gave the former access to Alexandra Dock. The HBR therefore refused 
to make the connection to the NER. The latter decided to apply to Parliament for 
permission to acquire and complete the connection and, in 1887, sought powers to 
construct a railway from a junction with the NER Victoria dock branch to a junction 
with the HBR. 14 
The Corporation petitioned against the proposal, stating that HBR Act of 
1880 authorised a railway practically identical with that proposed. The Corporation 
considered that if the NER were authorised to make this connection to the HBR it 
would indirectly obtain control over an important part of that company's railway. 
Rai/wavNews, 5th February 1887. 
Figure 19. Proposed connection betwcen the NER and HBR at Sculcoates. 
14 CitN Archives, Hull. TLP 166. North Eastern Railwaý Bill, 1887. 
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Commercial interests in the town thought along similar lines. At a meetin, ) of tl 
representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, merchants, shipowners and traders. 
resolutions had been passed condemning the NER's proposals and opposin" the L- 
granting of powers which were seen as inimical to the trade and commerce of the 
port. 15 
The HBR feared that giving the NER access to Alexandra Dock would divert 
traffic from the HBR line. It was particularly concerned as the Dock Company had a 
Bill before Parliament to lease or sell its property to the NER. As the Dock Company 
was a competitor of the HBR the latter feared that if the railway were built and the 
NER subsequently absorbed the Dock Company, this would effectively end dock 
competition at Hull. Indeed, it would confer upon the NER the very powers which 
Parliament had refused to confer upon the HBR in 1880, when it had sought to obtain 
access to the Hull Dock Company estate. " 
In the Commons Committee on 24 th March 1887 enquiring into the NER's 
Bill, Mr. Bidder QC appearing for that company, said that it was due to Forbes that 
the line had not been completed. He alleged that when Forbes had been called in to 
sort out the HBR financial affairs in 1884 one of his first questions was about the 
connecting railway to the NER. He asked, 'Why are you making this line? Do you 
not see that instead of being a feeder to you it will be a sucker? The traffic will come 
over the NER rails and not those of the HBR. For heaven's sake do not put another 
rail in! "' 
Henry Tennant, the general manager of the NER said in evidence that he was 
unaware of this and, in September 1885, had written to the HBR asking when the line 
was to be completed. Samuel Swarbrick advised him to communicate with Forbes 
but Forbes proved elusive. Tennant wrote many times but was unable to obtain a 
written reply from Forbes. Finally, in February 1886, he realised that that the HBR 
had no intention of making the connection. He went on to say that the HBR was 'a 
thorn in the side of the NER although it had only been in existence for two years. 
Is City Archives, Hull, TLP 166, Papers relating to the North Eastern Railway Bill. 1887. 
6 Ibid., Petitions against NER Bill, 1887. 
17 Ibid., Proceedings of Commons Committee, March 1887. 
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and it was 'boycotted by all the other systems upon which the NER could exercise 
any influence'. " 
Forbes gave a masterly perfon-nance when he appeared before the committee 
on 2 5th March. He said he had had innumerable interviews with Tennant on the issue 
of the connection and although he had not answered Tennant^s letters in writinp he :g 
had always done so verbally. He said that Tennant's point of view was that the HBR 
must connect the lines, and when the junction was operative the NER would tell the 
HBR what they were really going to do. Forbes said that if the NER got over the 
proposed junction and into Alexandra Dock without some kind of limitation it would 
sweep every ounce of traffic from the HBR. He went on to say that, in his view, the 
connecting line would be useless without exchange sidings. The cost to the HBR of 
completing the connection would be f 5,000-f 6,000, which they were not prepared to 
spend on a line without a defined use. He alleged that Tennant had been evasive 
regarding the provision of exchange sidings and, more importantly, under what terms 
and conditions the connection would be worked. Bidder's cross examination failed to 
shake Forbes. Indeed, after repeated questioning he was told by the chairman that he 
was labouring points and that the Committee understood Forbes' point of view and 
further questioning by Bidder was unnecessary. When the hearing was adjourned it 
was obvious who had won the contest. " 
Heads of Agreement for the use of the connection had been produced but the 
NER realised that its cause was lost and the section of the Bill relating to the 
Sculcoates connection was withdrawn leaving the HBR victorious. " The HBR was 
proving a match for the NER, at least in the short-term. 
18 City Archives, Hull, TLP 166, Proceedings of Commons Committee, March 1887. 
19 Ibid., Proceedings of Commons Committee, March 1887. 
20 Citv Archives, Hull, TLP 166, Heads of Agreement in respect of connection between NER and 
HBR lines at Sculcoates, Hull.. 
City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, -16 
th August 1886. 
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4. Abortive proposals for the sale of the HBR and the Hull Dock Company. 
The long-term prospects for the HBR were not, however, so rosy. Ha\ýino provoked 
competition over rates it could not control the subsequent battle. In FebruarN, 1887 
the HBR chairman reported that the Hull Dock Company would not agree to stop the 
rates war. It wished to acquire Alexandra Dock and institute a joint purse sYstem. 
This was wholly unacceptable to the HBR, which had once more asked for access to 
the Dock Company estate and had been refused. " 
In 1887 the Dock Company, in an attempt to get out of a worsening financial 
situation, brought a Bill before Parliament to enable it to sell or lease its undertaking 
to the MSLR, LYR, NER or LNWR, or to one or more of them. " The Board of Trade 
queried whether it would be in the public interest that Hull Docks should become the 
property of one or more of four of the most important railway companies in the 
kingdom. This had long been a matter of national concern. The Joint Select 
Committee of the Lords and Commons in 1872 on railway amalgamation had 
considered the effects that might arise from docks becoming the property of railway 
companies and had recommended that where effective competition by sea existed it 
should be safeguarded by preventing railway companies from obtaining control over 
public harbours. But despite this recommendation, the HBR had been sanctioned by 
Parliament in 1880 to construct its railway and dock by an amendment of 
3 Parliamentary Standing Orders .2, The policy of Parliament had been one of 
ambivalence, at least as far as Hull was concerned. 
24 
As it now seemed possible that the Dock Company could be sold to a 
competing railway the HBR decided against further negotiations about rates. In view 
of its dire financial position the HBR decided to follow the example of the Dock 
Company and seek amalgamation with one or other of the more powerful railway 
companies. But when the Corporation saw that the NER and MSLR were included 
among the list of companies with which the HBR was prepared to amalgamate it was 
21 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 26 th February 1887. 
22 City Archives, Hull, TLP 162, Hull Docks Bill, 1887. 
2" Ibid., Board of Trade report, 1877. 
24 lhicl. 
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horrified. The HBR directors %ý ere summoned to explain this action. The preliminary 
meeting was held on 5 Ih January 1887. Samuel Swarbrick, explaining the Bill, said 
that the situation was very complex and Forbes would explain the position at a 
subsequent meeting. " 
At the next meeting Forbes attempted to explain away the contentious parts 
of the Bill in terms of legal technicalities. He said that in order for the HBR to hax, e a 
locus slandi in opposition to the Dock Company, as to its proposed power to 
negotiate with the MSLR and the NER, these companies must be included. He 
denied that he had had any negotiations with the NER, either directly or indirectly 
and said that the only proper way the MSLR and NER could be removed from the 
Bill was for them to be struck out by Parliament. " The Corporation, however, 
dismissed Forbes' arguments and wished to exclude the NER and MSLR from the 
list of companies with which the HBR might amalgamate. 27 
On 25'h January deputations from the Chamber of Commerce, the Guardian 
Society, shipowners and traders attended a meeting with the Corporation. Smith was 
present representing the HBR. He once again attempted to explain away the inclusion 
of the NER in the Bill in similar terms to Forbes. Nevertheless the Corporation 
representatives insisted that all references to the MSLR and NER be struck from the 
Bill. " 
Despite the best efforts of Swarbrick, Forbes and Smith to come up with 
reasons for offering the HBR to the NER the Corporation remained adamant that it 
would maintain the independence of the HBR. The sophistry used by the HBR 
directors may well have increased suspicion on the part of the Corporation that they 
were prepared to do a deal with the NER or any other railway company if they 
thought they could get away with it. These suspicions were soon to be confirmed 
15 City Archives, Hull, TLP 166, Minutes of meeting with Hull Corporation, 5 th January 1887. 
26 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsle. v Railwa, v, I'ol. 1, p. 71. Forbes had written to J. D. Dent, the 
chairman of the NER as earN as 7 th July 1884 asking for a meeting so that he could explain why 
the NER were the 'right people' with whom to come to an arrangement. 
27 Co Archives, Hull, TLP 166, Minutes of meeting with Hull Corporation, 15 th Januar\ 1887. 
28 Ibid. 
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when the MR made a bid for the HBR in December 1887 and Smith and Forbes 
appeared in their true colours. This will be discussed below. 
The Corporation held a public meeting on 7 th February to sound out opinion 
concerning its opposition to the Bills proposing the sales of the HBR and the Dock 
Company. C. H. Wilson, speaking in opposition to the Bills. said that the 
management of the Dock Company had led to its present impecunious state. He 
argued that the NER would try to recoup the outlay involved in the purchase of the 
Dock Company. He further alleged that the policy of the NER had been to profit at 
the expense of Hull by drawing trade to their northern ports. In connection with the 
HBR, he referred to the threat issued at the NER half-yearly shareholders' meeting in 
February 1887, that if the HBR did not attempt to live on good terms with the NER 
they 'will have to take the consequences. ' The only harrn the HBR had done to the 
NER was to break its monopoly, and competition must be preserved. In the interests 
of the town he therefore felt that the Bills must be opposed. The meeting consented. " 
In view of this overwhelming opposition the greater part of the Dock Company's Bill 
failed, the only sections being retained were those which allowed for the reduction of 
wharfage rates. " 
The competition between the Dock Company and the HBR had been 
financially advantageous for Wilson, a fact that he acknowledged. Returning to his 
sniping at the Dock Company he said that such competition had been very injurious 
to the shareholders but very beneficial to the port of Hull. He went on to say: 
We must not forget that every port is reducing its port charges. The old Dock 
Company cannot maintain their position and cannot pay their shareholders a 
dividend unless they work harmoniously with the HBR, either by amalgamation. 
or by agreement with them that they do not go into unnecessary competition and 
unnecessary expenditure. " 
29 Eastern Morning Vcws, 8h February 1887. 
30 Citv Archives, Hull, TLP 162, Hull Docks Bill, 1887. 
Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping, AGM, 14 Ih November 1887. 
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However, the Dock Company was not working han-noniously with the HBR and 
amalgamation did not appear to be an option. The financial situation for both these 
undertakings was to worsen before it improved. 
5. The deepening financial crisis affecting the HBR. 
In the meantime the HBR was lurching from one financial crisis to another. A special 
shareholders' meeting was held in June 1886 to consider abandonment of the Halifax 
and Huddersfield extensions, saving f 19,000. " In July, yet another special meeting 
was held to authorise the creation of f500. OOO preference shares or stock. Smith 
admitted that the HBR was in a bankrupt condition and heavily in debt, but he hoped 
that when the extra capital had been raised the company would be able to meet its 
increasing debt. The motion to raise the capital was carried. " 
These measures were not enough. Claims against the company came thick 
and fast. The contractors issued an additional writ for 00,754. On 17'h December 
1886 representatives of the debenture holders applied to the Court of Chancery for 
writs against the company. ý" On 21" December further writs, on behalf of the 
contractors and the consulting engineers, were issued against the HBR for payments 
totalling F, 17,402. The matter was taken to arbitration and f 12,078 was awarded. On 
nd December 1886 the company announced that the interest due on Ist January 
1887, on the first and second debenture debts of f960,000 and fl, 500,000 
respectively, could not be paid. 35 Perhaps surprisingly Smith and Swarbrick were 
appointed as judgement receivers on 6 th January 1887. Forbes and Fisher were 
subsequently added. On 21st February Swarbrick and Henry Dever, a chartered 
accountant, were appointed receivers on behalf of the debenture holders. 36 
32 Rai/ii, qy Times, 5"' June 1886. 
-13 Ibid., 31" July 1886. 
34 Ibid, 25"' December 1886. 
35 Ibid, ]"January 1887. 
36 National Archives, Kew, RAIL 312S, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1886-1898,26 th February 
1887. 
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Swift action was taken to reduce liabilities. The Halifax and Huddersfield 
extensions were abandoned. " A company called the Hull and North Western Junction 
Railway was formed to take over construction. " One of the promoters was William 
Trotter. who later became chairman of the HBR. The new company paid f 10,630 to 
the HBR for various rights under the Bill, which was predictably opposed by Hull 
Corporation because it did not prohibit the sale of the new railway to any companN 
other than the HBR. The Corporation wished to exclude the possibility of a sale to 
the NER or MSLR, which it considered would infringe the Act authorising the 
HBR. " This was eventually resolved by an undertaking from the company to sell 
only to the HBR. "' The MR was to have running powers over the line as agreed in 
1882. The HBR also sought to give the LNWR running powers. However, all the 
other major companies except the LNWR petitioned against this and the proposal 
was dropped. " 
Despite these measures the HBR staggered down the road to financial 
Armageddon. In February 1887 the Railit, ti-y Times, with the benefit of hindsight, 
renewed its attack, expressing in no uncertain terms what it thought of the receivers. 
In a leading article entitled 'The Hull and Barnsley Starveling', it wrote: 
When Parliament, with a light heart, sanctioned the duplication of railway and 
dock facilities at Hull in the interests of this audacious concern it may be 
assumed that it did not foresee the natural sequel to such a course, which was at 
the time patent to all those who cared to exercise an independent judgement in 
the matter. Amongst other matters for consideration at the half-yearly meeting of 
the company is the proposal to appoint as the receivers ordered on behalf of the 
,7 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 27 th February 1887. 
East Riding Archives, Beverley, DDML/I 1/3, Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway 
and Dock Act, 1887. 
8 City Archives, Hull, TLP 163, Hull and North Western Junction Railway Bill. 
39 Hull Corporation had originally sold 126 acres of land and subscribed f 100,000 to the HBR on the 
conditions stipulated in clause 26 of the 1880 Act, which required a guarantee of the independence 
of the railway. 
40 Ibid., Correspondence between Company's solicitor and Hull Corporation. 
" City Archives, Hull, TLP 164. Hull and Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway Bill, 1887. 
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debenture holders Colonel Smith and Mr. Swarbrick. These two gentlemen. or 
the former. at all e-vents. have been responsible for the action which has resulted 
in the deplorable present state of things, and it is difficult to understand how they 
can exercise an independent control of their colleagues or over the affairs of the 
undertaking. " 
It was easy for the journal to criticise the appointment of receivers who had 
been so intimately connected with the company's problems, but it was probablN a 
case of the best from a bad bunch. Smith was the chairman and a banker, Swarbrick 
was a railway accountant and Forbes had a wide experience of railway management. 
Moreover, the Raffit, aj, Times seemed to have suffered a convenient attack of amnesia 
as, in 18 8 1, it had said: 
We have already on two occasions during the process of its formation called 
attention to the HBR, which we have every reason to believe is going to work 
such beneficial results for the port of Hull and that part of the coal district of 
South Yorkshire which is practically without railway accommodation. " 
It was not surprising that the debenture holders sought to abrogate Forbes' 
appointment as manager of the undertaking. In dismissing the application Mr. Justice 
Chitty said that Forbes' special experience was of the utmost value in supporting the 
company and protecting its interests when attacked before Parliamentary 
Committees. " He obviously had a higher regard for Forbes' talents than did the 
railway press. 
Competition continued. The NER reduced its rates for South Yorkshire 
collieries from 2s. 7d. (13p. ) to 2s. 4d. (111/2p. ) per ton. The HBR was obliged to 
follow suit with a further reduction of 2d. (1p. ) per ton for wagons supplied by 
collieries . 
45 Traffic revenue increased slowly from f98,148 for the half-year ending 
42 Railway Times, 26 th February 1887. 
41 lbid, 22 nd January 188 1. 
" RailwavNews, II th June 1887. 
Citv Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, l9th August 1887. 
154 
, th )0 June 1887 to fI 11.627 for the half-year ending 3l't December 1887 but this ýý as 
still insufficient to pay the debenture holders and the ordinary shareholders received 
nothing. By February 1888 the company owed f 750,000 to creditors, f 21/2million to 
debenture holders and a considerable amount in Lloyds Bonds. It was becoming 
obvious that an alliance with a more powerful railway company was essential. " 
In August 1887 the Railway Times, still hostile to the HBR. once more dipped 
its pen in vitriol for another leading article under the title of *The Hull and Barnsley 
Starveling': 
To judge from the tenor of the half-yearly report of the HBR, the position of 
affairs in that miserable undertaking would seem to be far more satisfactorN, to 
the board than to its proprietors, or indeed. to the reading public generally ... It 
even scorns to name the precise and ridiculous amount of its capital 
indebtedness. An Act has been obtained for abandoning certain extensions. 
Would not a winding-up Act not have met the case in a simpler and more 
efficient manner? " 
The NER was also suffering from this competition but to a lesser degree than 
the HBR, since it had very considerable reserves to draw upon. Now that the HBR 
had its own dock the NER was subject to even more severe rivalry but fought hard to 
maintain its share of the traffic. The company's rhetoric was that it was anxious to 
work hannoniously with its *old friend', the Dock Company and sympathised with it 
in the losses it had sustained. " Thus, the effect of the HBR's competitive strategy 
was to force its rival into ever-closer alliance with the Hull Dock Company. 
6. The proposal for the sale of the HBR to the MR. 
This state of affairs could not continue indefinitely. In early December 1887 rumours 
began to circulate that the MR were seeking to take over the HBR on very favourable 
46 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 17 th February 1888. 1- 
47 Railwqv Times, 13'h August 1887. 
48 RailwayNcws, 6 th August 1887. 
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terms. In fact. Forbes and Swarbrick had been authorised to negotiate. 49 The MR, to 
which the HBR connected at its western end. was the only company showing any 
sign of friendly overtures. Acquisition of the HBR would give the MR an 
advantageous outlet on the East Coast mirroring the port of Heysham on the West 
Coast. which it already owned. The offer was to be of f40 MR stock for f 100 HBR 
stock. The Railwq. v Times was sceptical. From the outset it suspected that the whole 
exercise was a ploy to increase the value of HBR shares. " 
In December 1887 the HBR asked for the Corporation"s consent to an 
arrangement whereby the MR should work the railways and docks of the HBR. The 
Town Clerk asked for further details. The response was that negotiations were still 
under way and that final details were not yet known. This gave rise to a suspicion on 
the part of the Corporation, reinforced by the HBR's conduct in 1887, that certain of 
the directors did not wish to reveal details of the proposal at this early stage in the 
belief that this would hamper the Corporation's ability to mount effective opposition. 
The Corporation, therefore, compromised by agreeing to the deposit of the Bill 
without prejudice to its being able to refuse consent to the Bill itself. " 
On 21s' February 1888 the chairman of the Corporation Parliamentary 
Committee said that he had been told that details of the HBR and MR agreement 
would not be disclosed until the filled up Bill was carried into committee, and it 
would be impossible until the last moment for the Corporation to determine how the 
Bill might affect the independence of the HBR. The Corporation felt it important to 
prevent the NER obtaining any clauses which might hinder the MR from properly 
working and developing the HBR and decided, as a precautionary measure, to 
petition against the Bill. On 13 th March Alderman James Stuart, a director of the 
HBR and member of the Corporation Parliamentary Committee resigned his seat on 
that committee, further reinforcing the suspicion that underhand dealings were 
planned by the HBR. In February the HBR directors visited Derby to see the 
49 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 312/8, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1886-1898.6'h December 
1887. 
50 Railwqv Times, 10"' December 1887. 
51 CitN Archives, Hull, TLP '121.1888 Bill to empower HBR to enter into a working agreement with 
the Midland Railway. Agreement with Midland Railway and associated papers. 
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locomotive and carriage works of the MR. 52 This suggested that the practicalities of a 
working agreement were being considered. 
The coal owners were concerned about the effects of the amalgamation on the 
coal trade at Hull. As a result of the opening of the HBR the rate for coal from South 
Yorkshire to Hull had dropped from 3s. 2d. (16p. ) to 2s. 7d. (13p. ) per ton. The 
promoters of the HBR had held out the inducement of a coal trade to London by rail 
and sea, a plan which had been carried out to a limited extent in the preceding year 
and was capable of vast expansion. However, this was unlikely to happen if the MR 
had control of the coal traffic as it had its own expensive route to London to feed and 
was likely to increase rates to Hull. The colliery owners had been refused any 
assurance that the existing rate would not be increased and they decided to oppose 
the Bill. " 
However, in an endeavour to come to an agreement on the question of coal 
rates, a deputation representing the mine owners visited the directors of the HBR and 
although received with courtesy they were referred to the directors of the MR. They 
received a very different reception from the MR and were met with marked coldness. 
The interview did not last half an hour, the MR directors telling the deputation to ask 
for what they required in a committee of Parliament. This was poor politics on the 
part of the MR as the deputation discussed the treatment they had received and 
agreed that this reinforced their opinion that the proposed transfer of the HBR to the 
MR should be opposed by every legitimate means. " 
Nor was this the only opposition. When Corporation finally received the draft 
working agreement on 6 th April 1888 it was not reassured by the provisions it 
contained. 55 The clauses incorporated in the Bill for the protection of the NER meant 
that: 
52 Railway Times, 18 th February 1888. 
53 lbid, 4 Ih February 1888. 
S4 RailwaY News, 31 "March 1888. 
-S i Cltv Archives, Hull, TLP 32 1, MR and HBR Amalgamation Bill, 1888. The HBR was to be 
worked by the MR at 58% of gross receipts for the years 1889 and 1890, at 56% for the next two I": I 
cars, and at 5510 for 1893 and each succeeding year. The whole of the rolling stock, steam vessels 
and plant were to be vested in the MR at a cost to be fixed bN an arbitrator. The MR would issue 
3',, 41 o debenture stock" to the extent of f 12 10,000 in replacement of the loan capital of the HBR. 
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1. The NER would obtain full access to Alexandra Dock on equal terms with the 
MR by means of Sculcoates Junction. 
One half of traffic (except passengers, coal and coke) arising from the MR 
system would be carried over NER lines. 
3. The NER were to be allowed to take what was described as non-competitive 
traffic from the HBR by means of Sculcoates Junction. Non-competitive traffic 
was defined as merchandise and mineral traffic of all descriptions between 
Alexandra Dock and stations and places on the NER which were not reached by 
any other line of railway independently of the NER, and traffic between 
Alexandra Dock and the following collieries: Whitwood, West Riding, 
Lofthouse, and collieries connected with the Methley Joint Railway. These 
collieries were presently accessible by the HBR independently of the NER. " 
According to the Town Clerk the result of this would be the collapse of effective 
competition. He argued that, in practical terms, a merger would: 
1. Permanently shut the HBR line to all places which could not presently be reached 
independently of the NER and secure to the NER all traffic between Hull and such 
places. 
2. Provide nearly equally between the NER and the HBR all traffic from the MR to 
Hull. It meant an unlimited amount of traffic could be diverted by the NER from 
the HBR. 
3. Put an end to any hopes of Hull becoming a coal port. 
4. Restore the railway monopoly existing prior to the opening of the HBR. 
5. Place the Dock Company at the complete mercy of the NER. 
Under these circumstances the Corporation would oppose the Bill. To seek 
justification for this and to galvanise further opposition it intended to submit the 
CIt\' Archives, Hull, TLP 32 1. ! 888 MR & HBR Agreement. Clauses inserted for the protection of 
the NER. 
City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee papers, December 1887 to April 1888. 
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agreement and clauses to a meeting of HBR shareholders who kNould realise that 
their interests had been totally ignored. " 
The Chamber of Commerce opposed the Bill and agreed with the Corporation 
but noted that the members would doubtless have welcomed the MR to Hull if it 
could have been received without attendant clauses for the protection of the NER. " It 
passed a resolution that the Chamber of Commerce considered the MR agreement 
detrimental to the interests of the commercial community of the port and the 
shareholders of the HBR. " 
A war of circulars now broke out. " On II th April the London shareholders 
issued a circular in support of the Midland agreement and the NER clauses. Two 
days later a copy of the clauses and the Corporation recommendations was sent to 
each ordinary shareholder. This noted that all the directors disapproved of the 
proposed agreement except Smith, Forbes and Cope, the last named being the 
solicitor for Lucas & Aird, widely known to be creditors and debenture holders. 
Forbes was, of course, a receiver representing largely debenture holders and creditors 
of the HBR. " On 17 th April a circular was issued on behalf of a committee formed 
for the protection of ordinary shareholders, urging rejection of the proposals. On 20th 
April the Corporation issued another circular re-stating its opposition to the 
amalgamation and giving preliminary details of its proposals for a dock and railway 
trust. 
C. H. Wilson now threw his weight behind opposition to the scheme despite 
earlier support. He had come to the conclusion that in the interests of the 
shareholders of the HBR and the Hull Dock Company, as well as the town of Hull 
generally, that the agreement should not be carried out. It is likely that Wilson's 
expressions of concern were motivated by his calculation of the likely effects of the 
merger on his business interests. 62 
57 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee papers, December 1887 to April 1888. 
58 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping AGM, 3 1" October 1888. 
59 Railwaj, Times, 24"' April 1888. 
60 CItv Archives, Hull, TLP 321.1888 circulars to shareholders. 
61 Citv Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee papers, December 1887 to April 1888. 
62 Railwal, Times, 14 th April 1888. 
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There can be little doubt that Forbes was behind the drafting of the NER 
clauses. As a businessman he saw the amalgamation with the MR and 
accommodation with the NER as a way out of the HBR's difficulties which would 
eventually yield a return on capital, thereby silencing the London faction and the 
debenture holders. However, for as long as the Corporation held the power of veto 
over arrangements the HBR could make, it was unlikely any agreement containing 
the NER clauses would be allowed. 
On 25thApril the motion for the proposed agreement with the MR was put to 
a meeting of HBR shareholders. The meeting split along predictable lines. Smith 
spoke for the Bill including the NER clauses and was seconded by Forbes. John 
Fisher, the deputy chainnan, spoke against the Bill, particularly the NER clauses. H. 
Williams, a London shareholder, supported the resolution in favour of the Bill but J. 
I Woodhouse, representing Hull Corporation, opposed it strongly. He pointed out 
that it was well known that Wilson's had withdrawn their ships from Alexandra 
Dock because they disapproved of the agreement and the clauses, and upon them 
depended the dock's future. He went on to say that the Corporation was considering 
a dock trust but he could not give details because the scheme had not yet been finally 
approved by the Corporation. " 
As C. H. Wilson had been a keen supporter of the HBR and Alexandra Dock 
it may seem strange that Wilson's had withdrawn their ships. However, Wilson was a 
man who put his company's interests first and was prepared to use measures that 
would harm the HBR if it enabled his wider ends to be met. He would no doubt have 
supported the amalgamation with the MR but for the NER clauses. There can be little 
doubt of his influence in the town. His political opponents alleged that: 'Messrs. 
Wilson's have ruthlessly driven their opponents out of their path ... and are masters of 
the situation. They purchase the great bulk of their stores away from Hull, bringing 
them to their warehouse. Those stores that must be bought in Hull are procured from 
a small circle of Radical supporters. "' Despite this type of propaganda Wilson 
retained his popularity in Hull amongst the electorate and his seat as a Gladstonian 
Liberal until his elevation to the peerage in 1905. 
63 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR meeting, 25") April 1888. 
64 Central Library. Hull, Hull Critic. 28"' March 1885. 
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The opposition of others is less easy to explain. H. Lowenfeld, who had been 
involved in the issue of circulars. was another leading opponent. He explained that 
initially he was in favour of the agreement, and the circulars issued by him may have 
given that impression. But he did not then know that there would be any NER 
clauses which, in his opinion, wiped out every advantage. This was strange 
behaviour coming from a speculator such as Lowenfeld with control over capital 
approaching f-1,300,000 in the company, as it would appear to have been in his 
interests to give support to the proposed amalgamation. It seems unlikely that after 
issuing three circulars in support of the amalgamation he should be convinced by 
reading the NER clauses to perform such a volte-face, the grounds for which are 
unclear. 
Smith announced that the proposal for amalgamation was rejected. Trotter 
demanded a poll. to be taken as the shareholders left the meeting and the result 
declared on 27 th April. " This was further adjourned until 7 th May due to problems 
with the allocation of proxy votes. The Railway Times reported: 
Notwithstanding the lapse of several days since the meeting of the shareholders, 
a very small proportion of the proxies have been examined, and much valuable 
time has been wasted in disputation. The promoters of the agreement have 
objected to the proxies given to Mr. Lowenfeld being cast against the agreement, 
as they contend that they were obtained on the understanding that they were to 
be used in favour of it. On the other hand a number of Mr. Trotter's proxies have 
been objected to by other opposing directors and the result of these and other 
disputes is practically a deadlock. " 
Whether or not the confusion was the result of deliberate malpractice or a 
consequence of managerial ineptitude on the part of the HBR board is not clear At 
65 RailivuY Times, 28'ý April 1888. 
66 lbid, 5"' May 1888. 
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the meeting on 7th May Smith announced the re SUlt. 
17 The resolution was not carried 
and the Amalgamation Bill was withdrawn. " 
The views of the wider community of railway investors, as represented bý the 
periodical press. found all this fairly predictable. The Railit'aY Xeii, s. in a leading 
article said: 
The sole object of the Hull Corporation and the traders is to secure the benefits 
of competition, and if they are to have their way. this competition must be 
continued for their benefit, without question of whether the owners of the 
railway receive - or are not to receive - one farthing of return on the capital 
which they have invested. " 
Subsequently it commented, in a similarly critical vein: 
Probably no railway expert knows better than Mr. Swarbrick the positions 
which the leading companies occupy with respect to each other in this matter of 
67 City Archives, Hull, TLP 32 1, Report of scrutineers. 
The results were: 
Votes against 
No. of Proxies Stock (f) Votes 
Mr. Woodhouse's List 1 889 89,240 5,085 
Mr. Woodhouse's List 2 329 36,990 2,050 
1,218 126,230 7,135 
Mr. Fisher's list 552 129,449 5,297 
Mr. Lowenfeld's list 457 617,223 11,370 
Present and voting against 665 221,840 6,224 
2,892 1,094,742 30,026 
Votes for 
Mr. Trotters' Proxies 1,080 1,111,514 22,592 
Present and voting for 29 312,420 2,443 
1,109 1,423,934 25,035 
69 Railwqi, Times, 12"' May 1888. 
69 RailwavNews. 14"' April 1888. 
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the traffic to and from the town and port of Hull. That gentlemen may perhaps 
have satisfied himself and his friends in the Hull Corporation that the GNR, 
LNWR or LYR would, by taking up the HBR, be willing to risk their present 
friendly relations with each other, and the loss of advantages resulting from the 
present interchange of traffic. To the uninfon-ned, however, this appears to be 
very improbable. " 
Despite this, two months later it saw future prospects for the HBR: 
Taking all things into consideration it will be evident that the HBR, at no distant 
day, must become a most important line for the conveyance of coal to the chief 
Humber port, connected as it will be with many of the principal mines of the 
West Riding of Yorkshire. " 
The Railýt, aY Times was even less charitable in its views on the Corporation 
and traders of Hull and particularly of the suggestion by the Corporation, in its 
circular supporting the dock and railway trust, that it could borrow money at 3%. In a 
leading article it said: 
The Hull Corporation has been freely vaunting its ability to borrow on better 
terms than the MR, a contention hardly supported by market quotations for its 
various stocks. Be that as it may, the opposition to the proposed agreement 
would appear to be largely recruited, as we have said, by personal influence, 
down to the withdrawal of Messrs. Wilsons' ships from Alexandra Dock. owing 
to the negotiations. It would be curious to be put in possession of the exact 
causes that have combined to focus so many various and *independent' interests 
in fighting a scheme which, to candid minds, offered the best and only chance of 
rescuing the HBR undertaking from bankruptcy without damaging the interests 
of the port of Hul 1.72 
70 
Railway News, 28"' April 1888. 
71 
Ibid., 3 oth June 1888. 
72 RailwaY Timcs, 28"' April 1888. 
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The Railway Times was perhaps being a little na: fve, here. The opposing interests 
were clearly defined and whilst the motives of some were far from transparent the 
basic confrontation was between those who would benefit financially from the 
amalgamation, and those who felt that their wider interests were served by the 
continuance of competition. Wilson wished to have a foot in both camps, urging 
amalgamation of the HBR with any company but the NER and being prepared to 
exert any necessary pressure to achieve his aims, even to the extent of damaging the 
HBR. 
7. New proposals by the Corporation for a Dock and Railway Trust. 
The tactics of the HBR were paralleled by the Hull Dock Company which, in 
December 1887, lodged a Bill for its lease or sale . 
7' For reasons that should now be 
clear the Corporation opposed the Bill, ostensibly because it breached parliamentary 
standing orders . 
7' The proposed Bill allowed the Dock Company to lease or sell the 
undertaking to the GNR, LYR, MSLR, MR, NER or LNWR. The Corporation felt 
the Bill would unden-nine its powers in respect of the HBR and could destroy the 
competition which the latter had created. 
In January 1888 a meeting of the Dock Company directors and the 
Corporation was held to discuss these concerns. The Corporation steadfastly opposed 
any diminution of its statutory powers and was not even prepared to say that the 
exclusion of the NER would make the Bill acceptable. It was prepared, however to 
see the Dock Company sold to any railway company except the HBR, provided that 
73, City Archives. Hull, TLP 321, Bill for the leasing, selling of the undertakings of the Dock 
Company at Hull. 
74 Parliamentary Standing Order No. 17 states: On or before 21" December immediately preceding 
the application for a Bill whereby any express statutory provision then in force for the protection of 
the owner, lessee or occupier of any property, or for the protection or benefit of any trustee or 
commissioners, corporation or person specifically named in such provision is sought to be altered 
or repealed, notice in writing of such Bill and of the intention to repeal such provision, shall be 
served on every such owner, lessee or occupier, public trustees, or commissioners, corporation, or 
person. 
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it was satisfied that such sale did not diminish competition. " The Corporation ýýTOte 
to the parties concerned proposing the following conditions for its support: 
I. That all reference to the HBR be omitted from the Dock Company's Bill. 
2. That the Corporation be free to oppose the Bill in both Houses of Parliament. 
3. That no objection be taken in either House of Parliament to the locus standi of 
the Corporation. " 
The Dock Company initially rejected these conditions but subsequently 
realised the weakness of its position. There followed several weeks of tortuous 
negotiation, which finally resulted in the Dock Company withdrawing the Bill. the 
principal reason being the steadfast opposition of the Corporation. " 
The Corporation's opposition to the Dock Company proposals had been 
based on its proposals for a dock trust. In June 1888 it put forward its plan to form a 
trust embracing all the docks, making the HBR the main entry to the port. The 1861 
Dock Act had stipulated that the Dock Company should not oppose such a trust, but 
the Corporation had apparently overlooked the fact that this had been repealed in 
1883. 
A meeting was held on 14 th June 1888 between the Corporation, The Dock 
Company and the HBR to discuss the amalgamation of all the docks and the HBR to 
form a trUSt. 78 Maxsted, for the Dock Company, accepted in principle the creation of 
a dock trust. But Smith, for the HBR, said that he could not entertain the possibility 
of amalgamation of the docks without amalgamation of the railways. It was decided 
that he parties should consider the possibility of a dock trust by 15 th August. The 
main points were: 
75 City Archives, Hull, TLP 32 1, Minutes of meeting held at Dock Company offices, 6 th January 
1888. 
76 City Archives, Hull, TLP 321,1888 Proposals for Docks Trust, Minutes of meetings. 
77 Ibid. 
78 
Ibid. 
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1. The HBR and Dock Company to be amalgamated and to be administered as one 
body. 
2. The Corporation to redeem at par, or on such terms as may be arranged. the 
debentures, debts and fixed charges of both undertakings. 
3. The proportions in which the income from the amalgamated properties to be 
apportioned between the shareholders to be settled by agreement. 
4. The governing body to be of shareholders of the amalgamated companies, 
members of the Corporation and shipowners and merchants interested in the trade 
of the port of Hull. 
The membership of the governing board would be 18, six would be appointed by the 
Corporation and six each from the Dock Company and the HBR. The board would be 
constituted in December 1889 and the companies would be amalgamated on I" 
January 1890. The Corporation subsequently put its proposals in the form of a Bill. '9 
The Dock Company directors, after discussing the Corporation's proposals, 
changed their minds and decided that they were not in favour of the trust and found 
themselves on the same side as the HBR, who did not want to lose control of such a 
valuable asset as Alexandra Dock. The South Yorkshire coal owners were also much 
opposed to the scheme and proposed an amalgamation between the HBR and LNWR 
in order to continue railway competition, arguing that amalgamation with the Dock 
Company could place them once again at the mercy of the NER monopoly. " The 
Railii, qy Times was unimpressed by the scheme. Under the title 'The Hull and 
Barnsley Hocus-Pocus, ' it opined, 'Hull Corporation is to promote a Bill whereby 
the HBR and the Hull Dock Company will amalgamate. Whatever may be gained by 
the HBR it will be a sorry substitute to the Hull Dock Company for the long- 
expected NER alliance. "' 
Not surprisingly, the proposal collapsed under the weight of opposition. 
Whereas the Corporation considered that the Bill was a practicable one, which 
Parliament would entertain, counsel for the HBR and the Dock Company were of a 
79 City Archives, Hull, TLP 321, Hull Docks Amalgamation Bill, 1889. 
80 Leeds, lfercwý-, 3 rd August 1888. 
81 Railwav Times, 23 rd June 1888. 
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different opinion. Smith said that he could not contemplate the HBR being made a 
public highway as was envisaged under the proposals and felt obliged to ý, 6thdra\ý 
from the conference. However, rather than abandon the conference totally he felt it 
should be adjournedsine die. " This was effectively the end of the trust Bill. 
The HBR was in still in grave financial difficulty and Smith had to justiýy the 
directors' stance to the proprietors. In August 1888 he argued that Parliament would 
be unlikely to allow the Corporation to become the owners of the railway and that the 
directors thought that they should wait for another potential buyer to come forward. 
As the HBR still did not have sufficient revenue to pay the debenture debt it was 
obvious that the company could not stand alone. " 
In the absence of a viable proposal for a dock trust, in 1889. the Dock 
Company, whose financial position was now becoming grave, introduced a Bill for 
its lease or transfer to the NER and to allow working arrangements with the HBR. " 
The Corporation was allowed to subscribe up to f 100,000 and the NER would work, 
maintain and manage the Dock Company"s property at Hull from I" July 1889 in 
perpetuity. The Bill went before the Lords committee on 27 th May 1889. Not 
surprisingly, the issue of monopoly came to the fore. Henry Tennant, the general 
manager of the NER, was asked whether, if the Bill were sanctioned by Parliament, 
would the monopoly of the NER at Hull be re-established in all its intensity? Tennant 
prevaricated, saying that the NER would once again be the owner of the railways 
leading to Hull. When pressed he said that that he objected to the word 'monopoly' 
as applied to the carrying trade, but the NER would be the owner of the railways and 
docks at Hull. The issue was clearly still of some sensitivity and, not surprisingly, 
given Parliament's policy towards railway amalgamations, the Lords did not favour 
the reinstatement of NER control, whether it be called monopoly or not. The Bill was 
modified by the Committee, all references to the transfer to the NER of the Dock 
82 Railway Times, 25 th August 1888. 
83 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 24 th August 1888. 
84 City Archives, Hull, TLP 322, Kingston upon Hull Docks Bill, 1889. A Bill to authorise the Dock 
Company to make railways and other works and to lease or sell their undertaking to the North 
Eastern Rai INN a\ Company and to enter into working arrangements with the Hull, Barnsleý and 
West Riding Junction RailwaN and Dock Compan%, and for other purposes. 
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Company and working arrangements with the HBR being struck out, leavin, -, onIv 
powers to make a deep water entrance to Albert Dock. " 
Another attempt by the Dock Company to extricate itself from its financial 
crisis had failed. Parliament was not yet ready to authorise the transfer of the docks 
to the NER and it was to be another four years before the Dock Company 
amalgamated with the NER. 
8. Warfare among the HBR shareholders. 
As we have seen, the earlier financial difficulties of the HBR had caused splits 
amongst the proprietors. By 1889 they had split into three camps. One comprised the 
Hull shareholders. led by the Corporation, who were concerned to preserve the 
independence of the HBR, with its better freight facilities and cheaper rates at Hull, 
at almost any cost including forfeiture of dividends. The Hull faction included two 
nominees of the Corporation appointed to the board as required by the 1880 Act. 
Opposing was the London faction led by William Trotter, which represented the 
larger and wealthier shareholders and debenture holders, who were uninterested in 
the politics of Hull and saw only a lack of return on their investments. Between these 
factions stood the independent shareholders led by J. W. Addyman of Leeds and I 
Garnett of Bradford. 
The London faction and their supporters saw amalgamation as the only way 
forward, but when proposals for a combination with the NER had been put before the 
board in January 1889, only three of the directors had agreed. These were Smith, 
Forbes and Cope, the solicitor for Lucas & Aird, the contractors, who were major 
shareholders and creditors. " Cope saw this as a way of getting some of the HBR's 
debts to Lucas & Aird paid. Forbes was interested in paying off the money due to 
debenture holders and had been suspected by the Hull faction of being in favour of 
an amalgamation with the NER for some time, despite his protestations to the 
contrary. This suspicion was soon to be confirmed. 
95 City Archives, Hull, TLP 322,1889 Dock Bill Parliamentary Committee minutes. 
86 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 31-118, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1886-1898,11 th January 
1889. 
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Rumours began to circulate of a proposed amalgamation bemeen the NER 
and the HBR. The railway press was sceptical. In a leading article in FebruarN 1889 
under the heading *The Hull and Barnsley and its Suitors' the Ruilivay Times said, 
-for the NER to plunge at once into an arrangement for guaranteeing a dividend on 
HBR stock under existing circumstances would be a magnanimous indiscretion of 
which we hardly think that company capable. "' But it was soon to emerge that there 
was substance to the rumours. 
1889 was a turbulent one for the HBR with numerous meetings of 
shareholders, some disorderly. marked by increasing acrimony and driven by the 
need to put the company on a sounder financial basis. In February a Bill of an 
expansive character was submitted which allowed negotiation with many of the great 
railway companies. It was announced that Forbes had undertaken to sound out the 
companies. The MR would not renew its offer, but in the course of negotiations 
Forbes had come into contact with the NER and found a disposition to bury the 
hatchet. Amalgamation with the NER was clearly a preferred option. " 
This did not indicate the true situation as Forbes had been negotiating with 
Henry Tennant of the NER for some time. Indeed, he had reported the results of these 
negotiations to the HBR board in December 1888.8' A letter dated 13 th November 
from Tennant to Forbes noted that an amalgamation of the NER and HBR would be 
the best way to advance the trade of Hull. Tennant said, *1 have heard this from 
several sources, including yourself. "' The negotiations had produced a provisional 
agreement on the following terms: 
1. That the NER should satisfy the debenture holders as regards their principal and 
interest accrued to the date of transfer, and pay the other creditors of the company 
and satisfy the holders of any rent charges; in short, that they would clear the 
ordinary stockholders of all prior encumbrances 
87 RailwaY Times, 16 th February 1889. 
88 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 13 th February 1889. 
89 The National Archives, Kew. RAIL 312/8, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1886-1898,7th December 
1888. 
90 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 312, '57, Various correspondence with Forbes, 1888. 
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2. That the NER should secure to the ordinary stockholders a dividend upon their 
0,300,000 of capital, commencing with a small payment and increasing to an 
assured maximum and beyond that, adding something for the increased 
prosperity of the NER itself. " 
However. the HBR board had been divided on the desirability of presenting it 
to the proprietors. Smith, who wanted a financial settlement, had suggested that the 
proposals be submitted to a Wharricliffe meeting but the board had voted against him 
by a majority of two. He said that preventing the proposal being placed before the 
proprietors was wrong, from which we may conclude that he calculated that the 
shareholders would accept amalgamation. However, John Fisher, the deputy 
chairman argued that whatever the terrns mentioned in Forbes' letter were, they must 
remember that the NER required from them an offer for their property on those tenns 
and that would depreciate it for all time. He therefore opposed the proposal. " 
By his action in backing the amalgamation with the NER Smith had 
effectively changed camps and now represented the London shareholders and 
debenture holders rather than the Hull faction. What the Hull shareholder did not, or 
would not, accept was the view, now embraced by Smith, that in its existing state the 
company would never get out of the hands of the receivers. However, the HBR had, 
on many occasions and in no uncertain terms, already been made aware of the 
attitude of Hull Corporation towards any proposed amalgamation with the NER. 
Smith and a group of shareholders led by Basil Pym, a debenture holder, 
applied to the Court of Chancery for an order restraining the majority of directors 
from withdrawing the Bill for the agreement with the NER until the proposals had 
been placed before the proprietors. 
91 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 13 th February 1889. 
92 Ibid., The HBR board believed that the following scale would be acceptable to the board and 
proprietors of the NER: In 1890 a dividend upon the ordinary stock of '/4%; in 1891 1/2%; in 1892 
3ý, 40, /o: in 1893 1 1/0 and in 1894 1 1, ý, 'ý/o. After that, in 1895, HBR shareholders would receive, in 
addition to the P 20 o an assured bonus of 1/4% or the proportion of 1/4% if the NER paid over 60 o and 
up to 70 o on their consols and a further bonus of '/2% or proportion thereof if the NER paid over 
7%. With reference to the debentures and other liabilities the intention would be to extinguish these 
by the issue of a sufficient quantity of NER Yo debenture stock not exceeding 0.500,000. 
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The subsequent Wharricliffe meeting to approve the NER Bill , \as held on 
12'h March. Smith pointed out that the directors who had tried to prevent the 
proposals being laid before the proprietors held stock amounting to a mere f 10.400. 
At the meeting Smith proposed a motion approving heads of agreement with the 
NER and Forbes seconded. All the Hull directors except Trotter were against. The 
resolution was carried. " The Railit, ay Times was unimpressed, Its view was that, 'the 
HBR was drifting into utter disorder and a chaos of counsels which may be used to 
demonstrate that the company is incapable of taking care of itself. ý 94 
With the directors and shareholders at loggerheads further meetings were 
inevitable. On 13"' April a special meeting was called at the urging of the London 
shareholders at which a motion was proposed to reduce the number of directors from 
14 to 9. Fisher, Massey, Leetham, Rayment and Stuart were proposed for removal. 
This was a blatant attempt to depose the Hull directors and was moved by Wildey 
Wright, a barrister of London, a speculator and possibly a nominee shareholder, who 
had only acquired his holding on I" April. As a counter the Town Clerk proposed an 
amendment that the number of directors be reduced from 14 to 13. A poll was 
demanded and the meeting was adjourned. " On 28 th April the amendment proposed 
by the Town Clerk was lost. W. A. Massey, one of the Corporation directors, 
launched a bitter attack on the London Committee. He asked, 
What fault had they to find with the Hull directors? Was it because they had 
served them faithfully to the best of their ability, and had placed thousands of 
tons of traffic and shipping in the docks and had encouraged the trade of the line; 
or was it that those persons wanted full control to manipulate affairs as they saw 
fit? The Hull directors would be prepared to retire in favour of some practical 
Yorkshiremen, but would decline to be removed in the interests of second 
debenture holders and in defiance of the interests of the old shareholders. 
93 Railivaj, Times. 16"' March 1889. 
94 Ibid., 23 rd February 1889. 
95 Ibid., 20"' April 1889. 
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The Hull faction did not give up the fight easily. Councillor Poole moved that 
directors be reduced from 14 to 12 and the meeting was again adjourned. 96 On II 1h 
May the peacemakers attempted to reconcile the Hull and London factions. 
Addyman proposed that the company be completely restructured. and he ýýas 
supported in this by Garnett. 9' He proposed that there should be five London 
directors, four from Hull plus Smith, and two to be elected by independent 
shareholders. A poll was demanded and the meeting was adjourned once more. 
Despite this in-fighting the voice of reason was at last being heard by the 
shareholders. It had been recognised that the fundamental problem was that the 
company was hopelessly under capitalised. The costs of construction had been 
grossly underestimated and the level of debt was such that the company in its present 
form had no chance of commercial success. Furthermore, despite their initial 
enthusiastic gestures, the traders of Hull were not giving sufficient support to the 
HBR. 
Meanwhile the London faction had regrouped. At a meeting in London on 3 rd 
June the London shareholders' committee passed a resolution approving the course 
adopted by the London Committee, and pledging support. The mover of the 
resolution had once again been Wildey Wright. On 6 th June, at Hull, Forbes made a 
speech in which he stressed that the motion to dismiss the Hull directors was not a 
personal issue but was merely reflecting the views of the majority of the proprietors, 
who lived in a world ruled not by sentiment, but by common sense. He said that the 
NER agreement had not been opposed on principle, but on price, alleging that Stuart 
had distinctly told him that if the NER were to pay more then they would all agree 
that the offer should be accepted. But Leak and Stuart, for the Hull faction, hotly 
disputed Forbes' assertion. Stuart went on to say that if they were retained on the 
board, common justice would require them to look at the various proposals from the 
shareholders' point of view and assist the London Committee in negotiating with 
various companies. But, as Hull men, they absolutely objected to a sale to the NER 
or any railway company that would be hampered with the NER clauses. even the 
96 
Railwav Times, 4 th Mav 1889. 
97 City Archives, Hull, DXR 7/1, HBR Shareholders' meeting, II th May 1889. 
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MR. Smith again put a resolution for the reduction of the board from fourteen to nine 
and he and his party voted for the resolution to exclamations of 'The wreckers! "I 
The London faction won. At the final meeting in this series on 12 th June it 
was announced that the resolution to reduce the number of directors to nine had been 
carried. Lucas seconded Wildey Wright in his proposal. Fisher. Stuart, Massey. 
Rayment and Leetham were removed, thus transferring the power-base to London. 
Emotions ran high. Smith rose and was hissed and booed so that his words were 
inaudible. When he finally did get a chance to speak he said that the whole question 
had been one of extreme difficulty, and if he could have seen his way to retain some 
of his colleagues who had now been voted off, he would gladly have done so. 
Counter-proposals were put forward for the removal of Lord Beaumont, Forbes, 
Cope, Smith, Swarbrick and Trotter. A long discussion followed during which the 
chairman appealed to the shareholders to allow business to be concluded that day. As 
a result the motion for the removal of Fisher, Stuart, Massey, Rayment and Leetham 
was carried and that seeking the removal of Lord Beaumont, Forbes, Cope, Smith, 
Swarbrick and Trotter was lost. " The Railway Times fired off an acerbic comment on 
the meeting: 
The upshot of the meeting was a foregone conclusion. A sham fight was set 
going under cover of which a majority of those present went through the form of 
ruling out the names of Smith, Trotter, Cope, Lord Beaumont, Forbes and 
Swarbrick, but it was at once realised that the resolutions would be necessarily 
abortive in the presence of an overwhelming majority in a poll against them, and 
they were accordingly withdrawn, Mr. Fisher and his four colleagues being 
removed from the board. "0 
Despite opposition to the directors' removal from the Corporation of Hull it 
was considered futile to oppose the wishes of the London shareholders. The London 
interests had prised control of the HBR from the Hull shareholders. In fact it made 
98 RailwaY Times, 8"' June 1889. 
99 RailwaY Times, 15 th June 1889. 
100 lbid 
17 3 
little difference to the management of the undertaking, as it had always been 
dependent on London money and London men raising it. But the pride of Hull was 
still embodied in the HBR and the Corporation, which had prevented the sale of the 
HBR to the NER, felt obliged to continue its self-ordained task of the preservation of 
the independence of the line. It was very aware of its obligation under the 1880 
Act. "' Furthermore, it saw its duty as the protection of the railway from the 
machinations of those who wished to exploit it by any means, or to use it as a lever to 
achieve more favourable terms from more powerful companies. whose final 
objectives could be construed as the demise of the independent railway. 
9. The end of warfare and the move towards prosperity, 1889-1890. 
Having gained control of the company the London shareholders* priority was to 
restructure its finances. On II th July the new directors resolved to press for the 
company's release from the Court of Chancery and to petition Parliament for extra 
funds of f2,000,000 31/2% preference debentures, fl, 000.000 to be applied to 
redemption of the first 4 '/2% debentures and the other f 1,000,000 to paying off the 
debts of the company. 102 The Bill was initially opposed by Hull Corporation on the 
grounds that they had not had time to give it consideration. However after 
discussions it withdrew opposition and the Bill received the Royal Assent on 12th 
August. This was to be the start of a new era for the fortunes of the HBR. " 
Optimism was evident at the half-yearly meeting of 16 th August 1889. Smith 
set the tone of the meeting by remarking that the HBR had 'leapt out of 
bankruptcy 
... into independence and prosperity'; f, 1,500,000 had already been raised 
in first and f2,000,000 in second debentures. The contractors agreed to take their 
interest in stock. "' Trotter had been instrumental in raising the capital. 105 Although 
101 City Archives, Hull, TLP 135, Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway and Dock Act, 
1880. 
102 City Archives, Hull, Report to Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee dated 26t" June 1889. 
103 Citv Archives, Hull, DXR 71, HBR half- yearly Meeting, 16th August 1889. 
104 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley Railwav, Fol. 1, p. 93. 
105 Hoole, (ed. ). The Hull & Barnsley RailivaY, I'ol. 1, p. 100. 
174 
the f2,000,000 was in fact merely the exchange of one security for another, it 
significantly reduced the company's debt problem. Under the Bill the receivers, 
Forbes and Swarbrick. would no longer be required to carry out such duties. New 
capital projects were planned at Alexandra Dock. More importantly, Smith said that 
there would be no more rate war with the NER and that the HBR would charge the 
same rates as agreed in the Humber Agreement, although not a party to it. "' The days 
of cut-throat competition with the NER were over. Forbes referred to a new era of 
cordiality towards those who had differed in the past. 
The arrangements were agreeable to the Corporation. The Town Clerk praised 
the work of Fisher in securing amendments to the Bill which safeguarded 
shareholders [including Hull Corporation] by saving them f49,000 per year. He was 
pleased to note that there no longer seemed to be a danger that the HBR could be 
transferred to the NER. However, all was not good news. Wilson's had moved their 
shipping trade from Alexandra Dock to Dock Company wharves; the HBR had lost 
24,500 tons and 44,000 tons had been gained by the Dock Company together with a 
considerable amount of immigrant traffic. "' 
The meeting of 16 th August marked a watershed in the relationship between 
the HBR and NER. It continued to be less than cordial but was never again 
characterised by the confrontational bitterness of the earlier years. This new attitude 
of conciliation was not reflected among the traders of Hull, as the Railway Times 
noted: 
Odd as it may appear there are some people who are never content unless they 
are miserable. The Hull traders belong to this class. Unless they can at intervals 
have a growl about their Me noir, the NER, life is to them a blank. If there is 
one thing a Yorkshireman dislikes more than another it is a blank, so in Hull they 
keep the NER and monopoly on tap to draw upon during the slack times. "' 
106 Eastern Morning News, 10"' June 1880. 
107 CitN Archives, Hull, DXR 7,11, HBR Shareholders' meeting, 16'h August 1889. 
108 Railwqv Times, 8th February 1890. 
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A very significant event occurred on 18'h November 1889 when Mr. Justice 
Chitty made an order releasing HBR from Chancery upon affidavits showing 
payment of the company's debts. "9 
The HBR failed to live up to its title because it did not actually reach 
Barnsley. In 1889 a Bill was brought forward for a railway, to be called the Barnsley 
Town Railway, to run from the HBR near Monk Bretton to Eldon Street North in 
Barnsley where a station would be situated. Among the promoters was W. Trotter. 
Hull Corporation gave notice that it would petition against the Bill unless protecti\'e 
clauses similar to those in the HBR Act were incorporated, which they were. 
However, the proposal for the railway sank without trace and the Bill never came 
before Parliament. Presumably. in view of the HBR's recent history, investors could 
not be found. "' 
A particular benefit to the company had been the business acumen of 
Swarbrick and Forbes, who had been vociferous in their view that the HBR must be 
run as a business and not as an emblem for Hull, even if this meant control by 
London proprietors and their money. Against this were the Corporation and Massey. 
who saw the HBR as a symbol of victory in the fight against monopoly rather than a 
small provincial railway company, and an under-capitalised one at that. However. 
none of this prevented the Corporation from persevering with its self-imposed task of 
guaranteeing the independence of the HBR. 
By 1890 the HBR had achieved a measure of maturity with the realisation 
that if the NER was not to be a friend then at least it was better not to have it as an 
enemy, and an extremely powerful one at that. Unfortunately for the HBR it still 
suffered from a lack of friends among other railway companies, but had passed 
through its crisis years and in the future its affairs were to be ruled more by the head 
than the heart, to the increasing chagrin of the Corporation. Nevertheless it now 
stood on the threshold of prosperity. 
The next move forward for the HBR was to gain access to the collieries of the 
South Yorkshire coalfield and deliver the promises made at its inception that it would 
become a successful carrier of coal. Before examining this phase of the company's 
109 Radirm, News, 233rd November 1889. 
110 City Archives, Hull, TLP 182, Barnsley Town Railway Bill. 1889. 
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expansion it is necessary to examine the progress of the Hull Dock Company which, 
unlike the HBR, had little or no chance of remaining an independent company. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
THE HULL DOCK COMPANY, 1889-1893 AND THE HULL 
DOCK STRIKE, 1893. 
1. Introduction. 
Having considered the early years of railway competition the thesis will now chart 
the fortunes of the Dock Company in detail. This chapter will analyse the events 
leading to the amalgamation of the Dock Company and the NER in 1893. This took 
place at the same time as a dock strike in Hull, which had repercussions on the 
political tenor of the town. 
A point that was not generally accepted by the railway commentators of the 
time was that although it was acknowledged that the Dock Company needed the 
intervention of the NER, the need was reciprocal. The 1880s had seen a great 
demand for South Yorkshire hard steam coal, which assumed an increasing 
importance in the trade of the Humber ports. The MSLR and LYR had good 
connections for this trade at Grimsby and Goole respectively. The MSLR had a 
particular advantage because the close integration of its railways and shipping at 
Grimsby was facilitated by its ownership of the port, and the fact that it had operated 
a steamship fleet since 1864. ' Furthermore, the LYR together with the ACN was 
2 subsidising the working of steamships from Goole from 1865 onwards. As a 
consequence, Grimsby and Goole had increased their Dutch traffic at the expense of 
the unsubsidised shipping lines operating out of Hull. Ownership and control of the 
Hull Docks, with the exception of Alexandra Dock, would enable the NER to greatly 
Cltv Archives, Hull, TLP 175a, MSLR Steamboats Bill, 1889. 
This Bill was to authorise the MSLR to run steam vessels between Grimsby and the Netherlands, 
Baltic ports, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Hull Corporation initially opposed the Bill but 
dropped its opposition in the face of apathy from the shipowners of Hull. In addition the MSLR had 
challenged the locus standi of the Corporation. 
2 B. F. Duckham. 'RailwaN Steamship Enterprise: The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railwa\'s East 
Coast Fleet 1904 - 1914', Business Histot-j% Vol. 10, (1968), p. 46. 
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improve the efficiency of its operations at the port and provide a stepping stone 
towards more intimate involvement in steamship operation. an area in which it had 
fallen behind its major competitors on the east coast. 
There were other areas which the NER could have tapped more effectively. The 
railways had opened up markets for fish in the booming industrial centres of the West 
Riding and Lancashire. ' The resulting expansion of the fishing trade meant that more 
quay space was needed at Hull, despite the opening of St. Andrew"s Dock in 1883 
for the sole use of fishing vessels. ' Modernisation of fishing vessels led to a need for 
facilities for bunkering. Between 1890 and 1892 fish landings had almost doubled. ' 
By 1889 the HBR was past its crisis years and on the way to economic recovery. 
No such bright future awaited the beleaguered Dock Company which did not have, 
and could not raise, the capital for much-needed improvements. Its financial situation 
was becoming increasingly dire. Dividends had dropped from 4 percent in 1884 to 3A 
percent in 1889. ' The NER was a welcome suitor. This chapter shows how and why 
amalgamation was consummated in 1893. 
The transfer of the Hull Dock Company to the NER took place against the 
background of a major strike at the port. Although the railway companies were only 
marginally affected by the strike its consideration is relevant to this thesis as it 
marked a turning point in the political complexion of Hull. The change in municipal 
politics. which the strike set in train, was to establish a new era of commercial co- 
operation in the port leading, to a diminution of the r6le of the civic authorities. This 
was to have far-reaching consequences regarding the future relationships between the 
Corporation and the HBR. It marked the start of an ever-increasing divergence of 
strategic outlook between them. 
3 1. Friel, Maritime Histoýv of Britain and Ireland. (London, 2003), p. 220. 
B. Hinchliffe (ed. ), The Hull and Barnsley Railway, 1ol. 2, (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 79 
4 E. Gillett & K. A. MacMahon,, 4 Hisiotý, of Hull, (Hull, 1989), p. 349. 
Figure 29. St. Andrew's Dock. 
1 
5 City Archives, Hull, DPD1 2/1,233, Notebook of W. T. Huffam, Dock Company Secretary. Fish 
landings at Hull increased frorn 3 34,787 tons in 1890 to 64.557 tons in 1893. By 1898 the', had 
reached 104,064 tons. 
6 Ibid. 
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2. Unsuccessful attempts to alleviate the Hull Dock Company crisis. 
In 1889 the Hull Dock Company was in a poor financial situation. In a desperate. but 
unsuccessful, attempt to raise extra revenue it proposed to levy fresh dues on lighters, 
and other river craft. This infringement of Hull's overside status was vehementIv 
opposed by Chamber of Commerce, which alleged that such tolls would militate 
against water carriage, as the immense transhipment trade at Hull would be driN'en 
elsewhere. The Chamber also opposed any accommodation between the Dock 
Company and the NER because it would give control of water traffic to a railway 
company. ' 
However, an alliance with the NER was a possible solution to the Dock 
Company's problems and, in 1889, it introduced a Bill to authorise a working 
agreement. But this failed in the Lords mainly due to opposition from Hull 
Corporation on the grounds that it contained no guarantee that the NER would 
maintain, extend and improve the docks. ' 
In 1891 the Dock Company tried another tack, proposing to ask the NER to 
provide capital for dock improvements. However the proposal was defeated by the 
shareholders who, unlike the directors, thought that the Dock Company could 
manage alone. But the directors realised that it was imperative that something was 
done to improve the state of the docks. ' 
Despite the failure of the 1889 Bill further informal approaches were made, in 
June 18 9 1, to ascertain the attitude of the Corporation to an arrangement between the 
NER and the Dock Company. At a private function the Mayor, J. T. Woodhouse, said 
that a condition sine qua non of obtaining the sympathy of the Corporation to any 
such arrangement between the NER, HBR and the Dock Company was that the 
Corporation should feel assured that other railway companies should be bona fide 
partners in the agreement, sharing the advantages which the arrangement would give 
to the NER and the Dock Company. If such assurance could be obtained, and if C. H. 
Wilson, representing the large traders, would co-operate, the Mayor said that he 
Central Library. Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping AGM, 60'November 1889. 
8 W. W. Tomlinson, Vorth Eastern Railwa 
' v, 
(Newton Abbot edition, 1967), p. 709. 
9 City Archives, Hull, TLP 327,1893 Amalgamation Bill papers. 
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would do all in his power to promote the arrangement. " This encouraged the Dock 
Company to consider amalgamation with the NER. 
3. The 1892 Bill for amalgamation with the NEk 
By the end of 1891 the Dock Company, estimating that at least f 60,000 was required 
for urgent dock improvements, asked the NER for this sum. The NER was unable to 
oblige as it lacked statutory powers to spend money on an estate it did not own. " 
Rather than spend money piecemeal on dock improvements it was decided, after 
negotiations, to submit two Bills, one for the amalgamation of the NER and the Dock 
Company and another for powers to construct a new dock at Marfleet, to the east of 
Alexandra Dock at a cost of f-Imillion. 12 The Bills would also allow dredging and 
deepening of the Humber. " As well as rescuing the Dock Company the proposal 
would provide the port with much needed facilities. The Dock Company was pinning 
all its hopes on rescue by the NER. At a board meeting in January 1892 the directors 
noted the huge benefits of access to the railway company's capital. "' But problems 
arose during the negotiations. The main one, in the eyes of the NER, was that 'the 
Dock Company had a rather exalted ideas of the value of the docks. "' 
Reaction in the town was mixed. Reversing its position of 1889, Hull 
Chamber of Commerce supported the proposal for the amalgamation on the grounds 
that Hull had at last become a coal port and NER investment in the docks would 
improve facilities for that trade. " But the HBR and the Corporation opposed the 
Bills. The HBR did not want to see the existing docks fall into the hands of the NER 
10 City Archives, Hull, TLP 319, Memorandum of a private meeting at the home of Sir Bernhard 
Samuelson, 56 Princes Gate, London, on 23 rd June 1891. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 320,1892 Dock Bill papers. 
Tomlinson, North Eastern Railway, p. 711. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 176, TLP '320, Bills, 1892. (1). For enabling the NER to make new 
railways and other works and to acquire additional lands, and for other purposes. (2). For Dock 
improvements and construction of a neýN, ' dock. 
14 Railway Titnes, 
-331" 
January 1892. 
1ý RailwaY /Vews, 6 th February 1892. Report of NER half-yearlý meeting, 5 th February 1892. 
16 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping AGM, II th November 1892. 
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and was less than eager to have a dock, larger than Alexandra Dock, constructed 
alongside it. Its petition stated, inter alia, that it had expended f6,850,000 on 
facilities, a large portion of that expenditure being due to the Dock CompanN. 's 
failure to construct Alexandra Dock, and the HBR had as yet received no satisfactory 
return for its outlay. Its net revenue was insufficient to pay in full the interest on 
debenture debt and it had only once, in 1891, been able to declare a diN, idend on 
ordinary stock for one half year. " 
Despite its earlier promise of support, the Corporation feared the 
reinstatement of monopoly and petitioned against the Bills. It argued that if the NER 
obtained pennission to build only the dock, this could prejudice the interests of the 
Dock Company and the traders of Hull, and if it obtained the amalgamation Bill 
alone, it might have second thoughts about spending large amounts on a new dock. 
Furthermore, the location of the new dock would prevent any further eastward 
extension of Alexandra Dock and generate additional traffic over the level crossings 
in the town. But the Corporation's stance was that opposition would be withdrawn if 
the NER and the Dock Company would agree that the Bills should stand or fall 
together. This was agreed and both Bills went before Parliament. " 
Support for the proposals was widespread. Giving evidence before the Lords 
Committee on 31" March 1892 John Wolfe Barry, consulting engineer to the NER, 
said that tinkering with the existing docks would be unsatisfactory and he had 
recommended a new dock. He refuted the claim that it stopped the HBR extending 
eastwards by pointing out that an additional 200 acres (81 hectares) were available 
for eastward extension and that the present Alexandra Dock estate covered only 192 
acres (78 hectares). The new dock was to be of 32 acres (13 hectares). Barry also 
insisted that greater capacity for coal was required. " 
The coal interests supported this argument. Thomas Thompson, the manager 
of Denaby Main Colliery Company, said that present facilities for coal at the Dock 
Company's docks were unsuitable. The docks were too shallow and the equipment 
17 City Archives, Hull, TLP ')26, Petition to Lords against Amalgamation Bill by HBR. 
18 City Archives, Hull, TLP 211, Bill for amalgamation of Dock Company and NER. TLP 176, TLP 
320, Bill for additional Dock accommodation. 
19 City Archives, Hull, TLP 176,1892 NER Bill Parliamentary Committee proceedings. 
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was obsolete. Although Alexandra Dock had been a great boon to the trade of Hull. 
the dock was now overcrowded and additional facilities were needed. He was sure 
that there would be enough coal shipped to Hull for both the HBR and NER. At 
present the Denaby Company sent all its coal for Hull by means of the MSLR. " 
Similarly, Arthur Briggs, managing director of Whitwood Collierý' laid the 
blame for delays and losses solely at the door of the Dock Company, due to the lack 
of appliances for handling coal. He said that at Humber Dock they could ship five 
waggons of coal per hour, Albert Dock seven or eight, Victoria Dock five and 
Alexandra Dock, ten to twelve. But at Goole the ACN could easily handle 200 tons 
(more than 18 wagons) per hour into its compartment boats, being limited only by 
the time taken to trim the coal. " The South Yorkshire collieries had benefited 
considerably from the opening of the HBR. In 1881 these collieries sent some 
500,000 tons of coal to Hull whereas in 1891 they had sent 1,240,000 tons. In 
contrast the West Yorkshire collieries had sent about 470,000 tons in 1881 and the 
tonnage had remained practically constant. He pointed out that most of the collieries 
that exported coal were not connected to Alexandra Dock. 22 
More criticism of the existing position came from David Davy, chairman of 
Hickleton Colliery. He said that he did not think that the old docks, even in 
conjunction with Alexandra Dock, would be sufficient, and the proposed NER dock 
was an absolute necessity. Arthur Wilson, who had interests in collieries at 
Shirebrook and Glapwell in Nottinghamshire, admitted that the amount of tonnage 
being sent to Alexandra Dock had been gradually diminishing while the amount sent 
20 Ccntral Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping report, 1902. The Hull shipping list 
shows the following ships registered at Hull and belonging to the Denaby and Cadeby Colliery 
Company: 
Denabýy. 1150 tons Registered 1891. Replaced by vessel also named Denaby in 1900. 
FirshY. Registered 1891. 
Cadch. v. 1150 tons. Registered. 1892. Withdrawn in 190 1. 
Scawsh. v. 2341 tons. Registered 1893. 
Rereshy. 2961 tons. Registered 1898. 
21 H. Crabtree, M. Clarke, (ed. ). RailwaY on the 11'ater, (Goole, 1993), pp. 18-37. The ACN pioneered 
the use of compartment boats formed into trains for the carriage of coal on its waterways. 
2' City Archives, Hull, TLP 176,1892 NER Bill Parliamentary Committee proceedings. 
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to Hull Dock Company docks had been increasing. Although he did not give a reason 
for this, it was probably significant that the trend had started about the time of the 
proposed sale of the HBR to the MR, of which Wilson's had disapproved. " 
The Corporation's evidence produced no surprises. J. I Woodhouse, 
appearing for the Corporation, expressed a lack of trust in the HBR board, asserting 
that if they could sell the undertaking to the NER they would. He argued that it was 
in the interests of the NER to develop Hull but they had not been wise enough to see 
it. He went on to say that C. H. Wilson had stated that the Corporation had been the 
cause of the Dock Company's problems, alleging that the HBR, with the assistance 
of the Corporation, had ruined the Dock Company, thus forcing it into the hands of 
the NER. Woodhouse completely rejected these allegations. 24 
The Lords Committee passed the Bill without any major amendments, but 
when the Bills came before the Commons Committee there was inadequate time for 
their consideration. The Bills fell and Parliament was dissolved two days later giving 
no opportunity to send the Bills back. " Once again the Dock Company had a lifeline 
snatched from it at the eleventh hour. 
4. The 1893 Bill for amalgamation with the NER. 
The fundamental problems of the Dock Company remained and it was no surprise 
when, in 1893, a Bill was re-introduced for amalgamation only. " The proposal for 
the dock at Marfleet had been dropped, according to the NER chairman, 'to try to 
effect more of an understanding with the HBR. '2' The Corporation immediately 
sensed that this was yet another scheme to restore NER monopoly and gave notice of 
strenuous opposition. Negotiations between the Corporation and the NER took place 
2ý City Archives, Hull, TLP 176,1892 NER Bill Parliamentary Committee proceedings. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Railvi, aY Times, 2 
nd jUly 1892. 
26 City Archives, Hull, TLP 326, A Bill for the amalgamation of the undertaking of the Dock 
Company at Kingston upon Hull with the undertaking of the North Eastern Railway and for other 
purposes. 1893 
27 Radii, av News, II th February 1892. Report of NER Half-\ early Shareholders' Meeting, I Oth 
February 189' 3. 
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between 25"' January and 2 nd March 1893. when theý x\ere broken off bv the NER. 28 
The Corporation consequently submitted a petition against the Bill. 19 
The Corporation's support for 1892 Bills had depended on receiving 
satisfactory assurances concerning the linkage between the NER takeover and the 
provision of a new dock. All such safeguards had been removed from the 189-1 " Bill. 
The Corporation regarded this as a breach of good faith by the NER, and the first 
step in the acquisition of the HBR and the revival of NER monopoly or, alternativeIN', 
that the NER might collude with the HBR to increase rates. It wished for a re- 
enactment of the Hull Docks Bill of 1861 under which the Dock Company was 
obliged to consent to sell to a public trust. However, the Hull Docks Act 1883 had 
repealed these provisions. " 
On 15 th March 1893 Hull Corporation submitted a proposal to the NER that 
various additional clauses be inserted in the Bill to protect the interests of the port. 
Firstly, that the charges levied by the NER at Hull should not be greater than those 
being charged by the HBR at Hull or the MSLR at Grimsby. Secondly, the NER must 
undertake to provide a deep-water dock and thirdly, three Hull Corporation 
representatives should sit on the board. The NER refused outright. " The Corporation 
went on to make the well-used allegation that the NER had not encouraged Hull's 
trade, but had systematically fostered that of rival ports. The local press shared the 
sentiment. One editorial stressed that the attitude of Hull Corporation, 'must be one 
of absolute and uncompromising hostility until the port of Hull can be safeguarded 
from monopoly. 532 Letters to the press fuelled the fires of dispute. Rhetoric was used 
such as: *The Dock Company has for six years been trying to barter their estate to the 
benefit of the NER. When the Bill is thrown out the directors can address themselves 
to bring up the company to prosperity in a proper and legitimate marmer. ' 13 Hostility 
was directed equally towards the NER and the Dock Company. By the time the Bill 
28 City Archives, Hull, TLP 326, Telegram from NER dated 2 nd March 1893 and letter from 
Corporation. 
29 Eastern Morning Nci t, s, 4"' March 1893. 
30 City Archives, Hull, TLP 146, Hull Docks Act, 188-33. 
3, City Archives, Hull, TLP 326, NER and Dock Company amalgamation papers. 
Eastern. 1forningNews. 10th March 1893, Editorial. 
I ýth Ibid, 
_3 
March. 1893. Letter. 
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came before Parliament the press had worked itself into a frenzy of unfounded 
allegations such as: 'There are rumours of a secret deal between the HBR and NER 
which would lead to the restoration of the NER monopoly. "' One fear was that the 
HBR would sell out to the NER. A further cause for apprehension was that the NER 
would increase dock charges making Hull more expensive than Grimsby. 5 
As a result of pressure from the Corporation, clauses were finally inserted 
into the Bill to safeguard the interests of the HBR and to regulate dock charges. They 
stated that the NER must not amalgamate or enter into any joint purse agreement 
with the HBR without the consent of Hull Corporation, and that the NER must not 
reduce dock charges below those charged by the HBR at Alexandra Dock. This was 
an important clause as rate cutting had been extremely injurious to the Dock 
Company and the HBR. The most important clause of all, however, was that the 
NER was required to give the HBR notice of any intention to construct a dock to the 
east of Alexandra Dock and the HBR could require this to be a joint undertaking. In 
order to ensure that the NER would put the docks in order the Lords imposed a 
condition that the company would, within seven years, expend at least f500, OOO in 
improving the docks. " 
Even so, opposition came from Hull Corporation on the grounds that no new 
dock was included. It also came from the ACN and others as far away as the Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Board and the Tyne Commissioners. As lessee and tenant, the 
ACN had the use of wharves, sheds, dock space and other facilities belonging to the 
Dock Company, and was afraid of losing these if the docks fell into the hands of the 
NER. The ACN alleged that it suffered at the hands of the present Dock Company as, 
when material was transhipped at Hull, the ACN was charged both inward and 
outward wharfage, whereas the railways paid outward wharfage only. Coal brought 
to Hull by water was charged wharfage at 6d. (21/2p) per ton whereas coal brought by 
rail was only charged 3d. (1 1/2p. ) per ton. The ACN feared that with the docks in the 
hands of a 'hostile competitor' the situation would worsen and the NER would 
attempt to divert river traffic to Goole to the advantage of its railway system. 
3 34 Eastern 11orningNews, I" June 1893, Editorial. 
Net, 14"' March 1893. 
ý, 6 Cit\ Archives, Hull, TLP 326, NER and Dock Company amalgamation papers. 
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Furthermore. if the Bill were passed, the Humber Agreement, by which Hull traffic 
was divided among the railway companies, could become a more acti\ýe instrument 
for the diversion of traffic from water carriers. " 
The Tyne Commissioners and Tyne coal owners and merchants petitioned 
against extension of the NER's monopoly at ports. They feared that the NER would 
operate Hull docks at the expense of other portions of their system. Similarly, a 
petition from the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, apparently fearing competition 
from a revived Hull, alleged that the ownership of docks by railway companies was 
against the public interest. " 
When the Bill came before the Lords the Corporation objected that no new 
dock was included, despite considerable evidence being given before Parliamentary 
Committees the previous year that a new dock was a necessity. Furthermore, the Bill 
would destroy the independence and competitive character of the HBR and prove the 
first step towards its acquisition by the NER, thus reviving its monopoly in Hull. The 
Corporation alleged that the present favourable rates and dues were a result of 
competition by the HBR, and sought that the NER should not be authorised to take 
any higher dues than at present charged by the Dock Company. " 
There was, however, evidence of different points of view in certain 
commercial circles in the town. The division was between large and small concerns. 
Thus C. H. Wilson, giving evidence in support of the Bill, focused on the threat 
posed by the Manchester Ship Canal, begun in 1887 and due to open in 1894. He 
pointed out that it was nearer to many of the West Riding industrial centres than Hull, 
and could become a centre for the South Yorkshire coal trade upon which Hull 
depended. He said that the Dock Company could not provide the facilities required 
by the port of Hull, and that it was time for the NER and HBR to come to an 
accommodation to stop the 'foolish competition' between them. An important point 
of Wilson's evidence was that he said that the Corporation was not mainly composed 
of large traders, but the Chamber of Commerce was, and it supported the Bill. He 
thought that the Corporation took a small-minded view of the commercial interests of 
37 Citv Archives, Hull, TLP 326, NER and Dock Company amalgamation papers. 
1 38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., Parliamentary Committee proceedings on NER and Dock Amalgamation Bill, 1893. 
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the port and alleged that there was a feeling in Hull among the small ratepa. yers and 
labouring classes against amalgamation and in favour of municipal i sation of the 
docks. He asserted that those classes of voters were able to exercise pressure on the 
Corporation. " 
Further argument along these lines came from Arthur Wilson. Like his 
brother, he queried whether the Corporation represented the commercial interests of 
the port. He said that members from the mercantile community were \'cry few indeed 
but, in his opinion, several of the legal profession decided the policy of the 
Corporation. Wilson alleged that the Corporation was heavily influenced by the 
working class vote which caused it to have, what he called, wild dreams of the 
municipal isati on of the port. " 
Whilst it was true that the Corporation was now more influenced by the working 
class vote it was a non sequitur to tie this in with the municipalisation of the docks. 
In fact the working class ratepayers had, in the past, thwarted plans for a dock trust in 
the face of enthusiasm for it by the mercantile community. 
The NER had gained an ally in the shape of the South Yorkshire Associated 
Coal Owners who had changed their stance from previous opposition. West 
Yorkshire had always enjoyed an advantage in the rate for coal to Hull over South 
Yorkshire, as the NER served the West Yorkshire district alone, but served South 
Yorkshire in conjunction with the MSLR, over whose lines the coal passed before it 
reached the NER at Thorne. Some coal also went via the MR to the NER. When the 
coal owners had opposed the 1892 Bill they had feared that without protection the 
NER might have given further advantage to West Yorkshire. Although the NER still 
refused to grant equal mileage rates, an agreement had been reached which, in the 
judgement of the South Yorkshire Coal Owners, secured their position. If the rates 
charged by the NER for coal from West Yorkshire to Hull were reduced without a 
corresponding reduction in the rates charged to South Yorkshire collieries, or if any 
increase in the rates charged to South Yorkshire was not accompanied by a 
40 City Archives, Hull, TLP 326, Parliamentary Committee proceedings on NER and Dock 
Amalgamation Bill, 1893- 
41 Ibid. 
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corresponding increase in the rates charged to West Yorkshire collieries. then any 
South Yorkshire coal trader who felt aggrieved could appeal to the Railwav and 
Canal Commission. The coal owners felt that competition in the carrying of coal 
from West Yorkshire by the ACN would force the NER to keep its rates low, but as a 
safeguard the South Yorkshire Coal Owners wished to maintain the independence of 
the HBR. 42 
Other support from coal owners turned on the need for modernisation. David 
Davy, the manager of Manvers Main Colliery complained about the state of coal 
handling appliances in the old docks. Their condition was such that there was much 
breakage of coal with consequent loss of value. It would be expensive to equip the 
old docks with modern coal-handling equipment, such as that installed at Alexandra 
Dock and he considered that whereas the Dock Company could not afford it, the 
NER would be able to bring in the improvements needed. " 
The importance of the Bill to the NER was demonstrated when George S. 
Gibb, the general manager appeared in support. He said that the NER owned the coal 
facilities at Blyth, Tyne Dock, Newcastle, Dunston, Wearmouth Docks at Sunderland 
and all the docks at Hartlepool, West Hartlepool and Middlesbrough. It also owned 
railway access to the Tyne Commissioners' Docks on the Tyne, (the Northumberland 
Docks) and the Albert Edward Dock and the only rail access to the docks at 
Sunderland, belonging to the River Wear Commissioners. Despite this, he saw no 
problem in the acquisition of Hull Docks by the NER although, strictly speaking, it 
was forbidden by parliamentary standing orders. Gibb said that there was no sinister 
object whatever in the proposals and there was no intention of destroying the HBR as 
an independent competitive undertaking as they had a common interest in the growth 
of the trade of Hull. 44 
Corporation opposition to the Bill was led by J. T. Woodhouse. Having 
recounted the support for the Bill of the precious year he said that the Corporation 
olýjected now because no new dock was included, despite overwhelming evidence 
42 City Archives, Hull, TLP 326, Parliamentary Committee proceedings on NER and Dock 
Amalgamation Bill, 1893. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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the previous year that a new dock was a necessity. At Goole the proportion of 
tonnage to dock acreage \, ý'as 20.000 tons per acre; at Hartlepool, 10.000 tons: at 
Grimsby, 7,000 tons; whereas at Hull, including Alexandra Dock, it was 23,000 tons 
per acre. Challenged by the promoters with C. H. Wilson's claim that the 
Corporation did not represent the larger traders of the port Woodhouse retorted that 
when people agreed with Mr. Wilson, they were everything. When theN did not aý. Iree 
he did not spare his expressions. Woodhouse accused the NER of bad faith in its 
dealings with Hull. but when pressed, could only give an example dating from 1847 
when George Hudson was chairman of the YNMR, well before the formation of the 
NER. 45 
The promoters argued that the overwhelming majority of the bodies with an 
interest in the scheme supported it. These included the Dock Company, the HBR, the 
Humber Conservancy, the Pilotage Committee and Trinity House. The Chamber of 
Commerce was in favour, subject to conditions concerned mainly with overside 
charges and other charges on river traffic, but agreement had been reached on this 
issue. Only the Corporation continued to oppose. " 
However, it became clear in evidence from Alderman Stuart, the chairman of 
the Chamber of Commerce and deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of 
Hull Corporation that the Chamber's agreement to the proposal was less than whole- 
hearted. The leading supporters had been F. B. Grotrian and C. H. Wilson, the pair 
who had conducted the negotiations with the NER. He, personally, opposed the 
proposed Bill and was unhappy with the Chamber's decision which had been 
opposed by almost a third of those voting. He stressed that it was not an 
unconditional acceptance of the proposal. " 
Such a response made it easy for the promoters' counsel in his closing speech 
to portray the Corporation as backward looking and detached from the business 
4ý City Archives, Hull, TLP 326, Parliamentary Committee proceedings on NER and Dock 
Amalgamation Bill, 18933. 
46 Ibid., Evidence before Lords Committee, June 1893 
47 Ibid. 
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needs of the port, which it was prepared to sacrifice because of a long standing but 
groundless suspicion and dislike of the NER. 'I 
The Select Committee decided to waive standing orders that prohibited the 
amalgamation of railway and dock companies. They were no doubt influenced bv the 
fact that the alternative was the bankruptcy of the Dock Company. The Bill received 
the Royal Assent on 24 th August 1893 . 
4' Hull Chamber of Commerce expressed 
satisfaction at the success of the Hull Docks Bill, a change from the equivocation 
before the Parliamentary Committee two months previously. " 
Thus did the Dock Company end its financial crises, and the NER now hoped 
to be able to invest in Hull in order to improve the docks and put its facilities on a par 
with those of the HBR. However, it had not considered the intransigence of the 
Corporation and the Humber Conservancy, and its goal of a deep-water dock was not 
to be realised for more than twenty years. 
5. The Hull dock strike, 1893. " 
The transfer of the Dock Company to the NER made it clear that the changing mix of 
political and commercial interests represented by the Corporation was crucial to that 
body's policy towards the NER and HBR. In 1893 a major re-alignment took place in 
the constitution of the Corporation as a result of the Hull Dock strike. It is therefore 
appropriate to consider the strike and its outcome in some detail. 
The root cause of the Hull strike went back to the successful London dock 
strike of 1889. Directly as a result of that strike the Shipping Federation was founded 
on 2 nd September 1890 to counteract the strike weapon. 52 It soon represented over 
80% of British shipping employers. Ostensibly it existed to secure the freedom to 
48 City Archives, Hull. TLP 326, Evidence before Lords Committee, June 1893. 
49 Ibid., Dock Amalgamation Act, 1893. 
50 Railway Times, I't July 1893. 
Some of the material in this section is based on the book by Raymond Brown, Waterfront 
Organisation in Hull, 18 70- 1900, (University of Hull, 1972), and the dissertation from which the 
book derives: 'The Labour Movement in Hull, 1870-1900 with special reference to new unionism' 
(Unpublished MSc Dissertation, University of Hull, 1966). 
52 L. H. Powell, Shipping Federation -, 4 Histon, of the First SixtY Years, (London, 1950), p. 7. 
191 
work for union members and non-union workers alike. " The main plank of its 
strategy was to open so-called *Free Labour Bureaux' which allowed unionists and 
non-unionists alike to register. This gave them preference in employment. if 
sufficient joined at any particular port the result could lead to the defeat of the local 
branch of the Dock, Wharf, Riverside & General Labourers' Union. However. the 
challenge to the union did not stop at that. If the local branches operated a closed 
shop policy the Shipping Federation was prepared to import, lodge and feed groups 
of non-union labourers to break the closed shop. 
In Hull, however, the relationship between the dockers and ship owners was 
harmonious. Thus, during the 1889 strike C. H. Wilson supported a suggestion from 
the Hull Trades Council that the workers should organise. By October 1889 two 
branches of the National Labour Federation were in existence. In November Ben 
Tillett's Dock, Wharf, Riverside & General Labourers' Union took over and formed 
three branches. 54 
53 H. Holman, (revised C. Laws), The Shipping Federation, (London, 1900). p. 262. 
54 D. Bythell, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Online, (2004), 
[ii(il): ý, "ýNývýýNý,. oxf'orcidtib. coin/lvlc\, v,! 'ai-ticleii36522], (March 2005). Benjamin Tillett (1860-1943), 
trade unionist and politician, was born in Bristol. At thirteen he joined the Royal Navy, and at 
sixteen became a merchant seaman. After serving a few years, he settled in Bethnal Green, London, 
where he married Jane Tomkins in 1882. He embarked on an eclectic programme of self-education, 
and became a teetotaller and an active chapel-goer. He worked as a dock labourer in a tea 
warehouse. 
In 1887, Tillett and some fellow workers formed a Tea Operatives and General Labourers 
Association in an attempt to prevent a wage reduction, but it remained small and ineffective until 
the sudden outburst of mass discontent among the waterfront workers of London in August 1889 
made it the focus for organisation among the unskilled. The great dock strike turned Ben Tillett 
overnight into a household name, and brought him into contact with leading London socialists and 
trade unionists such as John Bums and Tom Mann, and prominent public sympathisers such as 
Cardinal Manning. 
In the euphoria which followed the end of the strike, Tillett launched his union as the Dock. Wharf, 
Riverside, and General Labourers' Union and proceeded to recruit thousands of unskilled workers 
from a variety of occupations in different parts of the country. In the general election of 1892 he 
fought an impressive campaign as Independent Labour candidate at Bradford West, and in 1893 he 
\\as present at the Bradford conference ýN hich resulted in the establishment of the Independent 
Labour Party (ILP). 
continued 
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The growth of union membership proceeded rapidly and bý December 1890 
there was 100% membership at Hull docks. Wilson's attitude was vital to this 
success. Although many ports adopted the Shipping Federation's free labour registry 
offices, known as the British Labour Exchange, Hull did not. The Shipping 
Federation urged Hull shipowners to establish an office but recognised that the 
shipowners were divided with some, particularly Wilson. saying that such a step was 
unnecessary as long as the dock workers and employers got along together. Indeed, at 
a dockers' meeting in November 1891 C. H. Wilson said that Ben Tillett was no 
longer regarded as an enemy by the employers in the port of Hull. It was clear that 
Wilson recognised Tillett as a moderate and responsible union leader. Tillett 
responded by praising Wilson's attitude to his workforce. " 
Despite this, in December 1890 the Shipping Federation established an office 
at the premises of Joseph Gregson, the secretary of the Hull Chamber of Commerce 
and Shipping. In April 1892 it attempted to defeat organised of labour in Hull. Coal 
tippers working for the HBR struck after a refusal of their demands for a pay 
However, Tillett's union was in reality very weak. The dock strike in Hull in 1893 destroyed the 
union's main regional stronghold, and, except in the Bristol Channel ports, its waterfront 
membership elsewhere dwindled. By 1900, it was essentially a small provincial union. Meanwhile, 
Tillett lost his place on the TUC parliamentary committee as a result of the revision of the standing 
orders which conservative union leaders engineered in 1895. and he ceased to be active in the ILP 
after unsuccessfully contesting Bradford West a second time in the same year. 
He was present at the famous meeting on 27 February 1900 which set up the Labour 
Representation Committee, served for a time on its executive, and stood unsuccessfully as its 
candidate at Eccles in the 1906 general election. His relations with Keir Hardie and Ramsay 
MacDonald were never easy. 
Tillett's career defies easy categorisation, and simple images -a meteor, a chameleon, or a 
weathercock - fail to capture its complexity. His long-term impact was more limited than that of 
most of his leading contemporaries in the labour movement, and his personality was less attractive 
than that of his lifelong associate, Tom Mann. To his admirers, Tillett was a tireless fighter against 
injustice and an irrepressible champion of the rights and dignity of the working man. To his 
opponents (inside as well as outside the movement) he was the ultimate agitator: an irresponsible 
trouble-maker, vain, mercenary, and unprincipled, who was violent in speech but timid in action. 
Yet despite the man\r twists and turris of his career, his reputation as one of the most eloquent and 
inspiring orators of Labour's pioneer generation remained untarnished. 
55 Hul/Neirs. 21 "November 189 1. 
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increase. The HBR then employed non-union labour, which led to a demand that all 
workers on Alexandra Dock should be called out. " The union was taken aback by 
this militancy on the part of the rank and file. Tillett was sent to negotiate ýNith the 
HBR, and the dispute was settled. This was seen as a victory for Tillett and the 
strikers as they obtained considerable increases in rates, many of , ýhich %ýCre 
backdated by three months. " But this was not the end of the matter. At around the 
same time the SS Isis arrived at Albert Dock with a Shipping Federation crew to load 
coal. The Hull dockers 'blacked' the vessel with the result that the Federation sent 
labourers to Hull. However, they were frustrated by the Hull Dock Company, which 
reffised to allow the imported labourers to use its appliances. This made the work so 
laborious that most of the free labourers gave up. The Shipping Federation was 
incensed and immediately took action against the Dock Company in the Queens 
Bench Division. However, the dispute was settled and the vessel sailed. The court 
case ended inconclusively, being discharged without costs. " 
By 1893 Hull was a well organised, unionised port, a situation that was 
anathema to the Shipping Federation. Although the federation liked to portray itself 
as an alliance of employers interested only in defending their own businesses its 
strategy was aggressive towards union labour. Its procedure of opening branches of 
the British Labour Exchange had worked well in the past and it now felt that it must 
take advantage of the first opportunity to break union power in Hull. The solidarity 
between the employers and the union had so far proved a stumbling block. 
The opportunity came in February 1893 when some men working a coal 
barge for Wilson's refused to pay arrears of union dues. This was reported to 
Wilson's who would, in the past, have deducted the arrears from the men's wages. 
On this occasion they refused to do so. The reason was probably that pressure had 
been brought on Wilson by the marine insurance companies within the Shipping 
56 National Archives, Kew, RAIL 312/8, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1886-1898. 
On 15th May 189' ) an agreement was announced between the H BR and the British Labour 
Exchange and co-operation with the Shipping Federation was promised. The HBR withdrew from 
British Labour Exchange on 25 th June 1895. 1 
57 HullNews, 
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Federation to confront the unions. " As a result union men refused to unload three of 
Wilson's coal barges. Wilson's retaliated by insisting that their foremen and shipping 
-) Oth clerks must leave the union. Adding to the rising tension was the opening, on . 
March 1893, of the Hull Labour Exchange, which promised employment for all who 
registered. It immediately registered 68 men. " This was a much greater threat to 
organised unionism in Hull than a trifling dispute with Wilson's. Furthermore, many 
dock labourers, who were members of the union, had been unemployed for a 
considerable time and had accrued arrears of union dues. With the promise of work, 
it was from these men that the bureau would be likely to successfully recruit. The 
union was alarmed to the extent that Tillett addressed a meeting of Hull dockers at 
Alexandra Dock warning against hasty action. A resolution was passed opposing the 
British Labour Exchange. 61 C. H. Wilson responded by alleging that the arrival of the 
free labour bureau was a consequence of the unions gaining too much power to the 
extent that the employers were now at their mercy. This, he claimed, had resulted in a 
diminution of trade and caused unemployment. 62 
All hope of moderation disappeared on 3rd April when the leader of the 
National Amalgamated Seamens' and Firemens' Union and MP for Middlesbrough, 
Joseph Havelock Wilson, made an inflammatory speech calling on dock workers to 
bring the trade of the port to a stop and urging gas and other unskilled workers to 
strike. " The employers, now united, had been waiting for such an event as this to 
justify a strategy upon which they had already decided, which was that a short, sharp 
contest with labour would clear the air and be best for all concerned, provided of 
59 C. Edwards, 'The Hui I Shipping Dispute', The Economic Journal, Vol. No. 10, (June 1893), p. 
347. 
60 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping AGM, 15 1h November 1893. 
61 Hull Dai4v News, 23 rd March 1893. 
01 Eastern Morning News, 28'h March 1893. 
63 J. Havelock Wilson, Aýi-, 'ýtormy Foyage Through Life, (Manchester, 1925), p. 274. It is interesting 
to note that in Havelock Wilson's autobiography he describes himself as well meaning but hailed 
'the villain of the piece. ' The book was published more than thirty years after the Hull dock strike 
by which time Havelock Wilson had become very much an establishment figure. 
Friel, MariliMe Histotýy (? f Britain and Ireland, p. 208. 
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course that the employers emerged victorious. " As a former supporter of labour 
Wilson's attitude was crucial to this strategy. On 4 th April the stakes NNere further 
raised when C. H. Wilson decided that his clerks and foremen should not belong to 
any union. " 
The dispute quickly escalated. On the following day 400 free labourers 
arrived in Hull and there were ugly incidents when union members threý, ý, stones and 
a free labourer discharged a revolver. The authorities panicked. On 6 th April the 
Watch Committee authorised the Chief Constable do what he considered advisable to 
immediately strengthen of the police force. The result was widely perceived as an 
over-reaction. 160 Royal Scots and 90 Dragoons arrived in the town and two 
gunboats appeared in the Humber. 66 Many questioned this level of military force. The 
Eastern Morning News, quoting from the London Daily News called it, this 
preposterous display of force in a town, which is as quiet as a Sunday congregation 
in church. 167 
By now the dispute had taken on a high national profile. Keir Hardie, the MP 
for the West Ham South constituency in London's industrial East End and the 
country's first socialist MP, questioned Asquith, the Home Secretary, in Parliament 
about the military presence in Hull. The latter said that the military, gunboats and 
police had been sent at the request of Hull Corporation and Magistrates on the 
recommendation of the Secretary of State. This action on the part of a Liberal 
Government came as an unpleasant surprise to many working class Liberal 
supporters and was a major factor in the securing of two Independent Labour Party 
seats in Hull in autumn 1893, ultimately affecting the balance of power in the town 
council. " 
Events now moved rapidly to an all-out strike which ultimately was to lead to 
the collapse of the closed shop. A ballot of unionist dockers on 6 th April showed 95% 
support for the strike but their leaders remained cautious and moderate. However, 
64 Hull Dail), News, 4 th April 1893. 
65 Edwards, 'The Hull Shipping Dispute', p. 348. 
66 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Watch Committee Minutes, 6 th April 1893. 
67 Eastern VorningVcii-s. ]I th April 1893. 
68 Brown, lf'atet.. -fi-ont Organisation in Hull, 1870-1900, p. 6. 
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Havelock Wilson was doing all he could to inflame the situation by promisin, -, 
nation-wide strikes in support of the Hull dockers. On 7'h April he made another 
inflammatory speech at the end of which Shipping Federation cards and an effigy of L_ ý 
C. H. Wilson were burned. Wilson was forced into a comer by these activities and 
any concessions on his part could have been construed as giving in to threats, 
particularly by his fellow ship-owners in the Shipping Federation who suspected his 
lack of resolve. It had become clear that many of the employers would accept 
nothing but the complete capitulation of the strikers and the end of unionised labour 
in Hull. By II th April there were approximately 1.000 free labourers in the port. 
Tillett had originally agreed to work the ships of owners not involved in the dispute 
but the intervention of Havelock Wilson ended this arrangement and the dispute was 
extended to cover every ship in the port. " 
On the following day the Chief Constable was authorised to obtain 50 
additional Constables. Local politicians were split. Councillor Millington, a member 
of the Hull Trades Council, proposed a resolution regretting the importation of the 
military into the town. The resolution was seconded by Councillor Pool but was 
narrowly defeated. The Watch Committee received a letter from the Hull Trades and 
Labour Council deploring the use of military force but took no action. " On 17 th April 
the Corporation passed a resolution that the situation was more serious than ever, and 
the withdrawal of either the gunboats or the cavalry would result in the most 
disastrous consequences. 71 
Increased support for the strikers came as a result of a tactical blunder by the 
Shipping Federation. On I VhApril its executive council met at York to consider the 
situation in Hull and a deputation, including C. H. Wilson, was heard. The council 
unanimously passed a resolution calling off all discussion with the union leaders. " 
This was seen as completely undermining the principle that disputes must be 
resolved by discussion. If accepted, it would have diminished the power of unions to 
69 Brown, 11'ateýfront Organisation in Hull, 1870-1900, p. 74. 
70 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Watch Committee Minutes, 13'h April 1893. 
71 Ibid. 
72 The Times, 12'1' April 1893. 
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the point of complete impotence. Its direct consequence was an upsurge in financial 
and political support for the strikers that strengthened their resol-ve. 
This support came from many quarters. Hull Trades Council organised the 
collection of some f, 12,000 and financial support was received from the 
Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers. The strikers were given a ticket worth 6s. 
(30p. ) per week and their credit at local shops was guaranteed by the union. These 
appeals, together with other appeals by MPs brought in so much that at the end of the 
strike there was a shortfall in union funds of only f 75 0.71 
The Federated Trade Unions of Hull were, however, prepared to compromise. 
On 17 th April they announced that they would accept the Free Labour Exchange if it 
were controlled by some independent body, such as the Board of Trade, thus 
ensuring that non-union labour was not given preference. They X"-ere also prepared to 
accept that foremen and clerks need not belong to the union. But the employers 
rejected these proposals out of hand. Deadlock had been reached . 
74 
The escalation of violence on both sides generated increasing concern at local 
and national level. On 8 th May the town magistrates passed a resolution which 
concluded that the main points of difference had been conceded, and only matters of 
detail remained unsettled, and called upon representatives of both sides to meet and 
endeavour to arrive at an honourable settlement . 
7' The Watch Committee endorsed 
the resolution and the Town Clerk forwarded copies to the Dockers' Union and the 
Shipping Federation. 
Efforts were also being made in Parliament to end the dispute. A draft 
agreement had been prepared by A. J. Mundella, the President of the Board of Trade, 
C. H. Wilson, MP, representing the Hull ship owners, Joseph Havelock Wilson, MP, 
John Burns, MR and Tom Mann, President of the General Labourers, Union. (Bums 
and Mann had been, together with Ben Tillett. the leaders of the London Dock strike 
of 1889). " Havelock Wilson was in favour of a general strike to bring the issue to a 
head. but Bums counselled against such action. He considered it too great a risk to 
-7 -, 
f Hull, p. 409. Gillett & MacMahon-4 Histoi-1, o 
74 Hull. Vews. 17 th April 189-33. 
75 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Watch Committee Minutes, 9th Ma-'. 1893. 
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the trade union movement to take such action on so small an issue. Counsels of 
moderation prevailed. The main points of the draft agreement were verv similar to 
those produced by the Trades Unions of Hull on 17 th April, with the exception of a 
stipulation that Labour Exchange Registry and Shipping Federation tickets should 
not be forced on the men, and registration with any association should not be a 
condition for employment or preference. 77 
The Shipping Federation met the proposals with outright hostility. It was 
reported that the Federation had rebuked C. H. Wilson for his involvement in the 
draft agreement as a breach of the resolution passed at York on II th Apri 1. " The 
Federation's opposition was seen by those outside it as unnecessarily prolonging the 
dispute. The amount of damage being done to the trade of Hull was clear. The 
tonnage shipped from Hull in 1892 had been 66,738 whereas that for 1893 was 
12,827, thus demolishing the claims of the Shipping Federation that free labour 
would provide a speed and economy superior to that of the closed shop. '9 The 
published figures proved what had been evident to the bulk of the traders of Hull for 
some time, and forced the shipowners to recognise the damage that their stance was 
causing to the commercial community generally. 
The growing opposition of commercial interests to the dispute helped to 
create a mood for settlement. On I oth May Tom Mann arrived in Hull and 
immediately began talks with representatives of both sides. Mann succeeded where 
Tillett had failed. He managed to obtain the agreement of the shipowners that the 
Free Labour Exchange should not give preference of employment to non-union 
labour. He went on to address a meeting of 10,000 union members and obtained an 
agreement from them to end the dispute if the employers agreed that the Labour 
Bureaux would not be used as a device by the Shipping Federation to weaken the 
trade union movement. It was reported on II th May that the Shipping Federation had 
practically agreed to the terms. " On 12 th May a deputation of the Hull employers met 
the Shipping Federation and stated that the men on strike in Hull were prepared to 
77 The Times, 18 th April 1893. 
78 
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accept the Federation"s York resolution with the addition of the following: 'That 
neither registration "-ith the British Labour Exchange nor membership of aný union 
shall carry with it with it either preference or prejudice with regard to any 
employment. ' The conditions were accepted. " In terms of the dispute narro'xly 
conceived, the result was thus a compromise. The meeting between the two sides in 
the dispute to thrash out the final agreement was held on 18 th May. The strike was 
called off and work was to start the next day. It was significant that C. H. Wilson did 
not appear among the negotiators for the employers' side, leaving that task to his 
brother Arthur. On 20th May the Lincolnshire, West Riding and Metropolitan police 
were recalled. Ten days later the York and Leeds police were sent home. 
Although the employers tried to portray the outcome a victory for the 
Shipping Federation, they had been forced to concede a key point which C. H. 
Wilson had conceded on 17 th April for which he had been castigated, and which Ben 
Tillett, for the union, had conceded even earlier. Although the unions also chose to 
represent the result as a victory union representation in Hull had been much 
weakened. The union had to forego its closed shop, allow the foremen and clerks to 
leave its ranks and suffer the presence of the Free Labour Bureaux. 
6. The aftermath of the dock strike. 
The strike marked the beginning of a collapse of morale among unionised 
dockworkers and the transformation of Hull from a closed shop to a major centre for 
free labour. The Shipping Federation claimed that almost 7,000 free labourers had 
been imported into Hull. " Immediately after the strike most of these left. A more 
long-term significance of the strike was that it marked a sharpening of class 
difference in Hull with consequent changes in the Corporation, which was to be 
reflected in its relationship with the HBR. 
C. H. Wilson provides a good example of how the dispute sharpened class 
distinctions. In an interview in the Westminster Gazette, which was quoted in the 
Hull Daily News. he attempted to explain his position in the dispute. He said that the 
I th 81 The Times, 
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dispute had been against his Principles as there was no man in England who had a 
deeper and truer sympathy with trade unionism. He acknowledged that the other 
employers had brought pressure to bear on him when he said that it had never been 
his wish to destrov the dockers' union, although he had been compelled to co-operate 
with those who had such a wish. '-' If Wilson were to be believed, then he had 
certainly started out as the friend of the trades unions just as he had started out as a 
friend of the HBR. In each case his friendship cooled rapidly when he felt his 
business interests threatened. Wilson then attempted to regain his position as the 
local philanthropist by distributing half-crowns to the unemployed. " However the 
real strategy of the Shipping Federation was revealed when it was disclosed that 
Wilson's. together with the NER and HBR dock operations, were giving preference 
in employment to non-unionists in clear breach of the agreement of 18 th May. The 
Trades and Labour Council asked the Mayor to intervene and give assistance to a 
further struggle with the employers and the Shipping Federation, but the men had no 
stomach for another dispute. They rushed to the Free Labour Bureaux in order to 
obtain tickets as they realised that without them there was little chance of work. By 
th 81 8 June more than 2,000 had registered. 
The strike proved invaluable to the Shipping Federation as it enabled it to 
smash the closed shop at Hull. The National Free Labour Association in Hull had a 
larger membership than Tillett's Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers' 
Union until after the turn of the twentieth century. The union stalwarts felt they had 
been betrayed. Havelock Wilson recalled that he had a very mixed reception at Hull, 
many being incensed at what they considered the weak-kneed policy of their 
leaders. " Tom Mann observed that the union's tactics had played into the hands of 
the employers and the Shipping Federation. He noted that within five weeks of the 
end of the strike The Federation and its free labour tickets had triumphed. " The 
Federation itself endorsed this view. After the strike it noted: 
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The strike collapsed by the complete acceptance on the part of the men of the 
terms laid down by the employers at the commencement of the strike - terms 
which involved a full recognition of the Free Labour Office, the abandonment on 
the part of the dockers' union of their claims that none but members of the union 
should be employed at the docks, and an admission of the full right of an 
employer to engage any master stevedore he chose, whether connected with the 
union or not. " 
Thus did the Shipping Federation define the victory of the employers and the 
crushing of unionised labour in the port of Hull. The strike made little or no 
difference to the railway companies directly but it was to have far reaching 
consequences for the catalyst of their relationship, the Corporation of Hull. The dock 
strike may be regarded as the defining point whence the relationship between the 
HBR and the NER became increasingly cordial and that between the Corporation and 
the HBR increasingly sour. 
88 Holman, (revised Laws), The Shipping Federation, p. 267. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
THE RISE OF HULL AS A COAL PORT, 1893-1916. 
1. Introduction. 
The period from the NER's take over of the Dock Company in 1893 to the outbreak 
of the Great War in 1914 was one of great expansion for Hull in which it became a 
major coal port. ' The HBR struggled in competition with the NER as a carrier of 
general freight and only came into its own when it had established better links to the 
South Yorkshire collieries. 2 This was not achieved without difficulty, but by the end 
of the century the HBR was a successful carrier of coal, to the extent that its facilities 
at Alexandra Dock were proving inadequate. 
The rise of Hull as a coal port was, to a large extent, dependent on access to 
the South Yorkshire coalfield, the development of which progressed in two stages. 
The first was the opening of collieries in the Barnsley and Doncaster areas but, as 
coal extraction methods became more sophisticated, the second stage saw new and 
deeper collieries being sunk to exploit the reserves in the concealed coalfield 
between Rotherham and Bawtry in the extreme south of Yorkshire. The NER realised 
that it could not allow itself to fall behind the HBR in the race to reach this coal and 
this resulted in a proliferation of joint lines to provide feeders for the coal to Hull. 
This chapter considers the politics leading to the construction of this network and 
analyses their operation. Although superficially, joint lines may be seen as an 
economic way of working they were in fact wasteful, given the need to legislate for 
agreements, and administration by committees drawn from the directors of the joint 
companies. Biddle argues that they were a significant factor in the high cost of 
I H. E. C. Newham, Hull as a Coal Port, (Hull 1913), pp. 15-24. 
2 B. J. Turton, 'British Railway Traffic in 192 F, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 
No. 48, (December 1969), p. 158. The relative sizes of the NER & HBR are indicated by the fact 
that in 1921 the NER carried 22,406,000 tons of coal (44% of its total freight), whereas the HBR 
carried 1,190,000 tons (61% of its total freight). Coal as percentage of total freight over the whole 
railway system was 590'6. 
203 
running railways in Britain. ' Indeed, none of the joint railways considered in this 
study was particularly successful. However. it will be argued that this was maink- 
due to factors outside the control of the railway companies. principall,., the decline in 
coal exports after 1913. 
As this chapter shows, it was in the new combinations of companies to 
develop these joint lines that long-standing politics and jealousies changed. After 
1900 the cordial relationship between the GCR and the NER cooled, the latter 
looking to the LYR for support and the former seeking alliance with the MR. ' 
However, unlike earlier times, relations between the NER and HBR remained 
relatively cordial despite the efforts of Hull Corporation to obstruct co-operation 
between them. 
2. The South Yorkshire Junction Railway. 
The first major coal railway serving Hull was the South Yorkshire Junction Railway, 
(SYJR) authorised in 1890. ' It was promoted by colliery interests. The first directors 
were John Buckingham Pope, the chairman of the Denaby Colliery Company, and 
three others, all representing colliery interests. ' The original proposals were for a 
network of railways based on a junction near Sprotbrough on the outskirts of 
Doncaster. The Commons select committee decided that the scheme was too 
grandiose and threw out all the proposals with the exception of the railways from 
Wrangbrook to Denaby and from Sprotbrough to Bessacar. In the event only the line 
from Wrangbrook to Denaby was built. ' It ran from the HBR at Wrangbrook Junction 
to connect with the newly developed Cadeby and Denaby collieries near 
Conisbrough. ' A connection to the MSLR at Denaby was authorised but was not 
J. Simmons & G. Biddle, (eds. ), The 0, ýford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997). 
p. 2 -33 
8. 
4 G. Dow, Great Central, IoL 3, (London, 1965), p. 205. 
5 City Archives, Hull, TLP 192, South Yorkshire Junction Railway Act, 1892. 
6 Pope had been a member of the founding committee of the HBR. (See Chapter 4. ) 
1 , Doncaster Archives, BT 356'5276, Proposals for South Yorkshire Junction Railway, 1889. 
8 City Archives Hull, TLP 192. South Yorkshire Junction Railway Act, 1890. 
Figure 23. The South Yorkshire Joint Railwa\ and connecting branches. 
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made, the SYJR ten-ninating at buffer stops a short distance from the MSLR line. ' 
Barnett suggests that this was because of the colliery owners' dissatisfaction with the 
service proposed by the MSLR. " This is borne out by the fact that Pope, in his 
treatise Railway Rates and Radical Rule, had accused the MSLR of charging 
excessive rates to a colliery which he did not name. but from the location giNeii it 
may be inferred that it was Denaby. '' The Denaby Colliery Company had been in 
dispute with the MSLR over the cost of coal carriage and had challenged the 
railway's right to charge the same rate from Denaby as from more distant collieries. 
The case dragged on until 1886 when the colliery company lost. " 
The proposed line was widely seen as part of the HBR system and in 
February 1890 Hull Corporation wished to place protective clauses in the SYJR Bill. 
The SYJR solicitor noted rather sourly that he thought the Corporation would 
welcome the new railway bringing coal traffic to the HBR, rather than raise 
objections. " The Corporation was beaten and withdrew. " The close connection 
between the HBR and SYJR was confirmed by an Agreement dated 27 th June 1891 
under which the HBR was to operate the SYJR for 50% of the coal receipts. " The 
line opened on 8 th September 1894. It was expected to turn the HBR into a major 
mover of coal. But this was not to prove easy. Pope had nominally supported the 
HBR since its inception, but he was not a man to do any financial favours and had 
9 B. Hinchliffe, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley Railway, Vol. 2, (Sheffield, 1980), p. 23. A connection 
was eventually made from the GCR line at Lowfield Junction, Conisbrough, to the SYJR in 1908. 
The GCR used the SYJR for access to Brodsworth Colliery. 
10 A. L. Barnett, The Railways qf the South Yorkshire Coaýfield, (Railway Correspondence and Travel 
Society, 1984), p. 11. 
J. B. Pope, Railway Rates and Radical Rule, (London, 18 84), p. 2 8. 
12 D. Hodgkins, The Second Railway King. The Lýfe and Times of Sir Edward Watkin 1819-1901, 
(Cardiff, 2002), p. 485. 
13 City Archives Hull, TLP 192, South Yorkshire Junction Railway. File of correspondence. Letter of 
8"' February 1890 from F. Parker Rhodes, solicitor for SYJR, to Hull Corporation. 
Newham, Hull as a Coal Port, p. 32. F. Parker Rhodes was also the secretary of the South 
Yorkshire Coal Owners Association. 
14 City Archives Hull, TLP 192, South Yorkshire Junction Railway. File of correspondence. 
Co Archives Hull, TLP 200, Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway and Dock 
Company and South Yorkshire Junction Railway Company Act, 1891. 
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driven a hard bargain over rates. His contract with the HBR was for 3 10,000 tons of 
coal annually but it was anticipated that up to '/2 million tons of coal would 
eventually pass along the SYJR each year. However the Raihi, qj, Times was less than 
impressed. Recording an increase of just 015 in the first three weeks of business 
compared with the same period in the previous year. it argued that: *either the HBR 
is doing very badly indeed or the vaunted Denaby connection is proving a delusion 
and a sham'. " This was perhaps a little harsh as three weeks was too short a period in 
which to assess the future prospects of the line. 
The 1891 working agreement gave the HBR a seat on the SYJR board and 
Pope wanted this to be a reciprocal arrangement. However, the relationship between 
the two companies was not as close as Pope desired and the HBR would not accede. 
This thwarting of his ambition frustrated Pope and, although from time to time he 
denied it, his treatment by the HBR rankled and caused personal animosity towards 
its directors. His background as a barrister seemed to give him an appetite for 
litigation. Railways ran deep in his politics. He was a fervent advocate of free trade 
and, in his treatise Railii, qj, Rates and Radical Rule, had castigated railway 
companies for their rates policy, particularly the charging of preferential rates. " He 
had stood as Conservative candidate for West Hull in the 1880 general election 
against the Liberal candidate C. H. Wilson. " Railways had been a key issue here. 
Pope had been a supporter of the HBR scheme and it was widely thought in Hull that 
Wilson who, until December 1879, had been a director of the NER, was opposed to 
it. However, Wilson had come out in support of the HBR with the result that Pope 
had been defeated and Wilson had been elected. Pope's touchiness regarding the 
HBR may therefore be readily understood. 
In 1895 Pope, by now the chairman of the SYJR, attacked the board of the 
HBR in a pamphlet, accusing them of mismanagement, neglect and incompetence. 
He proposed a scheme for a dock at Great Heck, where the HBR crossed the ACN 
Goole-Knottingley canal, at which point the coal would be transferred to water. The 
HBR refused to consider this scheme as it would have resulted in the use of only 
16 Railway Times, 20"' September 1894. 
17 Pope, Railwqj, Rates and Radical Rule, pp. 11 -37. 
18 G. R. Park, Parliamentary Representation (? f Yorkshire, (Hull, 1886), p. III 
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some 7 miles (I I km. ) of the HBR main line and would have greatly benefited the 
ACN and the port of Goole at the expense of Hull. " The Railu, qj, Times described 
Pope as. 'a man who does not conceal his opinion with regard to the incompetence of 
the present administration; a man of influence and a good customer who has been 
snubbed by the HBR. "' Pope was joined in his attack by R. P. Houston, the owner of 
the Houston Shipping Line of Liverpool, who claimed to have f 1/2million invested in 
railway ventures .2' 
Houston castigated the HBR's lack of coal facilities in Hull at 
Cannon Street. 22 The attacks continued when in a further article Pope described the 
HBR board as *a bucket-shop group who had manipulated HBR stock so successfully 
2' some years ago. ' Personal attacks on each of the board members followed. -' By this 
time, of course the HBR was firmly under the control of financial interests without 
particularly strong connections to Hull so these attacks may be interpreted as a 
continuation of the geographically based divisions of the late 1880s. 
In February 1895 Forbes reminded the shareholders of what had happened in 
the past when they indulged in such conflict. In an attempt to reconcile the parties a 
Committee of Inquiry was formed to look into the past and present policy and 
management of the HBR. The committee consisted of six; Houston and two 
associates, representing the colliery interests, and three independent shareholders to 
be appointed by the board, but Houston and his associates took exception to this and 
refused to sit on the committee, describing the exercise as a 'bogus investigation. ' 
Pope also refused to give evidence before the committee . 
2' The chairman was Henry 
Lambert, the general manager of the Great Western Railway, and the secretary was 
R. Dawe-Hill, the Town Clerk of Hull. There were indications of sharp practice. It 
19 K. Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley Railway, Vol. 1, (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 157. 
20 RailwaY Times, 21" January 1895. 
21 S. Swiggum & M. Kohli, The Ships List, (2004), 
[Imp: "xk, \, ý, xk,, tlicý, hipslist. coiii, /sliil)s hnesdiouston. html], ( October 2004). 
R. P. Houston & Company was formed in 1880 in Liverpool as to carry frozen meat from the 
Argentine to the UK. The company commenced passenger operations in 1885. In 1898 the British 
& South American Steam Navigation Company was formed and all existing ships transferred to it. 
Railivaj,, Times, -16"' January 
1895. 
lbid, 2 nd Februan, - 1895. 
'4 lbid, 25"' May 1895. 
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was revealed during the course of the inquirý that a Mr. Ganderton, who represented 
himself as in the employ of the Cadeby and Denaby Colliery Company. ý, Nas 
canvassing traders in Hull in order to obtain complaints against the HBR to laN 
before the committee of enquiry. A letter of 5 th April accused two shareholders who 
had qualified just before the half-yearly meeting of being spirited up by a trader to 
join agitation which would bring substantial profits both to the trader and 
themselves. 25 
The committee's findings were placed before a meeting on 28 th May. It found 
that the directors of the HBR had acted wisely by discouraging the scheme for a 
connection to the ACN at Heck, as this would be very likely to lead to a price war 
between the railway and canal companies. Furthermore, the committee implicitly 
attacked Pope's credibility. Under the Great Heck proposal he had said he could send 
11/2million tons of coal yearly from Denaby. This would have meant raising 5,000 
tons per day and no colliery in the UK raised anything like that amount. In fact. from 
I" January to Vt May 1895 Pope's colliery had only sent 40,768 tons, although the 
contract with the HBR allowed 103,000 tons in the same period. The committee 
considered that Pope was unable to fulfil his expectations, and pointed out that there 
were already twenty-one coal merchants using Cannon Street and fourteen other 
firms obtaining consignments of coal from the station. It concluded, 'the present 
management should not be interfered with and should be allowed to continue its 
work without being harassed, and as due economies are practised, better results 
might be confidently expected. 126 Such an unequivocal level of support for the 
HBR's management was not likely to placate Pope and his associates. Houston, 
proposed a motion rejecting the report, adding that he did not desire a seat on the 
HBR board, nor did any friend of his. We may dismiss his claim as disingenuous. 
The Railway News had little time for Pope's machinations. It opined: 
The Committee of Inquiry into the affairs of the HBR submitted its report. 
completely disposing of the charges of mismanagement put forward by certain 
agitators, some at least of whom were more interested as coal owners in securing 
21 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley Radivqv, VoL 1, p. I 11. 
26 Rai/way, 'Vews, I" June 1895. 
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the carriage of their traffic at very low rates than in the net earnings of the 
undertakings as shareholders. The proposals of Mr. Buckingham Pope, the coal- 
master. "'ho wants to get his traffic carried to a port of shipment at reduced rates. 
are disposed of in a few trenchant paragraphs which clearly indicate the nature 
of that gentleman* s interest in the agitation for a change of management. 27 
Pope's response was to abandon the scheme for the dock at Heck. and to use 
the South Yorkshire and Sheffield Navigation, owned by the MSLR, which passed 
close to his collieries. This did have some effect on the HBR as by February 1896 
there was a deficiency of 127,665 tons sent over the HBR by the collierý' company. 28 
The attacks by Pope irritated the HBR board. In August 1895 the chairman 
said that he did not find fault with the action of Houston and his friends but what he 
did object to was the attack by Pope, which was clearly motivated by the business 
interests of colliery owners. The HBR had recovered from Pope's bite and he did not 
suppose they would hear very much more of his bark or his bite. " 
He was wrong. The Lambert Report did not deter Pope and his allies in the 
railway press. The Raiht, cýy Times, in an editorial, described the Lambert Report as a 
'whitewashing report. "' Sniping continued, directed particularly at Forbes. Pope 
issued a pamphlet which was described by the HBR board as an 'unfair and libellous 
attack on Forbes. ' Pope stated, erroneously, that Forbes did not receive fees as a 
director of the HBR but that his remuneration was solely in respect of unspecified 
'extras. ' He said that the sale of the HBR to the NER would 'constitute an extra of 
portentous dimensions. ' Pope alleged that the sale of the HBR emanated entirely 
from Forbes who, 'without consulting his colleagues had entered into negotiations 
and arranged a scheme with the NER for the sale of the line, and the board were 
merely summoned by telegraph to confirm Mr. Forbes' arrangement. ' Pope went on 
to allege that Forbes was all-powerful and that the other directors were little better 
27 Radiva. v News, I" June 1895. 
28 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley RailwaY, Fol. 1, p. 112. 
'9 RailwaY News, 17 th August 1895. 
30 Rai/waY Times, II th Januarý 1896. 
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than dummies. " The Raili4'ay Times considered that Forbes should not shelter behind 
the board's claim that *the investigations of an impartial and independent committee' 
had shown that Pope's allegations were baseless. " 
In 1895 Smith, the prime mover behind the HBR, resigned from the board. 
John Fisher, the deputy chairman took his place. Smith also resigned his seat on the 
SYJR, his place being taken by Charles Lucas. " Smith was knighted, and appointed 
as Governor of Western Australia. His career from that point on was far from 
distinguished and he took no further part in the affairs of the HBR. " 
31 Railway Times, IP August 1898. 
32 Ibid, 8th February 1896. 
33 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 312/8, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1886-1898,3 oth October 
1895. 
34 Hinchliffe, (ed. ), The Hull and Barnsley Railway, Vol. 2, pp. 272-273. 
In 1895 Smith received the KCMG on his appointment as Governor of the Colony of Western 
Australia. He proved to be, perhaps, the least successful governor the Colony (later State) ever had, 
and his failure was all the more conspicuous as his term of office coincided with the years 
immediately before federation, when the advice of a strong and respected man was needed. 
Smith was involved in three scandals. The first was when he was sued by an hotel in Kalgoorlie 
over the non-payment of a bill for a reception. He had refused to pay on the grounds that it was 
exorbitant, but public opinion seemed to think that even if it were true, it was unseemly for the 
representative of the Crown to be involved in such a sordid quibble. Next, in June 1899, a letter 
from Smith was read out at the Annual General Meeting of the Park Hill Gold Mining Company, in 
London, praising the mine. His defence was that it had been a private letter and, in any case, was 
intended to help the economy of the whole Colony, rather than one particular company. Finally, in 
October 1899, he and five others, some of doubtful reputation, were sued by the Bank of New 
South Wales for the repayment of an overdraft of f 5,700, which had been advanced to them to 
finance an hotel in Coolgardie. It was alleged that the local bank manager had been bribed by a gift 
of shares. Smith was said to have written another letter, whose contents also became public, 
including the unfortunate comment: 'I am much eased with the balance sheet, showing a profit of 
fifty per cent per annum. The place is bigger and more commodious than I expected, and it has a 
big and increasing business'. He was described in the local papers as a vice-regal puffer, and 
boomster of mines and hotels. The Colonial Office took a very serious, but perhaps lenient, view of 
these events, deciding that the Governor 'may be considered more of a fool than a knave'. He was 
told to apply for leave of absence on the grounds of illness (he had, in fact, had pneumonia), and 
this was granted from November 1899, (brought forward from leave due in April 1900). On his 
return to Enudand he was told that he must retire, and was asked to make arrangements for this to 
continued 
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The HBR ,,, endetta with Pope continued throughout 1896, the latter alleging 
that it was impossible for his colliery to send more traffic over the HBR whIle the 
latter was managed as at present. Pope insisted that he had no personal wish to be on 
the HBR board but he implied that he could do the companý, some good if he were 
there. In February 1896 he invited Forbes to sue him over the allegedlý, libellous 
pamphlet. Forbes replied in a conciliatory fashion and was re-elected as a director. " 
Despite Pope's protestations to the contrary, it was clear that he still coveted a 
seat on the HBR board. The matter came to a head at the HBR half-yearly meeting in 
August 1896 when it was proposed to increase the number of directors from nine to 
eleven. The chairman, John Fisher, proposed that one of the extra places be filled by 
William Shaw Wright. There had been a proposal to fill the other vacant seat on the 
HBR board by the appointment of Pope. Sensing a possible conflict of interests as 
the Denaby Company and the SYJR were likely to go to litigation with the HBR over 
coal contracts, the chairman pointed out that Pope was chairman of the Denaby 
company and the SYJR. Frederick Greenfield, who had proposed Pope, withdrew his 
proposal. Greenfield was a stockbroker and one of Pope's supporters in the pamphlet 
war against the HBR board. Charles Poston of Stevenage was appointed instead. This 
led to complaints from some shareholders against the introduction of more Stock 
Exchange and London men on the directorate alleging that all they did was to look 
after their own interests. Fisher replied that when a future vacancy occurred the 
board would be glad to consider the claims of the West Riding and Lancashire. He 
justified Poston's elevation as one of the best men to help them get the money they 
would shortly want from London to develop the undertaking. " This demonstrated the 
maturity of the HBR board as it recognised that connections to capital were essential 
and took precedence over those to industry. 
appear as natural and spontaneous as possible. The resignation took effect from 30th June 1900. He 
returned to his former commercial activities, but a directorship of the Hull and Barnsley Railway 
was not amongst them; perhaps the Board had heard of his peccadilloes in Australia. He died on 
18th October 1920. 
35 RailwaY Times, 15'h Februarý, 1896. 
36 Railwqv N'cwsý 22 nd August 1896. 
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After Pope's machinations it is perhaps not surprising that for the half year 
ending 30 th June 1896 the Denaby Company was 210,000 tons short on the amount 
of coal it ought to have delivered to the HBR. But despite Pope's obstructive efforts 
the SYJR had turned the HBR into a significant carrier of coal, a prospect which ýN-as 
envisaged at its opening in 1885. The burgeoning coal export trade from Hull was to 
encourage further feeder railways. But the next coal railway to join the HBR would 
cause further disputes with Pope and his colliery company. 
3. The Hull and South Yorkshire Extension Railway. 
In 1897 a competitor to the SYJR appeared in the shape of the Hull & South 
Yorkshire Extension Railway (HSYER). The first directors included David Davy, the 
manager of Hickleton Main Colliery, John Fisher, Charles Poston, George Shaw and 
George Blake Walker, the four latter all being connected with the HBR. " The HBR 
agreed to give f1 . 000, later increased to f2,500, towards the promotion of this 
railway, which ran from Wrangbrook on the HBR, just to the west of the junction 
with the SYJR, to Wath and on to a junction with the MSLR. ` However, the 
connection to the MSLR was not deemed necessary, and was not made despite 
powers for it being renewed in 1908. The line gave the HBR direct access to 
Manvers Main, Hickleton, Wath Main and, at a later date, Frickley collieries. '9 The 
close connection with the HBR was confirmed in May 1897 when the HSYER 
approached the HBR to negotiate an agreement for the latter to work the railway. The 
HBR took over the railway in 1898. " The Act authorising the construction of the 
HSYER received the Royal Assent on 2 nd July 1897 despite opposition from the 
NER and MSLR. Construction took almost three years. " 
37 East Ridina Archives, Beverley, DDML/I 1/3, Hull and South Yorkshire Extension Railway Act, 
1897. 
38 Figure 24. The HBR and associated branches, Wrangbrook - Wath. 
39 Hoole Archives, Darlington. The HBR obtained access to Frickley Colliery on 24"' July 1908. 
(From speech to HBR Old Boys reunion dinner by Col. Smith on 19'h October 1910). 
40 Citý Archives, Hull, TLP 243. Hull Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway and Dock Act, 
1898. 
Hoole, (ed. ). The Hull & Barnsleýý Railwaý% VoL 1, p. 160. 
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Fear of competition from the new route spurred Pope into making fresh 
complaints against the HBR board, alleging, in a pamphlet. that the HBR main line 
and its dock facilities at Hull could not cope with the existing traffic. let alone more. 
and that the HBR suffered from an acute lack of rolling stock. There was some truth 
in this as the HBR had been forced to borrow wagons from other companies to deal 
with a glut of traffic and loaded wagons had been left in sidings as they could not be 
cleared at the dock. 42 Not surprisingly, the HBR board replied in kind. In August 
1896 John Fisher complained that Pope's allegations were aired in public rather than 
being conducted through more appropriate channels. ` The HBR board also alleged 
that hundreds of empty wagons were on Pope's lines waiting for loading and 
delivery. " 
The threat of the new railway spurred Pope into further unfounded 
allegations. In September 1896 letters appeared in the Railway Times from the 
45 Cadeby Colliery Company concerning further delays in handling coal at Hull. The 
colliery company said that although 310,000 tons of coal per year were sent as 
required by the contract, much more could have been transported but for operational 
shortcomings on the HBR. It went on to allege that the promotion of new coal 
railways in South Yorkshire, notably the independent Dearne Valley Railway (DVR) 
and the HSYER could prevent the HBR fulfilling its obligations to the Denaby 
Company. Any loss suffered by the Denaby Company or the SYJR would result in 
heavy claims for compensation against the HBR. ` The response came quickly from 
Hickleton Main Colliery, which was to be served by the HSYER, alleging that the 
Denaby Company had taken fright at the competition it faced and was issuing vague 
threats for which there was no foundation. " The correspondence continued for a 
while in the columns of the Railway Times but had petered out by the end of the year 
42 H oo I e, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnslev Railway, Vol. 1. p. 1] 5. 
43 John Fisher was the senior partner in the firm of Tealby & Co., timber importers. He became 
chairman of the HBR in October 1895 when Smith relinquished the post and remained until his 
death in September 1900. 
44 Railway Times, 22 nd August 1896. 
4 5, lbid, 5 th September 1896. 
46 lbid, 2 nd October 1897. 
47 lbid, 9th October 1897. 
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in a series of claims and counter-claims among which the Cadeby Company had 
emphatically denied that it had objections to additional feeder lines. " 
The HBR, unable to cope with its increased traffic, found itself in a position 
similar to that which had occurred on the NER in 1872. However. unlike the latter. it 
was unable to lay the blame at the door of an inefficient dock operation over which it 
had no control. Despite the public statements of the directors a real problem existed. 
The HBR was deficient in wagons and urgent measures were needed to redress the 
situation. A meeting was held on 27 th November 1896 to authorise the issue of neýý- 
capital to provide much needed rolling stock, a dock extension and other works. It 
was proposed to raise f 300,000 in 4% preference stock. The motion was carried by a 
large majority. " Hull Corporation agreed to invest f 10,000 in the new 4% preference 
stock issued by the HBR. This was in addition to f 100,000 that they already held in 
ordinary stock. " 
The HBR was not entirely convincing in its display of managerial 
competence. At the next shareholders' meeting in February 1897 Trotter, the 
chairman, tried to gloss over the deficiency in rolling stock. " He said he wished to 
set the record straight regarding the borrowing of wagons from other companies. 
They had not been borrowed but when the HBR had a large quantity of goods for the 
MR or GNR they advised those companies and asked them to send wagons to take 
away the goods. But the HBR recognised that it needed more wagons and had 
already contracted for 400, which would be delivered in the next six months. This 
should be sufficient for the time being. It did not seem to occur to anybody at the 
meeting to ask why, if the HBR had not needed to borrow wagons, they were now 
ordering 400 more. 
None of this was likely to placate Pope et al. The Denaby faction objected to 
the re-election to the HBR board of Walter Bailey of the shipping firm of Bailey & 
48 Railwav Times, 24h December 1897. 
49 Ibid, 28 th November 1896. 
50 Ibid, 2 01h February 1897. 
51 William Trotter was a stockbroker with the firm of James Capel & Co. He took an active part in the 
work of the London Committee and was instrumental in raising the necessary capital to release the 
HBR from Chancery. He became chairman in 1900 and resigned because of ill health in August 
1907. He died in September 1908. 
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Leetham. claiming that his firm was 'essentially North Eastern. ' Out of 12.000 tons 
of coal sold by the Denaby Company to Bailey & Leetham the latter had insisted that 
10,000 tons were to go over the NER. The Denaby Company also complained that in 
the last 12 months it had sent 312,000 tons of coal over the HBR but nevertheless 
was not allowed to have any voice in that company's affairs. 52 It opposed the HBR's 
working agreement with the HSYER, as it would place other collieries in a better 
competitive position. It also threatened the HBR with legal proceedings over an 
allegation that during the South Wales coal strike of 1896 it did not deal with Denaby 
coal as expeditiously as possible. In the autumn of 1898 the Denaby Company was 
still complaining about the election of Poston, and attacked Forbes, intimating that he 
was an 'arrogant dictator who arranged all meetings where important business was 
discussed. ' There can be little doubt that Pope was behind these attacks which 
echoed those made previously by him. The Denaby Company went on to allege that 
Forbes was prepared to sell the HBR to the NER at a price well under its stock 
51 market valuation. It said of the HSYER that 'the traffic it carries will of necessity 
divert a similar quantity from the existing railway. ' This brought a retort from the 
HBR chairman who, referring to the circular, said that it showed that the real secret 
51 
of their opposition was fear of competition. 
The charges of operating inefficiency did, however, bring some action. In 
September 1898 the HBR board authorised the issue of f450,000 additional capital 
for dock extensions to deal with traffic from HSYER. The HBR extension to 
Alexandra Dock opened with commendable speed on 25 th July 1899. It was 71/2acres 
(3 hectares) in extent and was designed for the shipment of coal and mining 
timbers. " However, things had not gone as well as had been hoped for. On 10 th 
August 1899 John Fisher announced that the dock was now available although the 
coal appliances were very far behind. " By the end of the year two coal hoists had 
52 Raillvqv Times, 13"' February 1897. 
53 Railwai, News, I" October 1898. 
54 Ibid, 8th October 1898. 
55 
Railwav Times, 27 th jUIN, 1899. 
56 
Ibid., 12 th August 1899. 
215 
been completed and two were still in the course of construction. " Traffic from the 
SYJR and HSYER now ensured that Hull was on the way to becoming a major coal 
port. 58 But it was not to realise its full potential until yet more coalfields ý\ere 
exploited, each colliery needing railway access. 
4. The development of the concealed coalfield. 
tip to the turn of the twentieth century the coal brought by rail to Hull had come 
from collieries in West Yorkshire and the Barnsley area of South Yorkshire. 
However, in the last years of the nineteenth century much interest was being 
expressed in the development of the concealed coalfield, a roughly triangular area 
between Selby in the north and Rotherharn and Bawtry in the south. It was known as 
the concealed coalfield for the reason that deep beneath the limestone there were 
abundant coal measures. This was part of the East Pennine coalfield, which extended 
from Nottingham to Leeds. " At the western boundary of the coalfield the seams 
outcropped at the surface but increased in depth further east. Their location had been 
known about for some time but the capital and technology for extraction from these 
great depths was not available until the dawn of the twentieth century. 60 
Around 1890 Lord Beaumont (a one-time director of HBR) had a borehole 
sunk on his estate at Carlton Towers, not far from Drax. After about 1,200 feet 
(365m. ) the work was discontinued, but the boring, as far as it went, was satisfactory. 
giving the strongest evidence of coal measures being present and similar to those 
worked further south, but at much greater depth. Beaumont subsequently proposed to 
sink to the coal at Balne Moor, near to the HBR and the River Aire, at no great 
distance from Goole and with direct railway connections to Hull. It was estimated 
that the coal would be found at a depth of between 1,800 feet (550m. ) and 2,000 feet 
(610m. ). A committee was formed to consider exploiting these reserves. The local 
57 Railway Times, 3d February 1900. 
58 
lbid, 13 th August 1898. 
59 Fi, -, ure 20. The Yorkshire and East Midlands Coalfield. 
60 D. Wilmot. 'The Lancashire, Derbyshire and East Coast Railway' (Unpublished MA Dissertation, 
University of York, 2000). pp. 18-19. 
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landowners were strongly in favour. " However, at the time nothing became of this 
scheme although the proposed exploitation of this coalfield led to the construction of 
a joint HBR and GCR line through the area some twenty years later. The exploitation 
of the southern part of the concealed coalfield began in the early years of the 
twentieth century. 
The development of the concealed coalfield precipitated a race between 
railway companies to gain access to it. Such development was very significant for 
the port of Hull. Both the NER and the HBR were exploring the possibilities of 
obtaining access to the coalfield with outlets to Hull and Goole in the case of the 
NER, and Hull in the case of the HBR. Although the NER had not competed with the 
HBR for access to collieries in the Barnsley area it felt it should not be allowed to 
fall behind the HBR in gaining access to this new coalfield. It was looking into the 
possibility of creating a route using its existing railway from Hull to Goole and then 
onward by means of light railways to gain access to South Yorkshire. " 
The chairman Sir J. W Pease confirmed the details at a shareholders' meeting 
in February 1901. It was proposed to purchase the light railways to Haxey and to 
construct a new line approximately 25 miles (40 km) long to serve the South 
Yorkshire collieries. The area to be exploited by the proposed railways extended 
from Rotherham in the west to Bawtry in the east. Coal would be shipped to Goole 
and Hull. About f 100,000 would have to be spent at Hull. " 
But, by the 3 Oth June 1901 the NER had abandoned the schemes for making a 
railway to connect the South Yorkshire coalfield with the company's railways 
serving the ports of Hull and Goole. Before the Bill reached its committee stage the 
NER had ascertained that other railway companies were contemplating the 
construction of new lines in the same district, and under these circumstances. the 
directors decided not to proceed with their Bill in the present session, in the hope 
61 Railway News, 27 1h September 1890. 
62 Railway Times, 17 th November 1900. 
C. W. Judge, TheAxholme Joint Railway, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 38-57. Construction of the Isle of 
Axholme Railway, which the NER planned to use, commenced in July 1899 but the line did not 
open until January 1905. The NER took over the railway in 1901. 
03 Railway Timcs, 16t" February 1901. 
Judge, The. -Ixholine. Joint Railway, p. 18. 
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that. by discussion. a scheme might be fon-nulated which would afford the necessar% 
facilities by arrangement with other companies. 64 
The HBR was one reason for the NER*s reticence. In February 1901 the new 
chairman, William Trotter. had continued the HBR policy of making Hull into a coal 
port. It had been instrumental in the opening of the SYJR and the HSYER and in 
continuation of its policy of opening feeder lines it had been decided that the 
company should have direct access to the large coalfield lying between Rotherham 
and Bawtry. 6' The HBR had therefore promoted ambitious schemes to reach the new 
coalfield. As a jumping off point it planned to use the HSYER, which opened for 
goods and mineral traffic on 16 th May 1902.66 In November 1901 the HBR had 
proposed a line from a point near Hickleton and Thumscoe station, running through 
Mexborough and across the River Don to Denaby where it divided into three separate 
branches. One went off in a south-easterly direction through Conisbrough Parks to 
Braithwell and terminated at a junction near Laughton with the Wales and Laughton 
Light Railway, over which running powers were sought to Dinnington. A branch to 
Dinnington Colliery, which was then being sunk, and a branch to Maltby were 
included. The central line from Denaby went in a southerly direction to terminate at 
Rotherham. This included a branch to Aldwarke and Silverwood collieries. The 
westerly of the three lines re-crossed the River Don and joined the MR at Kilnhurst. 
This line would have given the HBR direct access to Sheffield. 67 
But like the NER, the HBR had second thoughts about its ambitious scheme 
and duplication of routes and, by February 1902, the HBR (South Yorkshire 
Extension Lines) Bill, had been scaled down to a line from Thumscoe to North 
Anston [Dinnington Collieryl. " The HBR had also deposited other Bills to protect its 
interests. A reason for abandoning the grandiose scheme given publicly, but which 
appeared to have little foundation, was the failure of the coal trades to give their 
64 Railivu. v Times, 3 rd August 1901. 
65 Ibid, 16'h February 1901. 
66 Ibid.. 24 th May and 23 
rd August 1902. 
67 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley Railwqv, IV. 1. p. 165, 
Figure 22. The railways of South Yorkshire. 
68 CitN Archives, Hull, TLP 265, Hull, Bamsle\ and West Riding Junction Railm"ay and Dock (South 
Yorkshire Extension Lines) Act, 1902, 
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support. Hull Corporation, aware of its duty to monitor schemes affectino the HBR. t7 
decided to petition against the 1902 Bill as a precautionary measure. '9 
Meanwhile the NER and the LYR \ý ere pressing ahead ýý-ith a joint proposal 
for a railway to connect the new coalfield to their lines. The MR and GCR \\ere 
proposing similar schemes, but hoped that before the Bills came before Parliament an 
arrangement would be made between all the companies. " Such was the case. An 
agreement was arrived at with the MR, GNR and GCR under which the line 
proposed by the NER and LYR. with slight diversions, was to be made bN- the five 
companies jointly. " The new line was to be known as the South Yorkshire Joint 
Railway (SYJt). " The total length was 17 miles (27 km) and the estimated cost 
050,000. The line ran from a junction at Kirk Sandall on the GCR Thorne to 
Doncaster line via Maltby to an end-on junction with the GCR and MR joint line at 
Dinnington Junction and via that line to a junction with the GCR Sheffield to 
Worksop line at Brantcliffe. where there were east and west facing junctions. It was 
opened for mineral traffic on I" January 1909.73 
Despite this success the NER was still to face competition from the HBR. 
The manner in which the latter finally achieved access to the new coalfield was 
extremely convoluted and much involved with the wider railway politics of the 
period. " In 1897 the Dearne Valley Railway (DVR) was incorporated. This railway 
had been promoted by the proprietors of various collieries in the area, including 
Houghton Main, Hickleton Main and Carlton Main. 75 It was planned to connect with 
the HBR at Brierley Junction near Hernsworth and run past various collieries 
crossing the River Don at Conisbrough and terminating in junctions with the Great 
69 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, 27 th January 1902. 
70 Railway Times, 22 nd February 1902. 
71 Ibid., 9th September 1902. 
72 B. J. Elliott, The South Yorkshire. loint Railway and the Coa'ýield, (Usk, 2002), pp. 19-23. 
73 D. Joy, 
.4 Regional History qf the 
Railways of Great Britain, Vol. 8, South and West Yorkshire, 
(Newton Abbot, 1975), p. '133. 
Figure 25. Branches around Doncaster. 
74 Figure 22. The Railways of South Yorkshire. 
75 J. Marshall, The Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway, Vol. 2, (Newton Abbott, 1970), p. 139. A 
connection from the DVR to Denaby Colliery was opened in March 1906. 
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Northern and Great Eastern Joint Railway (GN&GEJt) at Black Carr Junction south 
of Doncaster. The GN&GER passed through Lincolnshire and Cambridgeshire. areas 
with no indigenous coal and but gave the GER access to the South Yorkshire 
coalfield, thus further heightening railway competition there. The DVR opened in 
two sections; from Thumscoe to Cadeby in January 1906 and from Cadeby to Black 
Carr in May 190976 
As the DVR was to connect to the HBR at its western end its promoters 
initially approached the latter in order to agree reciprocal running powers. In 1897 
the DVR had engaged the services of Henry Lambert. formerly of the Great Western 
Railway, as a consultant. This was the man who had issued the so-called 
'whitewashing report' on the HBR in 1895. He suggested that talks should continue 
with the HBR but that the DVR should try to remain independent. An agreement was 
concluded with the HBR in 1898 for running powers over the DVR for a period of 
five years from that date. However, in 1899 the DVR, wishing to connect with as 
many railways as possible, approached the LYR, asking if it would complete the 
DVR and purchase it. The LYR was not interested, as the HBR running powers 
complicated the situation. However, by 1901 the LYR had second thoughts and 
decided that the DVR could be a useful acquisition, if only to block further 
expansion by other companies. An agreement was drawn up between the companies, 
which allowed the LYR to build connections at the western end of the DVR and 
work the railway with full running powers. The agreement stipulated that the DVR 
should grant no such further powers without the permission of the LYR, and that it 
must not renew the running powers of the HBR. An Act of March 1902 allowed the 
LYR to subscribe to the DVR, at which time the HBR, presumably as a blocking 
move, said it wished to renew its running powers. The DVR initially refused and the 
stalemate dragged on until November 1905, when the companies agreed that the 
HBR could use its running powers under the 1898 agreement, for access to 
Grimethorpe and Houghton Main collieries. " 
7(, Barnett, The RailivaYs (? f the South Yorkshire Coa'ýiield, p. 55. 
Figure 24. The Hull & Barnsley Railway and connecting branches, Wrangbrook-Wath. 
77 Marshall, The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, Vol. -1, p. 1333. 
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Similarly tortuous negotiations accompanied the promotion of the Shireoaks. 
Laughton and Maltby Railway, authorised in 1901. The GCR stated its intention was 
to complete this line northward to Conisbrough. " By 1904 this had not been done 
and an independent line, the Rotherham, Maltby and Laughton Railway (RML) was 
promoted by local colliery interests. This line was to have junctions with the MR at 
Rawmarsh and the GCR at Thrybergh and would take over the privately owned 
Roundwood and Dalton colliery railway. It would run to the west of and parallel with 
the route of the HBR line proposed in the Act of 1902. The line was opposed by the 
HBR on the grounds of unfair competition and for some reason, not readily apparent, 
as they would have worked it, by the MR and GCR. This episode spurred the GCR 
into action and it renewed its 1901 scheme. This was viewed with some dismay by 
the partners of the GCR in the SYX i. e. the GNR, MR, NER and LYR, as the GCR 
proposal to a considerable extent duplicated the route of the SYJC' 
By the early 1900s the profitability of such duplication was already 
questionable and it is not surprising to find negotiations opening between the RML, 
GCR and HBR which resulted in an agreement on 5 th April 1904 for the GCR to take 
over the RML, except the portion between the two junctions, which was to be 
abandoned, and in lieu thereof the portion of the HBR Thurnscoe to Dinnington line 
which paralleled it was to be constructed, and become the joint property of the HBR 
and GCR. " The HBR also agreed that the RML line should be diverted to join the 
HBR proposal of 1902 at the northern junction, near Braithwell. It then continued as 
the HBR route to join the railway from Shireoaks, which became the MR and GCR 
joint railway in 1904. The point where the HBR joined the MR and GCR line was 
called the southern junction. 
Thus, by 1905, something like a spirit of co-operation had developed between 
the one-time rival railways. In 1905 the HBR submitted a new Bill to Parliament 
incorporating the RML railway and seeking powers to extend the time limit under the 
78 Dow, Great Central, I'ol. 3, p. 205. 
79 Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley Railway, Fol. 1, p. 167. 
Figure 22. The railways of South Yorkshire. 
80 Railway Times, 25"' May 1905. 
-)-) I 
1902 Act. " In August 1905 the Rotherham and Maltby Bill was authorised. '- , So ýý as 
the Bill setting up of the HBR and GCR joint Committee to construct a line from 
Thumscoe to the southern junction of the proposed 1902 line at Dinnington. The 
RML had obtained an Act in 1905 to build a railway from Rawmarsh to Dinnington. 
This line connected at North Anston with the GCR and MR joint line to Shireoaks. 
The promoters of the RML agreed to utilise as far as possible the Thurnscoe and 
Dinnington line. It was agreed that the parties involved should obtain a Bill in the 
next session of Parliament to transfer powers sought in the RML Bill to the GCR, 
and to negotiate agreement with the HBR concerning the joint construction and 
operation of the line from Thurnscoe to Dinnington. Until the line was constructed 
the HBR was to have running powers over the RML line from its junction with the 
proposed line and Rawmarsh, and over the GCR to Wath and Stairfoot. These would 
cease on the completion of the northern section. The HBR would, however, have 
perpetual running powers to Ravenfield and Silverwood collieries with a north facing 
connection to the northern section of the HBR line when it was completed. As the 
RML had not raised capital or carried out any works it was dissolved and vested in 
the GCR. The GCR had an option for six months after the passing of the Act to take 
a half share in the northern line, which it did. The MR did not exercise its privilege to 
take a share in the northern line from Braithwell to Thurnscoe and this section was 
not constructed. In 1907 the MR exercised its right to take a third share in the 
southern line which was thenceforward managed by the HBR, GCR and MR Joint 
Committee. The line was opened for goods and mineral traffic on Ist October 1909. " 
On 9th January 1911 the SYR opened a line approximately 1/2mile (3 /4 km) in 
length form Laughton East Junction to join the HBR, GCR & MR joint line at 
Laughton West Junction immediately north of the former Southern Junction. This 
gave the HBR direct access to Dinnington Colliery by means of running powers over 
81 City Archives, Hull, TLP 265, Hull and Barnsley Railway Act, 1905. 
82 Railiva-v Times, 12"' August 1905. 
8-, Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley RailivaY, Fol. 1, p. 167. 
this railway. " Under an agreement of 1911 the HBR was to pay to the SYR 
Committee 3d. (1.25p. ) per ton on coal and coke conveyed over this line. 85 
Early in the twentieth century more collieries were sunk further north on the 
concealed coalfield in the Doncaster area at Bullcroft, Bentley and Edlington. The 
latter colliery became known as Yorkshire Main. It was supposed that coalfield 
development would extend further north, almost to Selby. Abortive proposals were 
made for the sinking of pits in the Goole area; at Pollington in 1910 and at 
Sykehouse in 1916. " This was sufficient to excite the interests of railway companies. 
The scene was set for the last railway promotion to exploit the concealed coalfield. 
5. The HBR and GCR Joint Railway. 
The HBR decided that a direct route to South Yorkshire, passing through the area of 
the proposed new mines, would have great future potential for coal traffic. In 1909 it 
proposed a railway some 24 miles (381/2 km) in length from Aire Junction, near 
Gowdall, on the HBR main line to join the line authorised in 1902 near the northern 
junction at Braithwell . 
8' The Bill also contained powers to abandon the 1902 
proposal for the completion of the railway from Braithwell to Thurnscoe. " The new 
line was to have branches to Bentley and Bullcroft collieries in conjunction with the 
GCR and a terminal spur to a station at Doncaster. To save money the HBR hoped to 
construct the line jointly with another company. " 
The GCR and GNR opposed the Bill. The MR initially opposed the Bill but 
withdrew its opposition when running powers over the line were agreed, in return for 
which it was to contribute f250,000 towards the cost of construction, estimated at 
f455,000. The GCR opposition was half-hearted, as its real objective was to obtain a 
share in the new line. The HBR agreed that if the GCR were to construct the northern 
84 Dow, Great Central, f'ol. 3, p. 209. 
85 Hoole Archives, Darlington, KH 1 '156, Agreement between SYR Committee and HBR dated 23 rd 
July 1909. 
86 Barnett, The RailwaYs qf the South Yorkshire Coaýfield, p. 85. 
87 Figure 25. Branches around Doncaster. z: 1 
98 Doncaster Archives, DVALL/233, Hull and Barnsley Railway Bill, 1909. 
89 1 'th Railivai, Thnes, 
-3 
February 1909. 
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part of the proposed line of 1902 the HBR was willing to transfer its interest. 
However. both the GCR and MR agreed that it would be wasteful to construct this 
line as it duplicated existing routes. Powers for abandonment kýere sought but ývere 
opposed by the GNR, which alleged that the real object was not to get coal to Hull, 
but to introduce the MR into the area to send coal to the south in competition with it. 
The GNR was to be unsuccessful as the railway was authorised in April 1909. 
The GCR had more success. The final Act gave the GCR a one-third share in the new 
line and stipulated control by a Joint Committee, to consist of four directors of the 
HBR and two of the GCR. " After the passing of the Act the GCR increased its share 
in the new line to one-half, chiefly to keep the NER out. This situation was 
regularised by an Act of 1910, which allowed equal numbers of HBR and GCR 
directors on the Joint Committee. The GNR, LYR, MR and NER enjoyed running 
powers over the line, which were never exercised. 9' The reason for the interest shown 
in the line by the large companies was that it passed through the heart of the 
concealed coalfield. 
In 1913 the HBR obtained an Act for a railway to Bentley Colliery in 
conjunction with GCR, replacing a proposal embodied in the Act of 1909, now to be 
abandoned. The MR had running powers over the 1909 proposal and claimed them 
also over the railway to Bentley. 9' The joint line was opened for traffic on I" May 
1916. " Despite the fact that almost a million tons of traffic passed over it in the first 
year of operation, it was never to achieve its potential. The exercise was an 
expensive luxury for the MR, which paid f250,000 for running powers over a line it 
never used. 9' 
The great misfortune of the HBR & GCR joint line was that it opened too 
late. The boom in coal transport was curtailed by the war and the anticipated 
development of the concealed coalfield occurred much too late for the HBR. In any 
case the new mine was in the Selby area, which was nowhere near the joint line. 
90 RailwaY Times, 22"" May 1909. 
91 Dow, Great Central, I fol. 3, p. 210. 
92 City Archives, Hull, TLP 287, HBR Act, 1913. 
93 Hinchliffe, (ed. ), The Hull and Barnsle ' i, 
Railway, foL 2. p. 204. 
94 Raillrai,, Ycivs, 16 th February 1918. 
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There can be little doubt that if war had not broken out there could have been 
considerable exploitation of the concealed coalfield. But even if the railway line 
came to be regarded as a white elephant, there had been sound financial reasons for 
its construction at the time. In fact the GCR worked the southern part of the line 
exclusively from its opening, and the HBR, despite its initial anxiety to gain access 
to Dinnington Colliery, never worked south of Warmsworth. " 
More generally, though, as this chapter has shown. the railways serving Hull 
were an important reason for its success as a coal port. In 1913 the railways of the 
United Kingdom carried 225 million tons of coal and coke. " This was the peak. In 
1913 Hull exported almost 5/2million tons of coal. It had rail connections with over 
380 collieries in Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire. 9' The amount exported 
in 1884, the year before the opening of the HBR was a mere 593,000 tons. " This 
tenfold increase was due in no small measure to the opening of the SYJR, HSYER 
and the SYR. Whereas the HBR had initiated the increase in the movement of coal, 
by 1913 both the HBR and the NER had access to the new super-pits of the 
concealed coalfield and were engaged in healthy competition. Between them, the two 
companies had turned Hull into a major coal port. The next chapters will examine the 
evolution of co-operation between them. 
95 Hinchliffe, (ed. ), The Hull and Barnsley Railway, Vol. 2, p. 12 1. 
96 Simmons & Biddle, (eds. ), The 0)ýfbrd Companion to British Railway History, p. 94. 
9, Newham, Hull as a Coal Port, p. 24. 
98 Figure 33. Coal exports from Hull. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
CO-OPERATION AND OBSTRUCTION, 1893-1908. 
1. Introduction. 
The change in the political balance in Hull and the effect it had on the Corporation 
were important factors underpinning railway politics in the years between 1893 and 
1908. The period was characterised by increasing co-operation between the NER and 
HBR and obstruction of the NER's plans by Hull Corporation. But inter-regional 
economic competition was also important. A factor influencing the amalgamation of 
the Hull Dock Company and the NER in 1893 was the threat of competition from the 
Manchester Ship Canal, construction of which had commenced in 1887, and which 
was to open in 1894. This focused the minds of the ship owners and traders of Hull. 
Those such as C. H. Wilson, who had been a keen opponent of NER policy in the 
town, were influential in the proposal for the dock amalgamation. In November 1893 
Wilson said that acquisition of the Hull Dock Company by the NER was in the 
interests of the town but warned that the Manchester Ship Canal would provide extra 
competition. Without improvements to dock accommodation at Hull the future 
looked bleak. ' Against this background the NER and HBR drew closer together and 
consequently the links between the HBR and the Corporation began to come under 
strain. 
2. The proposal for amalgamation of the NER and HBR, 1895. 
Despite its acquisition of the Dock Company in 1893, a continuing problem for the 
NER was lack of deep-water facilities at Hull. Under the terms of the 1893 Act it 
could only construct such facilities by arrangement with the HBR. Negotiations took 
place, and terms were agreed for an amalgamation of the NER and HBR. 
1 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping AGM, 15 th November 18933. 
"16 
Considering the dividends received so far by HBR shareholders, the terms appeared 
to be generous. 
However, such a proposal was unlikely to have the support of the 
Corporation. On 18 th November 1895 the NER and the HBR notified the Corporation 
that they proposed jointly to promote a Bill for amalgamation. The Corporation did 
not oppose this outright, but asked for an undertaking from the NER that it would 
withdraw the proposal at any time if the Corporation so wished. Hull's commercial 
and shipping interests were split, with Wilson's on one side supporting the 
amalgamation and the other shipowners of the port together with the Chamber of 
Commerce on the other. All lobbied the Corporation. On 4 th December C. H. Wilson 
wrote to the Corporation alleging that the opposing view of other shipowners did not 
represent the real shipping interests of the port and urged it to support the proposed 
amalgamation. However, at the same time, the Corporation received objections to the 
proposal from the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Trade and many other 
trade federations. 3 
The Corporation, NER and HBR met on I Oth January 1896. Sir J. W. Pease, 
the NER chairman made a general case for the merger, pointing out the inefficiency 
caused by the duplication of facilities. Furthermore, he said that amalgamation would 
diminish the use of the level crossings on the Victoria Dock branch. ' He announced 
that as there had been insufficient time for discussion the NER proposed to withdraw 
the Bill. Although the withdrawal came as a surprise to the Corporation, they 
welcomed it. It may be conjectured that the NER had used the proposal more in the 
2 W. W. Tomlinson, North Eastern Radwav, (Newton Abbot edition, 1967), p. 716. First debenture 
holders of the HBR were to receive El 00 and second debenture holders f 115 of NER 3% debenture 
stock for each f 100 of their holdings. Ordinary shareholders would change their stock for NER 
preference stock bearing interest at I% in the first year after the transfer, 11/4% for the next two 
years and then V/12110 in perpetuity with the addition of a bonus if the dividend on NER consols 
exceeded 6%. 
City Archives, Hull, Parliamentary Committee minutes, November 1895 to January 1896. 
4, Edward Pease', 1911 Encj, clopedia, ( 2004), 
[http: //67.191 I encyc loped ia. org/P? E, /P E AS E_EDWA RD. htrn ], (June 2005). 
Joseph Whitwell Pease (18-28-190-31), was made a baronet in 1882. He was MP for South Durham 
from 1865 to 1885 and for the Barnard Castle division of Durham from 1885 to 190' 3. 
2 1) 
way of testing the waters. together with an opportunity to put the case for 
amalgamation. rather than a serious proposal. as they were axNare that in the face of 
opposition from trading interests in Hull there was no possibility of the Corporation 
giving its consent. ' 
The Corporation's steadfast opposition to the NER continued when, in 1896, 
the latter submitted a Bill for a connection to the HBR at Walton Street and the 
substitution of Walton Street level crossing by a bridge. ' This would have connected 
the two railway systems in the event of an amalgamation. The Corporation 
considered the Bill and surprisingly, in view of its feelings about level crossings on 
the Victoria Dock branch, told the NER in December 1896 that the proposal for the 
bridge was 'unnecessary and undesirable'. This was another demonstration that the 
Corporation opposed any proposal of the NER on principle. ignoring its merits. ' 
C. H. Wilson*s support for amalgamation remained as strong as the 
Corporation's opposition. At the HBR meeting in February 1896 he once again 
advocated amalgamation with the NER, declaring that an independent HBR had no 
prospect of ever getting a reasonable dividend. He warned that despite intense 
competition from Grimsby, Goole, and the Manchester Ship Canal, the company did 
nothing to conciliate the traders by cutting rates or moving towards the 
amalgamation needed to achieve these ends. ' The NER chairman, Pease, reflected 
Wilson's views when he told of his company's frustration that it was prevented from 
making any reduction of dock charges or constructing dock accommodation in 
certain parts of the river without the consent of the HBR. ' This was the big-business 
view but it failed to take account of the fact that there was still much anti-monopoly 
feeling among certain traders, especially the smaller businesses, in Hull. 
Wilson resigned from the Chamber of Commerce in 1896, ostensibly because 
that body had opposed the HBR amalgamation scheme. However, amalgamation was 
5 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, November 1895 to January 
1896. 
6 City Archives, Hull, TRID 3 1, NER Omnibus Bill, 1896. 
7 The connection at Walton Street was not made until 1924 by which time the HBR had ceased to 
exist. 
Railivqv Times, 15'1' February 1896. 
9 RaiIwqvNeit-s, 8"' February 1896. 
228 
only one aspect of inter-regional economic competition, the effects of which were 
becoming apparent to Hull's traders. There had been personal controversv and 
bitterness between Wilson and Massey, another ship owner. a Corporation-appointed 
director of the HBR and chairman of the Chamber of Commerce. " Wilson thought 
that Massey was more interested in the Manchester Ship Canal than in Hull because 
Massey had once had interests in Manchester, although he had later abandoned 
them. '' Wilson was not only concerned about the threat from Manchester. In July 
1896 the Corporation received a letter from him complaining of competition from 
subsidised Norwegian steamers which were diverting trade from Hull to Newcastle 
and asking the Corporation to submit a memorial to Parliament on behalf of 
10 Central Library, Hull, Men of the Period, 1897, (Leeds, 1897). 'Watson Arton Massey is the head 
of the firm of W. A. Massey & Co., steamship owners and brokers, and colliery agents, whose 
business in this direction is one of the largest in the port. He was born in 1847 at the village of 
Ellerker, near Hull, the birthplace of his family for three generations past. He received his 
education partly at Ellerker and partly at Boston Spa, subsequently completing his studies in 
Germany. Identifying himself in early life with the shipping interest, he entered, in 1859, the office 
of the firm of ship owners from which he eventually acquired (in 1868), the business he now 
controls. It is among the leading concerns of its kind on the North-east coast; and he is now 
assisted in the administration of its affairs by his two sons. His public career began in 1872 as 
Chairman of the Newington Local Board (a large district in the west of Hull, and now incorporated 
into Hull), and also at the same time Chairman of the Newington School Board. Subsequently, in 
1880, he entered the Hull Town Council as a representative of Lowgate Ward, afterwards named 
Queens Ward. He was elevated to the Aldermanic Bench in 1895. He is chairman of the 
Waterworks Committee, deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Committee and a member of the 
Property Committee. 
Alderman Massey's work in the Council has always been marked by an advocacy of measures 
calculated to accelerate the commercial prosperity of Hull, and he has had not a little to do with the 
promotion of that activity in trade and shipping circles which has made this the third seaport in the 
kingdom. He is a member of the Humber Conservancy Commissioners, and a director of the Hull 
and Barnsley Railway and Dock Company. In 1880 he figured prominently among the first 
promoters of the new dock and railway'. 
Eastern Morning News, 29th September 1909. Massey was a director of the HBR from 1881 until 
his removal together with the other Hull directors in 1888. He became a Corporation appointed 
director in 1895 and remained on the Board until his death on 28'h September 1909. 
Railwav Thnes, I I"' January 1896. 
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Wilson's. There is no trace of such memorial being submitted. " The Corporation was 
perhaps irked by Wilson's attempts to manipulate it for his own purposes. 
3. NER proposals for dock improvements, 1897-1899. 
By 1897 the rising importance of the coal trade, detailed in chapter 7. and the threat 
from improved facilities outside its zone of operation convinced the NER that major 
dock improvements could no longer be delayed and it submitted proposals for a neýN 
dock of 10 acres (4 hectares), west of Victoria Dock, and new entrances to Albert and 
Humber Docks together with a deep-water lock at Albert Dock and the extension of 
Victoria Pier. " The estimated cost was f781 '000.14 
The NER also undertook to 
deepen the navigable channel of the Humber and it was this proposal which led to 
controversy. The Corporation and the Humber Conservancy required clauses in the 
Bill obliging the NER to maintain a navigable channel. The NER would not accept 
this and, despite negotiations, agreement could not be reached. In the circumstances 
the NER had no alternative but to withdraw the Bill for the dock works. " The NER's 
decision disappointed the commercial community of the port. On 14 th June 1897 
Hull Chamber of Commerce and Shipping informed the Corporation of its 
unanimous opinion that the withdrawal of the NER Bill would be a 'calamity for the 
port'. " This was extremely significant in that it was the first example of a major 
difference in policy between the Chamber of Commerce and the Corporation. At the 
NER meeting in August, 1897 the chairman contrasted the attitude of the Humber 
Conservancy with similar bodies on the Tees, Wear and Tyne who largely accepted 
the NER's plans and did not insist on it assuming future responsibilities after 
dredging work. " 
12 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, July 1896. 
13 City Archives, Hull, TLP 240, NER Hull Docks Bill, 1897. 
14 Tomlinson, North Eastern Railway, p. 718. 
5 City Archives Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes. Correspondence between the 
NER and Hull Corporation from April to June 1897. 
16 Ibid., Correspondence, June 1897. 
17 Railwa. vNews, 7 th August 1897. 
230 
The underlying reasons for dock improvements ýý ere. if anything. increasing 
and in 1898 the NER once again produced a scheme for dock improvements. These 
included an eastward extension of Victoria Dock. This scheme depended on the 
acquisition of a piece of Corporation land called the Western Reservation. which lay 
between Victoria and Alexandra Docks. " The NER wished to buy this. and pointed 
out that whereas the HBR had unlimited land on which to extend east of Alexandra 
Dock, the NER had only the Western Reservation on which to extend Victoria Dock. 
The Corporation decided to use this piece of land as a lever to place extra conditions 
on the NER. These included the construction of a station at Newington, a matter 
which had been in contention for twenty years, and the abolition of the level 
crossings round Hull on the Victoria Dock Branch, which were a serious cause of 
traffic congestion in the city. '9 In response the NER agreed to pay half the cost of 
replacing the level crossings, estimated at 034,000, but refused to build a station at 
Newington as demand was insufficient. " The NER further stipulated that if it bore 
half the cost of abolishing the level crossings the Corporation must transfer the 
Western Reservation to them on easy terms. At this point in the negotiations the 
18 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Minutes. Letter dated 16 th April 1898 from HBR to Town Clerk. 
19 The Corporation had carried out a census of traffic at the major road level crossings for the week 
ending 4 th January 1898. 
Appendix 3. Census of road and rail traffic at level crossings in Hull, 1898 & 1909. 
20 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 312/8, HBR Directors' Minute Book 1886-1898. It was not 
only the NER who considered a station at Newington to be unnecessary. On 7 th April 1887 the 
HBR directors had declined a request for a station at Newington on the same grounds as the NER 
refusal. 
K. Hoole, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain. Vol. 4. The North East, (Newton 
Abbot, 1978), p. 47. Hoole suggests that the origin of Newington station was in 1896 when Robert 
Jameson, a wealthy timber merchant, and a good customer of the NER, was given permission to 
erect a platform at his own expense to enable his wife, who was an invalid, to board and alight from 
trains close to where she lived. It is unclear when the NER took over the halt but a signal box was 
erected in 1899 which was reduced in status to a gate-box during the Great War. The Newington 
Branch was closed in May 1965. 
W. B. Yeadon, Railit-aYs qf Hull, (Nottingham, 1995). p. 87. The station did not appear in the 
public timetable. it was used in conjunction with Hull Fair. 
M. E. Quick, Railwav Passenger Stations in England, Scotland & Wales, (Railway & Canal 
Historical Society. 2003). p. 167. 
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Humber Conservancy once again raised the issue of dredging the rix, er channel and 
subsequent maintenance. This was the last straw for the NER. On 18 th March the 
company notified the Corporation that it was withdrawing the 1898 Dock Bill. The 
Corporation, anxious not to be seen as party to sabotaging dock improý, ements, 
responded by offering further discussion .2' But the NER had had enough. The mood 
at the shareholders' meeting on II th February had been belligerent and set the tone 
for the negotiations over the Dock Bill. Sir Isaac Lowthian Bell, the deputy chairman 
of the NER had said, 'the Corporation and traders of Hull ought to pay the expense 
of improving their town, and not the shareholders of the NER. ' He went on to say 
that he hoped that the directors would remain firm, 'and if the Hull people would not 
accept their proposals, let them stop as they are. ' This was met with cries of 'Hear. 
hear' and applause. 22 On Vt April the NER general manager wrote to the 
Corporation saying that no purpose would be served by further discussion. 23 
After these two abortive attempts to work alone the NER now realised that 
the only avenue left was to fall back on the clauses in the 1893 amalgamation Act 
which authorised the building of a joint dock with the HBR to the east of Alexandra 
Dock . 
2' After negotiations with the HBR a Bill was deposited, in February 1899, to 
construct such a dock at a cost of f 1,419,655.25 This did not find favour with the 
Corporation, which had got wind of the scheme and had discussed it on IO'h 
December 1898 but did not receive formal notice until 28 th December. It seems that 
the NER and HBR dock committee anticipated Corporation's reaction, and was 
delaying informing that body for as long as possible. 26 
The Corporation's stance had been indicated by Massey in the previous 
August, when he said that any absence of comment by the Corporation concerning a 
joint dock should not be taken as acquiescence, nor the supposition that it would be 
to the benefit of the HBR. 2' But opinion elsewhere was largely favourable. The 
21 City Archives, Hull. Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, March 1898. 
22 Railwqv Times, 19"' February 1898. 
-3 City Archives, Hull. Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, 12'h April 1898. 
24 Railway News, 26"' March 1898. 
2S RailwaY Times, I V" February 1899. 
26 City Archives, Hull, Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, December 1898. 
27 Railwqv Times. 1-3)"' August 1898. 
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Railu, cýy Ne14, s was unimpressed by Massey's attitude, commenting. *It is really 
preposterous that petty local jealousies should stand in the way of so great an 
improvement at this port. "' Indeed, the proposal was received favourably in Hull b\ 
almost the entire commercial community. " 
The Corporation's opposition was based on four concerns. Firstly, that the 
new dock would be unlikely to earn enough to pay the 31/2% interest on the loan 
granted by the NER to the HBR to finance the dock, causing the HBR to become a 
debtor of the NER and place it in a position where it was in danger of losing its 
independence. However, the railway companies argued that the increased traffic. 
resulting from the NER being allowed to use the HBR high level line to the dock, 
would easily make up the difference. The Corporation was not convinced, but the 
possibility of increased traffic gave rise to its second concern, which was that the 
NER would use its low level line for access to the dock, resulting in an increase in 
rail traffic over its level crossings with consequent disruption to road traffic in the 
city. Thirdly, the Corporation was concerned that the Bill contained no clauses for the 
protection of river and coasting traffic regarding dock dues. Such protective clauses 
had appeared in the 1893 amalgamation Bill but were omitted from the Bill for the 
joint dock. Fourthly, the Bill stated that a joint committee was to be formed of three 
representatives from the NER and three from the HBR, and that the chairman was to 
be from alternating companies each year, the first being from the NER. The 
Corporation noted, with some dismay, that there was no provision for its 
representation on the committee. 30 
The two railway companies, ostensibly rivals, were acting in concert. At a 
Whamcliffe meeting, held to discuss the proposal for the joint dock the NER's 
favourable treatment of the HBR became clear. The NER would obviously become 
the senior partner. It would advance the HBR share of the cost. If it were able the 
HBR could repay the whole debt on giving the NER twelve months notice. The HBR 
28 Railwal, Times, 4 Ih March 1899. 
29 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce and Shipping AGM, 15 th November 1899. 
On 24"' February 1899 the Hull Seed, Oil and Cake Association memorialised the Corporation to 
(live support to the new dock. On 6 Ih March the Chamber of Commerce and Shipping did the same. 
30 City Archives, Hull, Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, March 1899. 
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would have half the net revenue of the dock. The NER was to be allowed to use the 
high level line for access to the dock giving the HBR a toll over 6 miles (10 km. ) of 
railway for a period of twenty years. But. despite general support for the building of 
the largest dock in the kingdom the Corporation did not consider that the interests of 
the HBR and the port were sufficiently safeguarded. It reserved the right to oppose 
any Bill. " 
On 9"' March 1899, the Corporation wrote separately to the NER and HBR 
suggesting inter alia, that the Corporation should have representation on the Joint 
Committee, one HBR director being withdrawn. The fact that the Corporation wrote 
separately to each company and not to the joint committee could be seen as 
indicating its reluctance to do business with the latter. The committee refused. " The 
Corporation then withdrew this demand, hoping to open discussion of other clauses 
that it wanted inserted. It requested a clause guaranteeing the independence of the 
HBR and required that overside and wharfage rates be provided for as they had been 
in the 1893 Bill. In order to prevent excessive rail traffic over the city's level 
crossings it suggested that between the hours of 08.00 and midnight the NER should 
not run traffic from the new dock over the low-level line. Discussion was one thing; 
gaining the acquiescence of the joint committee was quite another. The joint 
committee now felt that it held the initiative and none of the clauses was accepted. In 
response the Corporation announced that it would oppose the B ill. 33 
The Corporation's opposition was fruitless. On the 18 th July a Commons 
Committee approved the preamble of the Bill, being satisfied that the independence 
of the HBR was safeguarded, as was shipping in regard to dues and charges for using 
the dock. The HBR was to have running powers to Hull Paragon Station on terms to 
be agreed between the two companies. In one regard, however, the Corporation got 
what it wanted. The hours of restriction of traffic over the level crossings were to be 
from 05.30, rather that 08.00, to midnight" In the Lords the Corporation continued 
31 Railway Times. 3 rd March 1899. 
32 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 527,416, Hull Joint Dock Committee Directors' Minute Book, 
17 th March 1899. 
33 City Archives, Hull, Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, April 1899. 
City Archives, Hull. Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, July 1899. 
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its opposition, but to no avail. The Bill was passed under the title of the Hull Joint 
Docks Act, 1899. "' 
The Corporation had up to now been. if not liked, at least respected as it had 
been seen to be carrying out its duty to protect the independence of the HBR and, as 
a corollary. the commercial interests of the port. Its opposition to the joint dock put it 
at odds with the ship owners and larger traders of the city. The political shift started 
by the dock strike was now being starkly illustrated in the attitude of the Corporation. 
It led to a situation unique in the history of the railways of Hull when the HBR 
aligned itself with the NER and the Chambers of Commerce and Trade against the 
isolated Corporation. 
Competition between the HBR and NER was now all but over. There was still 
duplication of tracks and other facilities, which gave rise to a small amount of 
competition but, by and large, the commercial community in the city was glad to see 
the end of cut-throat competition, which had seen the end of the Dock Company, and 
very nearly the HBR. The way forward was now seen to be by co-operation between 
the mighty NER and the lusty infant HBR, with the latter concentrating on areas 
which did not directly compete with the NER, such as carrying minerals from South 
Yorkshire. There was a certain irony here, in that the conditions for a rapprochement 
between the railway companies had been the takeover of the HBR by financiers who 
were not connected directly with Hull's traders. The victory can be said to have gone 
to the NER but the spoils, in the form of increased trade, went to the commercial 
interests in the new city of Hull. 
The situation was not, however to everyone's taste. The Railway Times gave 
its usual gloomy prognosis: 
The HBR has had to choose between two evils. It had to face competition from 
the NER or it had to enter into this costly and unremunerative venture. It must be 
confessed that the prospects for the shareholders are not improved. It must also be 
said that the prospects of the line just now are not very bright and the NER, if it 
35 City Archives, Hull, TLP 244. Hull Joint Docks Act, 1899. 
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entertains the idea of absorption again, may be able to strike a better bargain by 
waiting a few years. "" 
It was soon to be proved wrong as the HBR began to flourish. 
4. Disputes between Hull Corporation and the railway companies. 
The almost complete defeat of the Corporation over the joint dock presaged a lengthy 
period of disagreement. Incidents in 1900 and 1901 illustrated the worsening 
relationship between the Corporation and the railway companies. In October 1900 
Hull Corporation tried to protect its financial interests in the HBR, by insisting that 
the new chairman of the company should be a member of the Corporation. Alden-nan 
Massey was suggested. This suggestion was quickly rebuffed. The HBR announced 
that the deputy chairman, William Trotter had been appointed chairman and W. S. 
Wright as deputy chairman, thus illustrating the widening gulf between the HBR and 
the Corporation. " These men were closely connected with commercial and financial 
interests. 
36 Railway Times, 22 nd April 1899. 
37 lbid, 6 th October 1900. 
Central Library, Hull, Men of the Period - England, 189 77. 'William Shaw Wright is the present 
sole proprietor of one of the major firms in the seed crushing industry and com trade of Hull, the 
firm of Messrs. Wright Brothers & Co., whose offices are in High Street and whose mills are 
situated in Wincolmlee. This firrn is the oldest in the trade, which has been carried on in direct 
succession from father to son since its first establishment about sixty years ago. William Shaw 
Wright was bom at Hull and educated at Westminster School and Trinity College, Cambridge, 
where he graduated BA in Classical Honours, and subsequently MA. At the termination of his 
career at the University, he entered is father's business, in the affairs of which he has since played a 
part of great activity. He is a Director of the Hull and Barnsley Railway and Dock Company, a 
member of the Chamber of Commerce, and a member of the Hull Com Trade Association, of 
which he was President two years ago. Messrs. Wright Brothers & Co. are both seed crushers and 
corn merchants upon a large scale, and are one of the very few firms in Hull combining these two 
trades. In Wincolmlee their three mills for seed crushing afford facilities for maintaining a large 
output, commensurate ývith the demand existing for the firrn's products in seed-oils and oil-cake. 
continued 
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In 1901 the Corporation suffered a minor defeat at the hands of the NER. The 
latter submitted a Bill for the replacement of the level crossing on Hedon Road by a 
bridge. This was a fulfilment of its obligation under the Dock Amalgamation Act of 
1893. which gave the Corporation power to require the NER to abolish the C. 'ý, -isting 
level crossings on Hedon and Hessle Roads. The Corporation wished to double the 
tramlines in Hedon Road and replace steam trams with electric trams . 
3' The NER 
was required to build the bridge with the Corporation bearing one third of the cost . 
39 
The Corporation wanted the bridge on the site of the existing crossing, but in order to 
lessen engineering difficulties the NER wanted it some distance to the east. After 
lengthy correspondence between the parties, from October 1900 to January 1901, 
agreement was reached that the bridge would be where suggested by the NER. " 
The joint dock continued to provide an opportunity for the Corporation's 
opposition. By November 1900 the estimated cost of the dock had risen from f 1.5 to 
f2 million. The HBR said it could not afford more than 050,000, half the original 
estimate of the cost. The proposal was at a standstill and it might be necessary to go 
back to Parliament. " The Corporation's continued opposition to the joint dock 
caused difficulties within the HBR board, which were exacerbated by Massey's 
presence on it. At a board meeting in August 1902, at which Massey was not present, 
William Trotter, presiding, said that a proposal by the Joint Committee to build the 
Linseed and rape-seed are imported from Russia, India, North and South America and other 
sources, and cotton-seed principally from Egypt'. 
G. A. Lee, 'Hull Tramways', (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1968), p. 90. 
The tramway in Hedon Road, which was opened in May 1889, was operated by steam trams and 
owned by a private company until 1900 when Hull Corporation bought the system. The steam 
trams crossed the NER in Hedon Road by means of a level crossing. The Corporation continued the 
steam trams until January 190 1, when it was decided to change to electric trams, which ran 
elsewhere in the system. It asked the NER to replace the level crossing by a bridge. However, the 
dispute over the siting of the bridge delayed the start of the electric trams in Hedon road until 1903. 
39 City Archives, Hull, Hull, TLP 251, Correspondence between NER and Hull City Council. 
40 City Archives, Hull. Hull, TLP 251, NER Bill, 1901. 
41 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 527,416, Hull Joint Dock Committee Directors' Minute Books, 
17 th December 1901 &21" March 1902. 
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dock on a reduced scale had led to disagreement with Massey. 2 Trotter ýýellt on to 
suggest that Massey's position was anomalous in that in public he had been urging 
the immediate construction of the joint dock for some time, but on the HBR board he 
had opposed its construction. " The response to his remarks soon came. In October 
1902. Massey told the Corporation that he shared the view of the Corporation NNhich 
had elected him onto the HBR board that the joint dock alliance would pro\e 
disastrous to the HBR. He still held that opinion, which was strengthened by the 
proposal to construct a much smaller dock. After discussion the Corporation 
reaffirmed its opposition to the alliance of the HBR and the NER in the construction 
and working of a joint dock which was not in the interests of the port nor the HBR 
and, in view of the proposal to reduce the dock's size, the Corporation considered 
that the scheme should be abandoned. " 
In November 1902 the Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution opposing the 
reduction in size of the dock. There followed a stormy meeting during which the feud 
between Massey and the Wilsons erupted. Arthur Wilson attacked Massey as one 
who was leading the opposition to the joint dock. Despite Massey being on the board 
of the HBR Wilson accused him of not showing trust over the matter. He went on to 
say that as Massey's interests in the trade of the port were not very extensive, he did 
not know why the he enjoyed so much influence with the Corporation and other 
interests in the city. Massey retorted that he considered that Wilson was being far too 
personal and proceeded to make his position clear, saying: 'The NER are there on the 
top the same as they were in the old dock estate, which was sold to them for a mere 
song. They will be on the premises and at the top if this agreement is not destroyed. I 
make no secret of it and I say again to Mr. Wilson, I will do my best to destroy the 
joint dock bargain as long as I have any strength left. "' Massey was at least 
consistent in his opposition. He had been one of those alluded to by the Eastern 
Morning News two years earlier when it had said, 'there are those who contend that 
42 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce AGM, 15 th November 1900. 
4 ', Radwen, News, 14 th August 1902. 
44 City Archives, Hull, Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, 16'h October 1903. 
45 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce AGM, 12"' November 190" 
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the new proposal is simply a rope which the NER is placing round the neck of the 
HBR. "46 
In August 1902 the NER defended the reduction of the size of the joint dock 
on financial grounds, but the wider business community resented the proposal for a 
smaller dock . 
4' The enterprise recently displayed by the GCR in plans for a new 
deep-water dock of 45 acres (18 hectares) across the Humber at Immingharn had 
influenced public opinion in Hull on this matter . 
4' At a meeting of the Hull Chamber 
of Commerce in October 1902 T. R. Ferens, presiding, said that the attenuated dock 
scheme should not have the support of the Chamber of Commerce. 49 Massey 
seconded the proposal. However, Arthur Wilson was able to swing opinion in his 
favour when he argued that the new dock would be able to accommodate 20 steamers 
300 feet long, and that it was ridiculous to allege that it would ruin the HBR. Wilson 
carried the day when he asserted that the Chamber of Commerce should not be seen 
to be sabotaging the dock scheme. " 
But even the reduced scheme could not be built quickly enough for the 
51 
mercantile community in Hull. In January 1904 the Railway Times complained that: 
Hull is badly in need of docking facilities. Alexandra Dock is overcrowded and 
the consequent delay and loss to ship owners is very great. Only a very small 
portion of the steamers that go into Alexandra Dock can get quay room and the 
46 Eastern Morning News, 6 th January 1899. 
47 Railwa. v News, 23 rd August 1902. 
48 RailwaY Times, 25'h October 1902. 
49 J. Markham, Colouýful Characters, (Beverley, 1992), pp. 50-54. Thomas Robinson Ferens (1847- 
1930) started his career at the age of 13 in the offices of the Stockton and Darlington Railway 
Company. In 1868 he moved to Hull to take up the post of confidential clerk to James Reckitt, 
starch manufacturer. In 1874 he was promoted to works manager and eventually worked his way 
up to chairman. He stood as Liberal candidate for Parliament representing East Hull in 1900 and 
was defeated, but was successful in 1906. He became a privy councillor in 1912 and continued as 
an MP unti I his defeat in 1918. He was active with Sir James Reckitt in promoting a garden village 
in east Hull for the company's employees, which was opened in 1908. 
Railwav News, 8 1h November 1902. 
51 Ibid, 13 1h February 1904. 
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consequence is that goods have to be discharged into lighters which have to wait 
for quay berths. " 
On 12'1' October 1906, Messrs. S. Pearson & Son of London were awarded 
the contract for the construction of the Hull joint dock. " The approximate value of 
the contract was f850,000. The works were to be completed by the summer of 19 10. 
By February 1907, work was under way. 54 However, the attenuation of the dock 
scheme and the slow progress put pressure on the NER. In August 1907 John Lloyd 
Wharton, the NER chairman, in reply to comments that the company would be in a 
better position at Hull if more rapid progress was made towards the completion of 
the joint dock, replied that it would not do for the company to spend fI 1/2million 
prematurely He said, 'the Hull friends of the NER should see that they are doing all 
that could be expected of thern. ' Their friends, particularly the Wilson's and North 
Eastern Shipping Company, the formation of which will be discussed in the next 
section, did not seem to be impressed. A directors' meeting of that company 
minuted: 'The difficulties of working and increased expenses under the present 
congested state of the docks and consequent irregular delivery of goods and coals 
were commented on with a view to avoid in future the consequent delays and 
losses. "' It had been suggested that as a temporary measure for relief, some of the 
coal ordered for Hull could be shipped from other ports and, if necessary, the NER 
were willing to do something in this direction as a temporary expedient. " This 
measure was not adopted. It would have been highly unpopular in Hull, particularly 
if coal had been sent to Hartlepool. 
Gossip began to circulate in railway circles regarding the future of the HBR. 
The Railivay Times reported: 'Negotiations are being undertaken with the LYR, but 
51 Railway Times, 16"' January 1904. 
53 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 527/416, Hull Joint Dock Committee Directors' Minute Books, 
12"' October 1906. 
54 City Archives, Hull, SRL, NER Half-Yearly reports and Accounts, 8th February 1907. 
SS University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives, DEW (2) 41.9, Wilson's and North Eastern 
Shipping Company, Limited. Directors' Minute Books. Vol. 1,1 9th November 1907. 
56 Railwav Times, 9"' August 1907. 
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nothing definite is forthcoming. 15 " Another report alleged that there was a proposal 
afoot for the sale of HBR jointly to the LYR and MR . 
58 In fact there was no basis to 
any of these rumours, but at the Chamber of Commerce AGM in 1904 Massey 
proposed that a committee be appointed to take such action as they deem fit with the 
view to obtaining active interest by one or more of the large railway companies. 
other than the NER, in the development of traffic over the HBR. " The rumours also 
prompted Hull Chamber of Trade is to appoint a committee. " There is no report of 
conclusions from either committee. 
The continuing antipathy between the Corporation and the NER was 
illustrated by two case, one concerning level crossings and the other concerning the 
water supply to Hull docks. In 1905 the NER submitted a Bill which contained, inter 
alia, a proposal for a pier on the Humber foreshore to the east of Hull with a branch 
railway some 51/2miles (8 km) long connecting with the Hull to Withernsea branch. 
The Corporation was concerned that extra traffic generated by the pier would pass 
over the level crossings on the Victoria Dock branch and informed the NER that it 
would vehemently oppose the proposal. In the face of this opposition the NER 
dropped the scheme, having been once more thwarted by the Corporation. " 
Hull Corporation supplied water to the NER until 1903 when, in order to 
obtain additional supplies, the latter began to use water from boreholes on its own 
land at Hessle. Hull Corporation asked for a declaration that it was ultra vires for the 
NER to do this. Although the Corporation would not undertake to give the necessary 
supply it sought to restrain the NER from doing so, arguing that the Dock 
Amalgamation Act of 1893 and the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act prohibited 
the NER from supplying itself with water as the supply was derived from land 
acquired for railway purposes only. Mr. Justice Jones decided for the NER in 
December 1905 and the Court of Appeal came to the same decision in July 1906.62 
57 Railway Times, 19th November 1904. 
58 Railroad and Transport Gazette, Xh October 1904, 
59 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce AGM, 16 th November 1904. 
60 Railroad and Transport Gazette, 16 th December 1904. 
61 City Archives, Hull, TLP 324, NER Bill, 1905. 
62 Railroad anti Transport Ga-zette. 27"' July 1906. 
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The Corporation's antipathy even encouraged it to try to build alternative 
facilities for shipping. In 1906 the Corporation proposed the erection of a pier and 
"harf on the Humber at the Western Reservation, where cargoes could be dealt with 
at any state of the tide. The cost was estimated at 034,000. The scheme \ýas 
defeated by a show of hands at a council meeting but a poll of ratepayers was 
demanded. The results showed 13,065 votes for the scheme and 3,498 against. 
However, some 33,000 of those eligible did not bother to vote. 63 In July the enabling 
Bill went before Parliament. The NER opposed the Bill on the grounds that it was 
not the Corporation's business to propose such an enterprise. Although the Bill 
passed the Commons Committee the Lords rejected it. The provision of low-water 
accommodation by the Corporation was unnecessary as the NER had powers to 
provide it at Albert Dock, and the scheme of the Corporation was seen for what it 
was; an attempt to enter into competition with the NER. 64 The abortive proposal cost 
the ratepayers f 11,965.17s. 0d. (f 11.965.85p . 
)65 
The Corporation was, however, equally prepared to use public money in 
support of the HBR. In January 1907 it considered a Bill authorising the HBR to 
construct a pier in the Humber westward of the entrance to Alexandra Dock at a cost 
of f 153,120. " The pier was connected to HBR lines but not to the NER. The NER 
raised no objection to the proposal as it was in the process of developing Riverside 
Quay. The Corporation was empowered to contribute up to f 150,000 to the scheme 
and decided to give a grant of the maximum allowed, but this was opposed by the 
Local Government Board, whereupon the HBR proposed to raise the capital itself. 67 
Despite a petition against the proposal by Earle's Shipbuilders, on the grounds that 
the pier would obstruct the entrance to their shipyard, the Bill received the Royal 
61 Assent. 
63 Railroad and Transpori Gazelle, 26 th January and 9'h February 1906. 
64 lbid, 26"' January and 3 rd August 1906. 
65 City Archives, Hull, Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, I 9th November 1906. 
66 Railway Gazette, 22nd March 1907. 
67 City Archives, Hull, Hull Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, 28th January 1907. 
68 City Archives, Hull, DPDI 4'39, Alexandra Dock Pier Act, 1907 
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The foregoing episodes illustrate the enduring hostility shown by Hull 
Corporation to the NER, although the former was still prepared to assist the HBR 
where possible, as exemplified by the case of the Alexandra Dock pier. The 
Corporation's relationship with the joint dock committee had started badl\ and 
deteriorated further. The HBR was inextricably linked with the joint dock scheme 
and the Corporation's opposition and hostility to it, as exemplified by Massey. was to 
bode ill for future relations between the two bodies. 
5. Railway company shipping enterprises. 
As we have seen the developing alliance between the NER and HBR was in no small 
measure a consequence of the logic of economic competition on a wider scale. 
Although it was dominant in North-east England the NER was always mindful of 
competition from ports elsewhere in the country and of threats from the railway 
companies on its periphery. These other companies were considering how short-sea 
shipping might be better integrated into their business activities. Indeed, the 
acquisition of the Hull Docks in 1893 had been the first step by the NER towards 
closer involvement with shipping activities. Recognising that the MSLR at Grimsby 
and the LYR at Goole were in a position to jeopardise its interests, it promoted 
measures designed to increase its part in shipping activity at Hull. '9 In 1896 it 
prompted the amalgamation of the firms of Ringrose & Company and Hutchinson & 
Sons into a reconstructed shipping line under the name of the Hull and Netherlands 
Steam Shipping Company. The NER secured an interest in the firm and subsidised its 
operations. Henry Tennant, of the NER, was the company chairman. Although the 
venture proved unprofitable, the NER decided that its shipping activities should not 
be abandoned. " 
69 D. J. Starkey & R. Gorski, 'Our Little Company: The Wilsons and North Eastern Railway Shipping 
Company Limited, 1906-1935', in Harbours and Havens: Essays in Port Histoty in Honour of 
Gordon Jackson, (St. Johns, Newfoundland, 1999), pp. 63-88. 
70 R. J. Irving, The, Vorth Eastern RailwaY Company 18'0-1914, An Economic History. (Leicester. 
1976), p. 172. 
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Thus, in 1900, the NER sought to subscribe f 120,000 to the provision and use of 
steam vessels for services between Hull and the Netherlands. "' The service was 
already being operated by the Hull and Netherlands Steam Shipping Company in 
conjunction with Dutch Railways. The local press welcomed the NER's attempt to 
develop the passenger and goods traffic between Hull and the continent, arguing that 
with the Dutch railways on the one side of the water and the NER on the other, Hull 
would become a very strong rival to Grimsby and Goole, especially the latter. 72 
Not everyone was so enthusiastic. Hull Chamber of Commerce and Shipping 
was concerned about preferential rates on imported foreign produce, a long-standing 
concern with British traders, and wished the Corporation to press for safeguards. 73 
The chamber held a meeting to discuss the NER Bill. Arthur Wilson, representing the 
largest ship owners in Hull with 85 ships, and still a director of the NER, had no 
objection to the Bill. However, Joseph Atkinson, who owned three ships, said that 
shipping men thought that Wilson's favoured the scheme because they had a private 
arrangement with the NER, a claim denied by Wilson . 
7' But Wilson's were under 
pressure in their European trade from Goole and Grimsby and, although they had no 
specific agreement at the time, they probably foresaw the prospect of future co- 
operation with the NER, which came to pass some five years later. As we have seen, 
Hull Corporation distrusted any proposal by the NER and opposed the Bill. causing 
the Railwqv Times to comment in exasperation: 
The NER only have to present a Bill of any sort and Hull Corporation is up in 
arms and marches blindly into opposition. Like Paddy, whose politics consisted 
of being 'agin' the government, so the Hull Corporation and traders, with the 
exception of Wilson's are 'agin' the NER. " 
71 City Archives, Hull, TLP 250, North Eastern Railway (Steam Vessels) Bill, 1900. 
72 Eastern Morning : Vews, 18 th November 1899. 
73 S. J. McLean, 'The English Railway and Canal Commission of 1888% The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, (November 1905), pp. 10-27. 
74 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce meeting, 24 th January 1900. 
75 d 1900. Railwav Thnes, FebruarN 
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A problem for the NER at Hull was the lack of co-operation between railwavs I 
and shipping lines despite its 1900 foray into shipping. Wilsons' difficulties ýýith 
European trade provided an opportunity to establish a joint Wilson"s and NER 
shipping line, making NER capital available as required but leaving the day to day 
running of the company to Wilson's. " A 10-year agreement was concluded in 1905 
between Wilson's and the NER to run steamships to certain ports. Thereafter the 
agreement could be concluded by either side giving 12 months notice. " The Wilson's 
and North Eastern Railway Shipping Company Limited was incorporated 6 th March 
1906. The company purchased seven ships from the Wilson Line, which would 
operate continental services from Hull. " On I 9th March 1906 Oswald Sanderson, 
who had been Wilson's continental agent, was elected chainnan. '9 
The establishment of the joint shipping line encouraged the HBR to enter the 
business. All the other railway companies in the area had obtained steamship powers: 
in fact, the MSLR had obtained them as far back as 1864. " The LYR had obtained 
76 D. J. Starkey, 'Ownership structures in the British Shipping Industry: The Case of Hull, 1820- 
1916', International Journal qf Maritime Historv, Vol. 8, No. 2, December 1996, pp. 90-95. 
77 University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives, DEW (2)/2.2, Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. 
Ltd. Directors' Minute Book, 2 nd November 1905. 
78 University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives, DEW (2) 41 /1, Wilson's and North Eastern 
Railway Shipping Company Limited, Memorandum and Articles of Association. 
The subscribers were: C. H. Wilson, Arthur Wilson, Edward Kenneth Wilson and Oswald 
Sanderson, representing Wilson's, and George S. Gibb, John L. Wharton, David Dale and Henry 
Tennant, representing the NER. The authorised capital was f250,000. 
79 University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives, DEW (2) 41.9, Wilson's and North Eastern 
Shipping Company, Limited. Directors' Minute Books, Vol. 1. 
80 City Archives, Hull, TLP 5 1, MSLR Steamboats Bill, 1864. A Bill for the establishment of 
steamboat services between Grimsby and Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, Bordeaux, Dieppe, 
Dunkirk, Flushing, LUbek, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Revel, Cronstadt, St. Petersburg and 
Konigsberg. The company was authorised to raise L250,000. Dunkirk, Dieppe and Bordeaux were 
removed from preamble by the Commons Committee on 23 rd June, 1864. Hull Dock Company and 
Corporation unsuccessfully petitioned against the Bill on the grounds that Hull had much trade with 
the ports mentioned in the Bill and much damage would be done to this by diverting it to Grimsby. 
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them in 1904 and the NER in 1900 and 1905. " The HBR now wished to recei-, c a 
share of the trade with the continent. The HBR Steam Vessels Act was backed b\ 
Massey, who had shipping interests in Hull, and received the Royal Assent on 2 Oth 
July 1906. It gave the HBR powers to operate steam vessels either alone or with 
82 
another company between Hull and continental ports. Wilson's initially opposed it 
but in 1907 an agreement was reached that the HBR would not to run steamers to 
Stettin, Danzig, Copenhagen. Arhus or Stockholm for as long as Wilson's ran an 
efficient and satisfactory service to these ports. In return Wilson's agreed not to gi\'e 
81 
undue preference to any other railway company over the HBR. In August, Massey 
recommended a twice-weekly Hull to Rotterdam service. In November two vessels 
were chartered at f400 and f430 per month respectively. There were to be sailings 
every Wednesday and Saturday from Hull and on Thursday and Saturday from 
81 Rotterdam. 
No records have been found of cargoes but the last entry for operating 
expenses was for the half-year ending 31" December 1907. All the figures had 
shown a loss, the total for the three half years of operation being f4,558. The largest 
loss of f 1,913 had been for the half-year ending June 1907. This was put down to the 
boats having to run light owing to inland navigation on the continent being 
obstructed by the freezing of the Rhine. 85 In August the chairman claimed that the 
losses had been more than offset by extra railway traffic. However, things were not 
as they seemed. The HBR had begun negotiations with the NER in July 1907 with a 
view to discontinuing HBR sailings if it were to receive a share of 27/2% of imports, 
excluding local traffic, from the Hull and Netherlands Steamship Company, in which 
81 Railway Gazette 21" October 1904. On 17'hOctober 1904 The Goole Steamship Company was 
transferred to the Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway for E26,772. The company had previously been 
jointly owned with the ACN. 
82 City Archives, Hull, TLP 267, HBR Steamships Bill, 1905. 
83 University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives, DEW (2)/4.17, Heads of Agreement between 
the HBR and Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. Ltd. dated 23 rd April 1907. 
84 
Hull Daily Mail, 27 th November 1906. 
85 
Railwqv Times, I oth August 1907. 
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the NER had an interest. The NER took over the service in September. 86 The Railwaj, 
Times reported that in early 1908 a new daily steamship service. in ýNhich the NER 
was interested, (The Hull and Netherlands Steamship Company) would commence 
between Hull and Rotterdam. " 
Robbins asserts that the shortness of the venture and Massey's role in the 
promotion of the enterprise indicate that it was an attempt by the Corporation, 
through Massey, to wage war against the NER. " Although it did achieve 271/2% of 
the rail haulage of imported goods of the Hull and Netherlands Company, there is no 
evidence that it was a case of the Corporation using the HBR to place yet another 
barb in the side of the NER. Indeed, the relations between the HBR and NER had 
improved to the extent that it was unlikely that the HBR would allow itself be used in 
this way. 
At the half-yearly shareholders meeting of the NER in February 1907 it was 
announced that the NER would start a steamboat service in conjunction with the 
LYR between Hull and the new Belgian port of Zeebrugge. The steamers would 
berth at Riverside Quay, the new NER deep-water pier. " This opened on II th May 
1907. The LYR and NER ran trains to and from the station adjoining the quay, so that 
passengers and their luggage passed directly from the trains to the steamers. " In July 
1908 an agreement was signed between the LYR and Thomas Wilson, Sons & 
Company for the pooling of Copenhagen traffic to Hull, Goole and Newcastle. " 
After a shaky start the NER's foray into shipping ended successfully with the 
Hull and Netherlands Company and, subsequently, the NER and Wilson's Company 
and the Zeebrugge service in conjunction with the LYR. Wilson's difficulties had 
86 Hoole Archives, Darlington, KH 1334, Agreement between Hull & Holland Joint Committee and 
HBR. 
M. Robbins, 'The Hull & Barnsley at Sea', Journal of Transport History, First series, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
(July 1971), pp. 183-188. 
87 Railwqv Times, 28"' December 1907. 
88 Robbins, 'The Hull & Barnsley at Sea', p. 187. 
89 City Archives, Hull. SRL, NER Half-Yearly reports and Accounts, 8 th February 1907. 
90 Railroad and Transport Gazette, II th May 1907. 
91 University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library Archives, DEW (2), '2. Thomas Wilson Sons & Co. Ltd. 
Directors' Minute Book, 20t" Julv 1908. 
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been beneficial to the NFR, providing a springboard for success and stren(, thenin, -, L- - 
the links between Wilson's and the NER. The growing rapprochement bemeen the 
NER and HBR was also furthered by their shared shipping interests. 
This chapter has illustrated the shifting relationships and alliances between 
the players on the railway and shipping scene in Hull. The NER and HBR had moved 
to a position which, if not friendship, was a recognition of the need to co-operate for 
their mutual benefit. Wilson's, ever pragmatic and opportunistic. had entered a joint 
venture with the NER, whom they had once opposed to the extent that C. H. Wilson 
had been a force behind the formation of the HBR, a companýl which he had been 
prepared to damage in 1888 when it suited his business interests. The one enduring 
feature of the period was the implacable hostility displayed by the Corporation 
towards the NER. The next six years leading up to the Great War were to be the most 
successful of all for the Hull railway companies. The Corporation was to become 
alienated from the HBR and its policies would be perceived as obstruction rather 
than assistance. 
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CHAPTER 9. 
AMALGAMATION AND OBSTRUCTION AND THE END OF 
COMPETITION, 1908-1921. 
1. Introduction. 
Although the years leading up to the Great War were, in many ways, difficult ones 
for Britain's railways, the period marked the rising fortunes of the NER and HBR. ' 
Total tonnage through the docks increased by more than 50% between 1905 and 
1913.2 As detailed in chapter 7, both the NER and HBR had secured rail links to 
South Yorkshire and the prosperity of Hull as a major coal port seemed assured. 
There were problems, however, caused by proposals for amalgamation among other 
major railway companies, which could threaten the regional rail duopoly of the NER 
and the HBR. ' 
Concerns about amalgamations and increased operating costs led the NER 
and HBR to propose a joint working agreement in 1909, but the Corporation defeated 
the scheme using its statutory powers, further alienating the HBR. It then continued 
its programme of obstructing the NER at every opportunity. The hostility shown to 
the NER by the Corporation is vividly illustrated by the Western Reservation dispute 
of 1911 and the graving dock dispute of 1913, both of which will be examined in 
some detail in this chapter. The opening of the joint dock in 1914 marked the high 
point of NER and HBR co-operation. Unfortunately, the outbreak of war brought an 
end to these golden days of the railway companies. 
The struggle between the Corporation, Hull's business interests and the 
various transport concerns serving the city had, of course, always taken place in the 
R. J. Irving, 'The Profitability and Perfon-nance of British Railways, 1870-1914', The Economic 
Histoty Review, New series, Vol. 3, No. 1, (February 1978), pp. 46-47. 
2 Figure 34. Hull Dock Tonnage, 1848-1912. 
P. J. Cain, 'Rai lway Combination and Government', 1900-1914% The Economic History Revieit'. 
Vol. 25, No. 4, (November 1972), pp. 623-629. 
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context of national and regional politics. For much of the nineteenth century policies 
and debates operating at these levels had for the most part, informed rather than 
determined local priorities. But the balance of power between Hull's traders. shippers 
and railway companies was eventually determined by the vote of Parliament. As we 
have seen in previous chapters national politics began to intrude more systematically 
as the nineteenth century drew to a close. 
Proposals for amalgamation among railway companies brought a consensus 
that co-operation could provide benefits in the shape of greater efficiency. As we 
have seen in previous chapters one effect was the growing co-operation between the 
NER and HBR with regard to Hull and the rapid rationalisation of proposals from 
these and other companies for new railways to serve South Yorkshire. The logical 
conclusion to amalgamation was seen by some, and not only those on the left of the 
political spectrum, as nationalisation of the whole railway system. ' The Labour party, 
from its founding in 1900, had embraced the basic principle of railway 
nationalisation, and its case was argued in detail in 1906. ' The view was re-stated in 
a pamphlet published in 1912.6 
The support of some traders for national i sation, a somewhat neglected aspect 
of the debate. was a result of the growing dissatisfaction with the existing system of 
state regulation of freight rates and charges. The problems of the system for the 
railway companies were made worse by pressure from an increasingly well- 
organised workforce for higher wages and better conditions. A threatened railway 
strike was averted in 1907 by the introduction of Conciliation Boards which, in 
7 
theory, allowed workers to resolve their grievances with their employers. The 
system failed and, in August 1911, the leaders of the railway unions called a national 
4 D. C. H. Watts, 'British Railway National isation: A re-examination of the causes, 1866-1921', 
Conteinporat-j, British History, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Summer 2002), pp. 6-8. 
5 R. W. Cunningham, Should our Railways be Nationalised? (Dunfermline, 1906). 
6 E. Davies, The Case. for Railway Nationalisation, (1912). 
[littp:, Iý", ww. ise. ac. uUibra[y/pamphlets/Transport/transportpamphietpaRes/the rai I ways. htm#jzener 
ated-subheading5], (April 2004). 
7 D. Howe 11, Respectable Radicals, (Aldershot, 1999), pp. II- 14. 
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strike. ' Within two days the Liberal government secured the end of the strike by 
putting pressure on the railway companies to increase wages, agreeing that the 
companies could recoup increased labour costs by raising charges. ' This corranitment 
was met by the provisions of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1913. " 
There was an immediate outcry from railway freight customers, as a result of 
which the goverriment set up a Royal Commission to examine the relationship 
between the railways and the state. However, the commission was suspended on the 
outbreak of war, when the government took control of the railways, and it did not 
report. " After the war the government retained control of the railways until 1921. 
The Liberal government stopped short of nationalisation of the system and 
12 
established four grouped mainline railway companies by the Railways Act of 1921. 
The NER and HBR became part of the new eastern group, soon to become the 
London and North Eastern Railway. In terms of railway politics the Great War was a 
catalyst, crystallising into distinct policies aspects of a debate which had been taking 
place for well over a decade. 
By the time of the Great War relations between the HBR and NER had 
become very close, symbolised by their co-operation in the joint dock project and the 
Saltend partnership, which will be described in this chapter. At a local level the 
power of the Corporation to interfere in the working of the HBR had been much 
, P. S. Bagwell, The RailwaYmen. The History of the National Union of Railwaymen, (London, 
1963), pp. 275-308. 
9 N. McKillop, The Lighted Flame, (London, 1950), pp. 88-98. 
10 R. K. Webb, Modern England, (London, 1969), p. 468. 
K. Brooker, The Hull Strikes of 1911, (Hull, 1979), pp. 28-34. 
11 M. Reed, ' Who Runs the Railways? ' Journal of the Railway and Canal Historical Society, Vol. 
34, Part 8, (Railway & Canal Historical Society, 2004), p. 529. 
P. J. Cain, 'Railway Combination and Government', 1900-1914', The Economic History Review, 
Vol. 25, No. 4, (November 1972), pp. 637-638. 
12 L. Macassey, 'The Railways Act, 192 1', Journal of Comparative Legislation and International 
Law, 3 rd Series, Vol. 4, No. 4,1922, pp. 162-175. 
K. Greives, 'Sir Eric Geddes, Lloyd George and the Transport Problem, 1918-1921', Journal of 
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Series, Vol. 13, No. 1, (March 1992), pp. 24-36. 
Cain, 'Railway Combination and Government', p. 633. Cain argues that the idea of nationalisation 
could never be expected to find favour in a 'businessman's Parliament'. 
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reduced by the rebuttal of its claim for representation on the joint dock committee. In 
fact, the Corporation played virtually no part in the life of the railways of Hull after 
the Great War until its vain attempt to prevent the merger between the HBR and NER 
in 1920. By this time it was a lone voice representing small traders, who would not 
accept that grouping of railways was the way to improve efficiency. Its views were 
obsolescent. 
The joint dock was a mixed blessing for the HBR. Almost on the day of its 
opening it had been taken over by the military. Furthermore the HBR had to pay for 
it out of revenue rather than capital. The Great War proved disastrous as receipts 
from coal exports declined from f390,996 in 1913 to f 157,096 in 1918, and never 
again reached their pre-war levels. " An additional factor was that many of the 
collieries in the Barnsley area were in decline and the focus had shifted to the 
concealed coalfield. The line completed by the HBR, in conjunction with the GCR, 
to tap the new coalfield was not completed until 1916, by which time coal traffic was 
experiencing an irrecoverable decrease. As the HBR was intrinsically a coal carrying 
railway it was becoming obvious even to its directors, although they would not admit 
it publicly, that it was no longer viable as an independent concern. Although the 
reduction in the coal business affected the NER, its multifarious traffic, including 
passengers, of whom the HBR had very few, made it much less vulnerable. Working 
expenses as a proportion of revenue rose sharply on both the NER and HBR after the 
end of the war. " Thus, despite the opposition of the Corporation amalgamation 
between the HBR and NER was inevitable. It was Eric Geddes, the Minister of 
Transport who, in his time with the NER, had advocated closer ties between the NER 
and HBR, who finally achieved what the Corporation had fought against for nearly 
forty years and brought about the demise of the HBR. 
13 B. H inch I iffe, (ed. ), The Hull and Barnsley Railway Vo 1.2, (Sheffield, 1980), p. 96. 
14 Figures 35 & 36. Working expenses as a proportion of revenue. I 
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2. Proposed railway amalgamations and their effects on the NER and HBR. 
In 1858 the GNR and the MSLR had obtained parliamentary powers for a traffic 
agreement which was to last for fifty years. " By 1908 the agreement Was due to 
expire and the two companies decided to amalgamate. " Hull Corporation found itself 
allied with the NER and HBR when it decided to oppose this on the grounds that the 
GNR had no docks of its own and therefore no inducement to forward traffic from its 
own lines in Yorkshire and the Midlands to one Humber port rather than another. 
After amalgamation the GCR ports of Grimsby and Immingham would effectively 
become ports of the GNR, thus greatly affecting the favourable position held by Hull. 
The Railway and Canal Commissioners ruled against the applicants. " The GNR and 
GCR were therefore forced to approach Parliament. One of the objectors had been 
the GER, which feared the consequences of amalgamation between the GCR and the 
GER's chief competitor. After talks the GER was invited to join the amalgamation 
and accepted. But in 1909 the companies' Bill passed through Parliament with a 
majority of only 25 votes. Alarmed by the smallness of the majority and fearful of 
the imposition of restrictive amendments the plans for amalgamation were 
abandoned. " 
Secure in its territorial monopoly, the NER had tried as far as possible to 
adhere to a policy of neutrality. It had neither the desire nor the need to alienate 
companies that only competed with it at its margins. However, in the last twenty 
years of the nineteenth century the balance of trade between the companies in the 
north of England had begun to change. The LYR, GCR and LNWR had appeared as 
strong competitors for the industrial traffic of the North and the Midlands. The focus 
of the struggle as far as the NER was concerned was the Humber ports. As we have 
seen in preceding chapters, the integration of GCR railway and shipping services, the 
developments at Goole by the LYR and ACN and the opening of the Manchester 
15 G. Dow. Great Central. Iol. 1, (London, 1959), p. 190. 
16 G. Dow. Great Central. Vol. 3, (London, 197 1), pp. 116-12 1. 
17 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, February & March 1908. 
18 G. Dow, Great Central, Vol. 3, pp. 120-12 1. 
Cain, 'Railway Combination and Government, P. 636. 
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Ship Canal had all been factors influencing the NER's purchase of the Hull Dock 
Company and its entry into shipping enterprises. But, just as the NER was 
concluding its shipping agreement with Wilson's in 1904, the LYR and LNWR xý ere 
negotiating a working agreement as a preliminary step towards fullýý co-operative 
working. '9 They produced their proposals in June 1908. " The gathering ground for 
traffic had previously been open to any of the companies operating in the region but 
the LNWR and LYR co-operation shifted the balance in favour of this Lancashire 
and London combination to the detriment of the North-east ports. " 
Therefore, in 1906 the NER undertook a comprehensive review of its 
relationships with competing companies. The person charged with this review was 
Eric Campbell Geddes, who had joined the NER in 1904 and was the company's 
commercial agent. Geddes was a product of the NER's progressive policy of 
management recruitment and training introduced by George Gibb, who had become 
22 
general manager in 1891. Gibb believed that the existing officers of the company 
were conscientious and experienced but their focus was too narrow, conditioned as it 
was by their railway training. As part of a strategy of introducing 'fresh blood' he 
had initiated the traffic apprentice scheme in 1897, mainly for graduates. One non- 
academic recruit who had particularly impressed Gibb as 'possessing uncommon 
energy and adaptability' was Geddes, who had previous experience of railways in the 
United States of America but none in Britain. 23 
19 J. Marshall, The Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway, Vol. 2, (Newton Abbot, 1970), p. 256. 
20 Cain, 'Railway Combination and Government', p. 633. 
2, R. J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company 1870-1914. An Economic History, (Leicester. 
1976), p. 230. 
22 J. Simmons & G. Biddle, (eds. ), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 
1997), p. 176. 
K. Greives, Sir Eric Geddes - Business and Government in War and Peace, (Manchester, 1989). 
Eric Campbell Geddes (1875-1937) joined the NER in 1904 and became general manager in 1914. 
He was co-opted into Government service during the war and subsequently became Minister of 
Transport in Lloyd George's coalition Government. He conceived the idea of streamlining and re- 
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1921. 
23 Irving, The, Vorth Eastern RailwaY Company 18-0-1914.. 4n Economic History, p. 216. 
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Geddes was asked to consider the effect of increased competition on the 
NER's existing policy of a 'fair exchange' of traffic with other companies. Geddes 
argued that the NER's policy of not seeking alliances had caused damage to its 
trading position, particularly at Hull. This damage would become greater as a result 
of the LYR and LNWR joint initiative, and further development by the GCR at 
Immingham. Geddes thought the NER was favourably placed in relation to the 
bilateral exchange of traffic. Despite its presence at Goole, the LYR was seen as a 
potential ally of the NER, as the latter received more traffic for Hull from it than any 
other company. He also considered that the NER might wish to contemplate an 
alliance with the LYR and LNWR. This was a radical step, but one that Geddes said 
would have two advantages. It would lessen the loss of traffic due to the co-operative 
working of the LYR and LNWR. But, more importantly, it would be the strongest 
alliance of large railways as far as Humber traffic was concerned, and would curb the 
activities of the GCR at Grimsby and Immingharn. He recommended that closer 
relations should be fostered with the HBR. Geddes' advice, with the exception of the 
fostering of closer relations with the HBR, was not taken, but his findings made the 
NER more keenly aware of the dangers of amalgamations among other railways, 
particularly among the other East Coast companies. " 
It came as no surprise when, in February 1909, the NER chairman, John 
Wharton, expressed disquiet about the proposed working agreement between the 
GNR, GER and GCR. He stressed that care must be take to ensure that agreements, 
amounting to an amalgamation, did not damage the interests of existing railways. He 
reiterated the view that the proposed agreement presented particular danger to the 
NER's interests in the Humber region. He particularly emphasised the threat posed 
by the transfer of GNR traffic from the north of the river, where it was worked in co- 
operation with the NER, to the south, where it would be in direct competition. Added 
R. J. Irving, 'British Railway investment and innovation 1900-1914: An analysis with special 
reference to the North Eastern and London & North Western Railway Companies', Business 
Hislorv, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1971, pp. 58-60. 
T. R. Gourvish, 'A British business elite: The chief executive managers of the railway industry 
1850-1922', Business Histori, Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, August 1973, pp. 289-316. 
24 Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, p. 6. 
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to this was the fact that the GCR was constructing a large deep-water dock at 
Immingham. Until it was satisfied that its interests were safeguarded the NER ý, vould 
oppose any Bills for amalgamation. " The HBR was similarly concerned. In August 
1909 the chairman, Wright, had referred to the proposed GNR, GER and GCR 
amalgamation and said it would not be to the benefit of the HBR, which had already 
lost coal traffic to the GNR and GER. " 
3. The proposal for amalgamation of the NER and HBR, 1909. 
Despite the unfavourable national context symbolised by the defeat of the proposal 
for the tripartite amalgamation the NER and HBR decided that in view of the 
common competitive threat facing them from amalgamations of other companies 
they would seek to work together. They were already bound together in the joint 
dock project. 
In September 1909 the Railway Times indulged in prophecy with regard to such an 
amalgamation. It saw the shared fears of the NER and the HBR as a factor that would 
draw them closer together, speculating that: 
Previous attempts [at amalgamation] have failed because of the opposition of 
Hull interests. Today such a proposal would be received with a better grace by 
local interests, because competition between the HBR and NER is rather more 
nominal that real. 27 
The same periodical was delighted when, two months later, its prophecy appeared to 
be on the verge of fulfilment. It proclaimed: 
25 1 th Railway Times, 
-) 
February 1909. 
26 Mid, 14 Ih August 1909. 
The DVR, which opened through to junctions with the GNR main line and the GNR/GER joint line 
at Bessacar, near Doncaster in Mav 1909, took much coal traffic from South Yorkshire which 
would otherwise have been carried by the HBR. 
27 Railway Times, 9"' September 1909. 
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The HBR and NER have provisionally adopted a working agreement proposed 
from January next for fifty years. This has no doubt been brought about in 
response to triple alliances between other companies, in particular that of the 
GNR, GCR and GER who are bound to favour Grimsby and, in due course. the 
new port of Immingham. 28 
The periodical, no doubt, thought that the merger would be eagerly supported in 
Hull. This was to prove a mistaken assumption. 
At first all went well. Negotiations between the NER and HBR led, on I" 
November 1909, to a proposed 50-year agreement between them. " The key points 
were: 
1. Junctions to be maintained and worked at joint cost to enable traffic to be 
interchanged between the docks and railways of the two companies. 
2. All revenue from traffic commencing or tenninating in Hull and from the docks to 
be divided between the two companies. 
3. The revenue to be divided in the proportions of the corresponding revenue derived 
from the railways and docks during 1908. 
4. The cost of new works and of maintaining them to be borne as agreed or settled 
by arbitration. 
In addition the HBR was to be allowed to run passenger trains over NER lines into 
Paragon Station free of payment. 
As suggested above, a factor persuading the companies to consider an 
agreement was the imminent opening of Immingham Dock. This would particularly 
impact on the HBR which, in 1909, owned the largest dock on the Humber. 
Alexandra Dock. A future problem for the HBR, however, was that when the new 
Hull joint dock opened the NER would have equal facilities to compete for trade 
which at present could only be handled at Alexandra Dock. The delay in the 
28 Railway Times, 6"' November 1909. 
29 CitN Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, 1" November1909. HBR & 
NER Agreement of 1909. 
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construction of the joint dock had thus been to the narrow business advantage of the 
HBR and the company was content that the facilities at that dock "ere to be 
attenuated. Nonetheless it foresaw a considerable diminution in the traffic using 
Alexandra Dock, and this could only be to the benefit of the NER. The NER had lent 
the HBR its share of the joint dock costs placing the latter in a position of borrowing 
money to finance a dock which would compete with its own. A pooling arrangement 
between the HBR and NER could relieve financial pressures that may have otherwise 
resulted. 
An additional problem for the HBR was its poor performance as a passenger 
carrier. When the line had been promoted it was anticipated that it would become a 
useful passenger line but, in over twenty years, very little such traffic had been 
attracted. One reason for this was that the route of the HBR avoided all centres of 
population. This leads to the suspicion that early promises regarding passengers were 
more to do with gaining political support for the line than sound business sense. With 
running powers to Sheffield over the MR, obtained in 1905, it hoped to pick up some 
longer distance traffic and, nearer home, dormitory suburbs and villages were 
springing up west of Hull, at places such as Kirk Ella and Willerby, settlements 
through which the HBR passed. " However its terminal passenger station at Cannon 
Street was inconveniently situated some distance from the city centre. To extend the 
line to a more central point in the city would be prohibitively expensive. The 
proposed agreement to run trains into the NER's Paragon Station would be of great 
advantage to the HBR. The lack of interchange points between the two companies 
had, moreover, been a source of inconvenience to traders and detrimental to the 
overall to the efficiency of the port. Enhanced facilities would allow traders access to 
the whole of the dock and railway system of Hull. The new connections would be of 
particular benefit to the West Yorkshire coal trade, which was unable to use the 
facilities at Alexandra Dock except by a circuitous route. 
It may have been expected that the Hull traders would live up to the Railli'ay 
Times' expectations and welcome the proposed agreement and the Chamber of 
Commerce did so in December 1909 by way of a resolution supporting the 
30 Railwav Times, II Ih March 1905. The MR granted running powers to the HBR from Cudworth 
Junction to Sheffield on I" July 1905. A through service commenced on 2 nd October 1905. 
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agreement. " However, the smaller merchants and retailers demurred. The Chamber 
of Trade, The Hull Fruit Merchants Trade Protection Society, The Hull & District 
Trades Council, The Humber Coal Exporters and Shippers, The East Hull 
Progressive Party and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners all 
condemned the agreement. " The city traders were split. The Corporation , Nas 
increasingly dominated by small traders, who feared the reinstatement of railway 
monopoly at Hull. These smaller traders argued that duplication of resources at Hull 
gave a measure of flexibility rather than inefficiency. They were unable to accept the 
business logic increasingly accepted within the railway industry which was that 
amalgamation would reduce costs by doing away with duplication. 
Despite such evidence of opposition from smaller traders and of Hull 
Corporation's entrenched opposition to the NER, on 27 th November the Railway 
Times indulged in some premature speculation noting that the agreement between the 
HBR and NER did not need parliamentary approval. The assent of Hull Corporation 
was necessary but the periodical expected that this would be given. The Railway 
Gazette was a little more cautious, announcing: 
The two railways which have an interest in Hull have wisely decided to cease 
their competition in order to enable the port of Hull to compete more effectively 
with its rivals on the Humber. This consideration should have due weight with 
Hull Corporation whose agreement is necessary before the arrangement can 
become operative. " 
In accordance with the Act of 1880 the HBR was required to obtain the 
consent of the Corporation, and it approached that body in November 1909. " The 
Corporation was totally inflexible and, on 3 rd December, issued what amounted to an 
31 Railwa. v Gazette, 7 th January 1910. 
32 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, November & December 1909. 
31, Railwqv Ga--cue, 5h November 1909. 
34 City Archives, Hull, Letter from HBR to Corporation dated I" November 1909 with copy 
agreement. 
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ultimatum, stipulating that it would only withdraw its opposition subject to the 
following conditions: 
1. The Corporation was to have power to call for a revision of the agreement after an 
agreed period of years. 
2. Its veto was to be preserved as regards any further combination between the two 
companies. 
3. Riverside Quay was to be open for the traffic of all railwa-y companies. 
4. The facilities at present enjoyed by the traders of Hull were to be preserved. 
5. A Conciliation Board with an independent chairman was to be constituted to 
resolve any dispute and the Corporation should have the power to terminate the 
joint agreement. 
6. Both railway companies were to co-operate with the Corporation and the Chamber 
of Commerce in obtaining, if necessary, Parliamentary sanction for the agreement. 
The Corporation's stance was supported by the usual interest groups; bodies 
representing the smaller traders, and the South Yorkshire coal owners. The latter 
foresaw the possible erosion of their advantageous position on rates Ils a vis the West 
Yorkshire collieries, stating: 'Those coal owners whose pits are in South Yorkshire 
are of relatively greater importance, as far as Hull is concerned, than those situated in 
West Yorkshire. "' This was true, as the great majority of hard steam coal came from 
South Yorkshire and North Nottinghamshire collieries and little from West Yorkshire. 
The railway companies refused to accept the conditions laid down by the 
Corporation which, in February 1910, refused to recommend the proposed 
agreement. However, in May the Corporation, aware that it could be cast as the 
wrecker of the agreement, appeared to have second thoughts and agreed to give the 
matter further consideration. The NER entertained hopes of a compromise. It also 
considered mounting a challenge to the Railway and Canal Commissioners on the 
grounds that that the assent of the Corporation could be said to have been 
'unreasonably withheld' as defined in the Act of 1880, but this was unlikely to 
35 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, January 1910. 
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succeed without unanimity between the affected railways . 
36 However, the HBR --ýýas 
happy with thes/a/us quo. The company was enjoying good results and it was in no 
hurry for the completion of the joint dock scheme nor too concerned If the 
arrangement with the NER fell through. By November 1910 the plans for the 
31 
working agreement were dead. In this way a further opportunity for co-operation 
between the railway companies at Hull foundered on the rocks of the suspicious 
conservatism of the small traders and the recalcitrance of the Corporation. 
At the HBR shareholders' meeting in February 1910 John Donnell. from the 
floor, alleged that there was no longer any friendly feeling on the part of the 
Corporation towards the HBR. The Town Clerk rejected this, saying that the 
Corporation had always done its best to help and protect the HBR, to the extent that 
the NER had described the railway as 'the Corporation's pet'. " This sentiment. 
superficially at least, did not appear to be reciprocated by the HBR. In November. 
William Shaw Wright, addressing Hull Chamber of Commerce said that he deeply 
regretted that the agreement with the NER had not come about and blamed Hull 
Corporation's negative attitude . 
3' But Wright was a seed crusher with a large 
business in the city and prominent in the affairs of the Chamber of Commerce. It is 
likely that he was expressing a view more likely to be agreeable with that of the 
Chamber of Commerce than the HBR. 
The Railway Times gave support to the idea that the HBR was not displeased 
at the consequences of the Corporation's intransigence: 
The HBR and NER agreement is off and it is said that the fact is welcomed, 
rather than otherwise by the HBR directors who find themselves today in a 
position of far more advantage and promise than was ever thought possible when 
the original agreement was mooted. "' 
36 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, May 1910. 
37 lbid,, Corporation Parliamentary Committee Minutes, November 19 10. 
38 Railway Times, 12 th February 1910. 
39 lbid, 19"' November 19 10. 
40 lbid, 5"' November 19 10. 
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The NER looked to the longer term. In February 1911 the chairman told a 
shareholders' meeting that he believed that the HBR board agreed with the NER that 
antagonism between the two companies in the face of competition from other ports 
was bound to be prejudicial to both Hull and the companies. He hoped that Hull 
Corporation would, one day, come to see the matter in the same light. To this there 
were cries of 'Hear Hear. "' His hopes were not to be fulfilled. The NER had 
reckoned without the continued hostility of the Corporation. 
4. The Western Reservation dispute, 1911. 
The events of 1909-10 had shown that the Corporation still had no intention of co- 
operating in any way with the NER and this was confirmed in 1911 when a bitter 
dispute arose over the NER's attempt to acquire 15 acres (31/4 hectares) of the 
Western Reservation adjoining Victoria Dock for timber storage purposes by 
introducing an enabling Bill. The Corporation had retained this area when land for 
Alexandra Dock had been sold to the HBR, and opposed the Bill on the grounds that 
there was no good reason for the acquisition of the land which contained a public 
right of way and a sewer vested in the Corporation. This argument was undennined 
when it was revealed before the Lords Committee that the eastern end of the Western 
Reservation had been leased to the HBR in 1907 in perpetuity. The NER had tried to 
obtain the western end in 1897 but had failed. Since 1907 there had been further 
unsuccessful attempts. 
The situation was, however, not quite so straightforward as portrayed. In 
further evidence it became apparent that in different circumstances the Corporation 
was quite prepared to consider leasing the land. In 1910 the Anglo-American Oil 
Company had requested a lease and in April 1911 the Corporation had asked the 
HBR to confirm that it did not wish to acquire the remaining portion of the Western 
Reservation. When counsel observed that the Corporation seemed to take a different 
viewpoint depending on whether it was the NER or HBR that wished to purchase the 
Western Reservation the Corporation responded that its attitude in regard to the HBR 
had been established. In relation to the NER it had not, but now would be. and its 
41 Railwqj, Times, I Vh February 1911. 
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position was that under no circumstances would the land be sold to the NER. The 
Lords suggested that the NER should be allowed to acquire the land subject to 
certain safeguards to the Corporation regarding river frontage. The Corporation 
would have none of this and its counsel was instructed to take no further part in the 
discussion. '2 
The Corporation's policies concerning this land proved to be even more 
complex. When the Bill came before the Commons Committee counsel for the NER 
said that when, in 1906, the Corporation found that it was not to be allowed to build 
its pier it made the HBR an offer that if the latter would make a pier and create 
competition on the river with the NER, then the Corporation would allow it to have 
15 acres (31/4 hectares) of the Western Reservation for that purpose. The NER had 
raised no objection to the proposed HBR pier as it had its own plans for Riverside 
Quay [opened in 1907]. The Mayor of Hull had said that at that time it might have 
been possible to let the NER have use of the land but only on the basis of a short- 
term lease. The NER pointed out that, by way of contrast, the HBR had its part of the 
Western Reservation on a 999-year lease. " 
Thus, over a period of four years there had been considerable debate about the 
Western Reservation within Hull Corporation. In its final offer to the NER it sought 
to impose stringent terms, which were: 
1) The lease to be for a period of 21 years. 
2) The annual rent to be f 1,250 per annum. subject to annual revision. 
3) All rights across the property to be reserved to the Corporation. 
4) The Corporation to be at liberty to re-take possession of the land at any time if, in 
the Corporation's opinion, it was required for any public purpose. 
5) The proposal in the NER Bill of 1911 regarding the Western Reservation was to 
be withdrawn. 
42 City Archives, Hull, TLP 287, Lords Parliamentary Committee proceedings, May 1911. 
43, Ibid., Commons Parliamentary Committee proceedings, 25h-27 th jUly 19,1. 
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The NER found this unacceptable. leading it to submit the 1911 Bill. " But the Lords 
decided that no good case had been made with regard to the Western Reservation . 4ý 
Once again the NER was thwarted by the obfuscation of Hull Corporation. and the 
episode demonstrated that Parliament was prepared to uphold the rights of 
democratically elected bodies over the requests of large companies. 
5. The Saltend partnership. 
Despite the Corporation's belief that the HBR could be maintained as a bulwark 
against the domination of Hull by the NER, the two railways found it increasingly 
advantageous to work together. This was illustrated by the Saltend project. In 
December 1908 the NER decided to construct extensive accommodation for storing 
petroleum at Saltend, east of Hull. This required ajetty, 300 yards (275m. ) in length, 
into the River Humber to enable large tank steamers to come alongside and discharge 
into reservoirs on the mainland, 200 acres (81 hectares) having been acquired for this 
purpose. "" In 1909 the NER introduced a Bill for a railway to Saltend Jetty, which 
involved crossing Hedon Road on the level. 47 The Bill also proposed a short 
extension from the Victoria Dock branch at Stoneferry. The Corporation opposed the 
Stoneferry branch as a matter of course and went on to raise the issue of the level 
crossing on Hedon Road and the additional traffic over existing level crossings in the 
City. 48 It suggested a bridge. The Chamber of Commerce also petitioned against the 
proposed level crossing. The Board of Trade, suggested that the level crossing should 
be allowed provided the number of trains using it did not exceed ten per day; if more 
were to pass then a bridge must be erected. The Corporation disagreed and reserved 
the right to oppose the Bill. The dispute was clearly more to do with blocking the 
City Archives, Hull, Corporation Property sub-committee minutes. 
City Archives, Hull, TLP 287, Commons Parliamentary Committee proceedings, 25th-27th Jul, 
1911. 
46 RailwaY Times, l2th December 1908. 
47 City Archives, Hull, TLP 283, NER Bill forjetty at Saltend and other works, 1909. 
48 City Archives, Hull, TLP 322, The Corporation carried out a traffic census during the week ending 
22nd April 1909. 
Appendix 3). Census of road and rail traffic at level crossings in Hull, 1898 & 1909. 
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NER than a real issue over rail traffic. The Corporation had conducted a surx-e\ of 
traffic on Hedon Road. The results were disappointing from its point of \ ieýý and 
demonstrated that Hedon Road at the site of the proposed level crossing was far from 
busy. " 
When the Bill came before the parliamentary committee their Lordships ý, ý-ere 
unimpressed by the attitude of the Corporation. They failed to see on what grounds 
the opposition to the Stoneferry branch was based, as it was open ground in private 
ownership with no roads at all. In the case of the proposed crossing of Hedon Road, 
T. R. Ferens, the MP for East Hull appeared as a witness against the proposed level 
crossing, more out of a sense of duty rather than conviction. Perhaps the same 
applied to John Henry Fisher representing the Chamber of Commerce, and to become 
a director of the HBR in 1910, who also appeared against the proposal. It was also 
opposed by the Hull and District Chamber of Trade. The NER agreed to the Board of 
Trade conditions and won its case, but despite the victory over the level crossing, the 
NER did not pursue its advantage. Co-operation with the HBR was preferable to 
confrontation with the Corporation and it commenced negotiations with the HBR 
regarding the use of its lines for access to Saltend. The HBR Bill of 1913 conferred 
various powers on the company, including the joint purchase, with the NER, of 
Saltend Pasture, where the Anglo-American Oil Company was establishing a 
refinery. This area had been purchased by the NER in 1908. The Bill also abandoned 
the proposed level crossing on Hedon Road. " 
As joint owners of the jetty and connecting railways at Saltend the NER and 
HBR successfully opposed the LYR claim of running powers to Saltend Pier, which 
were turned down by the Lords on 2 nd May 1913. " The era of real co-operation 
between the companies had arrived. 
49 City Archives, Hull, TLP '122, Lords Committee proceedings, 27 th April 1909. 
Appendix. 4. Census of traffic on Hedon Road, April 1909. 
50 City Archives, Hull, TLP 287, HBR Bill, 1913. 
ýj Eastern Morning Vews. 13 th Maý 1913. 
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6. The Graving Dock dispute, 1913 and the opening of the Joint Dock in 1914. 
The relationship between the railway companies and the Corporation entered a nexý- 
phase in the graving dock dispute, which pitted the NER and HBR as allies directl%, 
against the Corporation and Wilson's. In August 1912 the Town Clerk pointed out 
that twelve years had elapsed since the joint dock was authorised, but it was still far 
from completion. He contrasted the lack of progress with Immingham dock, which 
had taken six years from authorisation to opening. 52 He understood that the HBR was 
not solely to blame as it did not hold the purse, but it might do its best to facilitate the 
dock. The HBR chairman said that the character of the works meant that they took 
longer than Immingham although he did not explain the reason for this. 53 
Progress was further slowed by a dispute that arose over the proposed graving 
docks. This resulted in parliamentary scrutiny of the authorising Bill. The case 
provides an insight into the balance of power in Hull between the Corporation and 
various commercial interests. The Corporation petitioned against the lease of the 
graving docks on the grounds that Smith's, the Middlesbrough company to whom 
they were to be leased, would have a monopoly and could thus charge excessive 
prices. Hull Chamber of Commerce was also concerned at this proposal which would 
mean that ship repairing in Hull would be in the hands of an outside company. " This 
brought the Corporation into conflict with the HBR which, in March 1913, lost a 
legal battle to have the Corporation's locus standi denied. " 
When the Bill came before the Commons Committee on 23 rd April 1913 Mr. 
Wedderburn KC, appearing for the proposal, said that the issue was the determination 
between the public interest and the general prosperity of the port and the self-seeking 
interest of a small number of persons within it. He pointed out that in addition to the 
three graving docks in railway hands [one NER and two HBR] and the Central 
52 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee papers, January 1904. The Humber 
Commercial Railway and Dock Bill of 1904 replaced a Bill of 1901 to construct docks at Grimsby 
by a proposal to construct a dock at Immingham. To protect the interests of Hull the Corporation 
decided to oppose the Bill. 
53 Railwqv Times, 17'h August 191 
S4 Yorkshire Post, 14t" January 1913. 
55 Cit% Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, March 1913. 
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Graving Dock, there were seven more in private hands, making ten in all. The wo 
new graving docks would give a 4% return on f200, OOO and would be leased to 
Smiths, who undertook to spend f90, OOO, of which f60, OOO was to provide 
permanent equipment on the dock. As an example counsel cited Immingham, ýýhere 
the graving dock was in the hands of a private company, The Humber Graving Dock 
and Engineering Company. The company guaranteed the GCR a return of 4% on 
capital. However, he omitted to say that this company, formed in 1909, was 
controlled by the GCR, which also owned Immingharn Dock. 56 
The NER, represented by Eric Geddes, now deputy general manager, argued 
that Wilson's and the Chamber of Commerce had pressed the idea of the graving 
docks upon the joint committee. Geddes went on to assert that graving docks were 
not profitable in the hands of companies which were not ship repairers, giving 
figures for NER graving docks at Newcastle and Hartlepool which gave a return on 
capital of less than 2%, and the HBR obtained a return on capital of only 1.09% on 
its two graving docks at Alexandra Dock. 
Geddes tried to demonstrate that railway ownership did not lead to 
preferential treatment. He stated that the practice at railway-owned graving docks at 
William Wright and Alexandra Dock was to allow every ship repairer his turn, to 
which end, a roster was kept. This was incorrect and in a later session Geddes 
changed it. It was the ships which went on the roster and which were taken in order, 
not the repairers. There were several firrns of ship repairers in Hull who relied upon 
the use of railway owned graving docks. Indeed, even those who possessed their own 
docks still made considerable use of the railway graving docks. Edward Watkin. the 
general manager of the HBR, said that there was a provisional agreement with 
Smith's of Middlesbrough for the lease of the graving docks at the joint dock" 
The Corporation's argument focused on the possibility of preferential 
treatment. Whilst the graving docks at the joint dock were no longer than those at 
Alexandra dock, they were 10 feet (3m. ) wider, and this would give advantage in the 
56 Dow, Great Central, IV. 3, p. 260. 
57 City Archives, Hull, TLP 287. HBR Act, 1913. Commons Parliamentarý Committee Minutes. 
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case of larger ships. " This would accrue to the advantage of the lessees of the docks 
and to the detriment of local ship repairing firms. " 
But these firms were split. The chairman of Hull Chamber of Commerce said 
that it had canvassed opinion from the leading shipowners of the port. Out of sixteen 
they received nine replies, four against, four for, and one neutral. Those in favour 
owned 45 ships, those against 115, (which figure included 99 belonging to Wilson's). 
the neutrals had 5 and those who did not reply represented just 10 ships. The 
chamber decided to remain neutral. Although Wilson's (99 ships) had asked the 
Chamber of Commerce to oppose the leasing proposal, Cockerline's (12 ships) were 
in favour. He went on to say that although Wilson's were now opposing the lease the 
graving docks were constructed as a result of a resolution brought forward in the 
chamber by C. H. Wilson. " 
Counsel for the proposal made much of the fact that in the past the 
Corporation had encouraged the involvement of private capital in ship repairing, 
using public finances. The Central Dry Dock in Hull had been built in 1843 and 
enlarged in 18 7 1. In 18 74 it had been let out by the Corporation, and in 18 83 sold for 
a perpetual rent. The Dock passed into the hands of Wilson's in 1886 becoming the 
Hull Central Dry Dock and Engineering Company Limited, with C. H. Wilson on the 
board. This paralleled what was happening now and was being opposed by the 
Corporation, which had previously been instrumental in the Central Dry Dock 
passing into private ownership. The clear implication was that the threat of monopoly 
58 The size of the largest graving dock at Alexandra Dock was 550 feet (168 m. ) in length and 61 feet 
(18.6 m. ) in width. The largest at the joint dock was 550 feet (168 m. ) in length and 72 feet (22 m-) 
in width. 
59 City Archives, Hull, TLP 287, HBR Act 1913, Commons Parliamentary Committee Minutes. 
60 K. Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull and Barnsley Railway Vol. 1, (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 134. 
H inch Ii ffe, (ed. ), The Hull and Barnsley Railway Vol. 2, p. 96. 
D. Hodgkins, The Second Railway King. The Life and Times ofSir Edward Watkin 1819-1901, 
(Cardiff, 2002), p. 666. 
Edward Watkin was the nephew of the Chairman of the MSLR from 1864 to 1894, Sir Edward 
Watkin, an inveterate opponent of James Staats Forbes. Prior to his appointment as general 
manager of the HBR in 1905 Edward Watkin was mineral agent for the GCR. He immediately set 
about stren theninc, the -rip of the HBR on the coal trade and is credited with much of the modest 9 1-) -- 
success enjoyed by the company after his appointment. 
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came not from the proposed lease. but from Wilson's. Apart from the dry dock. m-o 
large ship-repairing firms were controlled by Wilson"s who had a strong interest in 
shipbuilding and repairing in Hull. " If Wilson's were left out of the opposition to the 
Bill. then firms representing more ships were for the Bill than were against. 
The issue of private ownership continued to dominate the debate. When the 
Bill came before the Lords Committee. on 224th June 1913, Geddes revealed that 
Smith's had been approached by the GCR to lease the graving dock at Immingham 
but refused to deal with this because that were in negotiations for the lease of the 
graving docks at Hull joint dock. Wilson's had urged the joint committee to construct 
graving docks in 1907. " When it was remarked that people would be very glad if a 
crane was erected at Alexandra Dock graving dock, Geddes remarked, 'I have ne\, er 
known a Hull trader who did not desire something that someone else was going to 
pay for. ' 
An important point at issue with the existing ship repairers in Hull was that 
although anyone could inspect a ship in the graving dock and submit a tender for 
repairs, under the tenns of the proposed agreement only Smith"s would be able to use 
the dock. If another repairer obtained the job he would have to remove the ship and 
carry out the work in another dock. This was seen as an advantage to Smith's and a 
drawback to other repairers as extra costs were involved in moving the ship and 
owners were unwilling to move ships unnecessarily because of the attendant risks. 
The HBR's case was that it had agreed to the graving docks only under 
pressure. Edward Watkin said that the HBR had originally been approached by the 
NER in 1908 but did not feel inclined to construct graving docks. But in a later 
approach the NER said that it had been negotiating with a large firm of ship repairers 
in the north, and was satisfied that the ship repairers would either construct docks of 
their own or take docks built by the Joint Committee at a reasonable rent. On that 
basis the HBR gave its consent to the construction of the graving docks. 
61 J. M. Bellamy, 'A Hull Shipbuilding Firm', Business History Vol. 6,1964, pp. 37-40. Wilson's 
took over Earle's Shipbuilders in 190 1. Between the launching of their first ship in 1853 3 and the 
take-over bý Wilson's. Earle's built nearly 400 o of Wilson's ships. 
62 The National Archives, Kew, RAIL 527/416, Hull Joint Dock Committee Directors' Minute Book. 
12 th July 1907. 
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The Corporation reaffin-ned that it had received resolutions against the leasing 
I 
of the graving docks from several bodies and had decided to oppose the leasing when 
36 councillors voted for opposition with none against. ". 
Robert Henry Farrah, the secretary of the National Union of Gasworkers and 
General Labourers whose union had opposed the lease before the Commons 
Committee alleged that subsequently he had been approached by Smith's manager. 
Mr. Annstrong, who asked him not to give evidence before the House of Lords. As 
an inducement he told Farrah that if Smith's came to Hull they would look to him to 
find them labour and would prefer to give trade unionists work. Armstrong denied 
any such pressure had been applied. " 
The outcome was another victory for the Corporation, Wilsons and the other 
opponents of the lease. On I" July the Lords rejected the clause to empower the joint 
committee to lease the two graving docks at Hull to the Smiths. " 
This brought to an end a period of confrontation between the Corporation and 
the NER during which the HBR found itself increasingly siding with the NER 
against the Corporation. The demeanour of the NER had changed from arrogance to 
conciliation and co-operation. There had been no reciprocal change in the 
Corporation's attitude towards the NER. The disputes over the Western Reservation, 
the spurious objections raised over the Stoneferry branch and the Hedon Road 
crossing, and its hypocritical opposition to the graving dock lease showed the 
Corporation had not moved with the times. However, its blighting effect on the 
commerce of the city was best illustrated when it wrecked the proposed NER and 
HBR working agreement of 1909 as a result of the narrow horizons of those had 
risen to power in its ranks. Although it had stood with the HBR and NER in opposing 
amalgamations among other railway companies which may have affected Hull, it had 
not been able to see that protection of the independence of the HBR against the NER 
63 These bodies included the Hull branch of the Ship Constructive and Shipwrights' Association, the 
Hull District Committee of the Boilermakers', the Iron and Steel shipbuilders' Society, the East 
Coast District of the National Union of Gas Workers and General Labourers, Hull Iron Trades 
Employers' Association and Hull and District Chamber of Trade. 
64 City Archives, Hull, TLP 287, HBR Act 1913, Lords Parliamentary Committee Minutes. 
65 RailwaY Times, 5 th jUl , 1913. 
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monopoly was, by the first decade of the twentieth century, an archaic concept which 
could only lead to inefficiency and was ultimatel. v to the detriment of the port. 
Optimism was high when, on 31" August 1913 water ý, vas let into the joint 
dock. " Such was the dock's importance that it was opened on 26 th June 1914 b% 
King George V accompanied by Queen Mary. It was named King George Dock. 67 In 
his address the chairman of the Dock Committee, Sir Hugh Bell, said that the dock 
had access to 400 collieries which annually produced 70 million tons of coal. The 
dock contained forty separate coaling berths with a capacity of up to 800 tons per 
hour each and became operational on Vt August 1914.68 
Three days later the Great War broke out. The new dock was taken over by 
the military denying the NER and the HBR full use of its facilities. Coal traffic was 
to decline throughout the war years and would never recover to anything like pre-war 
levels. Although not foreseen at the outbreak of war this was the beginning of the 
end for the HBR, an end that would result in resounding defeat for Hull Corporation. 
7. The war years. 
The Government took over all railways on the outbreak of war. In Hull the joint dock 
was found to be an excellent area for training troops and was adapted for this purpose 
with rifle ranges, drill halls, recreation rooms, canteens and dormitories. The dock 
had an almost ideal situation on the outskirts of Hull from where troops could easily 
reach the recently built coastal defences. " Shortly after the start of the war the 
partnership at Saltend between the NER and the HBR came into full operation. 
13,000 tons of petroleum were discharged at Saltend jetty. The Anglo-Mexican 
Petroleum Company secured a site of about 12 acres (5 hectares) nearby and built 
storage tanks for fuel oil, kerosene and bitumen. " 
66 Railway News, 6 th September 1913. 
67 Figure 3) 1. Hull Joint Dock. 
68 RailwavVews, 27 Ih June 1914. 
69 Hinchliffe, (ed. ), The Hull and Barnsley RailwaY Vol. 2, p. 199. 
70 Railwai,, Veivs, 31" October &7 th November 1914. 
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There were also important changes to the HBR board in the early ý ears of the 
war. William Shaw Wright, the chainnan, died on I't November 1914 and Colonel 
Charles William Trotter was elected in his place. " He took over at a bad time in the 
company's fortunes. The HBR had suffered a net loss of income as a result of the 
opening of the joint dock. This was because of the nature of the agreement with the 
state regarding losses sustained through wartime controls. Before the opening the 
HBR had been paying the interest on the cost of construction out of capital, but from 
the date of opening it became a revenue expense. In normal circumstances there 
would have been income to cover this but the outbreak of war had arrested all 
development. The arrangements did not cover capital which was unproductive, 
which hit the HBR hard as King George Dock was classed as unproductive capital, 
The HBR's share of this was about fI 1/4million, a substantial proportion of its total 
capital. Although the NER was similarly affected, it was a relatively small proportion 
of its capital. Representations to the Government proved unsuccessful. Even in the 
last few weeks of peace the HBR had not done well with the Joint Dock. It lost 
money due to a miners' strike in April 1914 which lasted about a month. This was 
followed by a seven week strike at Alexandra Dock in May and June. " 
The situation remained serious throughout 1915 and 1916. The use of the 
joint dock by the government limited accommodation for normal trade. The HBR 
share of capital expended on the dock up to 3 1" December 1915 was f 1,358,898 and 
the interest charges for the year 1915 were f 346,93 1. The HBR share of construction 
costs of the HBR and GCR joint line for 1915 was f 33,250 Interest charges were 
T f 9,687. But in February 1917 a change of government policy brought better news. 
The Railway Executive agreed to allow interest on HBR capital on works brought 
into use since 31" December 1912. However, the amount of the HBR claim for 
interest on the capital was not yet settled. In view of the reduction in revenue the 
directors restricted capital expenditure to works that were absolutely necessary. Due 
to the depletion of staff because of the war the HBR was compelled to reduce work 
on rolling stock and permanent way to a minimum with the result that repairs and 
71 Colonel Charles William Trotter was a son of the former chairman, William Trotter. 
72 Railirql, A, 'cws, 20"' February 1915. 
fbid, 19"' February 1916. 
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renewals had fallen into arrears. " Owing to the war the output of the collieries 
connected with the HBR was greatly curtailed. " The overall effect of the war on 
HBR finances was therefore extremely adverse. Government compensation proved 
both tardy and inadequate and problems were exacerbated by staff shortages both 
during and after the war, leading to cutbacks in maintenance and renewals. In 
February 1918 Trotter indulged in a little speculation regarding the future of railways 
after the war. Presciently he predicted a continuance of Government control of 
railways for a considerable period after peace has been concluded. " 
8. The Final years of railway competition, 1918-1921. 
After the war Hull initially benefited from the shipping boom of 1919-20. The state 
regulation of coal freight charges, introduced during hostilities to shift trade from 
short-sea shipping to the railways, ended in July 1919, and in August the 
Government introduced restrictions on the forwarding of coal to Liverpool and other 
Lancashire ports for bunkering purposes. In addition, the sudden lifting of wartime 
restrictions on non-essential goods caused commodities to pour into the country. " 
This provided brief, but welcome, relief for the railway companies serving Hull. 
However, re-organisation of the whole railway industry was more or less 
inevitable. A Select Committee on Transport, set up in 1918, concluded that railways 
had benefited from unified operation during the war and full nationalisation was 
contemplated. Subsequently, the cabinet rejected the idea of nationalisation on the 
grounds of cost and the belief that it would not be popular with an electorate weary 
of wartime government regulations. The railway companies also opposed 
national i sation. The 1919 Act setting up the Ministry of Transport continued the 
government's control of railways until August 1921 giving the first Minister of 
Transport, Sir Eric Geddes, time to re-organise the industry. The Railways Bill, 
74 RailwaY News, 23 rd February 1917. 
75 Ibid, 16 Ih February 1917. 
76 Ibid, 16 th February 1918. 
77 D. H. Aldcroft, 'Port congestion and the shipping boom of 1919-20', Business Histotý', Vol. 3. 
No. 2, July 196 1. pp. 97-106. 
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introduced in May 1921, gave rise to long and controversial debate and finally 
became law on 19th August 192 1. It amalgamated 120 railway undertakings into four 
large groups. " The main objective of the grouping was to reduce inter-company 
rivalry and remove the duplication of facilities, which in the past had led to 
inefficiency and increased costs. An additional aim was to introduce a revised 
railway charging policy. The Minister of Transport estimated that economies NAould 
be in the region of f20 million per annum. " 
The NER had misgivings about the proposals. The original scheme had been 
to group only the NER and HBR, but by May 1920 the GCR, GNR, GER, North 
British Railway and Great North of Scotland Railway had been added. The NER's 
directors thought that the earlier proposal was better. However, on financial grounds 
they recognised that the proposed North Eastern Group would be able to compete for 
the traffic of a large area, and had agreed to the later proposal subject to certain 
safeguards for the NER. Their first concern was that the financial deficiencies in 
other companies, particularly the Scottish ones, should not be shouldered by NER 
shareholders in the shape of reduced compensation. Since for the financial purposes 
of amalgamation the Minister intended to place the Scottish companies in groups by 
themselves, this removed one of the major concerns of the NER. Furthermore, 
companies were to be valued on their net revenue earning prospects. Had these 
concessions not been made then the NER would have had no alternative but to 
oppose the Bill. " 
There was also a good deal of difficulty reconciling the different financial 
structures of the companies to be merged. One problem was the variation in prior 
charges (debentures, etc. ) incurred by the different companies. For instance the 
whole of the GCR income for 1913 was paid away in prior charges; the GER paid 
over 80% and the GNR figure was 65%. In the case of the NER it was only 44%. 
Thus, on the basis of the 1913 accounts, the NER would add somewhere near f 1.3 
78 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee papers, 16 th July 1920. Railway 
Grouping proposals. 
79 H. J. Dyos & D. H. Aldcroft, British Transport, (Leicester, 1971), p. 308. 
M. Bonavia, Railwa. v Policýv between the Wars, (Manchester, 198 1), p. I- 
80 ,d Railwav Gazette, ) June 1920. 
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million to the amount available for dividends on ordinary stock, while no less than 
f 51/2 million would be added to the amount for prior charges due to the , veaker 
financial state of other companies. Considering the NER and the HBR, the net 
income would have to be reduced by some 56% before the dividend on ordinarv 
stocks would disappear, whereas in the Eastern Group as a whole, a reduction of onl\- 
17% of net income would mean that there was no dividend for ordinary shareholders. 
Arranging terrns, which would be fair to all shareholders would be difficult. The 
NER's view was that amalgamation should be by agreement and that aný question of 
compulsion should stand over until experience had been gained of the results of 
voluntary amalgamation. " 
The NER was also strongly opposed to government regulation of the 
railways. It argued that the public would be best served and the railways most 
economically run if companies were left to do their own business. Moreover, the nex", 
groupings would upset long-standing alliances between companies. The NER's 
chairman remarked: 'We have become directly competitive with all our old friends in 
the North Western Group (the MR, LYR and LNWR) and I hope that under the 
proposed system of grouping we shall continue to be friends. There is no denying the 
fact that the old links will be broken and we must become rivals. "' However, some 
shareholders were not impressed with the NER's attitude to weaker companies. One 
wrote to the Railwa Gazette stating that he did not like 'the face of the NER'. He Y 
went on to say, 'The characteristics displayed are not attractive, for there is just a 
tinge of arrogance and self-righteousness without any display of sympathy to less 
fortunate companies'. " 
In November 1920 the HBR and NER considered a merger proposal. This 
was in advance of the Bill authorising the grouping, which was to allow the 
companies to formulate their own proposals that were then to be approved by a 
tribunal. The HBR and NER had come together very closely by this time. The only 
Hull representatives now on the HBR board were the deputy chairman, J. H. Fisher, 
and the two Corporation nominees. On 15 th December a provisional agreement was 
81 Railivai, Gaz-elte, 3 rd June 1920. 
82 lbid, 3 rd June 1920. 
83 
lbid, 3 rd June 1920. 
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reached, despite the fact that Fisher, the deputy chainnan of the HBR, had indicated 
that any proposal for the absorption of the HBR would be \, igorously opposed 84 . This 
was, no doubt, a negotiating ploy to obtain better terms from the NER. If so. the 
tactic worked. Under the proposals debenture holders and preference shareholders 
were to receive the same income as previously. The holders of HBR f 100 ordinary 
stock were to receive f55 in NER consols, which was a fairly generous offer. The 
new company would absorb the joint dock and the Saltend complex, whilst Trotter 
and Fisher were to be given seats on the board. 85 
Hull Corporation seemed determined to stand against the tide of opinion in 
favour of rationalisation. Although the Minister of Transport intended to discuss the 
proposals with representatives of the railway companies and labour, no mention was 
made of the Corporation. " But the Corporation had statutory powers regarding the 
HBR, and as a consequence the Minister agreed to receive a deputation before 
submitting Government proposals. 
At the meeting the Corporation stressed the intimate connection between 
itself and the HBR and that it had always sought to preserve the independence of the 
latter. It argued that the efforts of the Corporation should not now be swept away. 
Geddes rejected this, arguing that the benefits of competition among railways were 
becoming more and more illusory. He pointed out that in 1910 there had been a 
general feeling in Hull that the time was ripe for an understanding between the two 
companies but, due to Corporation opposition, nothing had come of it. The case for 
amalgamation was now much stronger than it had been then. Whilst he accepted that 
Hull, as a community, had fathered and mothered the HBR, he thought that the Act 
84 Railway Gaiette, 2 nd jUly 1920. 
85 Ibid., 3 rd March 1922. 
86 lbid, 9(h jUly 1920. Lt. Commander. Kenworthy asked the Minister of Transport whether he had 
consulted, or intended to consult, the municipal authorities in Hull and the representatives of 
commerce and of organised tabour in that city with regard to the proposed amalgamation of the 
HBR with the NER. Mr. Neal, for the Minister of Transport, said 'The proposals of the 
Government outlined in the Command Paper 787 do not represent a final or detailed scheme 
incapable of modification, and I intend to discuss these proposals with the representatives of the 
railway companies. cornmerce and tabour'. 
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for amalgamation contained sufficient safeguards against possible oppression bN- a 
monopolistic railway. " 
The Chamber of Commerce also entertained hopes of a different and, from 
their point of view, more satisfactory outcome to the grouping proposals. But Geddes 
made it clear that the railway companies were to be grouped together. However, the 
Minister admitted that Hull was in an exceptional position and could. under the 
circumstances, be entitled to exceptional treatment. He accepted that there was a 
feeling in the city that if the mild form of competition which existed between the 
NER and HBR were to be abolished altogether, trade would not develop at the rate 
which was expected. " 
However, such local and regional interests were to be subsumed under what 
the government regarded as being in the national interest. On 15 th December 1920 
the expectations of Hull Corporation and the Chamber of Commerce were dashed 
when news of the provisional agreement between the HBR with the NER was 
announced. Despite this the Corporation still continued its opposition and suggested 
that the HBR be included in the North Western and Midland Group. This was clearly 
a last-ditch attempt to maintain railway competition in Hull. Copies of a petition that 
had been sent to Parliament were circulated to the members of the Chamber of 
Commerce and Shipping, the Hull and District Chamber of Trade, the Hull Corn 
Association and to various public bodies and associations in other parts of the 
country. " A public meeting was held in Hull on 6 th June 1921, convened by the Lord 
Mayor, to protest against the proposed grouping and had a large attendance. A 
resolution was passed at the meeting, protesting at the proposed grouping and was 
forwarded to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Transport and local Members of 
Parliament. 9' 
It was all in vain. The Government gave up control of the railways on 15 th 
August, 1921 and the Railways Act, 1921 received the Royal Assent on I 9th August. 
It was a quirk of fate that Geddes, the Minister who had conceived the scheme for the 
87 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, July and November 1920. 
88 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce AGM, 17 th November 1920. 
89 Appendix 5. Petition of Hull Corporation to Parliament. 
90 Citv Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee papers, July 1920 to June 1921. 
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grouping, leading to the demise of the HBR, was an ex-deput\ general manager of 
the NER. It is interesting to recall that Geddes, in his NER days, had been an 
advocate of energetically pursuing closer relations with the HBR. " 
The consequences of the amalgamation were soon to be felt. The Railuvi, 
Gazette anticipated that HBR passenger services would quickly be diverted from 
Cannon Street to Paragon Station providing villages as Willerby, Kirk Ella, South 
Cave and North Cave, regarded as suburbs of Hull, with a more convenient service. 
It also predicted that Cannon Street Station would be used exclusively for goods 
traffic"'. So it proved. 
Generally speaking the attitude of Hull's traders and commercial interests 
was one of resignation. The Chamber of Commerce, in particular. was in a 
philosophical mood over the amalgamation. The chairman, B. E. Maxsted, in his 
address to the Annual General Meeting in November 1921, reflected on the 
harmonious character of the efforts made by the Corporation and the Chamber to 
retain the independence of the HBR. Regretting the loss of competition brought 
about by the merger, he expressed the hope that the NER would do its best in the 
interests of Hull by assisting to promote trade thereby bringing the port back to its 
pre-war standard and, incidentally, thus benefiting the shareholders. 9' In the event, 
however, such hopes were to be subsumed into the much wider struggle for survival 
faced by the NER's successor, the London and North Eastern Railway, as railways 
faced the onslaught of road competition and economic uncertainty in the 1920s. 
In February 1922 arrangements were announced for the exchange of HBR for 
NER stock, f 100 HBR stock would become f55 NER consols. The share of the HBR 
debt on King George Dock of f 1,581,617 was automatically cancelled. There were 
complaints that HBR shareholders were doing well out of the transfer at the expense 
of the NER, but one shareholder, Mr. Nuttall, was vocal in his support. The chairman 
of the meeting argued that it was extremely advantageous to conclude the 
amalgamation as soon as possible. He stressed that the NER was not a public 
91 K. Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes - Business and Government in War and Peace, p. 6. 
92 Railmo, Ga: ette. 26"' August 192 1. 
93 Central Library, Hull, Chamber of Commerce AGM, 23rd November 192 1. 
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authority dealing with other people's money. This could be taken as a reference to 
the amount of public money the Corporation had spent opposing the NER. 
But Hull's ratepayers had little to complain about. The original investment of 
f 100,000 in the HBR had now become f55.000 NER consols. " Although this \\as a 
good financial deal the Corporation was left holding stock in a company which oý'er 
the years it had so bitterly opposed. The agreement for amalgamation with the NER 
was approved by the proprietors of the HBR at a half-yearly meeting in February 
1921. Amongst other items agreed it provided for the payment of compensation to 
15 the directors for loss of office. 
The last HBR board meeting took place on 28th March 1922. when the 
directors voted themselves f 10,000 compensation for loss of office, although m-o 
seats had been reserved for them on the board of the new NER. Then, at midnight on 
31 st March the HBR ceased to exist. The HBR network consisted of a total single 
line mileage of 3691/2whereas that of the NER was just over 5,000. The new NER. 
which emerged on I st April 1922, had capital of f 89.899,45 5.96 
The merger, driven largely by policies at national level, removed any prospect 
of railway competition in Hull and thus forced the Corporation to adapt to ne" 
circumstances. It brought to an end the period of distrust entertained by the 
Corporation and traders of Hull that was maintained up to and during the passage of 
the Railways Bill through Parliament. Times had changed, and, on Ilth March, 
Ralph L. Wedgwood, soon to be the general manager of the new NER, speaking at 
Hull, said that the company which was about to come into existence would not be the 
old NER any more than it will be the old HBR. Wedgwood expressed the fullest 
confidence that the change would be for the benefit of the port of Hull. " If this 
speech was a meant as a sop to the fears of the commercial community of Hull it was 
hardly likely to allay their anxiety and, in the case of the Corporation, its bitterness. 
at what it considered had been its treacherous betrayal. But as future research will 
perhaps demonstrate, such attitudes, rooted in the commercial and railway politics of 
Q4 City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee meeting minutes, 20th April 1922. 
95 Railwaj, Gazette, 10"' March 1922. 
96 City Archives, Hull, SRL, HBR and NER Annual Reports, 192 1. 
97 Railwav Ga--ette, 31" March 1922. 
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an era in which railways dominated inland transport, were no more adequate in the 
succeeding era of growing road competition as the legislation which had brought 
about the enforced merger of the NER and HBR. 
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CHAPTER10. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
1. Introduction. 
This thesis has examined the relationship between the Corporation of Hull and the 
railway companies serving the port in the context of the macro-economic and 
political environments of the period between 1840 and 1922. More specifically, it has 
analysed the r6le of the HBR in breaking the perceived NER monopoly. It has been 
argued that the Corporation's intransigence was a major factor in its change of status, 
at least as far as the railway situation was concerned. from protector of the port of 
Hull to reactionary stumbling block and that, arguably, from the 1890s, and certainly 
in the twentieth century, the Corporation's political complexion became an 
increasing hindrance to the development of transport facilities in the port. 
A facile view of the association between the NER and Hull Corporation may 
be corporate greed in conflict with civic rectitude. An equally superficial 
interpretation of the actions of the Corporation with regard to the HBR would be to 
adduce that it played a useful part in breaking the NER monopoly by encouraging the 
founding of the HBR, but subsequent inflexibility led to its alienation from the very 
body it was trying to protect. As this thesis has shown, the reality was considerably 
more complex and finely nuanced than this. The Corporation represented diverse 
interests in Hull, the disparate strengths of which varied over the decades, depending 
on factors such as the fluid political situation and the organisational evolution of 
commercial concerns influenced by external commercial threats. Hence, although the 
Corporation's support for the HBR and its antagonism towards the NER were 
immutable, the reasons for this stance, and the effectiveness of the policies therebý' 
predicated, varied during the period covered by the study. In such a context the 
Corporation's actions can be understood as representing the political will of onlý' 
certain of the citizens of the port. 
Similarly the relationship between the NER and HBR may be seen as bullýý 
and victim but this, again. over-simplifies the position. The thesis has demonstrated 
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that the situation must be considered as an evolutionary process driven by 
commercial necessity, the changing constitution of the HBR's controllin,,,,, interests 
and, after 1900, the NER and HBR's shared fears of amalgamations among 
competing railway companies, which could damage their financial interests. The end 
result of these factors was co-operation and a not unwelcome merger, at least on the 
part of the HBR. 
2. The Corporation and the railway and dock companies. 
Hull Corporation was central to the development of the port throughout the 
nineteenth century although it never enjoyed the degree of influence of similar 
bodies in ports such as Liverpool, where municipal politics more closelN, controlled 
the docks. The thesis has illustrated, on several occasions, awareness on the part of 
Hull Corporation of the desirability of taking control of the docks. Although the 
Corporation attempted to restrain what it perceived as the greed and inertia of the 
Dock Company with the 1861 Act restricting that company's dividends to 5%, its 
plans take over the latter and run it as a public trust remained unachieved because 
agreement between traders, other commercial interests. and the ratepayers of the port 
could not be reached. But Hull Corporation was, at least, an early advocate of good 
railway connections. In 1836 it subscribed to the HSR and it supported the abortive 
Hull and Barnsley railway scheme in 1845. However, Corporation support for the 
HBR in 1879 went far beyond mere financial backing, although there was a 
considerable amount of this. 
There can be little doubt that the Corporation acted as it did in what it 
perceived to be the best interests of Hull, subject always to the proviso that that those 
perceptions were refracted through the prism of particular class and business 
interests, although some of its actions, particularly its opposition to the joint dock 
scheme, may be construed as misguided. For the most part it displayed a pellucidity 
lacking in the actions of the railway and dock companies, which was unsurprising, as 
their objective was to make profits for their shareholders. But the duplicity of the 
railway companies went further. The NER showed that it was prepared to use 
underhand tactics such as bribing the Dock Company to prevent opposition to its 
Bills, and promoting spurious railway schemes such as that to Kirkella. The HBR 
used similar sophistry when it delayed giving details of the proposed 1888 MR 
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amalgamation and subsequently tried, through its wordsmith Forbes, to bamboozle 
the Corporation into letting it sell out to the NER, an action which Forbes had 
privately favoured for many years despite his repeated denials. At the same time the 
Corporation and the Hull interests were losing their grip in the HBR board, as the 
realities of business life dictated that the HBR could not exist merely as a symbol of 
Hull's independence. It had to look to London for finance and the price of this was 
control by London interests. The Corporation was kept in the dark over the proposed 
joint dock scheme and the final treachery was the HBR directors' supposed 
opposition to the amalgamation with the NER, when they were in fact discussing 
terms, including a handsome payoff to themselves. Throughout all this chicanery the 
Corporation remained steadfast to the principles of corporate independence enshrined 
in the 1880 Act incorporating the HBR. 
The thesis has produced much evidence for the assertion that, from the late 
1850s, the Corporation did all it could to make life at Hull as difficult as possible for 
the NER. It was an article of faith with the Corporation that any contact it had with 
the NER was the equivalent of supping with the devil. Their relationship was marked 
by a growing antipathy as a result of an increasingly aggressive posture on the part of 
the Corporation fuelled, in part, by the arrogance and complacency of the NER. 
However, in the early years of the twentieth century the relationship between the 
HBR and the Corporation was cooling and the former began to see the efforts of the 
Corporation as obstruction rather than protection. The idea of the HBR as 'Hull's 
railway' was dear to the hearts of the Corporation members, some of the proprietors 
of the HBR and many of the inhabitants of Hull, but this concept did not accord with 
reality. These groups beatified the HBR, elevating it to the status of an emblem for 
Hull, rather than seeing it for what it really was; a commercial undertaking, and not a 
particularly successful one at that. The fact was that in the difficult early years of the 
HBR the traders of Hull were manifesting gross hypocrisy by asserting that the 
railway must be preserved at all costs, whilst giving it insufficient support by way of 
traffic. 
Two problems for the HBR have been examined in this thesis. Firstly. that 
although the HBR had been conceived as a coal line, it was not such for the first 
fifteen years of its existence. and during this period it faced a Herculean task in 
building up revenue against existing competition. Many of the trains run in the 
carlier years were mixed freight and it was here that the HBR faced stiff 
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competition. ' The second problem was its ostracism by other railýNav companies. 
especially the NER and MSLR. Until the opening of the HBR, the MSLR and the 
Don Navigation, which it owned, enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the transport of 
South Yorkshire coal to the Humber ports. This made the MSLR unwilling to do any 
favours for the HBR, which found itself isolated. ' 
Counter-factual history is a risky business but it is reasonable to conclude that 
the situation could been very different if the 1878 Hull Docks Bill proposing the nexý 
deep-water dock at Marfleet had been successful and had the dock been served bý 
the NER as was proposed. For once the Hull Dock Company showed initiati\ýe and 
enterprise, but it surrendered as a result of opposition to its Bill. Such pusillanimitN, 
iii the face of resistance was bad enough, but by 1879 the Dock Company had a new 
chairman, conservative in all respects, whose policy was to suspend progress and 
express total satisfaction with the existing dock accommodation notwithstanding 
overwhelming evidence that more was required. 
This lack of resolve eventually worked to the benefit of the port, although the 
accomplishment of this took more than twenty-five years. Had it not been for the 
failure of the 1878 Dock Company Bill and Corporation support, the HBR would not 
have come into existence, nor would Alexandra Dock have been built. Without 
Alexandra Dock the NER would have been compelled to provide deep-water 
facilities. However, with the later construction of the joint dock, the port enjoyed the 
considerable advantage of two large deep-water docks, directly as a result of the 
provisions of the Act transferring the Dock Company to the NER. The irony was that 
although the joint dock brought greater prosperity to Hull the Corporation alone 
carried on a vigorous and sustained campaign against it. 
It is almost certain that without the intervention of the Corporation the HBR 
would have amalgamated with the MR in 1888 and the clauses placed in the 
agreement for the protection of the NER would have effectively reinstated its 
monopoly. The monopoly would, in fact, have been more complete, as it would have 
given the NER access to Alexandra Dock, at the time the largest deep-water dock on 
See Chapter 7. 
B. Hinchliffe, (ed. ), The Hull and Barnsley Railway, Iol. 2, (Sheffield, 1980). p. 50. 
2 See Chapter 5. 
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the East Coast. The proposal for a sale of the HBR to the NER in 1889 kNas a gross 
error of judgement by Smith and Forbes. It should have been obvious to them that 
the Corporation would never countenance such a proposal despite the eloquence of 
Forbes and the removal of the Hull directors from the board. The remedy for the 
HBR's difficulties was the obtaining of capital from proprietors rather than other 
railway companies, and it was this course which eventually resulted in the cornpaný' 
being released from Chancery with a subsequent steady growth in prosperity. 
A problem faced by the traders, and the HBR in particular, was that of turning 
Hull into a major coal port. The thesis has pointed out on several occasions that Hull 
had great difficulty in obtaining hard steam coal for bunkering and export due to the 
NER policy of charging a considerably higher rate for South Yorkshire coal as 
opposed to the softer West Yorkshire coal. This made it particularly difficult for Hull 
to compete with Grimsby, to which the MSLR carried South Yorkshire coal at lower 
rates. A factor inducing the NER to join the HBR in the joint dock scheme was the 
emergence of Hull as a coal port. With the opening of the SYJR in 1894, the HBR 
acquisition of the HSYER in 1898 and the opening of Alexandra Dock extension in 
1899 coal exports from Hull rose sharply, most being handled by Alexandra Dock. ' 
The NER, by this time, realised that if it wished to participate in the exploitation of 
the South Yorkshire coalfield it would need a new dock with modem coal handling 
appliances. 
When the Dock Company passed into the hands of the NER in 1893 it was 
assumed at the time, by informed opinion in Hull, that the fonner could not survive 
without the capital injected by the NER, which was correct. However, the NER had 
an urgent need for improved facilities, particularly deep-water access at Hull, to 
enable it to compete with Alexandra Dock, and it realised that the Dock Company 
would never be able to fulfil these requirements. The purchase of the Dock Company 
by the NER brought into focus problems that had built up over the years as a result of 
poor management and lack of foresight. Four of the docks, Humber, Railway, Princes 
and Queens were obsolete by contemporary standards, being town centre docks, with 
access railways running inconveniently through the streets, and the lock entrances of 
those docks were inadequate. Although in 1893 the NER had possession of some 149 
Figure 
-3-33. 
Hull Coal exports. 
285 
acres (62 hectares) of docks against 46 acres (19 hectares) owned by the HBR the 
share of trade of the old docks continued to fall. year by year. ' 
A major step forward in 1899 was the agreement between the NER and HBR 
to build the joint dock. However. it should not be assumed that this proposal XNas 
driven by a mutual feeling of goodwill between the companies. After se\-Cral 
unsuccessful attempts to obtain its own deep water facilities at Hull, thwarted mainIN- 
by the Corporation and the Humber Conservancy. the NER reluctantly concluded 
that its only option was to fall back on the 1893 clauses for construction of a joint 
dock with the HBR. The situation was also unsatisfactory for the HBR, which found 
that because of the 1893 Dock Amalgamation Bill it was now being forced to par-take 
in the construction of a dock which would be a rival to Alexandra Dock and to which 
the NER would have access. It is little wonder that the scheme progressed so slowlý,. 
The joint dock proposal was received favourably by the entire business community 
and endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Trade. Only the 
Corporation opposed the scheme for reasons examined in chapter 8. Its proposal to 
appoint directors to the joint dock board and to impose other conditions was smartly 
rebuffed and the success of the Bill left it completely isolated. 
The early years of the twentieth century were marked by a series of quarrels 
between the Corporation and the NER, where it seemed that the former would spare 
no efforts to irritate and frustrate the latter. The case which, above all, illustrated the 
intransigence of the Corporation and its uncompromising hostility towards the NER, 
was the latter's attempt to purchase or lease the western reservation in 1911, when 
the Corporation made it clear that it would not sell land to the NER and would only 
lease on stringent conditions. However, it was, at the same time. inviting the HBR to 
purchase land there. It is little wonder that relations between the NER and the 
Corporation reached their nadir. 
But within two years a radical change had taken place. The NER and HBR, 
initially brought together by fears of amalgamation among competing railway 
companies, were co-operating in the Saltend project, and in the graving dock dispute 
of 1913 the HBR, alongside the NER, found itself opposing the Corporation. 
Although the Corporation emerged as the victor in the dispute it had become clear L- 
Figure 34. Hull Docks tonnage. 
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that in its choice of allies the HBR now found the NER preferable to the Corporation. 
whose conservatism it considered to be a hindrance to progress. 
3. Municipal politics and business influence. 
Irving asserts that the merchants of Hull failed to realise that they did not have a 
divine right to trade with the West Riding, and that although early rates had been 
based on a mileage principle, by the time of the formation of the NER in 1854 it had 
become apparent that the system was detrimental to the economy of the railway 
industry. ' This argument would certainly not have been accepted by the traders of 
Hull, who, for the larger part of the second half of the nineteenth century, perceived 
the NER's equal rates policy as being detrimental to their businesses. I have argued 
that the disputes over charges need to be seen in the context of the general perception 
of traders throughout the country, that railway companies were monopolies in need 
of regulation. 
The thesis has demonstrated the importance of the attitude of business 
interests in the relationship between Hull Corporation, the docks and the railways. It 
has also argued that the posture of the business interests was both fractured and fluid. 
The most powerful businessmen in the port, the Wilson brothers were a paradigm for 
this contention, moving from initial support for the HBR to a stance where they were 
prepared to damage it by taking trade from Alexandra Dock. Furthermore, Charles 
Wilson moved from a position of hostility to the NER over its opposition to the Hull 
South and West Junction Railway to one of co-operation with the Wilson's and NER 
shipping company. Initially the 1879 scheme for the HBR was supported by the 
entire business community, which encompassed both Liberals such as the Wilson 
brothers and Smith, and Conservatives such as Pope, Grotrian and Massey. But the 
critical point was reached in the 1880 parliamentary elections when the 
Conservatives put up Pope, an energetic advocate of free trade. against C. H. Wilson. 
Wilson left the board of the NER and threw his considerable commercial and 
political influence behind the new railway, winning the seat by a large majority. ' Not 
5 R. J. Irving, The North Eastern Railwai, Company 18-0-1914, (Leicester, 1976). p. 121. 
6 G. R. Parkes, The Parliamentary Representation ofTorkshire, (Hull, 1886). p. I 11. 
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all of this support came from the business community. of course, but the ýýax, e of 
popular opinion in favour of Wilson and the HBR was a significant factor in shapimg 
the Corporation's attitude to Hull's railways. 
For much of the 1880s and early 1890s benevolent liberalism, as personified 
by Charles Wilson, dominated the politics of Hull shipping and ste\ edoring 
businesses. Indeed Wilson had encouraged his dock workers to join a trade union 
with the result that Hull docks were. to all intents and purposes, a closed shop, albeit 
a closed shop that, by and large, fell in with Wilson's , vay of working. Alongside this 
increase in unionisation of mainly unskilled workers there occurred a growth of the 
Hull Trades Council, which had been reformed in 1881. A result of this was a steady 
increase of working class representation in local government. By 1894 there \N-ere 
eight Trades Council representatives on the Corporation. ' 
The Hull dock strike of 1893 accelerated this shift of local political power 
from the larger industrialists to the smaller traders of the port and the organised 
working-class. Wilson's activities during and after the strike brought about a change 
in the mood of those who depended on him for their living, a change that rippled 
through the social and political fabric of the town. Wilson was an unwilling 
figurehead for the employers and the Shipping Federation, but figurehead he was. 
The problem was the dichotomy of Wilson's Liberal-Labour alliance, which boosted 
both his political persona and his position as Hull's leading industrialist. situations 
that were mutually conflicting. Wilson's actions in the dock strike dented his 
reputation as a Radical Liberal and in the 1895 general election he was opposed by 
Hull's first Labour candidate, Tom McCarthy. However, the voters were not yet 
ready for such radical change. Despite the effect of the strike Wilson won the seat. 
defeating McCarthy by 6,637 votes to 1,400. ' This conservatism, in terms of local 
politics was reflected in the balance of power at the local level, although here the 
issue was partly one of a lack of organisation by working-class radicals. 
In 1894 the Trades Council had formed a progressive party which 
incorporated radical Liberals, but from 1895 onwards it moved to the left and its 
initial energy was dissipated as attitudes hardened towards Socialist groups. This 
7 R. Brown, lVatet. -front Organisation in Hull, (Hull, 1972), p. 6. 
8 J. Markham, Colouýlul Characters, (Beverleý . 1992), p. 105. 
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resulted in a shift from conventional liberalism to a more radical liberal view in the 
constitution of the Corporation and a bias in favour of those lesser ranks of the 
traders of the port who, although radical politically. remained conservatiN-e in their 
business perspective, and still perceived the NER as the ogre who brought all ills. 
After 1895 the Liberal-Labour supporters on the Corporation were uncoordinated 
and undisciplined and there was no effective and organised left-wing caucus to 
balance the increasing identification of the Corporation with policies determined býý 
the Chamber of Trade. All of these shifts had an influence on Hull's attitude towards 
its railways. 
A factor focusing the minds of the major commercial interests in Hull during 
the 1890s was the construction of the Manchester Ship Canal. C. H. Wilson had used 
the threat of competition from Manchester as justification for an amalgamation of the 
NER and HBR. His view was that of a major businessman and was diametricallý- 
opposed to that of the smaller traders of the port, the very people who had an 
increasing representation on the council. By 1897 there were three distinct 
viewpoints being expressed among Hull's business and political interests. C. H. 
Wilson was advocating amalgamation of the NER and HBR; the Chamber of 
Commerce was opposed to amalgamation but recognised the need for better dock 
facilities and was quite happy for them to be supplied by the NER; and the 
Corporation opposed an amalgamation and anything else involving the NER, 
blinkered by its hostility to that company. 
There is a similarity between the business pathways of Wilson's and the 
HBR. Although the Wilson brothers dominated the economic and social networks of 
the town their business suffered in the long-term as a result of its structure. It was a 
family firm rooted in the economy of Hull and, until 1891, a family partnership. 
Even when it became a private limited company in 1891 financial control remained 
vested in the family. This led to an inability to raise capital to compete with other 
joint-stock shipping companies. Under-capitalisation led to stagnation. Starkey 
asserts that the Wilson enterprise bore the stamp of the merchant world of the mid- 
nineteenth century, a mqjor factor leading to its absorption by the Ellerman Line in 
1916, six years before the HBR ceased to exist. Nonetheless this business structure 
did not inhibit the expansion of Wilson's into the largest privately-owned shipping 
company in the world for much of the nineteenth century. Its weakness was that it 
could not sustain growth in the face of competition from joint-stock shipphio r_1 ltý 
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companies 9. Similarly, the HBR suffered from the small scale of its conception. being 
tied largely in terms of trade. and therefore revenue, to the micro-economN of the 
region in which it operated. It was under-capitalised and even its access to London 
money at a later stage could not overcome the basic weakness that it was too small to 
be viable as a long-term railway company. The grouping of railways accelerated its 
amalgamation with the NER, but even without government intervention the HBR 
could not have survived on its own. 
As the thesis has shown the factors leading to the demise of the HBR should 
be considered in the wider context of the national railway situation which developed 
in the early years of the twentieth century. Proposals for amalgamations between 
railway companies in the drive for greater efficiency, from which the NER and HBR 
were not immune, made closer co-operation between the two companies inevitable. 
But the small traders and municipal authorities of Hull existed in a micro-economic 
world totally at odds with the outlook of big business, which included the railway 
companies. The zealotry of local government could not save the HBR when local 
influence came into conflict with the policy of railway grouping decided upon by 
national government. Although we may conclude that the HBR served its purpose as 
an instrument by which local monopoly was challenged, it outlived that purpose, a 
fact which its protector and benefactor, the Corporation of Hull, could not or would 
not accept. 
By the time of the NER and HBR merger in 1922 the wheel had turned full- 
circle. The new NER had a more total monopoly than its predecessor had ever 
achieved. It provided the only railway access to Hull and owned all the docks. But 
monopoly was no longer an issue. The importance of coal exports was declining and 
competition was not to be from other railways, but from the emerging road haulage 
industry. Another chapter had opened in the history of Hull as a major seaport. 
This thesis thus contributes to the wider historiography of railways and ports 
and also that of regional economic development. As I noted in the introduction the 
historiography of railways is vast and that of ports somewhat less so. But academic 
works dealing with railway and port interfaces and the attendant municipal politics 
D. J. Starkey, 'Ownership structures in the British Shipping Industry: The Case of Hull, 1820-1916'. 
International Journal qf 1 laritime History, Vol. 8, No. 2, December 1996, pp. 86-95. 
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are few, and although Simmons and Jackson have addressed the subject to a limited 
extent, I have argued that theirs is a broad-brush approach, which precludes specific 
case studies. " Detailed studies of railway and port interfaces are extremelý rare, and 
although Jarvis has produced analytical studies of the situation in Liverpool. there is 
scope for more academic research with regard to the situation at other major ports, 
London, Southampton and Bristol being suitable candidates. " This would enable us 
to move towards a greater understanding of the interplay between the various bodies 
involved in port development and to identify factors influencing the policy making 
process in this important field of transport history. 
10 J. Simmons, The Railiva. V in Tovt, n and Country 1830-1913, (Newton Abbot, 1986), pp. 196-224. 
G. Jackson, The Histol-v and Archaeology qf Ports, (Tadworth, 1983), pp. 78-124. 
A. Jarvis, Liverpool Central Docks, 1799-1905 -An Illustrated History, (Stroud, 1991). 
A. Jarvis, 'The Members of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board and Their Way of Doing 
Business', International Journal qf Maritime History, Vol. 6, (June 1994), p 123. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
CHRONOLOGY, 1774-1922. 
1774 Hull Dock Act obtained. 
1778 Hull Dock opened. 
1801 Corporation empowered to make a ferry and pier. 
1802 Powers obtained for a further dock at Hull (Humber Dock). 
1809 Humber Dock opened. 
1814 Steamships arrive on Humber. 
1824 Leeds and Hull Railroad Company proposed. 
1825 London Northern Railroad planned. 
Leeds and Selby Railway surveyed. 
1826 Port of Goole opened by ACN. 
1829 Junction Dock opened. 
18310 Leeds & Selby Railway Bill receives Royal Assent. 
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1834 Leeds & Selby Railway opened. 
1835 York and North Midland Railway Company formed. 
Hull and Selby Railway proposed. 
1836 Hull and Selby Railway Bill receives Royal Assent. 
1838 Prospectus issued for Queen's Dock Company. 
1839 YNMR reaches Milford Junction. 
1840 Leeds & Selby Railway taken over by George Hudson. 
Hull and Selby Railway opened. 
1845 Hull and Selby Railway leased by YNMR. 
Hull - Bridlington Railway authorised. 
York, Hull and East and West Yorkshire Junction Railway proposed. 
Hull and Barnsley Junction Railway proposed. 
Leeds and Thirsk Railway Act receives Royal Assent. 
1846 Railway Dock opened. 
Hull-Bridlington Railway opened. 
Act obtained for construction of Paragon Station. 
Hull and Lincoln Direct Railway proposed. 
Hull-Hornsea Railway proposed. 
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1847 Manchester & Leeds Railway becomes LYR. 
1848 Paragon Station opened. 
LYR absorbs Wakefield, Pontefract and Goole Railway. 
1850 Victoria Dock opened. 
1851 Leeds and Thirsk Railway name changed to Leeds Northern Railway. 
1852 Act for establishment of Humber Conservancy obtained. 
YNMR obtains powers to construct railway to Victoria Dock. 
Leeds Northern Railway opened. 
Prospectus issued for Hull-Holdemess Railway. 
1853 Victoria Dock Harbour entrance opened. 
Victoria Dock Branch Railway opened. 
Proposal for amalgamations to form NER. 
West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway Company Act receives Royal 
Assent. 
Hull-Holderness Railway Act obtained. 
1854 Bill for Dock Company to raise f 1,500,000. 
Old Dock and Junction Docks renamed Queen's and Prince's Docks 
respectively. 
North Eastern Railway Company (NER) Bill received Royal Assent. 
Hull-Holdemess Railway opened. 
NER gives up Barton ferry. 
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1855 First Humber Agreement concluded. 
1856 Midland Agreement concluded. 
Hartlepool Agreement concluded. 
1859 Dock Company introduces Bill for dock on the Citadel site. 
1860 West Dock Company fon-ned. 
Hull & Holderness Railway leased to NER. 
Proposal for railway from Staddlethorpe to Thome. 
1861 Dock Company Bill for Western Dock receives Royal Assent. 
Beverley and Homsea railway proposed. 
Hedon and Aldbrough railway proposed. 
NER proposes line from Staddlethorpe to Rawcliffe and Askem. 
LYR proposes railway from Hull to South Yorkshire. 
MSLR proposes railway from Hull to South Yorkshire. 
Proposal for Hull and West Riding Junction Railway. 
1862 Victoria Dock extension commenced. 
Hull & Holdemess Railway purchased by NER. 
Hull-Homsea Railway Act authorised. 
NER proposal for railway to Thome rejected. 
1863 NER absorbs Stockton and Darlington Railway Company. 
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1863 NER obtains Act for Hull-Doncaster railway. 
1864 Victoria Dock extension completed. 
Victoria Dock branch railway doubled. 
Hull & Holderness railway trains run to Paragon Station. 
Hull-Homsea railway opened. 
Hartlepool Railway absorbed by NER. 
1865 Second Humber Agreement Concluded. 
NER subscribes f 50,000 to the Dock Company and opens 
negotiations regarding a lease or amalgamation. No agreement 
reached. 
Proposal for Hull, Lancashire and Midland Counties Railway. 
Proposal for Hull, West Yorkshire and Lancashire Railway. 
1866 Corporation introduces Bill for a Dock Trust. 
Hull-Hornsea railway transferred to NER. 
1867 Royal Commission on Railways vindicates NER rates policy. 
1869 Albert Dock opened. 
C. H. Wilson becomes a director of the Dock Company. 
Hull-Doncaster railway opened. 
1870 Final Humber agreement concluded. 
1872 Recommendation for a dock to the west of Albert Dock. 
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1872 NER purchases Hull-Selby Railway. 
Blockage of railways and docks at Hull. 
Proposal for Hull. South and West Junction Railway. 
1873 William Wright Dock opened. 
Hull, South and West Junction Railway Bill fails. 
C. H. Wilson appointed director of NER. 
1874 MS&LR proposal for independent goods station at Hull. 
MS&LR exercises running powers to Hull for passenger traffic. 
NER proposal for line to Kirkella rejected. 
NER and LYR subscribe f 50,000 to Hull Dock Company. 
1878 Dock Company, with NER support, introduces Bill for docks at 
Saltend. 
Dock Company withdraws Bill for new dock. 
1879 William Wright resigns as Chairman of Dock Company. Succeeded 
by J. W. Pease. 
Proposal put forward for HBR and new dock. 
Dock Company invited to participate in construction of new dock. 
Bill for HBR goes before Parliament. 
Proposal for Hull, Huddersfield and West Riding Railway. 
Church Fenton, Cawood and Wistow Railway obtains Act. 
1880 Dock Companly refuses to participate in new dock scheme. 
Smith removed from Dock Company board. 
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1880 Smith installed as Sheriff of Hull. 
HBR Bill receives royal Assent. 
Prospectus issued for HBR. 
Church Fenton, Cawood and Wistow Railway proposes extension to 
HBR at Drax. 
1881 Cutting of first sod of HBR. 
Action brought in Chancery against HBR to restrain payments out of 
capital. 
1882 Act obtained by HBR to legalise payments from capital. 
Act obtained by HBR for Huddersfield and Halifax extension and fish 
dock at Marfleet. 
Promotion of East and West Yorkshire Union Railways. 
1883 Church Fenton. Cawood and Wistow Railway name changed to Selbý 
and Mid-Yorkshire Union Railway. 
Proposal for Leeds, Church Fenton and Hull Junction Railway. 
Proposal for Hull and Lincoln Railway. 
1884 London Committee of HBR shareholders formed by Sir Francis Head. 
Grierson called in to report on HBR management. 
HBR attempts to raise further f 1,800,000 preference stock. 
Lloyds Bonds issued. 
HBR construction stops. 
Act obtained to raise further f 1,500,000 stock. 
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1884 Proposal for Scarborough and West Riding Railway. 
Forbes and Swarbrick appointed as joint managing directors ol'HBR. 
HBR construction restarts. 
1885 Alexandra Dock opened. 
HBR opened. 
LYR exercise running powers to Hull. 
War of rates breaks out between HBR and Dock Company. 
1886 Huddersfield and Halifax extension abandoned. 
Writs issued against HBR by creditors. 
1887 Dock Company introduces a Bill to make further provision with 
respect to rates and dues and to enable it to sell or lease and to transfer 
its undertaking to the MS&LR, the LYR, the NER or the LNWR or to 
one or more of them. 
Start of Sculcoates dispute. 
NER fails in Sculcoates dispute. 
Writs issued against HBR by debenture holders. 
Hull and North Western Junction Railway formed to take over part of 
original HBR extension railways. 
NER reduces rates. 
Proposed MR and HBR amalgamation. 
1888 MR Amalgamation Bill withdrawn. 
Corporation introduces scheme for a Dock Trust. 
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1888 HBR and Dock Company turn down Dock Trust scheme. 
Dock Company introduces Bill for power to lease or sell its 
undertaking to the NER. This to proceed concurrently with a Bill 
introduced by the HBR for the same purpose. 
HBR Bill and Dock Bill fail. 
1889 Abortive proposal for amalgamation of HBR and NER. 
Dock Company introduces abortive Bill for the purposes of 
empowering the sale and transfer of its estate to the NER, giving tit 
powers to levy dues on lighters in the River Humber and enabling it to 
construct a deep-water entrance to Albert Dock. 
Hull directors removed from HBR board. 
HBR Act obtained to raise extra f2,000,000. 
HBR released from Chancery. 
1891 Dock Company asks NER to provide capital for dock improvements. 
Proposal defeated by shareholders at a Whamcliffe meeting. 
HBR pays first dividend. 
1892 Proposal for SYJR. 
Swarbrick resigns from HBR board. 
Act obtained for SYJR. 
Bill introduced by Dock Company for amalgamation with NER. 
Bill introduced by NER for new dock at Marfleet. 
Both Bills fail. 
1893 NER introduces Bill for amalgamation with Dock Company. 
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1893 Amalgamation Bill receives Royal Assent. 
Hull dock strike. 
1894 SYJR opened. 
1895 Buckingham Pope attacks HBR board. 
Lambert Committee appointed to look into HBR management. 
Committee exonerates HBR management. 
Smith resigns from HBR board. 
NER proposes amalgamation with HBR. 
1896 HBR board increased from nine to eleven. 
HBR raises f 300,000 extra capital. 
NER and HBR Amalgamation Bill withdrawn. 
NER prompts the Hull and Netherlands Steam Shipping Company. 
1897 HSYER Bill receives Royal Assent. 
NER introduces dock improvement Bill. 
NER withdraws Bill for dock improvements. 
Deame Valley Railway incorporated. 
Gibb initiates traffic apprentice scheme on NER. 
1898 HBR takes over HSYER. 
NER introduces dock improvement Bill. 
NER withdraws Bill because of opposition from Corporation and 
Humber Conservancy. 
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1898 HBR raises f450,000 additional capital for infrastructure to deal xvith 
traffic from HSYER. 
NER & HBR deposit Bill for Joint Dock. 
1899 Joint Dock Bill receives Royal Assent. 
Cadeby Colliery Company sues HBR. 
Alexandra Dock extension opened. 
1900 NER Steamships Bill receives royal Assent. 
John Fisher (Chairman HBR) dies. Massey proposed. Wright 
appointed. 
1901 Shireoaks, Laughton and Maltby Railway obtains Act. 
NER replace Hedon Road level crossing by a bridge. 
1902 HSYER opened. 
HBR (South Yorkshire Extension Lines) Bill introduced. 
NER Joint Railway with MR, GCR, LYR and GNR (South Yorkshire 
Joint Railway) proposed. 
Proposal to reduce size of Joint Dock. 
NER Bankers (J. & W. Pease) became insolvent. 
1903 NER introduce Bill for new swing bridge at Wilmington. 
Strike at Denaby Colliery. 
1904 NER quadruples Selby branch from Hessle to Brough and doubles 
Withemsea Branch. 
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1905 NER concludes agreement with Wilson shipping line. 
NER submits Bill for pier at Sunk Island. 
HBR changes name from Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction 
Railway and Dock Company to Hull and Barnsley Railý, vaý Company. 
HBR granted running powers into Sheffield. 
Hull and Barnsley Railway (Steam Vessels) Bill presented. 
1906 Wilson's and North Eastern Railway Shipping Companý, Limited 
incorporated. 
Contract awarded for Joint Dock. 
Hull and Bamsley Railway (Steam Vessels) Bill receives Royal 
Assent. 
Hull Corporation introduces Bill for pier and wharf 
1907 Hull and Barnsley Railway sailings discontinued. 
Riverside Quay opened. 
HBR obtains act for construction of a pier at Alexandra Dock. 
1908 Curtailment of HBR passenger services announced. 
Proposal for Nottingham - Hull Railway. 
NER proposes construction of oil terminal at Saltend. 
1909 South Yorkshire Joint Railway opened. 
HBR, GC & MR Joint Line from Braithwell to Dinnington opened. 
Act obtained for construction of Gowdall and Braithwell (HBR & GC 
Joint). 
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1909 HBR resumes full passenger services. 
NER and HBR propose working agreement. 
NER Bill for railway to Saltend. 
1910 Proposal for Lincoln - Hull Railway. 
NER and HBR working agreement fails due to Corporation 
opposition. 
1913 Bill introduced for joint NER and HBR ownership of Saltend. 
NER and HBR agree access to Saltend over high level route. 
1914 Joint dock opened. 
1916 Gowdall & Braithwell Joint Line (HBR & GCR) opened. 
1920 Transport Bill proposes amalgamation of NER and HBR. 
1921 HBR approves amalgamation with NER. 
1922 HBR amalgamated with NER. 
305 
APPENDIX 2. 
EXTRACT FROM THE HUMBER AGREEMENT, 1870. 
'Articles of agreement made the first day of February between the Manchester, 
Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Company, the London and North Western 
Railway Company, the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company and the North 
Eastern Railway Company with the object (without prejudice to other agreements) of 
developing the traffic of Hull and Grimsby with Manchester, Liverpool, Ashton and 
Staleybridge and for the purpose of providing for a division of receipts arising from 
goods traffic and for making certain arrangements respecting all traffic between the 
above named places :- 
That for the purposes of this agreement the term "Manchester" shall include Cross 
lane, Victoria, Longsight, Liverpool road, London road, Ashbury's. Ardwick, 
Openshaw, Oldham road, Salford, Oldfield road, Pendleton, Miles Platting, Newton 
Heath, Beswick and all present and future stations between any of these places and 
Manchester including all stations in Manchester used or owned by the companies 
parties to this agreement or any of them. 
That the term -Liverpool- shall include Broad Green, Preston road, Walton Junction, 
Mossley Hill, St. Michaels, Otters Pool, Mersey road and all present and future 
stations between any of these places and Liverpool including all stations in Liverpool 
used or owned by the companies parties to this agreement or any of them. 
That the term "Hull" shall include New Holland and all stations in Hull on the North 
Eastern Railway Company's Victoria Dock branch used or owned by the companies 
parties to this agreement or any of them and -Grimsby" shall include Grimsby. 
Grimsby Docks and Cleethorpes. 
That the term "goods" shall include cattle and all items carried by goods trains 
except coals and coke. 
That the term "passenger traffic" shall include horses, carriages, dogs, parcels. yeast. 
tish and all other things by passenger trains. Mails are not included in this agreement. 
That the passenger traffic between Liverpool, Manchester. Ashton and Staleybridge 
and Hull and Grimsby shall be carried by the various routes at equal rates and fares, 
)06 
such rates being fixed and settled from time to time at the meetings of the 
Conference of Managers. 
That the receipts derived from goods traffic passing between Manchester. Ashton 
and Staleybridge on the one hand and Hull and Grimsby on the other hand shall be 
divided in the following proportions. viz: - to the Leeds route 271/2%; to the 
Normanton route 133/4%: to the Goole route 133/4%; to the Sheffield or Manchester. 
Sheffield and Lincolnshire route 45%: and the companies party to this agreement 
agree to forward and receive traffic not otherwise consigned by the routes above- 
mentioned, subject to such alterations as the Conference may from time to time 
determine'. 
Source: The National Archives, Kew, RAIL527/568. 
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APPENDIX 3. 
ROAD AND RAIL TRAFFIC AT LEVEL CROSSINGS IN HULL, 1898 & 
1909. 
The Corporation of Hull carried out a census of traffic at the major road level 
crossings for the week ending 4th January 1898. The census was taken dail\ between 
the hours of 6 a. m. and 9 p. m. 
No. of Trains Time gates closed Pedestrians Vehicles other Trams 
than trams 
Anlaby Rd. 704 20 h. 20 rn. 12 s. 45,726 14,098 884 
Beverley Rd. 505 16 h. 46 m. 45 s. 98,430 19,854 995 
Hessle Rd. 774 27 h. 13 rn. 0 s. 7,732 1,632 ---- 
Holdemess Rd. 330 9 h. 44 rn. 30 s. 59,496 20,068 677 
Hedon Rd. 913 23 h. II rn. 30 s. 47,411 10,249 923 
Source: City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee Mi nutes 12th January 1898. 
A further census was taken during the week ending 22 nd April 1909 between the 
hours of 8 a. m. and IIp. m. 
No. of trains Time gates closed Pedestrians Vehicles other Trams 
than trams 
Anlaby Rd. 868 22 h. 56 m. 0 s. 73.526 28,952 4.860 
Beverley Rd. 503 14 h. I m. 0 s. 107,585 36,158 3.572 
Hessle Rd. 1,016 34 h. 59 m. 30 s. 32,559 588 ----- 
Holderness Rd. 304 8 h. 23 m. 45 s. 170,566 32.500 4.32 3 
Source: CItN Archi ves, Hull, TLP 283. 
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APPENDIX 4. 
CENSUS OF TRAFFIC ON HEDON ROAD ON 17 th, 19th & 20'h APRIL 1909. 
6 a. m. to 7 p. m. 17 th April (Saturday). 
Total 
Foot Passengers Inward 60 
Outward 95 155 
Cyclists Inward 150 
Outward 244 394 
Passenger vehicles Inward 14 
Outward 18 32 
Carts and Rullies Inward 90 
Outward 93 183 
6 a. m. to 7 p. m. 19th April (Monday). 
Foot Passengers Inward 60 
Outward 50 110 
Cyclists Inward 151 
Outward 137 288 
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Total 
Passenger vehicles Inward 5 
Outward 9 14 
Carts and Rullies Inward 99 
Outward 110 209 
Beasts, 4: Sheep, 150. 
6 a. m. to 7 p. m. 20 th April (Tuesday). 
Total 
Foot Passengers Inward 59 
Outward 74 133 
Cyclists Inward 70 
Outward 74 144 
Passenger vehicles Inward 3 
Outward 47 
Carts and Rullies Inward 128 
Outward 132 260 
Beasts, 68; Sheep, 120. 
Source: Cit\ Archkes. Hull. TLP 283. 
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APPENDIX 5. 
PETITION OF THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF 
KINGSTON UPON HULL AGAINST THE AMALGAMATION OF THE RBR 
AND NER, 1921. 
1. The HBR was promoted in 1880, with the avowed object of breaking down the 
monopoly in Hull of the NER. 
2. The Hull Corporation was actively associated with the promotion and 
(a) invested f 100.000 in ordinary shares, which statute forbids their parting ý, N-ith; 
(b) sold the promoters the land for their dock on easy terms, 
(c) were given by statute a right of veto upon any infringement of the 
independence of the HBR-, 
(d) have the right to and do appoint two directors on the HBR Board. 
3. The railway was opened in 1885, and since that time there have been numerous 
attempts to unite in greater or less degree the HBR with the NER. The Hull 
Corporation have on every occasion successfully resisted these attempts at the 
cost of both money and effort. 
4. The right of veto was repeated in an Act of 1893, under which the NER acquired 
the Hull Docks (other than the HBR dock), and inI 899 when the NER and HBR 
were by statute authorised to construct jointly a new dock. 
5. The veto of the Corporation was subject to an appeal to the Railway and Canal 
Commissioners or the Board of Trade. No party has ever ventured to make such 
appeal. 
6. The present Bill still leaves the other large ports heretofore enjoying railway 
competition. (e. g.. Liverpool. Manchester and Bristol). 
7. The Bill entirely deprives Hull of any railway or dock competition and utterly 
ignores the rights granted to the Corporation by Parliament, so hardly fought for 
and so consistently and strenuously sustained. 
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8. The Bill is grossly unfair to Hull therefore. If "grouping" must take place the onlý, 
fair course is to group the HBR with the Midland Group (Group 3), and thus 1CaN, e 
Hull with competition, as in the case of Liverpool. Manchester &c. 
9. This would only be fair, quite apart from the unique position of the Hull 
Corporation relatively to the railway position in the city. The existence of their 
statutory rights outlined in brief above brings into stronger relief the soundness of 
their claim that the Bill as it stands is unjust and should not receive the support of 
Parliament. 
I O. The HBR is physically joined to the MR at Cudworth and the Corporation deny 
that the indebtedness of the HBR to the NER in connection with the jointly-owned 
King George Dock is any insuperable or serious barrier in the way of the 
alternative grouping suggested. The money was borrowed by the HBR from the 
NER upon terms which another group could readily take over with the 
"partnership" in the dock. 
I I. The Minister of Transport must admit that the case of the Hull Corporation is 
unique and indeed a strong one, but the Bill discloses no attempt to acknowledge 
this and the port is relegated to the mercies of an even more complete monopoly 
than in 1880, when at least the docks were in the hands of a separate company. 
12. Every section of the trading and corporate community in Hull is bitterly opposed 
to the proposals of the Bill as to the HBR. 
Source: City Archives, Hull, Corporation Parliamentary Committee minutes, I Oh June 1921. 
APPENDIX 6. 
DIRECTORS AND GENERAL MANAGERS OF THE HULL AND 
BARNSLEY RAILWAY COMPANY. 
Directors 
Anstruther Henry Torrens 1908-192" 
Bailey Walter Samuel 
Beaumont Lord 
Briggs Henry 
Brooshooft E. 
Cope John Alexander 
Dent Villiers Francis 
Fisher John 
1895-1910 
1881-1890 
1880-1895 
1880-1881 
1884-1892 
1889-1909 
1880-1900 
Fisher John Henry 1910- 1922 
Forbes James Staats 1884- 1904 
Garnett Thomas 1901-1916 
Hamilton Lord 1919- 1922 
Hargreaves John Henry (C) 1916- 1922 
Head John Francis 1880- 1883 
Joshua Samuel 1884- 1886 
Keighley Edward Ernest (C) 1918- 1922 
Larard Frederick (C) 1909- 1918 
Leak John (C) 1880- 1895 
Leetham Edward 1880- 1889 
Lucas Arthur Charles 1892- 1915 
D/ChairI880-1888 & 1889-1895. 
Chair 1895-1900. 
D/Chair 1914-19-1-2. 
D/Chair 1889. 
__ I 
Massey Watson Arton 1881-1888 
Massey Watson Arton (C) 1895 -1909 
Micks Robert Henry 1914 -1922 
Newbald Charles James 1880 -1881 
Plunket Lord 1915 -1919 
Poston Charles 1896 -1913 D/Chair 1907-1913. 
Rayment William 1880 -1888 
Rollit Albert (C) 1906 -1916 
Smith Gerard 1880- 1895 Chair 1880-1895. 
Smith Gerard Hamilton 1913- 1922 
Stephenson Lawrence 1880- 1884 
Stuart James 1880- 1888 D/Chair Feb - July 1889. 
Swarbrick Samuel 1883- 1890 
Trotter CharlesWilliarn 1908- 1922 D/Chair1913-1914 Chair 1919-1922. 
Trotter William 1887 -1907 D/Chair 1895-1900. Chair 1900-1907. 
Walker George Blake 1896- 1922 
Watkin Edward 1921- 1922 
Witty Thomas (C) 1880- 1895 
Woodhouse James (C) 1895- 1906 
Wright William Shaw 1896- 1914 D/Chair 1900-1907. Chair 1907-1913. 
(C) Indicates a director appointed by Hull Corporation. 
General Managers 
Hill Vincent 1884-1900 
Wood Walter 1900- 1905 
Watkin Edward 1905-1922 Appointed Director in 1921. 
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APPENDIX 7. 
PROPOSED RAILWAYS CONNECTED WITH OR AFFECTING HULL. 
1824 Leeds & Hull. 
1825 London Norlhern. 
1840 Hull - Selby. 
1844 Hull & Gainsborough. 
1845 Hull & Barnsley Junction. 
1845 Hull, Sheffield and Midland Direct. 
1846 Hull - Bridlington. 
1846 Hull and Lincoln Direct. 
1846 Arram - Hornsea. 
1847 Brough - Market Weighton. 
1853 Victoria Dock. 
1854 Hull & Holderness. 
1855 Hull, Goole & Doncaster. 
1856 Hull, Brough and Market Weighton. 
1860,5taddlethorpe - Thorne. 
1861 Beverley - Hornsea. 
1861 Hedon - Aldbrough. 
1861 Staddlethorpe - Thorne - Askern. 
1861 Hull& West Riding Junction. 
1861 Hull - Thorne (SYR). 
1861 Askern - Raivc/iftý, - Broon? fleet (LYR). 
1864 Hull-Hornsea. 
1865 Hull, Lancashire &- Ifidland Counties. 
1865 Hull, [Fest Yorkshire & Lancashire. 
1869 Hull - Doncaster. 
1872 HullSouth & West Junction. 
1873 Hull, Victoria Dock - Kirkella. 
1879 Hull, Huddersfield & Wesl Riding. 
1879 Church Fenton, Cawood and Wistow. 
1882 Eusi & West Yorkshire Union. 
18 83 Selby and Mid-Yorkshire Union. 
1883 Hull & Lincoln. 
1883 Scarborough & West Riding. 
1885 Hull, Barnsley & West Riding Junction Railway & Dock. 
1887 Hull & North Western Junction. 
1893 Scarborough, Bridlington and West Riding Junction Railway. 
1894 South Yorkshire Junction. 
1902 Hull & South Yorkshire Extension. 
1902 Railways w Dinnington and Thurnscoe. 
1908 Hull & Nottingham Railway. 
1909 Railways at Dinnington and Thurnscoe (HBR, GCR & MR). 
1909 South Yorkshire Joint (NER, GNR, GCR, LYR & MR). 
1910 Hull & Lincoln Railwqy. 
1913 Hull, Lincoln & Nottingham Railway. 
1914 HullJoint Dock. 
1916 Aire Junction - Braithwell (HBR & GCR). 
Notes: 
1). Lines shown in Italics were not constructed and the date shown is that of the 
proposal. 
2). Lines constructed are shown in bold type on the date of their opening. 
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APPENDIX 8. 
AREA OF HULL DOCKS 1921. 
Name Area 
Acres Roods Poles (Hectares) 
Queens 9 3 29 '), .73 
Queens Tidal Basin 0 1 0.15 
Humber 7 0 24 2.83 
Humber Extension 2 1 19 0.93 
Princes 6 0 5 2.42 
Railway 2 3 9 1.12 
Victoria 20 0 4 8.10 
Victoria Humber Half Tide Basin 3 0 0 1.23 
Victoria Tidal Basin 2 3 7 1.13 
Drypool Half Tide Basin 1 0 8 0.43 
Drypool Tidal Basin 0 1 0.12 
Albert 24 2 28 9.87 
Albert Tidal Basin 1 3 37 0.73 
Albert Channel 0 3 4 0.32 
William Wright 5 3 37 2.36 
St. Andrews Dock 10 2 10 4.29 
St. Andrews Dock Extension 8 3 11 3.56 
St. Andrews Tidal Basin 0 1 0 0.21 
No. I Timber Pond 14 0 4 5.67 
No. 2 Timber Pond II 1 1 4.5 8 
17 
Acres Roods Poles (Hectares) 
No. 2 Timber Pond Extension 
Alexandra Dock 
Alexandra Dock Extension 
King George Dock 
14 20 5.90 
46 20 18.80 
7 00 2.85 
53 00 21.41 
Total 255 2 31 102.74 
Sources: City Archives, Hull, TLP 264, Plan of Hull Dock Company Estate 1891. 
Central Library, Hull. Chamber of Commerce Annual Report, 1921. 
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GLOSSARY. 
The following abbreviations are used: 
ACN Aire and Calder Navigation. 
DVR Deame Valley Railway. 
GCR Great Central Railway. 
GER Great Eastern Railway. 
GGSJR Great Grimsby and Sheffield Junction Railway. 
GN&GER Great Northern and Great Eastern Joint Railway. 
GNR Great Northern Railway. 
HBR Hull, Barnsley and West Riding Junction Railway and Dock 
Company. [In 1905 the name of the company was changed to the Hull 
and Barnsley Railway Companyj' 
HSR Hull and Selby Railway. 
HSYER Hull and South Yorkshire Extension Railway. 
LNWR London and North Western Railway. 
LSR Leeds and Selby Railway. 
LYR Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway. 
MLR Manchester and Leeds Railway. 
MR Midland Railway. 
MSLR Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway. 
RML Rotherham, Maltby and Laughton Railway. 
SDLUR South Durham and Lancashire Union Railway. 
SDR Stockton and Darlington Railway. 
SYJR South Yorkshire Junction Railway. 
SYR South Yorkshire Joint Railway. 
SYR South Yorkshire Railway. 
YNMR York and North Midland Railxvay. 
1 Citý Archives, Hull, TLP 26ý. Hull and Bamsle% RailwaN Act, 1905. 
119 1 
On I" August 1897 the name of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Rail'wav 
was changed to the Great Central Railway. 
Kingston upon Hull became a city in 1897. 
320 
FIGURES. 
1. Charles Henry Wilson. 
2. Arthur Wilson. 
3. Gerard Smith. 
4. Watson Arton Massey. 
5. James Staats Forbes. 
6. Frederick Brent Grotrian. 
7. Edward Philip Maxsted. 
8. Albert Kaye Rollit. 
9. Yorkshire and Humberside. 
10. Railways in North & East Yorkshire & County Durham. 
11. The NER in Yorkshire - 1921. 
12. The HBR - 192 1. 
13. The HBR in East Yorkshire - 192 1. 
14. The HBR in West Yorkshire - 192 1. 
15. NER Railways in Hull - 192 1. 
16. Proposed Hull South & West Junction Railway - 1872. 
17. Proposed Hull & Barnsley and connecting railways. 
18. Proposed Hull & Bamsley Railway - 1880. 
19. Proposed connection between NER and HBR at Sculcoates. 
20. The Yorkshire and East Midlands coalfield. 
') 1. Yorkshire collieries - c. 1960. 
22. The Railývays of South Yorkshire. 
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23. The South Yorkshire Joint Railway and connecting branches. 
24. The HBR and associated branches, Wrangbrook - Wath. 
25. Branches around Doncaster. 
26. Hull Town Docks. 
27. Victoria Dock and The Old Harbour. 
28. Albert & William Wright Docks. 
29. St. Andrew's Dock. 
30. Alexandra Dock. 
3 1. Hull Joint Dock. 
32. Alexandra Dock and King George Dock. 
33. Coal exports from Hull, 1875-1913. 
34. Hull docks tonnage, 1848-1912. 
35. HBR expenses as a percentage of revenue, 1875-1921. 
36. NER expenses as a percentage of revenue, 1854-1921. 
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Fig. 3. Gerard Smith. 
(Central Library, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 4. Watson Arton Massey. 
(Central Library, Hull. ) 
Fig. 2. Arthur Wilson. 
(Central Library, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 1. Charles Henry Wilson. 
(Central Library, Hull. ) 
Fig. 5. James Staats Forbes. 
(National Portrait Gallery. ) 
Fig. 7. Edward Philip Maxsted. 
(Central Library, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 6. Frederick Brent Grotrian. 
(Central Library, Hull. ) 
Fig. 8. Albert Kaye Rollit. 
(Central Library, Hull. ) 
324 
Cr 
'Irl o 
co 
z 
n < 
< uj 
. 4k 
M 41 i 
Z7 
ui 
Ly- 
Fig. 9. Yorkshire and Humberside. 
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Fig. 10. Railways in North and East Yorkshire and County Durham. 
(K. Hoole, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, Vol. 4, The North East. ) 
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Fig. 11. The North Eastern Railway in Yorkshire - 192 1. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 12. The Hull & Barnsley Railway - 1921. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 13. The Hull & Barnsley Railway in East Yorkshire - 1921. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 14. The Hull & Barnsley Railway and associated railways in West Yorkshire - 1921. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 15. NER Railways in Hull. 
(R. A. Cook & K. Hoole, North Eastern Railway Historical Maps. ) 
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Fig. 16. Proposed Hull South & West Junction Railway - 1872. 
(S. Ellis & D. R. Crowther, Humber Perspectives, p. 411. ) 
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Fig. 17. Proposed Hull & Barnsley Railway and connecting Railways. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 18. Proposed Hull & Barnsley Railway in Hull. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 19. Proposed connection between NER and HBR at Sculcoates. 
(City Archives. Hull. ) 
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Fig. 20. The Yorkshire and East Midlands Coalfield. 
(B. J. Elliott, The South Yorkshire Joint Railway and the Coaffleld, p. 8. ) 
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Fig. 21. Yorkshire Collieries - c. 1960. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 22. The Railways of South Yorkshire. 
(K. Hoole, (ed. ), The Hull & Barnsley Railway, Vol. 1, p. 165. ) 
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Fig. 23. The South Yorkshire Joint Railway and Connecting Branches. 
(D. Joy, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, Vol. 8, p. 23 2. ) 
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Fig. 24. The Hull & Barnsley Railway and Associated Branches, Wrangbrook - Wath. 
(D. Joy, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, Vol. 8, p. 224. ) 
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Fig. 25. Branches around Doncaster. 
(D. Joy, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, 
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Fig. 26. Town Docks, Hull, in 1883. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 27. Victoria Dock and the Old Harbour Hull. 
(City Archives. Hull. ) 
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Fig. 28. Albert & William Wright Dock in 1893. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 29. St. Andrew's Dock in 1883. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 30. Alexandra Dock in 1894. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 31. Hull Joint Dock in 1914. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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Fig. 32. Alexandra Dock & King George Dock in 1921. 
(City Archives, Hull. ) 
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